Back to the SSR

BILASH RAI

If there is one thing that symbolises how far we have come in nearly two years of the peace process, it is the sight of the newly re-inducted Maoist ministers walking around with (ex-royal) Nepal Army bodyguards.

It should be a small extra step from this to integrate the two armies, but things are not as simple as that. Our army for many years was a largely ornamental force that paraded on Tundikhel twice a year and was at the beck and call of the palace. November 2001 changed all that, and for the next five years the army fought a dirty internal war that badly tarnished its reputation.

Nepal's defence budget tripled during the war years, the number of men under arms nearly doubled. We can't afford, and don't need, such a massive military. With the peace process, there is an opportunity to clean up the institution and move from a feudal praetorian guard to a non-partisan, professional force under elected civilian command.

So, how do you reconcile adding tens of thousands of ex-guerrillas into an army that should be downsized? Is soldiering the only job we have to offer ex-combatants? Downsizing and integration of Maoists into the army go under the acronym SSR (security sector reform).

Gen Katuwal's uncharacteristically direct comments after visiting India and before his China trip were echoed by the prime minister this week. However much UNMIN and the Europeans may push SSR, it looks like our giant neighbours aren't that fond of the idea. Now that we are getting ready to vote out a monarchy that used to be the symbol of nationalism, it is even more important to have a de-politicised army that is above the fray.

The way the Maoists have tampered with the ministries under their control gives ammunition to those against integration. The Ministry of Information has turned state media into Maoist mouthpieces. We just can't allow that to happen to the Nepal Army, or be politicised like the Nepal Police was by the NC and UML in the 1990s.

To be sure, Katuwal was being disingenuous when he said he didn't want the army to be infiltrated by indoctrinated cadre. After all, let's not forget that February First was a military coup of which the jarsap was one of the kingpins. If the army had no problem doing the bidding of diehard royalists then, theoretically, there should be no problem allowing diehard republicans into the rank and file now.

There is also a psychological factor at play here: for the sake of peace the army shouldn't reject integration outright. Cadre politics within the Maoists just wouldn't allow its leaders to be seen to accept the role of a defeated PLA. Senior commanders will probably drift into politics anyway, and some battle-hardened warriors could be useful to the national army.

The best compromise could be to set up a separate rapid deployment force made up of both armies for border patrols, industrial security and to guard the national parks.

But for all this to happen, it would behoove the comrades to show that they can be trusted, prove that the YCL listens to the leadership to stop extortion and violence, and desist from threatening every other day to go back to the jungles.