The post World War II <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/west-is-west">decade of the 1950s</a> saw the dismantling of colonial systems, establishment of a new world order with the United States replacing Britain. <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">India and Pakistan</a> had just gained independence and were still traumatised by partition.&nbsp; In China, Mao Zedong came to power after 20 years of revolution, and promptly annexed Tibet. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/a-new-cold-war-in-the-himalaya">Cold War</a> between the US and the Sino-Soviet alliance led to proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam. In Nepal itself, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/inside-story-of-nepal-s-rana-dynasty">the Ranas</a> were replaced by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/history-on-canvas">the Shahs</a> in 1951, and ten years later <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/last-days-with-bp-koirala">BP Koirala</a> became the first democratically elected prime minister — soon deposed in a coup by King Mahendra. Nepal opened up to the world and tried to keep a delicate balance between global and regional powers. The book, Nepal in the Long 1950s, explores politics, economics and the socio-culture milieu in the decade following the end of the Rana rule. Edited by researchers Pratyoush Onta, Lokranjan Parajuli and anthropologist Mark Liechty, the book is a collection of 10 essays, the first six of which place <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">Nepal in the larger geopolitical context</a>, while the last four explore the role of foreign specialists and institutions in reshaping Nepal. Prawash Gautam examines how the last years of <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/the-rana-reign-a-recap-of-history,3751">Rana rule</a> were marked by looser controls, enabling the emergence of the public sphere. One tea shop near Dharara became a space for socialisation, discourse, as well as political organisation.&nbsp; However, while this teashop was unique in that it allowed customers from ‘lower’ caste communities, Gautam says <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-caste-struggle">caste-based discrimination</a> and limited access to women still prevented public spaces from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/everybody-counts-in-nepal">being inclusive</a>. Bandana Gyawali writes about how the Nepali notion of unnati (progress), was replaced by the concept bikas (development), a ‘more democratic’ term championed by the American aid programs that associated development with material gain which at the time meant little to Nepalis.&nbsp; Peter Gill’s chapter discusses efforts to legislate and implement socio-economic reform, including birta abolition, tenancy rights, and land distribution. However, he writes, these reforms were ultimately a populist tool used by new leaders for political gain. Sharad Ghimire delves into the state’s disaster response in the aftermath of<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/60-years-after-1954-devastating-flood-same-failings-of-government-today-post-quake,2433"> the deadly 1954 floods</a>. Political incompetence and attempts to politicise the crisis led to the failure of relief led by Prime Minister M P Koirala, ultimately deepening rifts between himself and leaders of the ruling coalition — giving King Mahendra the chance to assert himself.&nbsp; Meanwhile, the US answered Nepal’s call for help in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/disastrous-management-in-nepal">disaster management</a> to curb possible Communist influence in Nepal, much to India’s annoyance. Pratyoush Onta examines how <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/kingdom-lost-republic-gained">post-Rana politics</a> encouraged Nepalis to realise their intellectual freedom and pursue knowledge creation and distribution. The formation of the short-lived Nepal Sanskritik Foundation, set up by political leaders, scholars, and intellectuals like Bal Chandra Sharma and Isvar Baral who had witnessed and participated in India’s anti-colonial movements, facilitated social research and knowledge enterprise. Two chapters discuss the development of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/lessons-not-learnt-homework-not-done">Nepal’s education sector</a>. Lokranjan Parajuli looks into how domestic and foreign actors impacted the founding of Tribhuvan University, documenting the role of queen consorts Janti Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah and Queen Ishwari Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah, even as Mahendra remained wary lest it produce intellectuals who would undermine his authority. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/america-nepal-and-the-royal-coup">America, Nepal and the Royal Coup</a>, Tom Robertson India and the US were vying to help TU, writes Parajuli, but China and USSR arrived to also support higher education sector with less strings attached. This led to US and India joining forces, and the US eventually let India take the lead. Susan Heydon’s research into <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/is-free-health-care-possible-in-nepal">Nepal’s healthcare</a> sector reveals that development in biomedicine was in large part due to assistance from Christian missionaries, despite Nepalis’ wariness towards them, visiting foreign <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/grass-is-greener-overseas-for-nepals-doctors">healthcare experts</a>, as well as <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/e75-million-eu-aid-to-nepal-for-covid-19-ckmyfbkq">international aid</a>.&nbsp; As <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal">USAID fund cuts impact Nepal</a>, Jeremy Rappleye’s chapter on the US development assistance and Nepal’s modern education system is relevant read. He recalls how American educator Hugh Wood’s aid-centered blueprint for educational development in the 1950s was incongruous with what Nepali officials wanted. Wood’s model laid the groundwork for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/teaching-nepali-teachers-to-teach-better?fbclid=IwY2xjawIfg2JleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHRlYZ7S9dci12M2TMdHcirodLAD3e5OHzlfKW0z07B4plWF8Ofxo88JPfQ_aem_Ka7WIxuhTW0ghPf2qD-Yzg">Nepal’s modern education</a>, writes Rappleye, although it was not entirely appropriate. Former USEF Nepal director Thomas Robertson takes on the US ‘Four Point Program’ aimed at making Nepal reliant on American support. With the region in the grip of the Cold War, the US sought to expand its sphere of influence in Asia, in particular to stop India from going the way of China. Nepal therefore became strategically important to America’s aspirations for the region, writes Robertson. This meant Washington poured aid and into Nepal, including anti-malaria programs and land reform initiatives — in stark contrast to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-great-game-2nd-half">Donald Trump’s current pullout of USAID, MCC and other programs</a>. Mark Liechty ends the book with his exploration of the life and times of Boris Lisanevich and his Hotel Royal which ushered Nepal into the age of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/missing-out-on-nepal-s-tourism-potential">tourism</a>. But Boris was not particularly well versed in the art of hospitality, and while Nepalis in this burgeoning sector realised the opportunities and went about realising those potentials Lisanevich continued to dwell in his anachronistic <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-britain-mark-centenary-of-1923-treaty">colonial fantasy</a> of Nepal, not doing himself any favours.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250220080248_ac072d9d13e541b5d8616f34edb4aae86a8859c6fe44682932408722fa9bff37.jpg" data-media-id="editor_23" data-image-id="20250220080248_ac072d9d13e541b5d8616f34edb4aae86a8859c6fe44682932408722fa9bff37" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal in the long 1950s"> </figure>

Shristi Karki

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Nepal in the world, the world in Nepal

In December, the Nepal government announced it would not allow a Beijing-appointed Tibetan spiritual leader, the Panchen Lama, to attend a Buddhist conference in Kathmandu. Immigration at the airport was put on high alert to ensure he did not try to sneak in.&nbsp; Coming soon after Prime Minister K P Oli’s visit to China, that decision underscored Nepal’s precarious tight-rope act in addressing religio-political sensitivities in its relations with China. The Panchen Lama episode can be seen as a test for Nepal’s handling of the succession of the Dalai Lama, who turns 90 in July. “When the time comes to find a successor to the Dalai Lama, Nepal will face a larger policy dilemma,” predicts Sudheer Sharma, author of two recent books on Nepal-China relations. “The government is still unclear what it will do if the successor is chosen from the Tibetan community in Nepal, or from China or India.” <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/dalai-lama-gets-block-of-glacial-ice">The Dalai Lama</a> is the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism and a symbol of Tibetan identity; he is revered as the manifestation of Avalokitesvara, the Bodhisattva of Compassion. He was born in 1935 in northeastern Tibet and was formally recognised as the Dalai Lama in 1940.&nbsp; He has been living in exile in Dharamsala for the past 65 years after fleeing Lhasa following the Chinese takeover. He has been allowed to make a low-profile visit to Lumbini only once in 1987, and never after that due to objections from China.&nbsp; Nepal does not have a national strategy to handle the presence of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-sherpas-mourn-tengboche-abbott">religious leaders</a>. If there are policies, they are ad-hoc or undeclared, depending on the government of the day in Kathmandu. The Nepal government, under Chinese pressure, even prevents public celebrations marking the Dalai Lama’s birthday on 6 July. “The Dalai Lama’s attempts to visit Nepal again have been stopped &nbsp;since Nepal thinks he is not only a religious leader, but a political figure as well,” says Sharma. “There is no discussion in Nepal’s political circles regarding the succession of the Dalai Lama. The topic is regarded as a non-issue.”&nbsp; Over the years, the Dalai Lama has made various statements regarding his succession. At times, he has suggested that he will write a will to select a successor from within the Tibetan community. On other occasions, he has hinted that the next Dalai Lama could be chosen from a “free country”, and could even be a woman.&nbsp; The Panchen Lama succession in 1995 could provide a hint about how the post-Dalai Lama era will play out. The Panchen Lama is the second most important spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism, and heads the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18580">Tashilhunpo Monastery in Xigatse</a>, the epicentre of the 7 January earthquake, located 250km away from Lhasa.&nbsp; The Panchen Lama traditionally has the role of finding the next Dalai Lama, but the previous Panchen Lama (Lobsang Trinley Lhundrup Choekyi Gyaltsen) has been missing since 1995, after the Chinese installed their own candidate (Gyaltsen Norbu). The present Panchen Lama’s visits are carefully planned, and he has made only one foreign visit so far, to Thailand. “Nepal did not permit Panchen Lama’s visit as he is Chinese Communist Party-appointed, thus making him a political figure,” says Amish Mulmi, author of the book All Roads Lead North.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250124090148_3bb3d803c04c34657d0ac9759ca904073f75734a446506f8a57e50178b381c00.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20250124090148_3bb3d803c04c34657d0ac9759ca904073f75734a446506f8a57e50178b381c00" data-rendition-name="original" width="1087" height="697" loading="lazy" alt="Dalai Lama NT"> </figure>  What China was trying to do through the Panchen Lama’s visit for the Nanhai Conference in Kathmandu last month was to project its soft power, and perhaps prepare the ground for the Dalai Lama succession. But the ban raised the question of what Nepal will do if there is a visit by Hindutva figures from India at events in Nepal.&nbsp; Religious leaders and figures from various faiths regularly visit Nepal for devotional events, meetings and conferences. Their trips are often significant for promoting dialogue and cultural exchange, and cannot be banned under the Constitution. “We did the Nanhai Conference, and in future religious leaders will definitely visit Nepal. The question arises whether or not to allow them to engage in political activities or not,” says Mulmi. “Religion has always been political. So Nepal must not take easy decisions and must think it through.” Although Nepal and Tibet fought wars in the past two centuries, they share deep-rooted and ancient cultural, religious and trade ties. After the Chinese annexation of Tibet 70 years ago, Kathmandu gradually started dealing directly with Beijing.&nbsp; Today, Nepal is the only country with a consulate in Lhasa, a city from where the only direct international flight is to Kathmandu. Over the years, these ties have evolved, with shifts in trade dynamics and people-to-people interactions reflecting broader regional and global changes. Despite this, the historical bond between Nepal and Tibet remains a significant aspect of present-day bilateral relations with China, and this is why the selection of the next Dalai Lama has resonance here. “It is clear that China has been trying to adopt Tibetan Buddhism as a soft power. It is trying to co-opt Tibetan Buddhism on the lines of China’s ambitions and narratives,” explains Mulmi.&nbsp; The Dalai Lama’s <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=14733">considerable following</a> in Nepal, India, Europe and the United States is an irritant for Beijing. Recent Sino-American tensions have therefore given the spiritual ownership of Tibetan Buddhism a geopolitical dimension, and in this the Dalai Lama succession will become an important factor.&nbsp; Relations between Washington and Beijing during the second Trump term will have a bearing on this. As a buffer state between India and China, Nepal has historically tried to maintain equidistance between the two powers.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025012308014_95372c819980513e21490c3abe2aa8e712af6c89c5829e04d5f57880ad4f2a23.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="2025012308014_95372c819980513e21490c3abe2aa8e712af6c89c5829e04d5f57880ad4f2a23" data-rendition-name="original" width="2500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="What (or who) after the Dalai Lama NT"> <figcaption>THEIR HOLINESSES: The Dalai Lama, who will be 90 in July (left), and China-installed Panchen Lama (above). Traditionally, it is the Panchen Lama who has a role in finding a new Dalai Lama. Photos: TENZIN CHOEJOR (left) / CHINAN NEWS SERVICE (right)</figcaption> </figure>  But China has rarely stuck its neck out for Nepal. Despite repeated requests for military help during its war with the British East India Company in 1814-16, the emperor in Beijing refused.&nbsp; Explains Sudheer Sharma: “China did not want to get involved with the British. They thought of their own national interests then, and they are thinking of their own national interests now with India.” During the Khampa Uprising in the 1960s, Kathmandu was also squeezed between American support for the guerrillas and China’s objections to Nepal being used as a base. But with the Nixon-Mao rapprochement in 1972, the Americans stopped helping the Khampas. Nepal then yielded to pressure from Mao Zedong to mount a military campaign to drive them out.&nbsp; Nepal was left to manage and host Tibetan refugees, and balance that with China’s security concerns. Explains Amish Mulmi: “Nepal has pretty much done everything China has asked to do, including deporting Tibetans. China doesn’t need to be insecure, but Nepal needs to maintain a careful balance.” Today, despite Donald Trump’s chest-thumping and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trump-s-second-coming">threats of a tariff war against Beijing</a>, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping are on the same page regarding democracy and freedoms. Which may mean Washington could once more leave the Tibetans in a lurch, and this could have a direct bearing on the Dalai Lama succession sequence. The United States' shifting foreign policy has often been criticised for leaving allies and partners to fend for themselves. Trump may revive his pressure on Japan, Korea and Taiwan to pay for the US defence umbrella.&nbsp; Nepal’s stance on the Tibetan community relies on marking boundaries and offering protection. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal, China proposed that Nepal sign an extradition treaty which Nepal politely refused. “Nepal has tactfully not let the Chinese side extend a longer hand on the Tibetan issue,” says Sharma. “Possibly, we are learning our lessons from history.” The question of who will choose the successor to the Dalai Lama will be decided by geopolitics, and China’s increased stature as a global economic power.&nbsp; Beijing could insist on sticking to tradition to let its candidate for the Panchen Lama make the final decision. This would allow it to move the seat of the Dalai Lama from Dharamshala back to Lhasa. The present Dalai Lama could also appoint his own candidate, but that person will not be allowed into Tibet by China. In that case, we may have a situation where there are two Dalai Lamas.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250127030140_c9048725407641601bc68568db19e48197154cd6396f39d67ab113d94c26e675.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250127030140_c9048725407641601bc68568db19e48197154cd6396f39d67ab113d94c26e675" data-rendition-name="original" width="1910" height="757" loading="lazy" alt="Voice for the Voiceless Dalai Lama"> <figcaption>Dalai Lama's latest book Voice for the Voiceless details his dealings with China over the last seven decades. </figcaption> </figure>

