Trump’s First Month

In the first 30 days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump and his associates have been engaged in what some have described as a slow-moving political coup.  

The incoming president has undertaken what amounts to a full-scale attack on institutional checks and balances and on civil and political rights. He has launched sharp policy reversals in critical areas of public health, social services, and environmental protection. And in foreign policy, he has upended decades-old political and military alignments intended to defend against potential aggression by autocratic rivals such as Russia and China.   

Elsewhere in the world, similar actions have led to the emergence of what political scientists have called “competitive authoritarian regimes,” ones in which democratic institutions become facades that disguise the reality of autocratic control. 

Although it is far too soon to say how Trump’s onslaught will end, it is very important to highlight the major differences between his current threats to democracy and those posed during his first term.   

Trump 1.0 attacked deeply held norms of political discourse and practice, intensifying the social polarisation that had carried him to victory. But U.S. political and constitutional institutions remained more or less intact. Challenges to the democratic system—including on January 6—were contained by congressional opposition, by the courts, by the press, and by civil society. Even—or perhaps especially—resistance from within the Republican party itself also provided an important check on Trump’s abuses of power.

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The threat that Trump currently poses to U.S. democracy is far more profound, because it targets legal and constitutional institutions as well as norms. The Congress—currently under the control of now fully loyal Republican majorities—has failed to push back against attacks on independent agencies, the dismissal of Inspectors General, and efforts to weaken or eliminate congressionally mandated government agencies through mass firings and the freezing of funds, beginning with the virtual dismantling of USAID. 

A supine Senate has acquiesced to the high-level political appointments of people once considered far outside the mainstream, and it is sitting quietly by while Elon Musk wields extraordinary power to “reform” the state bureaucracy.  

Lower courts have moved to block some of these initiatives, but it remains to be seen whether their rulings will be backed by the highly conservative Supreme Court, or even whether Trump will abide by them if they are. Meanwhile, the press, popular movements, and big business—all important checks during the first Trump term—appear dazed, confused, and intimidated this time around.    

So far, the speed and volume of Trump’s actions has kept both supporters and opponents off-balance. Although some of his initiatives are transparently illegal, he has also exploited many gray areas of the law; and, as in other backsliding democracies, this makes it difficult for opponents to coalesce against such challenges. 

Worse still, the damage done by some of Trump’s (and Musk’s) early initiatives—particularly to government agencies responsible for health, environment, education, foreign assistance, and other critical functions—may already be irreversible. The toll can be measured in lost expertise, interruption of crucial research, suspension of vital services, and increasing threats to national security.    

To understand the magnitude of the threats we currently face in the United States, it is useful to place them in a comparative perspective. In a previous analysis of 16 cases of “democratic backsliding,” Stephan Haggard and I distinguished between countries where would-be autocrats succeeded in consolidating authoritarian control over the system (“competitive authoritarian regimes”), and those in which they did not. 

In both Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro and the United States under Trump 1.0, opposition groups retained critical institutional leverage in the courts, the legislature, and the states, and they were able to successfully contain autocratic initiatives.   

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Conversely, in countries such as Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela, elected autocrats headed political movements that gained control of these constitutional institutions, and this control, in turn, provided a cover of legitimacy which allowed them to disempower the opposition and undermine their democratic systems.  

Much more than Trump 1.0, the current incarnation of the Trump presidency bears a substantial resemblance to the democracies that devolved into competitive authoritarianism. Like other backsliders we have analysed, our Congress has enabled, rather than constrained, Trump’s attempts to expand his authority. The independence of the Supreme Court remains in doubt. And much of the opposition is divided and demoralised.     

We have not yet crossed the autocratic threshold, however. Trump’s bid to consolidate power continues to face important challenges that can become increasingly consequential over time. First, while constitutional institutions have been weakened, they remain alive. As noted above, lower courts have so far continued to provide important avenues for efforts to block or at least slow Trump’s destructive initiatives. 

Moreover, it is far from impossible for the opposition party to regain its footing. At the national level, to be sure, the Democrats have very little leverage, but their continued control of many state and city governments offers platforms for significant opposition. 

Civil society organisations are also likely to find their voices as the initial shock of the Trump presidency diminishes. And despite the pressure that it is under, the media remains a far more robust forum of opposition and criticism than its counterparts in countries that have yielded to authoritarian takeovers.

As I have written elsewhere, there are also internal fissures within the Trump coalition that are likely to widen as the initial honeymoon fades. The corporate sector—especially the technology giants—have rushed to curry favour with the new administration, in the hope of benefitting from lower taxes and deregulation.But big business is also severely threatened by the disruption of supply chains, high tariffs on imports, attacks on the immigrant labour force, and geopolitical instability. For example, the automotive sector, which is a major employer in the upper Midwest and in a number of red states, faces major challenges from tariffs on steel and restrictions on the imports of parts and materials.  

Finally, Trump will face defections from his own voters as his trade and immigration policies begin to undermine their aspirations for stable prices and secure employment. And discontent will grow if the administration fails to fend off new public health crises or if it proves unable to manage international conflicts in Ukraine, the Middle East, and Asia.   

To be sure, despite these problems, the MAGA base (about 30%of the electorate) is very likely to remain loyal; and in the current media environment, many other Trump voters might be confused about who is accountable for the difficulties they are experiencing.   

But in contrast to elected autocrats such as Orban or Erdogan, Trump’s electoral support has been weak to begin with—less than 50% in the 2024 elections—and approval rates are already beginning to fall. In our polarised society, we cannot expect Trump’s electoral support to collapse entirely, but the defection of at least some of his voters is likely to provide some wind at the back of the Democratic opposition and to weaken the loyalty of some Republican political leaders.      

The launch of Trump 2.0 has been extremely frightening, and as noted, some of the damage it has already inflicted on the state’s capacity to provide public services and international security will be extremely difficult—or even impossible—to repair.  

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Even if Trump’s initiatives are eventually blocked, moreover, the long-term health of our democratic system will remain precarious in the absence of new and innovative approaches to our long-standing social and political problems. 

But whether or not such approaches succeed, preventing a descent into authoritarianism would be no small achievement. At the very least, it would leave the road open for the construction of a fairer and more robust democratic system after Trump leaves the scene.  

Robert R. Kaufman is an Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University.  He is co-author of Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press, 2021.

This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from the original with their permission.