Brian Wong is assistant professor in Philosophy at the University of Hong Kong whose research examines the intersection of geopolitics, political and moral philosophy, and technology, with particular interests in the ethics and dynamics of authoritarian regimes and their foreign policies. Nepali Times interviewed him ahead of his keynote to Nepal-China 101 organised by Nepal Economic Forum in Kathmandu on 17 August.
Nepali Times: Nepal would like to see itself as landlinked, and not landlocked. What is the possibility of the country being an economic bridge between China and India?
Brian Wong: Both China and India are regional powers with significant interests in what their leaderships may perceive to be their respective spheres of influence. India's ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ (from the 2000s onwards) and China's ‘Belt and Road Strategy’ have been framed by many observers as thus inevitably clashing.
I would suggest that in lieu of reading these two powers' control and presence as absolute and exclusive, we can perhaps take a leaf from a modified Mandala model, whereby Nepal engages with both great powers whilst retaining its own autonomy. The frame that we should adopt should be tripartite-winning win/win/win for Kathmandu, Beijing, and New Delhi.
Given the sensitivity around the Himalaya between China and India, I would suggest that Nepal should perhaps see itself as less of a bridge, as a relatively neutral ‘whisperer' — in the same way Singapore is, in the words of Ambassador Walter Woon, for China and the US, between China and India.
A ‘buffer’ is perhaps too passive a term. A more appropriate concept would be to position Nepal as the cradle of talents who can speak across the Himalaya, as emphatic communicators and astute watchers of the Sino-Indian relationship.
Nepal would like to hitch its wagons to the Chinese and Indian economic engines, but somehow it is not working out.
Clarity is key. Clarity about interests — where lie the country's core priorities and commitments. How can it set about tackling its porous customs border and de-centralised (or, at times, defective) trade monitoring and taxation regime, to ensure that goods and services flowing in and out of the country are properly accounted for, with the corresponding dividends accruing to the people and not the selective few? How can it crack down upon those who evade taxes or smuggle goods across the border? How can it develop a niche and specialised manufacturing sector without the ability to fall back on a huge labour dividend, in an era of rapid automation? These are urgent questions that demand answering and operationalisation.
Then there is clarity about expectations, wants, and objectives. Nepal must communicate clearly to both Beijing and New Delhi what its own redlines and vital non-negotiable interests are. It must then set out areas where bargaining and bartering remain possible, and where tradeoffs are convenient towards Pareto-optimising across the board.
The [Nepal Economic] Forum report is both astute and on-point: it's about linking concrete and specific wants to particular asks, and emphasising to the establishments on the two sides that if they want a more proactive and vigorous Nepal government, they should respect Nepal's right to not choose -- and to court both Beijing and New Delhi alike.
Furthermore, Nepal must also diversify. I spend a lot of time in ASEAN, and there is immense potential and energy emerging from advanced manufacturing and semiconductor supply chains, through to renewable energy and digital services/e-commerce. Nepal should leverage and artfully harness its human capital, through sending promising and public-service-minded scholars abroad — with the demand that they come back and serve.
What are the areas that Nepal could take advantage from China’s phenomenal economic advance?
Rather than merely serving as a passive recipient of infrastructural financing which can inadvertently foster asymmetrical dependencies if not carefully managed, Nepal must strategically identify sectors where China's economic metamorphosis aligns with its own domestic capacity building. The foremost is in the digital economy and telecommunication.
Nepal can leapfrog traditional developmental stages by integrating advanced Chinese 5G infrastructure, e-commerce architectures, and digital payment systems. How can Nepal empower its youth to participate in the global gig economy if it lacks robust, affordable broadband?
China is the world's leading producer of solar photovoltaics and possesses vast expertise in hydroelectric engineering. Under the framework of the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network, Kathmandu should negotiate aggressively for technology transfer — not just capital investment — in harnessing its immense, underexploited hydropower potential.
Finally, Nepal should pivot its tourism strategy from volume to value, targeting the burgeoning, affluent Chinese middle class. This requires moving beyond standard package tours and developing high-end, ecologically sustainable hospitality sectors. By upgrading aviation infrastructure and coupling it with targeted digital marketing on platforms like WeChat and CTrip (Xiecheng), Nepal can capture a lucrative demographic without compromising its ecological redlines.
Nepal’s foreign policy has historically been guided by the doctrine of equidistance between its two giant neighbours. But there is also the United States that it has to contend with.
Equidistance, whilst historically a useful heuristic, perhaps implies a static, almost mathematical rigidity that is frankly ill-suited for today's fluid, multipolar geopolitics. As we introduce the United States into this calculus, particularly given Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and initiatives like the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, Nepal apparently finds itself navigating not merely a bilateral squeeze, but a broader theatre of global great power competition.
To grapple with this complexity, Kathmandu must transition from ‘equidistance’ to ‘strategic multi-alignment’ or ‘equiproximity’. This means evaluating foreign engagements not based on ideological alignment, but on strict, case-by-case pragmatism.
The successful, albeit much debated, ratification of the $500 million MCC compact in 2022 demonstrated that Nepal can accept vital American development aid whilst explicitly reaffirming its non-alignment and refusal to join any military alliance.
To maintain this delicate balance, Nepal must bolster its institutional capacity to scrutinise incoming investments and aid. When Beijing, New Delhi, or Washington come knocking, Nepal’s bureaucratic apparatus must possess the forensic ability to say: “Here is what we accept, here are the conditionalities we reject, and here is how this project specifically optimises our sovereign interests.”
By acting as a transparent, rule-abiding, and predictable partner, and refusing to play one superpower off the other in a zero-sum game, Nepal can carve out a sovereign space that commands respect from all three capitals.
Being from Hong Kong, what role do you see the territory that has strong ties to Nepal play in economic growth and progress?
Hong Kong presents a unique, under-explored value proposition for Kathmandu. The relationship is already anchored by a profound historical trust, forged by the generations of Gurkhas who helped build and secure Hong Kong, resulting in a vibrant, integrated Nepali diaspora in the city today. Hong Kong can serve as an important conduit and enabler of Nepal's developmental ambitions.
As an emerging premier green finance hub, Hong Kong is perfectly positioned to structure and issue green bonds for Nepal’s infrastructure projects, attracting international institutional investors who might otherwise hesitate to navigate Nepal's domestic financial markets.
Foreign corporations often cite legal unpredictability and dispute resolution as primary deterrents for FDI. By structuring joint ventures and international contracts with arbitration clauses seated in Hong Kong — leveraging its robust, internationally recognised common law framework — Nepal can significantly de-risk itself in the eyes of global investors. Ultimately, Hong Kong can act as a sophisticated, cosmopolitan conduit for capital and professional services, helping Nepal translate its raw potential into operationalised, world-class growth.
And central to all of this is the role of education. We need more scholarships, exchanges, dialogues, and high-level track-2/1.5s between China and Nepal, and Hong Kong can definitely play a role here. We have five of the top 100 universities in the world, per various international rankings.