What (or who) after the Dalai Lama?

The shock wave of the return of Donald Trump to the White House, as well as the Republican control of the Senate and possibly the House, will impact not just America but people across the world.
In South Asia, it will mainly change the way Washington views and deals with China and India, and in more unpredictable ways. The impact on Nepal will be governed by how US relations with the country’s two giant neighbours develop in the next five years.
“Compared to Harris who has been focused more on multilateralism and maintaining allies, Trump is more confrontational and unilateral,” says National Assembly member and former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Paudyel. “There is fear that Trump’s policies will push the world to become even more polarised than it is now.”
India and China will both be able to fill the gap left by Trump America’s retreat from global and regional leadership. They will be able to take advantage of Trump diluting relations with or abandoning traditional allies in Europe and Asia.
Although India is in the western camp, New Delhi has wanted to call its own shots. It is using its growing economic clout to thumb its nose at the EU and the US. For example, India has got away with importing oil from Russia despite western sanctions.
Says Akhilesh Upadhyay, Senior Fellow at the Strategic Affairs Center, IIDS: “From a traditional security perspective, Nepal is bang in the middle of China and India. China and America have a great power rivalry, and it is unclear which way Indian axis will go.”
India can also benefit if Trump follows through on threats on more tariffs on Chinese imports. Even though the Biden-Harris administration has been punishing China with tariffs and other barriers, Trump has in the past been more belligerent on Beijing.
“On the one hand, India is close to US in Quad, on the other hand, it takes part in BRICS where it works with Russia and China, and the Shanghai Cooperation. It remains to be seen how the US relationship plays out with our two big neighbours,” adds Upadhyay.
Since the enemy of an enemy is a friend, Washington has regarded India as its bulwark against increased Chinese economic and military clout. But New Delhi has not always gone along with US strategic interests, and does not really like the Americans being too involved with India’s smaller neighbours.
On the downside, A Trump administration could curb the influx of Indian IT workers in US, and the easy access Nepali students have to those jobs in the US could also be scaled back.
Some experts say which party is in the White House will not affect policy South Asia, and Nepal even less. But a Trump win could mean less development assistance to Nepal, particularly in reproductive health, human rights, and social safety.
Nischal Pandey at the Centre for South Asian Studies in Kathmandu says that the few state-level visits between the US and Nepal — from King Mahendra’s address to the joint session of US Congress during President Eisenhower tenure in 1960 to Ganesh Man Singh being received at the White House by President Bush Sr after 1990, to US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit in 2002 during George HW Bush’s term — have all been during Republican administrations.
He adds, “Historically, Republican presidents and administrations have been &nbsp;interested in Nepal than Democratic ones.”
More directly, Nepalis aspiring to migrate to the United States could find it more difficult. There are currently about 300 Nepalis waiting in Mexico for human traffickers to smuggle them into the United States, and that border is going to be tightened even more.
Earlier this year, Sao Paolo airport in Brazil had 150 Nepalis stranded after arriving to take the Darien Gap backdoor to the US. Another 200 headed out to Brazil were stuck at Addis Ababa airport, forcing Ethiopia to ban visas to Nepalis.&nbsp;
Trump has threatened a 20% tariff on Mexican imports if it does not stop migrants. He plans to deport 11 million undocumented people, he may not be able to carry it through but the threat is there for Nepalis in the US without papers.
Trump’s strong rhetoric on China could be bargaining brinkmanship, and it will be interesting to see how he balances this with Sino-Russian alignment. Biden did not roll back bans on Huawei and restrictions on TikTok, and US security concerns about China’s rise is a bipartisan issue, just as Gaza is. Harris would not have done things differently in those sectors.&nbsp;
Says MP Bimala Rai Paudyal: “Trump’s win could cause economic tensions with China, which will affect trade here as well, this is something we will need to prepare for.”
America’s moral authority to lecture countires like Nepal on transitional justice, human rights, democracy, and press freedom will be diminished during the second Trump term.&nbsp;
Reproductive rights, support for family planning projects in Nepal through the UN system may also fall like it did during his earlier presidency. Foreign aid through USAID could also be cut.
But perhaps the more indirect impact on Nepal of the Trump presidency will be his rollback on America’s commitment to curb climate change which will accelerate melting of the Himalayan icecap with major impact on water supply downstream in Asia.&nbsp;
“America’s climate commitments and goals will be impacted by Trump who doesn’t believe in climate change,” says Paudyal. “The current work on loss and damage, and carbon trading depends significantly on US funding, and the world looks to the US to be proactive.”
If Trump can bring the Ukraine war to a close by cosying up to Putin, a peace deal may improve fuel and food situation globally. There are thousands of Nepalis in the Russian Army, at least 50 have died, and they could finally come home.&nbsp;
Concludes Upadhyay: “As for Nepal, the Trump administration should see Nepal as a soverign nation on its own right rather than through the prism of great power rivalry either between US and China.”

Trumpet Call

The current wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States has been building for years. It started in the early 2000s, when US policymakers first raised national-security concerns about Huawei.&nbsp;
China’s national technology champion, the market leader in developing new 5G telecommunications equipment, was accused of deploying digital backdoors that could enable Chinese espionage and cyber-attacks. US-led sanctions in 2019 stopped Huawei dead in its tracks.
But Huawei was just the start. The US has since spiraled into a full-blown outbreak of Sinophobia – a strong word that I don’t use lightly. Phobia is the extreme or irrational fear or dread aroused by a particular object or circumstance.
Indeed, China threats now seem to be popping up everywhere. The US government has imposed export controls to cut off China’s access to advanced semiconductors – part of its concerted effort to stymie the country’s <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/artificial-intelligence-vs-human-stupidity">artificial-intelligence</a> ambitions.&nbsp;
The Department of Justice has just indicted a state-sponsored Chinese hacking group for allegedly taking aim at critical American infrastructure. Much has also been made of the purported risks of Chinese EVs, construction and dock-loading cranes and now TikTok.&nbsp;
Nor are the fears confined to technology. Several years ago, I wrote about America’s trade-deficit disorder, whereby the US government misdiagnosed a multilateral problem – a trade deficit with more than 100 countries – as a bilateral problem and punished China with tariffs.&nbsp;
Others have warned that Washington’s exaggerated claims of the Chinese military threat have, at times, bordered on hysteria as tensions mount in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Of course, all this is only half the story. China is equally guilty of its own strain of Ameriphobia – demonising the US for its accusations of Chinese economic espionage, unfair trading practices, and human-rights violations.&nbsp;
Both phobias are related to the profusion of false narratives that I address in my most recent book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Accidental-Conflict-America-China-Narratives/dp/0300259646">Accidental Conflict</a>. Notwithstanding this tit-for-tat blame game, my point now is different:&nbsp;
There is good reason to worry about an increasingly virulent strain of this phobia spinning out of control in the US. Not since the red-baiting in the 1950s, has America so vilified a foreign power.&nbsp;
Back then, a two-pronged congressional approach, led by US Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and the House Un-American Activities <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/the-destroyer-of-worlds">spearheaded an assault on alleged Communist sympathisers</a> under the guise of protecting Americans from Soviet espionage and influence.
Today, another politician from Wisconsin, Representative Mike Gallagher, has led the charge as chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party which, in an eerie parallel to the McCarthy era, has leveled a series of unsubstantiated charges against China. While Gallagher will retire from Congress in April, his legacy will live on, not just as co-sponsor of a bill that could lead to an outright <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rattled-by-criticism-nepal-bans-tiktok">ban of TikTok</a>, but also as the leader of a congressional effort that has cast a long shadow over those who support almost any form of engagement with China.
The litany of US allegations is a manifestation of unproven fears wrapped in the impenetrable cloak of national security. Yet there is no “smoking gun” in any of these cases. Instead, it is all about circumstantial evidence of an increasingly aggressive China. At work is an unmistakable bipartisan politicisation of deductive reasoning.
For example, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, a leading Democrat, <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/china-cars-national-security-threat-investigation/" target="_blank">asks us</a> to “imagine” what could happen if Chinese EVs were weaponised on American highways.&nbsp;
FBI Director Christopher Wray, a Donald Trump appointee and member of the conservative Federalist Society, warns that Chinese malware could disable critical US infrastructure “if or when China decides the time has come to strike” (emphasis added).&nbsp;
And a former US counterintelligence officer has compared sensors in Chinese-made cranes to a Trojan horse. There are many what ifs and mythical parallels, but no hard evidence on intent or verifiable action.
What is it about China that has generated this virulent US reaction? In Accidental Conflict, I stressed that the US has long been intolerant of competing ideologies and alternative systems of governance. The claim of &nbsp;American exceptionalism seemingly compels us to impose our views and values on others. That was true in the Cold War, and it is true again today.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/staying-neutral-in-a-us-china-confrontation">Staying neutral in a US-China confrontation</a>, Project Syndicate
I also argued that excessive fear of China conveniently masks many of America’s own self-inflicted problems. Bilateral trade deficits may well reflect the unfair trading practices of individual countries – China today, Japan 35 years ago – but broad multilateral trade deficits stem more from chronic US budget deficits that lead to a deficiency of domestic savings.&nbsp;
Similarly, the technology threat is not only an outgrowth of the alleged Chinese theft of US intellectual property, it also represents, as I stressed in Accidental Conflict, America’s underinvestment in research and development and shortfalls in STEM-based higher education. Rather than taking a long, hard look in the mirror, it is politically expedient for US politicians to blame China.
As Sinophobia feeds on itself, fear starts to take on the aura of fact, and the dangers of accidental conflict with China intensify. By acting on these anxieties, America risks inciting the very outcome it wants to deter. Fears over Chinese aggression &nbsp;in Taiwan are a case in point.
The US can and must do better. Rather than excusing the excesses of Sinophobia as justifiable reactions to the China threat, US leaders need to avoid the low road and think more in terms of being the adult in the room. Global leadership requires nothing less.
In his first inaugural address in 1933, US President Franklin Roosevelt underscored the ultimate risk of this dangerous pathology with the memorable line, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”&nbsp;
Amid today’s Sinophobic frenzy, that message is well worth remembering. © <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/" target="_blank">Project Syndicate</a>&nbsp;
Stephen S Roach is a faculty member at Yale University and the author of the forthcoming Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, November 2022).&nbsp;

