KIRAN PANDAY

In the middle of 2007, there were murmurs from the Maoists that they would quit the interim government unless a republic was declared immediately and a full PR system adopted. No one believed them, but they did walk out. Last year, the city was abuzz with speculation about whether the Maoists would sack Katawal. For whatever reason, they went ahead with their threat.

Over the past ten months, the Maoists have fluctuated a lot but throughout, they have been consistent about three things – we will not cooperate with Madhav Nepal; the next government should be under our leadership; and we will hit the streets to achieve our goal. The present stalemate persists because the Maoists have not budged.

There is a simple lesson here – take Maoist rhetoric seriously. They do not operate using the same strategies and tactics as other 'normal' liberal democratic parties, and usually end up doing what they say they will.

The Maoists are now preparing for their biggest show of strength ever, in both Kathmandu and other urban centres. From Ramechhap to Saptari, village committee members have been told to collect food and be ready to come to the capital at a moment's notice. Some from within the party have been sent to the cantonments to receive basic military skills (something UNMIN should flag up if it has come to their notice). In internal training sessions, comrades have been told this is the 'decisive battle'. Even as the other parties are asking the Maoists to become a 'civilian' party, smaller party units have been reorganised on 'military' lines.

So what is the aim?

Those at the bottom of the pyramid do not quite know. They have been told it is time for 'janabidroh', a people's revolt, but are ignorant of the larger political game.

At the top, everyone agrees on the need for mass protests and that there is no question of 'surrendering'. But there are differences about what this entails.

Kiran and company seem to think mass mobilisation, infused with a semi-violent apparatus, can enable them to capture the state. But the pragmatists within have argued that for a janabidroh to succeed, four elements are necessary – popular mass upsurge; a militant party apparatus; a division within the state security forces, especially NA, with the lower levels refusing to shoot; and support of sections of the international community. At best, the Maoists have the first two. Even there, the popular support of the middle and lower middle class in Kathmandu cannot be guaranteed given their 'vacillating' nature. Moderates in NC and UML, one might argue, would also get pushed towards the right-wing, ruining existing achievements.

Prachanda is shrewd enough to recognise that a unilateral seizure of power is not possible. But he also knows that the sole basis for a lot of Maoist bluster is the claim that they have a solid organisational and popular base. This is the time to prove it. Maoists say they will get 400,000 people out on May 1, which is definitely an over-estimate. Many in government are probably underestimating Maoist strength when they think the turn-out will be less than 100,000. But as soon as we get into that range, who really knows how to count?

The Maoist premise is that the non-Maoist politicians will get cold feet, the security organs will not want to get into a confrontation, and India will then try to stitch together a deal rather than risk a conflict with unknown results. If they do arrive at an agreement, the calculated gamble will have paid off. But if the non-Maoist camp does not blink, given that many feel the Maoists are bluffing (since they need a CA extension the most), then this could well go over the brink.

Rationality, logic and objective conditions suggest that there will be protests, but then the netas will hammer out something that allows them to continue to loot the state. But common sense is not the hallmark of Nepali politics, making predictions a hazardous task. Either way, the next few weeks will be critical, with long-lasting consequences for the nature of the state and who will dominate it.

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