US afflicted with full-blown Sinophobia

Nowhere is Nepal’s delicate balancing act between its giant neighbours India and China as evident as it is in this tourism capital.&nbsp; The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/pokhara-s-china-connection">Chinese have cultivated a special relationship with Pokhara</a> ever since they built the 200km Prithvi Highway connecting it to Kathmandu in 1974, right up to the inauguration of Pokhara International Airport last year. India has not been far behind: it financed the 181km Siddhartha Highway connecting Pokhara to Bhairawa in 1971, and a dam that raised the level of Phewa Lake. There are strategic reasons for India and China to eye Pokhara. Most <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/recruitment-of-nepalis-into-indian-army-paused">Gorkha soldiers in the Indian Army are sourced from these mountains</a>, and there is an Indian military pension centre here.&nbsp; For China, it is important to keep an eye on refugee centres here with thousands who fled Tibet after the Chinese annexation. Both India and China have an interest in who governs Nepal, and have followed (often meddled) with political developments in Kathmandu. A Nepali Congress-Maoist coalition that was seen by many to be India-leaning was <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/catapulting-to-singha-darbar">suddenly replaced on Monday with a Communist-led coalition</a> more amicable to China.&nbsp; However, it is Pokhara that is on the main geostrategic fault line between India and China, where the rivalry is openly played out. Pokhara’s mayor Dhana Raj Acharya is from the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist and has earned the moniker ‘Chinese mayor’ for pushing direct flights to Pokhara from Chinese cities, and activities like the Dragon Boat Festival on Phewa Lake, the China International Crosscountry Championship, and a full-scale celebration of Chinese New Year last month.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240309010324_1a033dbd507869e172cfe184d622391defeaf39a1af0a4a4e1c6b60bd5d1a675.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20240309010324_1a033dbd507869e172cfe184d622391defeaf39a1af0a4a4e1c6b60bd5d1a675" data-rendition-name="original" width="3500" height="2333" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal"> <figcaption>Pokhara Mayor Dhana Raj Acharya with Chinese Ambassador Chen Song. Photo: DHANA RAJ ACHARYA/FACEBOOK</figcaption> </figure>  The Indians have been looking at this flurry of Chinese activity with some concern, and have organised their own events.&nbsp; The first international flight at Pokhara's new airport was a Sichuan Airlines jet from Chengdu in June flying in the Dragon Boat Festival crew. India has been dragging its feet on allowing direct flights between Pokhara and Indian cities because the airport was built by the Chinese. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/pokhara-s-desperation-and-hope">Pokhara's desperation and hope</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit To make its point, the Indian Embassy organised a Yoga Day function on the same day as the inaugural Chinese flight. It was not a coincidence that both the Chinese and Indian ambassadors to Nepal were in Pokhara on the same day.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240309010324_d07a2bdaa9fdff8dd3d9e585673b83f642e3bbf03dfc45d5b7bbec0d6cfbd55d.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20240309010324_d07a2bdaa9fdff8dd3d9e585673b83f642e3bbf03dfc45d5b7bbec0d6cfbd55d" data-rendition-name="original" width="1840" height="1292" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal"> <figcaption>A Sichuan Airlines Airbus 319 was the first international flight to the new Chinese-built Pokhara airport in June last year. Photo: XINHUA. It landed on the same day that the Indian Embassy organised Yoga Day at the nearby Pokhara Stadium (below).</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240309010328_ac491e7363d9a7ee6ff46ff926bcb29b0cc08aba0687d9c6d3d4bb5afa09318e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20240309010328_ac491e7363d9a7ee6ff46ff926bcb29b0cc08aba0687d9c6d3d4bb5afa09318e" data-rendition-name="original" width="2250" height="1501" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal"> <figcaption>Photo: DHANA RAJ ACHARYA/FACEBOOK</figcaption> </figure>  &nbsp;On another recent visit to Pokhara, Indian Ambassador Naveen Srivastava made a pointed reference to the fact that Pokhara was connected to the Indian border (by the Indian built road in 1971) before it was linked to Kathmandu (by the Chinese-built road in 1974). He added that although Indian visitors liked to drive to Pokhara, they were facing difficulties because of the poor state of the Prithvi Highway.&nbsp; “I don’t know who is repairing that highway,” Ambassador Srivastava continued, referring obliquely to Chinese contractors, “but India has set a record in highway construction. Next time, also remember Indian companies.” Srivastava made no mention of India’s reluctance to allow flights to Pokhara, adding that most Indian visitors came by road anyway. Chinese Ambassador Chen Song also appeared concerned about the slow progress on the expansion of the Prithvi Highway, and drove along a part of it during a recent visit, posting drone footage of the upgrading work on social media. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/begnas-going-the-way-of-phewa">Begnas going the way of Phewa</a>, Durga Rana Magar While in Pokhara, Ambassador Song also publicly criticised the Indian policy of not importing electricity from Nepali hydropower plants built by the Chinese. And to drive that point home, two Chinese Air Force Y-20 transport aircraft landed at Pokhara airport in November with 50 tonnes of relief for Jajarkot earthquake survivors.&nbsp; New Delhi insisted that the India-Nepal Bilateral Consultative Group on Security Issues be held in Pokhara in October.&nbsp; “The great game between India and China is being played out in Nepal, and Pokhara is where it is most visible,” explains geopolitics expert Indra Adhikari.&nbsp; She adds, “India is concerned about an increase in Chinese activity around Pokhara, and competition between Nepal’s neighbours is heating up.”&nbsp; India’s main sensitivity appears to be over the fact that Kaski and neighbouring districts of central Nepal are major recruitment centres for the Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army. The Gorkha Pension Camp was opened as far back as 1955 in Pokhara, and in 1987 it established a school for the children of Gorkha soldiers in its military.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024031106034_a5c5037ae3a76c0443eca037a02d822494de1f60649e6f42466936fb3e632ddd.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="2024031106034_a5c5037ae3a76c0443eca037a02d822494de1f60649e6f42466936fb3e632ddd" data-rendition-name="original" width="900" height="551" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara geopolitics"> <figcaption>Indian Ambassador Navin Srivastav with mayor Acharya.</figcaption> </figure>  Similarly, China’s touchiness concerns the presence of British Gurkha veterans and their families living in Hong Kong, and Tibetans in four refugee camps in and around Pokhara.&nbsp; Pokhara was also the staging post for American and Indian military support for Khampa guerrillas who were fighting the Chinese Army in Tibet till they were disarmed or driven out in 1976. Explains analyst Ananda Raj Mulmi: “Beijing does not want Pokhara to once more become a base for anti-Chinese activities.” After opening the China-Nepal border at Korala in Mustang, the Chinese are keen to make Pokhara a trading hub in central Nepal.&nbsp; “The Chinese had a long term time horizon to link the Prithvi Highway to Korala, and wanted to extend the road from Pokhara to Jomsom but King Mahendra did not approve, so they just built it up to Baglung,” adds Mulmi.&nbsp; Pokhara’s sister city relations with eight Chinese cities is a source of soft power, and means there are frequent cultural exchanges. Pokhara is a household word in China because of the popular television serial Deng Feng Lai which was filmed on location here, and the main characters took a paragliding flight. <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/chinese-tourist-influx-to-nepal-in-2020-nqr538k3">Chinese visitors used to be the mainstay of Pokhara’s tourism till Covid</a>.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024031106034_ff7c3ce0f0e3b2e83849bcdf35942892b9fb7e4f110ce6032920fd3e4ccd8094.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="2024031106034_ff7c3ce0f0e3b2e83849bcdf35942892b9fb7e4f110ce6032920fd3e4ccd8094" data-rendition-name="original" width="976" height="665" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara geopolitics"> </figure>  More than a year after the inauguration of Pokhara Airport, there are no regular international flights. India may be preventing flights to its cities, but it is Nepal’s failure that it has not been able to attract airlines to connect Pokhara to Chinese destinations.&nbsp; “This is because we went ahead and built an expensive airport without factoring in geopolitical sensitivities,” says foreign policy expert Krishna KC. “We have to convince the Indians that it is also in their interest to allow flights.”&nbsp; Chinese Ambassador Song announced at Pokhara Airport’s inauguration that it was a BRI project even though it predated the concept, and this ticked India off even more. Nepal’s unclear flip-flopping over the issue aggravated both sides, diplomatic sources say.&nbsp; Even so, most people here blame India for being petty-minded about not allowing new air routes making Pokhara operations feasible, as well as permitting connections to Indian cities.&nbsp; Professor of geostrategic studies Bhim Nath Baral says it is natural for both powerful countries to be concerned that Pokhara will be used against its national interest.&nbsp; “But it is up to Nepal to deploy diplomatic skills to understand and reassure both sides,” he adds. “That can only come with a mature and self-confident foreign policy.”

Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry

China’s sharp economic slowdown has raised alarm bells around the world. But it has also thrown into relief the rise of another demographic powerhouse next door.&nbsp; The Indian economy grew at an impressive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-economic-growth-set-accelerate-its-fastest-year-2023-08-31/">7.8% annual rate</a> in the second quarter of 2023, and the country recently reached an important milestone by becoming the first to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/23/science/chandrayaan-3-india-moon-landing.html">land a spacecraft</a> on the Moon’s potentially water-rich south pole. India’s ascent, unlike China’s, has not been accompanied by an increasingly assertive foreign policy. As India’s geopolitical, economic, and cultural clout grows, so does its global footprint. China’s ‘<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/29/opinion/china-economy-decline.html">decline</a>’, as some have begun to call the conclusion of the country’s four-decade-long economic boom, opens new opportunities for the Indian economy and other developing and emerging countries. Earlier this year, India reached another milestone when its population officially <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">surpassed that of China</a>, which had been the world’s most populous country for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/19/world/asia/india-china-population.html">more than 300 years</a>. While China’s shrinking, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3207047/china-population-2022-marks-first-population-decline-60-years">rapidly aging</a> population is likely to impede economic growth and may curtail its geopolitical ambitions, India – one of the world’s <a href="https://indbiz.gov.in/one-of-the-youngest-populations-in-the-world-indias-most-valuable-asset/">youngest</a> countries, with a <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/#:~:text=The%20population%20density%20in%20India,1%2C202%20people%20per%20mi2).&amp;text=The%20median%20age%20in%20India%20is%2028.4%20years.">median age of 28.2</a> – is poised to reap a huge demographic dividend. But the driving force behind India’s emergence as a major global power is its rapid economic growth. While India’s GDP is still smaller than China’s, the country is currently the world’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2023">fastest-growing</a> major economy and is projected to account for <a href="https://t.co/SMFH21oTa0">12.9% of global growth</a> over the next five years, surpassing the United States’ 11.3% share.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231029081036_781e265ec0c9f72b3c2596697419554293b721f2c4e8c93b963d66e35f4aa3c1.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20231029081036_781e265ec0c9f72b3c2596697419554293b721f2c4e8c93b963d66e35f4aa3c1" data-rendition-name="original" width="696" height="477" loading="lazy" alt="India China graph NT"> </figure>  In addition to fueling a consumption boom, India’s youthful population is also driving innovation, as evidenced by the country’s world-class information economy and its recent moon landing, which the country managed to achieve despite a national space budget equivalent to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/india-races-russia-to-be-first-to-land-on-moons-south-pole-ad5d9d05">roughly 6%</a> of what the US spends on space missions. Having already surpassed the United Kingdom, its former colonial ruler, India’s GDP is poised to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/01/india-to-leapfrog-to-third-largest-economy-by-2030.html">overtake</a> that of Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030, behind the US and China. Given its increasingly unstable neighborhood, it should come as no surprise that India has the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time">third-largest</a> defense budget. The deepening <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Pakistan-China-and-terrorism">strategic alliance</a> between China and Pakistan underscores India’s precarious position as the only country bordering two nuclear-armed <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-becoming-chinese-client-state-by-brahma-chellaney-2016-05?">revisionist states</a> with expansionist ambitions. Moreover, for the past three years, India has been locked in a tense <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-cannot-win-india-himalayan-border-dispute-by-brahma-chellaney-2023-04">military standoff</a> with China along its Himalayan border. Bilateral relations, marked by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/12/india-china-arunachal-border/">intermittent clashes</a> in the disputed Tibet-Ladakh border region, are at their lowest point in decades. By confronting China despite the risk of a full-scale war, India has challenged Chinese power in a way no other country has done in this century. But despite leaning toward forging closer ties with the West, India remains hesitant to enter into formal military alliances with Western countries. Western powers are partly to blame. US President <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s reluctance to comment on the Sino-Indian military standoff, let alone openly support India, has sent a clear signal that India is responsible for its own defense. Given that the country’s future growth hinges on its ability to defend itself against external threats, India will likely step up its efforts to modernize its conventional armed forces and enhance its nuclear deterrence. The escalating geopolitical rivalry between China and India could also impede efforts to unite the Global South and transform the BRICS group into a credible alternative to the G20 and G7. The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) recently agreed to expand the group by adding <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/xv-brics-summit-johannesburg-ii-declaration-24-august-2023">six new members</a>: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, Argentina, and Iran. Given the 11 members’ divergent interests, BRICS+ will likely find it even harder to reach consensus on any major issue.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231029081040_43ee34df0da045fc9466deb8642e67e778412c7494d5aa1275da28fc08e002e9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_20" data-image-id="20231029081040_43ee34df0da045fc9466deb8642e67e778412c7494d5aa1275da28fc08e002e9" data-rendition-name="original" width="599" height="402" loading="lazy" alt="India China NT 2"> </figure>  Meanwhile, China’s economic slump could prompt President Xi Jinping to double down on his expansionist agenda. Biden recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/11/us/politics/biden-china-criticism-economy.html">characterized</a> the stagnating Chinese economy as a “ticking time bomb,” warning that, “When bad folks have problems, they do bad things.” China’s controversial <a href="https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1696104724691570945">new national map</a>, which depicts vast areas of India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Bhutan (and even a bit of Russia) as Chinese territory, underscores the threat posed by China’s increasingly aggressive behavior. In addition to these external threats, India’s future will be shaped by its response to domestic economic challenges. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/asia/in-india-government-tracks-its-own.html">great strides</a> in modernizing the notoriously outdated Indian bureaucracy and promoting e-government to reduce red tape and attract foreign direct investment. His government has invested heavily in upgrading and expanding the country’s infrastructure, implemented regulatory reforms, and sought to boost domestic manufacturing through Modi’s <a href="https://mea.gov.in/Images/attach/Make_in_India_Initiative.pdf">“Make in India” initiative</a>. But to transform itself into a global manufacturing hub, India must invest in human capital, particularly in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp012202">education and training</a>. Moreover, India’s size and diversity also pose enormous challenges. India may be the first developing economy that, from the beginning, has pursued modernization and prosperity through a democratic system. But as one of the world’s most culturally diverse countries, its seemingly never-ending election cycle has often fueled division and polarization. But, despite its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/divided-families-and-tense-silences-us-style-polarization-arrives-in-india/2019/05/18/734bfdc6-5bb3-11e9-98d4-844088d135f2_story.html">US-style polarized politics</a>, India’s democratic framework has served as a pillar of stability. By fostering open expression and dialogue, the Indian political system has empowered grassroots communities and individuals, enabling members of historically marginalized classes and castes to rise to the highest levels of policymaking. Whether India can maintain its current upward trajectory will depend on its ability to maintain political stability, rapid economic growth, domestic and external security, and a forward-looking foreign policy. Success would enhance India’s <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-us-china-balance-of-power-without-formal-alliance-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-06">global standing</a> and help advance <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-india-emerge-as-a-rival-to-china-manufacturing-population-it-investment-trade-youth-regulatory-reform-11673895652?mod=opinion_featst_pos2">US interests</a> in the Indo-Pacific, the world’s new geopolitical fulcrum and home to its fastest-growing economies.&nbsp; © Project Syndicate Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research, New Delhi and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin. His book <a href="https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/Water">Water: Asia’s New Battleground</a> (Georgetown University Press, 2011) for which he won the 2012 <a href="https://asiasociety.org/media/press-releases/brahma-chellaney%E2%80%99s-water-asia%E2%80%99s-new-battleground-wins-2012-asia-society-bernard">Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award</a>.

India’s quiet rise

Following the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/nepals-maoist-leader-visits-china">visit of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal to China</a> earlier this month, there was talk that export of buffalo meat to China was on the agenda. If so, not enough homework was done before Nepal raised the possibility.&nbsp;
Some traders in Kathmandu claim there is a growing demand for buffalo meat in China, and there have been reports of slaughterhouses in the eastern Tarai where buffalo meat is processed specifically for the purpose of smuggling it to China through various routes.
Chinese media do report the seizure of undocumented buffalo meat inbound to China from Vietnam, there is no evidence that the contraband is originally from Nepal.
Finding out if there is indeed a growing demand for water buffalo meat in China is not easy. The annual Chinese customs import data categorise buffalo meat (not visceral organs like liver, intestine, tongue, etc.) together with other cattle raised for meat under the category 'meat of bovine animal'.
Furthermore, an average Chinese person does not distinguish between buff and beef as separate products. For the average Chinese, beef/牛肉 (shuǐ niú ròu) is interchangeable with buffalo meat. Shuǐ/水 means water in Mandarin.
With the growth of China's economy and rising living standards, the demand for bovine meat is indeed shooting up. Due to the limited arable land and the local bovine population, ever larger quantities of beef/buff need to be imported every year.
China was already importing $2.52 billion worth of beef in 2016, and this grew to $17.76 billion in 2022. The top five source countries were Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, New Zealand and Australia.&nbsp;
The export of beef from Nepal is prohibited, but water buffalo meat export to China could be economically viable. But a great deal more homework needs to be done on the legal or technical infrastructure aspects.
The General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) has strict rules for imports of 18 food items, including meat products. These not only relate to how the meats are produced or manufactured, but also ensure that the food safety management system of the exporter country is equivalent to Chinese standards.
Which means that even a state-of-the-art Nepali slaughterhouse following safety and hygiene practices in frozen meat production has little to no chance of exporting to China unless the GACC has certified it.&nbsp;
Furthermore, there are exhaustive GACC standards in the evaluation and confirmation process, which include confirming legal provisions, animal and plant diseases, competence of food safety supervisory, overall safety and hygiene control in food production, processing, transportation and storage, competence in export food safety, food protection, traceability and recall system, emergency response preparedness, technical support capabilities, so on and so forth.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/are-you-sick-of-chicken">Are you sick of chicken?</a>, Sonia Awale
While there are provisions in Nepal for food safety and animal and plant epidemics, there is a wide implementation gap for safety and hygiene control in food production, transportation and supplies. For example, the Slaughterhouse and Meat Examination Act 1999 makes the licensing of slaughterhouses and examination of the meat mandatory, but looking at meat shops even in Kathmandu, it is clear how lax enforcement is.
The most recent epidemic of the lumpy-skin disease in cattle and the shortage of vaccines is indicative of Nepal's lack of preparedness in responding to the animal and plant epidemics, and the country needs to do a lot more to qualify as an exporter country for food products including bovine meats.
However, assuming that Nepal is planning to export water buffalo meat to China, it must quickly request an evaluation by the GACC -- even if such an exercise will likely result in the Nepalese food security management system not meeting the standards.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/nepal-sets-ambitious-target-for-food-sufficiency">Nepal sets ambitious target for food self-sufficiency</a>, Ramesh Kumar
Doing so would have practical benefits in having recommendations from the GACC as rectification instructions would also indicate the gaps, addressing which could strengthen technical cooperation between Nepal and China, at least in animal husbandry, and have benefits for Nepal’s own domestic meat industry.
Once Nepal moves toward standards-based food production, transportation, storage and security, it could then apply to be registered as an exporter in the GACC registration system.
Should Nepal pass the GACC evaluation and confirmation assessment, it can expect Chinese investors to be willing to set up meat and other food production and processing facilities here. According to a 2021 FAO estimate, Nepal has 2.32 million hectares of land underutilised which could potentially be developed as pasture.
Increased investment in food production and processing industries in turn can have trickle-down benefits to farming populations, especially in the hinterland where youth are migrating away from the land due to the lack of opportunities.
What is needed is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/polluted-politics">political will</a>, integrity and a determination to follow through. Things will eventually fall in place once we realise the gap and work to fill them. Or we can continue on being the country with the most bilateral MOUs with no practical significance except junkets for bureaucrats and politicians.
Nirab Gyawali is a Nepali lawyer working to be the first Mandarin-speaking transaction lawyer in Kathmandu.

Not easy for Nepal to sell buffalo meat to China

Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China comes as the season here in Beijing begins to shift from the summer to autumn.&nbsp;
As the Prime Minister alights from his aircraft at the Beijing Capital International Airport being greeted by still balmy conditions, he may very well wonder why his flight could not have touched down at the other (newer) colossal international airport in Beijing, Daxing International, designed by the award winning British architectural firm Zaha Hadid Architects.
That facility is not just a piece of art but is the world’s largest single-building airport occupying more than 7.5 million sq feet of ground space. Although by land-area, Daxing International is still significantly smaller than King Fahd International or even Denver International or Washington Dulles, the way in which the airport evokes, in combination, a sense of power, networks and a futuristic vision is inescapable.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/fixing-the-broken-parts-in-nepal-china-ties">Fixing the broken parts in Nepal-China ties</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit
This is not surprising at all because the People’s Republic of China is probably at this juncture of history the example par excellence of a Eurasian power vigorously straddling the super continent in almost every sense of the word: political, economic, cultural and certainly in respect to hard infrastructure systems.&nbsp;
It is also no surprise that it is exactly due to this position China currently occupies as a preeminent Eurasian power that it is bumping up with such great and increasing friction against not just the United States but <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/political-geography-of-india-nepal-china-ties">other leading powers in the system such as India</a> and so on.&nbsp;
The state of progressively intense upheavals that is consequently being generated within the international system is something that smaller powers such as Nepal will find almost impossible to circumvent let alone easily maneuver around.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-now-has-to-balance-not-just-india-and-china-but-also-the-west">Nepal now has to balance not just India nad China, but also the West</a>, Bhairaja Panday
It is within this broad lay of the land that Dahal's September sojourn to China must be viewed and analysed. Sino-Nepal relations do not exist in a vacuum, they are part of larger (and ever shifting) structural, geopolitical forces at play that can potentially pull Nepal against gravitational force into spaces not easily comprehensible, much less simple to navigate.&nbsp;
This comes back to the question as to what is the natural direction of Nepal’s foreign policy, where does the gravity of Nepal’s foreign policy lie, because it is against this question too that better inferences and assessments of the prime minister’s China visit can be brought to bear.&nbsp;
At any given point in history, the state of Sino-Nepal relations will be dictated as well by the overall <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/40-years-after-the-sino-us-thaw">nature and tenor of Sino-US</a>, Sino-Indian as well as Sino-Russian relations and different combinations of those bilateral relationships.&nbsp;
Nepal’s relationship with India and then the United States exerts a profound impact on its foreign policy towards China, and this is exponentially the case in contemporary times as larger and larger diaspora communities in those countries become more entrenched and organised, giving rise to push and pull factors that reverberate back into the corridors of power in Kathmandu.&nbsp;
It must not be forgotten as well that the Maoist party Prime Minister Dahal's visit to China takes place at a time in Nepal's history when its governmental and administrative apparatus is perhaps the most fragile and fungible they have ever been, and therefore prone to being malleable in general or definitely within certain distinct pockets.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/geopolitical-tectonics">Geopolitical tectonics</a>, Editorial
There are certain strong domestic lobbies in favour of China within Nepal’s political ecosystem, but it is hard to establish the extent to which these have the ability to triumph in forging real diplomatic success in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/sino-nepal-ties-in-the-post-afghan-era">Sino-Nepal relations</a>.&nbsp;
Surely in terms of big-ticket items in the bilateral relationship such as expansion of BRI and an elevated position for China in harvesting the green energy market in Nepal, it appears that Nepal’s position is currently circumscribed to a large extent by structural factors and that Kathmandu would need to approach cooperation with China with greater creativity encompassing an international approach.&nbsp;
For example, harnessing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">Nepal’s substantial hydropower potential</a> is a key objective of policy makers in the country but due to the divergent and fragmented geopolitical environment Nepal faces externally, it becomes challenging for any one of the great powers alone to plan and actually execute large scale infrastructure projects without inciting adverse pushback.&nbsp;
So would it be feasible for Kathmandu to think along the lines of gradually proposing and nurturing international consortia (by including within a single basket China, India and the United States, for instance) to address the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/balance-of-power">development of hydropower in Nepal</a> or other large scale infrastructure initiatives?&nbsp;
It is unlikely that such an approach can be made to happen, but it is certainly worth the effort by the prime minister to explore during his high-level engagements with leaders in China. Sticking to a strictly bilateral approach on this visit to China will be a safe bet for the Prime Minister Dahal and will not ruffle any feathers.
But if one can think out of the box as a means to inject more momentum from Nepal towards much needed regional economic growth, then why not at least try?
Bhaskar Koirala is an independent analyst with Peking University. Views here are the author's own.

Nepal's Maoist leader visits China

In 1960, during his second official visit to Nepal, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sat on a boat on Pokhara’s Phewa Lake with Prime Minister B P Koirala for one and a half hours and was spellbound by the reflection of Mt Machapuchre on the water.&nbsp; King Mahendra’s chief adviser Gunja Man Singh and Chinese ambassador Yuan Zhongxian had signed the agreement to establish diplomatic relations between Nepal and China on 1 August 1955, only a year after Zhou became Premier.&nbsp; In the nearly 70 years since, China has financed and supported infrastructure projects across Nepal — but especially those with links to Pokhara, like the Prithvi Highway that first linked Kathmandu to Pokhara by road. Anand Raj Mulmi, former president of the Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI), notes that China initially wanted Pokhara to be its focal point in Nepal.&nbsp; “The Prithvi Highway was built to project China’s soft power, and advance its geopolitical interest to link Nepal to China through Korola in Mustang,” Multi explains.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023091313094_0e0bd60f12dc8ce1ea07bb38116ae1d8da359d06808774e980ae840766d435f6.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2023091313094_0e0bd60f12dc8ce1ea07bb38116ae1d8da359d06808774e980ae840766d435f6" data-rendition-name="original" width="4608" height="3072" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara China connection"> </figure>  Indeed, China worked on road, irrigation, highway and hydropower projects in Pokhara. After the Prithvi Highway, it financed the construction of the Pokhara-Baglung road in 1988. The strategy was connectivity, long before the Belt and Road Initiative was even thought of. By 1980, China was also helping Pokhara’s irrigation sector, providing financial and technical assistance for a hydropower and irrigation project on the Seti River. All this&nbsp; Chinese activity made India suspicious, and Mulmi says things did not turn out like Beijing wanted.&nbsp; Even so, China’s love affair with Pokhara did not wane. The popular Chinese tv serial Deng Feng Lai (Up in the Wind) was filmed on location in Pokhara in which the two protagonists took <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19255#.XgmF09Iza70" target="_blank">a paragliding flight</a>. Since then, many young Chinese have started booking holidays in Pokhara.&nbsp; This dovetailed well with Rs 22 billion Chinese ExIm Bank loan for Pokhara International Airport which was inaugurated on 1 January 2023. The international flight to land there was a Sichuan Airlines Airbus 319 from Chengdu last month.&nbsp; The chartered flight on 23 June brought 130 Chinese passengers to Pokhara for the first Nepal-China Dragon Boat Race Festival organised by the Nepal Tourism Board, Pokhara Metropolitan City.&nbsp; “Events like the Dragon Boat Race Festival will bolster Pokhara’s economy, and enhance the socio-cultural relations between our two countries and its people,” said Chinese Ambassador Chen Song during the opening ceremony of the event.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023091313094_3e8d98945946e3368b5b5a360f9dad23253f680eee3d5e63049a47dd1d8a2861.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2023091313094_3e8d98945946e3368b5b5a360f9dad23253f680eee3d5e63049a47dd1d8a2861" data-rendition-name="original" width="1800" height="896" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara China connection"> <figcaption>A Chinese team participating in Nepal-China Dragon Boat race earlier this year.</figcaption> </figure>  Although the pandemic killed tourism prospects in Pokhara, Chinese tourists are flocking back. Lakeside restaurants in Pokhara once more have Mandarin menus and the city is still hoping that Chinese airlines will start direct flights to the new airport. Pom Narayan Shrestha, chairman of the Pokhara Tourism Council, says that Pokhara’s local as well as Gandaki Province government should push promotional activities.&nbsp; Pokhara first established sister-city relations with the city of Linzhi in the Tibet Autonomous Region in 2008. Since then, similar sister-city links have been established between Nepali cities and Kunming, Guangzhou, Yibin, Chiuchow, Haikou, Nanning and Yanji to promote bilateral cooperation in various sectors, including business.&nbsp; However, entrepreneurs in the region say that there have been no benefits to their business from such agreements.&nbsp; Experts also note that Pokhara has not been able to take advantage of the agreements, and the bilateral relationship has been limited to mayors and deputy mayors of Pokhara and the Chinese cities attending events in each other’s countries.&nbsp; “Pokhara’s sister-city agreements with various Chinese cities will only be relevant if Pokhara is promoted as a tourist destination there, and entrepreneurs from Pokhara can participate in and benefit from trade fairs in those cities,” says Mulmi. “Similarly, people from China also need to be invited to events in Pokhara, that is how all of the cities involved will benefit economically. Events like the Dragon Boat festival, and other Chinese cultural affairs represent a new beginning.”&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20230913130920_a2059268ee3f3ff7fbb916cb47806e0710fbfb02e25595771c49a5f1ac26640b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20230913130920_a2059268ee3f3ff7fbb916cb47806e0710fbfb02e25595771c49a5f1ac26640b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1080" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara China connection"> <figcaption>Pokhara Mayor Dhanraj Acharya with Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chan Song.</figcaption> </figure>  Kiran Prasad Koirala of Pokhara Metropolitan City, admits that the town has not been very aggressive in promoting &nbsp;sister-city relationships, but adds that Chinese cities have supported Pokhara, having provided financial, ambulance, and other aid during the pandemic. &nbsp; Bishwa Shankar Palikhe, president of the Nepal-China Friendship Association, has been actively involved in expanding exchanges between Pokhara and its sister cities in Kunming, Guangzhou and Linzhi. However, he admits a lot more needs to be done.&nbsp; Palikhe adds: “We must study the development and experiences of our sister cities and incorporate them into Pokhara’s development plans. Additionally, the entire world at present is trying to draw tourists from China, we must take advantage of our proximity.”&nbsp;

Pokhara’s China connection

At the annual Nepal Power Summit in Kathmandu on 18-19 April, officials called on India to allow Nepal to export power at real-time prices, not just in the day-ahead market. Also discussed was a need for more flexible guidelines on market access for Nepal’s electricity to India which currently buys power on a project-to-project basis, pointedly boycotting those built by Chinese investment or contractors. India’s interest in regulating Nepal’s rivers is not new, but with the Himalaya becoming a geopolitical and climate hotspot, its strategic interest in regulating river flow has grown.&nbsp; Climate models show that the hydrology of Himalayan rivers will change dramatically in the coming decades, with peak water in the 2030s, and low flow levels in the dry season thereafter. With 70% of the annual discharge on the Ganga flowing down from rivers in Nepal, 75% of it in the four monsoon months, storage projects in the mountains will be ever more important. Because of this, New Delhi would like pliant politicians in place in Kathmandu that will not obstruct its plans to ensure future water supply, and given current geopolitical tensions, this also means keeping the Chinese out.&nbsp; Ever since Sher Bahadur Deuba became prime minister for the fifth time in 2021, he has fast-tracked a slew of projects in which Indian companies are involved, including the West Seti reservoir project that has languished for 20 years mainly because of Indian objections to Australian and Chinese investment. Most recently, Indian National Hydroelectricity Power Corporation (NHPC) Limited is in talks to be awarded the 480MW Phukot Karnali Hydroelectric Project in Kalikot jointly with Nepal’s state-owned Vidyut Utpadan Company Limited with a share ratio of 51% to 49%. The project will likely be launched during Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s state visit to India in May. India’s NHPC has already been granted licenses for West Seti and Seti River-6 projects, and is also eyeing another 1,902MW megaproject on the Karnali.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603050_10fc6c82b0d995c39b388d8d8628365ea5e2299a1f4d474e2c2d5b7f01d37d83.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2023050603050_10fc6c82b0d995c39b388d8d8628365ea5e2299a1f4d474e2c2d5b7f01d37d83" data-rendition-name="original" width="3776" height="2424" loading="lazy" alt="West Seti"> <figcaption>Sushil Bhatta of Investment Board Nepal and Abhay Kumar Singh of India's NHPC, after signing an agreement to develop the 760MW West Seti and 460MW Seti River 6 projects in 2022.</figcaption> </figure>  In fact, across Nepal, Indian companies are building hydropower projects which will add a combined total of 4,000MW to the grid, three of which were rushed through only in the past year. Three more Indian projects are in the pipeline.&nbsp; Why the sudden renewed Indian interest in Nepal’s rivers? And what is the hurry? The answer lies in the need to plan for the decades ahead when water is going to be an even scarcer commodity in the Indo-Gangetic plains than it is now because of climate change, increased industrial, agricultural and household consumption. Energy analysts say that although India’s interest seems to be in renewable energy from hydropower to fulfil its decarbonisation commitments, exports of power from Nepal is only projected at $800 million in the next three years, which will only be a tiny percentage of the 1,600 billion kWh that India generated in the last fiscal year.&nbsp; And although power demand is expected to rise with rising incomes, industrialisation and increasingly intense summer heat waves in the plains, India’s long-term interest is in reservoir projects to store monsoon water in Nepal’s rivers to reduce monsoon flood risk and keep rivers flowing in the dry season. And New Delhi has not tried to hide its distaste for any Chinese involvement in these projects.&nbsp; Hydropower Investment and Development Company Nepal (HIDCL) in which the government is a majority shareholder informed the Investment Board Nepal in February that it was withdrawing from the export-oriented 762MW Tamor Hydropower project.&nbsp; CEO Arjun Kumar Gautam is upfront about why: “We cannot sell electricity generated with Chinese involvement in the Indian market.” Tamor was one of the two projects agreed upon during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in October 2019. Soon after, Investment Board Nepal (IBN) signed up China Construction to build the project after completing a feasibility study. The HIDCL now wants to null the agreement with the Chinese contractor and bring in a new contractor more amenable to the Indians. Meanwhile, India’s state-owned <a href="https://sjvn.nic.in/">Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam</a>, which is involved in a cascade of projects on the adjoining Arun River to generate a total of 2,000MW, is said to be aggressively lobbying top Nepali officials to also build Tamor. Besides the 900MW Arun 3, Satluj was awarded the Lower Arun by the K P Oli-led government in 2021 without competitive bidding. Then in May 2022, the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led government suddenly awarded Arun 4 to Satluj (with a 51% share) during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lumbini.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20230506020556_4f38ffb96de37f17c662684914f0b65ab41adaaf98183a073273e88621de480b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20230506020556_4f38ffb96de37f17c662684914f0b65ab41adaaf98183a073273e88621de480b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="666" loading="lazy" alt="Arun 4 agreement"> <figcaption>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba look on as Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam's Nanda Lal Sharma and the NEA's Kulman Ghising exchange MoUs in May 2022 in Lumbini to build the 409MW Arun 4. Photo: RATNA SHRESTHA/RSS</figcaption> </figure>  But even though Satluj is said to be also interested in the 1,061MW Upper Arun, Kulman Ghising of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) says it is building the project. "Upper Arun is our first priority, we are planning to start the construction of the access road," Ghising told us. Arun and Tamor are both in eastern Nepal (see map), but India is also interested in rivers in western Nepal because of the proximity of its main load centres as well as to augment the dry season flow of Nepal’s rivers that flow into the Ganga.&nbsp; There was some hue and cry last year after the Deuba-led government abruptly handed over the 750MW West Seti Dam and Seti River-6 projects to two Indian state-owned companies without competition or transparency. Experts pointed out that Nepal’s Public-Private Partnership and Investment Act 2075 states that there should be competitive bidding.&nbsp; The Seti saga is three decades long. After successive partnerships with Australian, Chinese and private Indian companies fell through, India’s state-owned NHPC finally took the lead. Since the terms of the deal are opaque, many experts question how beneficial the $1.6 billion project that involves building a high dam in the Doti district will be for Nepal.&nbsp; Indian state-owned companies appear to move faster than private Indian companies interested in river projects in Nepal. The GMR Group (Gandhi Mallikarjun Rao) obtained a permit to build the 900 MW Upper Karnali and a Project Development Agreement (PDA) was signed with the IBN in 2014 with plans to start construction in two years after securing funding. The government's latest decision to extend the deadline for the GMR by two years is being challenged in Nepal’s Supreme Court.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603054_0b5cc52ed5ece09ac54bf7fd42d663e156bd8a721203fecad4470d449722bfd9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2023050603054_0b5cc52ed5ece09ac54bf7fd42d663e156bd8a721203fecad4470d449722bfd9" data-rendition-name="original" width="1083" height="834" loading="lazy" alt="Indian investment in hydropower in Nepal"> </figure>  Geopolitical games The export-oriented 456MW Upper Tamakosi project finally started production in June 2021 after much delay. But because a part of the Upper Tamkosi was built by the Sino Hydro of China, India refused to buy power from the project during the monsoon surplus last year – even though it was built with NEA investment.&nbsp; One international lender told Nepali Times: “Obtaining an Indian nod before building any big hydropower project in Nepal has now become a must.” Indian pressure manifests itself in its refusal to buy only 364MW of electricity which was recently increased to 452MW. This is the sum total of generation capacity with no direct Chinese involvement. Nepal also cannot sell its power to China as there are no trans-Himalayan transmission lines, and exporting to Bangladesh would need an Indian approval system without giving a free and open market to Nepali electricity, while also rejecting any Chinese involvement. India’s international electricity trade procedure issued in February 2021 prohibits the import of electricity from projects invested in third countries that do not have a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the energy sector. The fact that India does not have an energy cooperation agreement with China has therefore become an excuse, not just to blacklist projects in Nepal with Chinese investment, but even Chinese contractors. India has even stopped the supply of explosives for projects like the Tanahu and Upper Trisuli-1 Schemes being built by Chinese contractors.&nbsp; "Even though there is nothing in writing, India does not want any involvement of the Chinese in any capacity in Nepal's hydropower projects, they even have details of which country is the contractor and where are the machines being used from," explains Ganesh Karki of the Independent Power Producers Association Nepal (IPPAN). India first allowed imports of electricity only from the 24 MW Trisuli and 15 MW Devighat projects, both built by the Indian in the 1960s. But after Deuba signed an agreement on energy cooperation between the two countries in 2022, NEA was allowed to 364MW.&nbsp; Even so, Nepal must renew this export provision every year, which is a bureaucratic hassle. What this essentially means is that if Indian companies do not get licenses for new plants in Nepal, they may not renew the power-selling contract either. Nepali officials have been trying to convince the Indian side that it is in their own best interest if Nepal has a surplus in the coming years. Based on projections of generation capacity, NEA has sent a proposal to New Delhi to export an additional 600MW.&nbsp; The installed capacity of hydropower projects in Nepal has reached 2,400MW and is expected to cross 3,000MW after the completion of more projects this monsoon. Projects with a combined capacity of 3,200MW are under construction and will be completed in the next three years. On the demand side, the average domestic consumption at present is about 1,600MW and is expected to increase only to 2,000MW next year.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603054_1ba6d252b58558d3d1263b0f76e3abbfc1c9dd3c019f8d9d47bd8aa415651e3f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="2023050603054_1ba6d252b58558d3d1263b0f76e3abbfc1c9dd3c019f8d9d47bd8aa415651e3f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1171" height="834" loading="lazy" alt="Hydropower generation in Nepal"> </figure>  &nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><div class="flourish-embed flourish-chart" data-src="visualisation/13536204"><script src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js"></script></div></div> &nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><div class="flourish-embed flourish-chart" data-src="visualisation/13535503"><script src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js"></script></div></div> There are critics who say Nepal should not be exporting power to India at all since it will not make a big dent in the trade deficit, and the $85.8 million it earned last year is negligible compared to the $8.33 billion Nepal earned in remittances.&nbsp; They say the priority should be on increasing electricity consumption in cooking, transportation and industry. At present, 70% of Nepal’s energy is from biomass and only 5% is from electricity.&nbsp; Since most of the electricity in Nepal is from run-of-river schemes in which generation depends on the flow of water in rivers, Nepal will have to continue to import power from India during the peak winter months for the next three years. In the monsoon, though, generation is double of demand, but the Indian quota, inadequate transmission and low domestic demand mean much of this clean electricity is wasted.&nbsp; Dinesh Kumar Ghimire at the Energy Ministry says Nepal is looking to sign a 25-year export agreement with India. "We are preparing a draft for the agreement. If both sides are on board with it, there may be an agreement during the Prime Minister's visit to India.” Edging out China While India is awarded one hydropower project after another in Nepal, China is being edged out. Both Phukot Karnali and Tamor hydropower projects were supposed to be implemented under Beijing’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) scheme.&nbsp; Last month, Sichuan Wangping Energy Science and Technology gave up its license to build the 235MW Humla Karnali-1 and 335MW Humla Karnali-2 in partnership with a Nepali company. The survey permit for these projects has now been granted to Ruru Hydropower, a Nepali company. The 1,200MW Budi Gandaki reservoir project has been caught in a geopolitical tangle between India and Nepal for the past six years. In May 2017, the Pushpa Kamal Dahal government handed over the project to China’s Gezhouba Group without competition. A few months later in October, the Deuba-led government reversed the decision and said Nepal would build it. Fast forward a year later and the Oli-led government gave Budi Gandaki back to Gezhouba, only for the Deuba-led coalition government in March 2022 to reverse the decision again. Exasperated, the then-Chinese ambassador Hou Yanqi said abandoned diplomatic niceties and said publicly that it was wrong for Nepal to change its decision every time a government changed. Says Ganesh Karki of IPPAN: “We have to conclude that because of India’s stance, it is difficult to get Chinese investment in Nepal’s hydropower. The top political leadership should lobby with India to remove this obstacle.” The hydro of hydropower&nbsp; Nepal’s former energy secretary Dwarika Nath Dhungel is convinced India considers water a strategic commodity, and its emphasis on electricity export hides its real intention to secure water supply in the coming decades.&nbsp; “We in Nepal, on the other hand, have no idea about this, and there is no clarity about our own water and energy policy. In fact, our policymakers are not working in the national interest at all,” he adds. Studies have shown that water scarcity in the Indo-Gangetic plains will increase as Himalayan glaciers dry up, and the groundwater level falls due to over-extraction. And in the monsoon, there is too much water, so the world’s most densely populated region is hit by destructive floods. &nbsp; Building storage dams in Nepal is a win-win-win for India, reducing flood risk, augmenting dry season flow of Nepali rivers that flow across the border, and generating electricity. Nepal will get some export income, but will not benefit much from irrigation since it only has a narrow strip of land in the Tarai, and large tracts of its fertile mountain valleys will be inundated by future reservoirs. “Nepal’s export of a few thousand megawatts will not mean much for India's huge power system with a capacity of around 400,000MW,” adds Dhungel. “What India is fixated on is our water. And that is why it does not want any third parties involved, especially not China.” Former secretary at the Ministry of Energy Anup Kumar Upadhyay on the other hand is all for more Indian investment in Nepal’s hydropower, and does not think there is any ulterior motive. He argues that the model in which Nepal is allowing Indian companies to build projects is beneficial to Nepal in the long term. At present, Indian companies that have received permission to build hydropower plants have agreed to provide about 22% of electricity to the Nepal government for free. And after 25 years, these projects will be fully owned by Nepal. Says Upadhyay: "Whatever projects we are giving to India now, India does not even have the benefit of regular water flow from them, so there is no reason to be suspicious that India has a grand design to control our rivers." Indeed, there are many in Nepal, even those critical of Indian behaviour, who say Nepal cannot choose its neighbours and it might as well keep India happy by ensuring that the river agreements are fair to Nepal as well.

Geopolitics of Nepal’s rivers

Architecture can be a powerful agent of change, shaping not just spaces but the way people live, connect, and experience the world.&nbsp; For Nepal, which is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/natures-fragile-gift-to-nepal">gifted by nature</a> and rich in <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/ambassador-fund-cultural-preservation-nepal,2092">cultural heritage</a>, &nbsp;reviving rural architecture with modern amenities could hold the key to more <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-sustainable-tourism-means-in-practice">sustainable tourism </a>that benefits local people more. “<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/bayalpata-hospital-in-nepal-wins-global-design-award">Design and architecture</a> are amazing tools to create a unique experience for visitors,” says Spanish architect Tomeu Esteva of Esteva i Esteva Architecture Studio. “Difficult destinations have beautiful hotels with design and comfort.” Esteva was in Kathmandu with his colleagues at an event organised by the Spanish Honorary Consulate at Dwarika’s Hotel last week to showcase buildings which Nepali architects can adapt with local material and design inputs.&nbsp; Rural architecture holds a unique significance: it is more than a shelter and must reflect <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/inking-an-idenity">local identity, culture</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/saving-humla-from-heritage-loss">heritage</a>. An area’s natural and cultural harmony can be upset by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/protecting-protected-areas-from-infrastructure?fbclid=IwAR1wK0MDFlFST_2EYb3f54LS4-fPt6rYfLG1DJ1JaQsU3w8-ezyXIxGOqzk">poorly planned development</a>, speakers at the event said, but the environment can be improved and revitalised by well-integrated structures.&nbsp; Another Spanish architect, Belen Moneo, has designed hotels at elevations of 3,700m in her home country Spain that supply natural spring water spas. “<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/lost-in-reconstruction">Creativity in construction</a> must be encouraged. Rural architecture always shows possibilities of what we can do better,” Moneo explains, adding that designs must enhance <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-healing-power-of-nature">the beauty of nature</a> and give a natural feel at a time when steel, glass and cement dominate <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/rebuilding-kathmandu-after-the-1934-quake">urban design</a>.&nbsp; This is why the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/weaving-nature-into-craft">use of natural products</a> such as bamboo, local timber, straw and rammed earth are in demand from customers who want a fresh eco-friendly look encouraged in construction of rural architectural structures. The demand for boutique hotels has increased world over, with &nbsp;more and more tourists favouring aesthetics, experience and comfort over price. While creativity is an important part of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/architecture-for-mountains">construction and architecture</a>, incentives to build and use <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Building,370">rural construction materials</a> still remain minimal, and Moneo emphasises the significance of design and execution.&nbsp; Esteva helped design the Vana Retreat in Dehradun that kept the natural environment in focus, with the structure giving an elaborate aesthetic experience to visitors. Another example is Hotel Las Mercedes in the Dominican Republic which was designed and constructed by Moneo and the company she co-founded Moneo Brock, respecting and revaluing the traditional architecture of the area. Hotels providing such experience could attract tourists and revenue. The Spanish ambassador to Nepal Juan Antonio March Pujol said, “The role of architecture and architects in developing tourism is crucial, not only in urban areas but rural settings as well.”&nbsp; The concept of rural boutique hotels gained traction in Spain during the 1990s, particularly in regions like Majorca with economic and environmental sustainability as the main focus. In Nepal <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/12-full-opinion/guiding-nepal-s-tourism-industry">the tourism industry</a> directly employs about 1 million people, and makes up about 8% of the country’s GDP. In Nepal, the stone homes of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/reviving-himalayan-vulture-and-culture">Mustang and Manang</a>, bamboo and mud structures of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-tarai-s-shrinking-forests">the Tarai</a>, and the Kathmandu Valley’s terra cotta tile skylines, graceful temples, and tranquil bahal courtyards are all examples of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-traditional-seismic-resistant-designs">Nepal’s traditional architecture</a>.&nbsp; Nepali architect Sarosh Pradhan has been working for the past eight years on the Brakka Village project in Manang Valley north of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/municipalities-want-to-manage-annapurna">the Annapurnas</a>. Other examples of this kind of rural architecture for high-end tourism are the Shinta Mani Hotel in Mustang and Khumbu Lodge below <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mt-everest-pvt-ltd">Mt Everest</a>. Says Pradhan, “There are places in Nepal that radiate purity and embrace simplicity. Creating projects in such settings require deep reflection and thoughtful planning.”  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250421030444_a07a23f6b60fa89c0f35b9dc1aaf19937da4881e6bfb2e1858f3c27dff91729f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_19" data-image-id="20250421030444_a07a23f6b60fa89c0f35b9dc1aaf19937da4881e6bfb2e1858f3c27dff91729f" data-rendition-name="original" width="4608" height="2184" loading="lazy" alt="A new architecture for Nepal's tourism"> </figure>  Rural architecture is not easy, and sometimes more expensive. Inflation, energy efficiency, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/those-who-stay">the climate crisis</a>, and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/cost-of-living-in-a-big-city">increased costs of living</a> pose obstacles to sustainable rural architecture. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/forgotten-international-starchitects-in-nepal">Forgotten international starchitects in Nepal</a>, Anne Feenstra and Varun S Bapu Esteva says faith and trust between client and architect is necessary for any project to be successful. He adds that architects must practice being humble, the process of designing always involves learning and not imposing their ideas on clients. Nepal is uniquely positioned for the growth of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/hiking-up-the-benefits-of-tourism">rural tourism</a> because of its stunning countryside as well as its internationally renowned traditions in holistic wellness. Creating infrastructure that is small, thoughtfully planned and that respects both tradition and contemporary hospitality standards is crucial. “Projects in Nepal can be made cost effective by using materials from houses that have been brought down,” says Esteva. “Pilot projects involving <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/local-government-by-the-people-for-the-people-of-the-people">local people </a>and simple designing also helps the process.” <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/vacant-homes-become-homestays-in-nepal">The growth of homestays in Nepal</a> is a step in the right direction, but they are still a bit too rustic for the international traveller who also wants comfort and is willing to pay extra for it. Upgrading the facilities in homestays and ensuring that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/an-archive-of-nepali-heritage">architectural heritage</a> of the locality is preserved using locally sourced building material could allow owners to charge more. Says Sangita Shrestha of Dwarika’s Hotel, “Our effort is to build upon rural architecture by empowering local communities and using what is available locally. We can fine tune and encourage indigenous design and training.” The vision goes beyond just boosting the economy, it is about building a future where tourism helps villages grow in a healthy and lasting way. Instead of using up resources, it gives back to the land and the people. It supports local communities by<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/staying-in-nepal-to-create-jobs"> creating jobs</a>, improving infrastructure, and protecting natural beauty. When done right, tourism can be a tool for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/progress-and-or-preservation">preserving culture and nature</a>, not harming them. Architects must therefore see their work as more than just designing buildings, they also need to care deeply about people and places, especially in rural areas that can benefit the most.&nbsp; With global interest in sustainable and off-the-beaten-path travel increasing, Nepal stands at the cusp of a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/missing-out-on-nepal-s-tourism-potential">tourism transformation</a> that values community-driven, eco-conscious hospitality. A mix of modern ideas and traditional knowledge could transform rural tourism in Nepal. Says Shrestha, “Young architects should spend time with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/the-unsung-heroes-of-conservation">local and indigenous communities</a>, listen to their stories, and learn from their <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/life-and-livelihood-in-remote-nepal">ways of living</a>. These communities have deep knowledge about the land, materials, and climate. If this wisdom is used in new designs, it can help create tourism spaces that truly benefit everyone.” &nbsp;

A new architecture for Nepal's tourism

Extract from an addendum to Nepal's Two Wars, Chapter 2 in the updated edition of Essays on Nepal: Past and Present by Sam Cowan, a retired British Army general with a long association with the Gurkhas. The book was first published in 2018, and republished earlier this month by FinePrint exclusively on Amazon. The addendum details a one-to-one conversation the author had in the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=8884">Royal Palace </a>with the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=8371">King Gyanendra</a> in November 2002 just after he had taken his initial steps on the road that ultimately led to <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=14681">the abolition of the monarchy</a> in Nepal in 2008. In the early evening of September 16, 2002, in my role as Colonel Commandant of the Brigade of Gurkhas, I had my second and last official audience with King Gyanendra to give him an update on the Brigade’s activities over the previous 12 months. I had some 6 or 7 such audiences with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/preserving-king-birendra-s-family-home">King Birendra</a>.&nbsp; These were official affairs with the British ambassador of the day present, along with key <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=12233">palace officials</a> and a representative from Nepal's Foreign Ministry. The two monarchs were very different in character and temperament, but both treated me with the utmost civility and made the audiences as relaxed and easy for me as possible.&nbsp; It is, however, worth recording that when the official business had been covered, King Birendra, with a twinkle in his eye, often ended by asking, “Now General, what’s the gossip in London?” The second audience with <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=8026">King Gyanendra </a>was my last official act in uniform. We came back to Kathmandu in the first week of November (after treks) to stay for a few nights with our Defence Attaché before heading back to the UK. Waiting for me was a message from the Palace saying that King Gyanendra would like to meet me informally: <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=6933">no uniform</a> and no ambassador.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250421080420_f9046f9882d4481781d14f2b64f18c7fbbea62562e1d74e3465de6d01fb43750.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250421080420_f9046f9882d4481781d14f2b64f18c7fbbea62562e1d74e3465de6d01fb43750" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="2406" loading="lazy" alt="Gyanendra crowned page 1"> <figcaption>Nepali Times Special Edition of 6-14 June 2001 with enthronement of Gyanendra. </figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250421080424_21333d6ae21828eb47fe3f849438d215fe2804460d47bb2896ef4aee4e895ad2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250421080424_21333d6ae21828eb47fe3f849438d215fe2804460d47bb2896ef4aee4e895ad2" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1857" loading="lazy" alt="Royal massacre"> <figcaption>Nepali Times 22-29 June 2001 covering the royal massacre after which Gyanendra became king. </figcaption> </figure>  Although I had no idea what the purpose of the meeting might be, events in Kathmandu since I last saw the king put me on edge. On October 4, 2002, Gyanendra had dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, allegedly for failing to hold <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/what-goes-on-in-nepal-s-elections">elections</a>. He had put in place a new prime minister and a cabinet personally selected by him. When I heard the news on my travels, the people I met were generally supportive of the king’s actions. There was a general view that something had to be done, the country was going nowhere, and the king deserved his chance, not least to solve<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/14-years-after-conflict-no-closure-in-nepal"> the Maoist </a>problem. Back in Kathmandu, views were not so sanguine. The chosen prime minister, Lokendra Bahadur Chand, was a relic from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/mob-movement-and-mayhem">the Panchayat period</a> whose party had failed to win a single seat in the last elections held in 1999. Some of the chosen cabinet ministers had, to put it mildly, dubious reputations, and others had no record of proven competence in any field. There was a fear that the king’s real motive in dismissing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/deubas-denouement">Deuba</a> was to start to reverse the democratic gains made since 1990. I informed <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-britain-mark-centenary-of-1923-treaty">the British ambassador</a> about the invitation. He was strongly against accepting it, which was probably the clinching reason for my decision to do the polite thing and accept it. On the evening of November 7, 2002, I presented myself at the royal palace, alone and in civilian attire.&nbsp; As in the past, the Military Secretary, Major General Vivek Shah, met and escorted me into the presence of the monarch. This time, however, he was politely asked to leave the room and shut the door behind him. King Gyanendra greeted me warmly and invited me to sit down.&nbsp; Read also:<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-ghost-of-monarchy-returns-to-haunt-nepal"> The ghost of monarchy returns to haunt Nepal</a>, Shristi Karki  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250421080424_e382af945d0ad2a04ae41fabe5393f793dd10f54cb1220f111c7c9e7423eb558.jpg" data-media-id="editor_15" data-image-id="20250421080424_e382af945d0ad2a04ae41fabe5393f793dd10f54cb1220f111c7c9e7423eb558" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="993" loading="lazy" alt="Gyanendra coup"> <figcaption>Nepali Times 4-10 February 2005 after king Gyanendra's coup imposed media censorship. anendra became king. </figcaption> </figure>  I had wondered, and to be truthful, had worried, not just about the purpose of the meeting, but about how the conversation might start and develop. I reduced my resolve to two points: be polite but speak candidly. The latter resolve was quickly put to the test with the king’s opening words: “Sam, [in previous meetings it had been ‘General’, you walk the highways and byways of this land more than most, tell me what the common man is thinking?” &nbsp;“Your Majesty, I have no idea what they are thinking, but they are waiting.” “Waiting?” “Yes, Your Majesty, they are waiting to see whether what you did some weeks ago in appointing your own prime minister and cabinet ministers is going to make any difference to their lives or whether it is just going to be more Kathmandu hot air.” “Everything is going to be difficult and is going to take time, a lot of time.” “Your Majesty, time is the one thing you don’t have. You must act quickly and decisively to take advantage of the opportunity you have created. Everyone knows that you have appointed these new ministers. Why don’t you get them in here one by one and tell them that they have three months to deliver a programme in their area of responsibility that is going to make a difference to people’s lives? Most will fail to do so. Sack them! It will be a powerful signal of your strong intent to deliver real change.” I can express the opening of our conversation in this way because just about every word is still etched in my mind. The king’s response to my last quoted words was to challenge me to give an example of something that could be delivered quickly. I can give a verbatim record of what I said in response to this unexpected challenge: “Health posts, Your Majesty, there is no shortage of them throughout the country as building them has been one of the sources of local corruption, but very few have any medicine to issue at present or have skilled people to assess and meet medical needs. Your Majesty, children are dying for lack of a few pills. Given the right priority, over a period, say of six months, every health post could be fully stocked with medicine and manned with trained people. This is something I could help to lead for you as I know it would have strong international backing. At last, people would know that you mean business.” As I warmed to the theme, I could see no sign of the king having any enthusiasm for the idea, and I quickly disengaged as it dawned on me, as it had clearly dawned on the king, that the reason for the deficiencies in health posts was to prevent any Maoist combatant from gaining access to any <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/tech-away/nepal-s-health-tech-industry-is-here-to-stay">medical support</a>, and if this meant people suffering, so be it. The subject of the Maoist insurgency inevitably came up, and I took the opportunity to elaborate on what is written in the final four paragraphs of the article above. I advised King Gyanendra that, self-evidently, since there were three parties in the conflict—him, the Maoists, and the political parties—it was imperative that he form an alliance with one of them, preferably the political parties; otherwise, he would find himself isolated, as the other two parties would inevitably, at some stage, form their own alliance. However, it quickly became apparent that the king’s mind was on a totally different track. On the Maoists, he told me that he had channels open to them, but he was scathing about the political party leaders. He made it clear that they would be waiting for a very long time before he gave any power back to them, and that is a polite way of expressing the actual words he used, but “crawling through the door” is a phrase which has stuck in my mind.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250421080424_5403455ff6168f0d202a96cb53edea69136d74d59b989cfcc7cc4a1d57672cb5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_17" data-image-id="20250421080424_5403455ff6168f0d202a96cb53edea69136d74d59b989cfcc7cc4a1d57672cb5" data-rendition-name="original" width="2000" height="1317" loading="lazy" alt="fall of monarchy"> <figcaption>Nepali Times 28 April-3 May 2005 with cover image by Ajay Joshi of jubilant protesters after street demonstrations sidelined king Gyanendra, paving the way for a ceasfire and restoration of democracy. </figcaption> </figure>  As the conversation developed, it became ever clearer that King Gyanendra had decided to go in alone, relying on the misleading assurances he was constantly receiving from <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=14954">the army</a>, and no doubt his close advisers, that the Maoists could and would be quickly defeated militarily, and taken out of the equation. This would obviate the need for him to do any deal with the political parties.&nbsp; Thus, the way would be clear for him to establish a version of his father’s Panchayat system, under a constitution that would be granted to the people by him, their sovereign, as his father and brother had done in 1962 and 1990. As in those constitutions, ultimate power would have remained in the sovereign’s hands. This proposed direction of travel was very clear from what the king said to me. In sum, King Gyanendra was motivated by a desire to emulate his immediate predecessors by granting his people a constitution that would restore his father’s Panchayat system in a modern form and give him a central role in decision-making. What was particularly dispiriting was that beyond this single objective he had no plan worthy of the name, nor demonstrably did he have the people with the skills to implement an appropriate plan even if one had existed. Crucially and depressingly, there was little or no indication from the king that he realised that such a course of action could put Nepal’s monarchy into serious jeopardy, as indeed proved to be the case. <h2>King Twice</h2>  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250420110436_315d519fe3d68d2406ebe1480fed54720fbf21b8907a4da5cde751fdc623d445.jpg" data-media-id="editor_19" data-image-id="20250420110436_315d519fe3d68d2406ebe1480fed54720fbf21b8907a4da5cde751fdc623d445" data-rendition-name="original" width="1302" height="632" loading="lazy" alt="“Tell me what the common man is thinking!”"> </figure>  <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=8371">Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah has been king twice</a>. In 1950 he was enthroned briefly as a child king (left, above) by the Rana Prime Minister Mohan Shumsher when his grandfather, King Tribhuvan, fled to exile in India. In 2001 he was crowned king again after the massacre in the royal palace in which his brother King Birendra and nine other members of his family were killed by Crown Prince Dipendra.&nbsp; During his second reign, Gyanendra gradually asserted power by sacking Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2002, and then taking full control after the 1 February 2005 coup. He was sidelined after the ceasefire in April 2006, and became a commoner after the Constituent Assembly finally <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/Ftnp-abolishing,624">abolished the monarchy in 2008</a>. In the past year, Gyanendra has tried to exploit public dissatisfaction with the political parties to restore the monarchy.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250421080432_26ef4a4b0e3cee9fdc6794446702efe16550d293904b4f6dd46fe35d4d10c788.jpg" data-media-id="editor_22" data-image-id="20250421080432_26ef4a4b0e3cee9fdc6794446702efe16550d293904b4f6dd46fe35d4d10c788" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Essays on Nepal by Sam Cowen"> </figure>

“Tell me what the common man is thinking!”

“It's Kathmandu.” Just as the family was sitting down for one of its extended lunches, that jubilant cry was from François Driard’s grandfather announcing the next posting for his diplomat parents.&nbsp; Driard (pictured) was 18 in the summer of 1996,<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/suburban-tales/chasing-a-nomad"> a bit of a hippie</a> already, and his life was about to change forever with the magical word “<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/time-capsule-of-kathmandu">Kathmandu</a>”. “I was awed with that information from my grandfather, nothing else mattered … In France <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/tales-of-courage-and-suffering-cx95f89e">in the 1990s</a>, Kathmandu had a mythical aura,” Driard recalls. He came to Kathmandu for Christmas that year to visit his stepfather, the French Ambassador Michel Lummaux. It was to be the first of many visits during school holidays, before he decided to permanently settle down in Nepal. “Kathmandu, and Nepal, were very different then, it was magical, I liked the nature, the people, civilisation, temples, trees,” says Driard, who explored the country sitting on the top of buses. “Visitors talk about the crazy <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/cost-of-living-in-a-big-city">urbanisation</a>, traffic jams today, and all that is true. But Kathmandu has not <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/loss-of-soul-and-soil">lost its soul</a>.” After his stepfather’s tenure in Nepal ended, Driard worked as a business reporter for international publications but decided he did not want to be anyone’s employee anymore. In 2007 he landed in Kathmandu with €20,000 in savings to invest.&nbsp; He knew a few crucial things about himself: he liked food and nature, which is very much tied up with his upbringing--full of lively conversations during lunch and dinner at the family table between <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-yak-cheese-is-on-world-map">abundant cheese, wine and cigars</a>. So he decided it would be cheese, and registered Himalayan French Cheese and went to the French Alps for a month to learn how to make Tomme de Savoie. “<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-story-of-langtang-cheese">Cheese making is such an ancient craft </a>and so I thought I won’t need much money or studying which I hated and indeed, if you have a tamako bhado and fire you are set,” explains Driard. But Nepal’s temperature and humidity were not ideal, even at higher altitudes. The first customers for his cheese were the Hyatt Regency and Nina and Hager. But he needed to create a market for cheese in a country which only knew hard churpi in the north and soft paneer in the south. He started selling his cheeses at the Summit Hotel weekend market, expanding to his own 1905 Farmer’s Market which later moved to Le Sherpa in Maharajganj, where it is now, and also a market at Labim Mall in Pulchok. He had cow dairies in Nuwakot and Dhulikhel, and finally a yak cheese unit at 3,379m in Ramechhap. It was the yak blue cheese from here that went on to win a Gold Medal in France, putting Nepal’s French cheese on the world map. “People come and try our cheese at the market, they ask questions. There is a lot of education to be done about cheese,” adds Driard, who also has three cheese shops in the Valley. Driard now makes 25 types of cheese. The products are being noticed and every year he has French students coming to Nepal to learn the art of yak cheese making. “In France, one family or company makes one kind of cheese for generations. In that I’m very unique as a cheese artisan,” he says. “The students come in to learn but I tell them to also teach us something too, add another cheese to my collection.” Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/langtang-after-10-years">Langtang after 10 years</a>, Sonia Awale Being a foodie, Driard is now also dabbling in meat with his own charcuterie at Meatini with bacon, ham, sausage and pâtés. All of this is now served at his Emilio’s Pizza, a leafy hideaway in Lazimpat. His South Side in Moksh is probably the smallest wine bar in the world. “I call the process sublime,” says Driard of his ventures, which have grown organically. “You need the same temperature and humidity of 12°C and 80% for cheese, meat and wine.” Emilio’s speciality is the eight-cheese pizza (which has eight types of cheeses), and a pizza with bhutan topping (not the country but fried intestines and organs Nepali-style). He has opened a small branch at Courtyard in Pokhara.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250426070456_bacae302c040dc18eeecdeafda72ddf06a6d2cec138ea9be7e45fe94cdf8b5b3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250426070456_bacae302c040dc18eeecdeafda72ddf06a6d2cec138ea9be7e45fe94cdf8b5b3" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1125" loading="lazy" alt="8 cheese pizza"> <figcaption>Eight-cheese pizza</figcaption> </figure>  With two artisanal cheese units, two farmers’ markets, a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-meat-of-the-story">meat processing unit</a>, a bakery, and wine bar he now envisions a vineyard so he can add Nepali wine to his repertoire. Another future plan is to start up an agri-tourism business where customers can drink, eat and work in peace. In the past 20 years in Nepal, Driard has not always succeeded in his ventures but this hasn’t curbed his enthusiasm. He is learning as he goes, and like an old wine, Nepal is growing on him. Its slowness suits his French art de vivre with eating slowly outdoors, having conversation, importing less.&nbsp; “I have proven that with even a little money you can do a lot of things in Nepal,” adds Driard. “In the West, they easily invest half a million euros on a cheese factory, I invested 10 times less.”&nbsp;

Fromage, vin et charcuterie Népalais

Bhuthan भुठान starts with Bishnu Bahadur KC played by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/dhuwa-smoke-telefilm,2671">Hari Bansha Acharya</a> on a call, requesting to speak to the visa officer. By this point, he had <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-should-now-allow-visa-on-arrival">applied for a visa </a>to Bhutan 10 times, but was denied each time. KC was a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-women-excel-in-sports-in-2024-z9ramyct">national football player </a>in Bhutan in 1988 before he and other Nepali-speaking Lhotsampa people were forced out of the country in the 1990s as part of the Druk regime’s ‘One Nation One People’ campaign. Over 100,000 Bhutanese Nepalis were forced out, driven across India and dumped in Nepal where they lived in seven<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/elderly-left-in-bhutan-refugee-camp"> refugee camps</a> supervised by the United Nations and other charities until they were resettled in the United States, Australia, New Zealand and some European countries starting in 2007. In the fictional movie with the satirical English title The World’s Happiest Man, KC has resettled in the state of Ohio in the US but wishes to visit his home country once before he dies. Between flashbacks, we learn KC has died without having fulfilled his wish. &nbsp; The drama then focuses on KC’s two families from two marriages as they debate whether to cremate him as per <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/muslim-hindu,2996">Hindu rites </a>or give him a Christian burial. A mediator played by Hollywood actor Bruce Dern urges them to take a firm decision before it is too long.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250430140420_b398a08091b866da2b0b8f6c1e6e26781609749aba896bfd2c68a10a519295c3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20250430140420_b398a08091b866da2b0b8f6c1e6e26781609749aba896bfd2c68a10a519295c3" data-rendition-name="original" width="945" height="945" loading="lazy" alt="Bhutan, the movie"> </figure>  There are drawn out scenes of KC being baptised and when he is confronted by his first wife from Darjeeling played by Anuradha Majumdar, he says he changed his religion in the hope that he will be <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/bhutan-s-refugees-between-hope-and-despair">allowed back in Bhutan</a>.&nbsp; We find out KC has a second wife, a Christian Nepali played by Puja Chand. Dayahang Rai as the younger son doesn’t have much screen time to flex his acting chops. &nbsp; Acharya competently portrays a man that is equal parts haunted by the memories of and longing for his home country. KC’s pain and loss is acute when he is teaching football to Gungun but between mid-scene, he freezes, perhaps lost in memories of being in Bhutan’s national team. &nbsp; In another scene, KC recalls his mother singing a lullaby in Dzongkha. He also has a box filled with medals, photographs and a football which he deflates with a knife in a powerful depiction of his <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/searching-for-a-homeland-away-from-home?fb_comment_id=1506516030025634">complicated emotions about his homeland</a>. KC keeps checking his mailbox in the hopes that his <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4977">visa application</a> has been accepted. He says in Nepali: “If a tree that has already struck roots in one place is shifted to another, it will not survive.”  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250430140420_4a9c27410326489576c04dedf40016bda3825e8f9663317f54fbfec4cbda6d34.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20250430140420_4a9c27410326489576c04dedf40016bda3825e8f9663317f54fbfec4cbda6d34" data-rendition-name="original" width="1422" height="2048" loading="lazy" alt="Bhutan, the movie"> </figure>  Dern’s character says that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/nepal-s-transitional-justice-and-the-west-s-recalibration">western world</a> has become “lonely in pursuit of happiness”, another reference to Bhutan’s obsession with its Gross National Happiness index. Scenes shift quickly throughout making the story difficult to follow at times. The use of symbolism is a trite overdone. Nonetheless, भुठान is a nuanced depiction of raw pain and agony of losing one’s homeland. But one cannot help but leave the theatre feeling deflated. KC dies without having visited <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/small-bhutan-dreams-big">Bhutan</a>, but perhaps he does in his afterlife. It is up to the audience to create its own ending to this sad story of exile. भुठान Mad Monkey Films, 2025 Directed by Binod Paudel 102 minutes In cinemas in Nepal