Although instability is endemic to South and Southeast Asia, it is becoming increasingly dangerous both for India’s neighbors and India itself. This was reflected most recently in the violent unrest in Nepal. But that crisis is hardly an isolated case. In Bangladesh, directly to India’s east, the same tensions that led to the overthrow of the government in 2024 remain unresolved. And to the southeast, Thailand is reeling from the court-ordered removal of its prime minister and a series of recent border clashes with Cambodia. 
According to the Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data project, Myanmar’s civil war has claimed at least <a href="https://acleddata.com/report/war-sky-how-drone-warfare-shaping-conflict-myanmar" target="_blank">80,000 lives</a>, both civilians and combatants, since 2021, following the military coup that ended Aung San Suu Kyi’s democratic government. To India’s west, a perpetually volatile Pakistan wrestles with the zombies of its history: Islamist extremist groups and poor economic and governmental performance. 
To the south, Sri Lanka may have settled down following the ouster of its president three years ago, but its economy shows few signs of mounting a sustained recovery. And to the north, China’s quest for regional hegemony is another source of instability. 
For India, these crises are not distant concerns. Refugee flows from Bangladesh are causing social unease and disruptions in India’s eastern states; the never-ending threat of cross-border terror from Pakistan nearly incited a war in Kashmir this summer; and now, Nepal’s volatile politics have given China another opportunity for meddling. Since this arc of fragility is too large to ignore, the question for India’s leadership is how to absorb and minimize the shockwaves, and how to steady the region.
One can start with Nepal, which has struggled to live by the ambitious constitution that was forged to end a long Maoist rebellion two decades ago. Nepali state institutions remain fragile and contested, and hopes of stability have been repeatedly dashed by factionalism, corruption, and political leaders’ inability to consolidate a system that everyone can trust. The recent spasm of shockingly brutal violence is a symptom of these deeper fault lines. 
India cannot be indifferent to such instability. Our long, open border with Nepal makes us vulnerable to refugee flows and cross-border crime, and our deep cultural, ethnic, religious, and economic ties mean that the government in Kathmandu will always look over its shoulder at the government in New Delhi. Moreover, China’s increasing influence in Nepal’s domestic politics has, as a matter of necessity, made the country a major strategic concern for India. 
In Bangladesh, the interim government that has ruled since <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/sheikh-hasina">Sheikh Hasina</a>’s ouster is failing in its efforts to restore law and order or safeguard human rights. The economy, a bright spot for decades, is under pressure from domestic political jitters and US President Donald Trump’s punishing tariffs. The febrile political environment has left the country’s minorities feeling increasingly insecure. The stakes for India are high, because its own efforts to manage the border, migration, and counterterrorism depend on the regime in Dhaka maintaining order. 
At first glance, Thailand’s turmoil and the border clashes with Cambodia may seem less urgent. But India, under its Act East policy, has been pursuing deeper economic and strategic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ ten member states and their 600 million-plus people. Any instability within that bloc will complicate this outreach. 
Moreover, Thailand has long served as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. If its institutions falter, or if disputes with Cambodia escalate despite Malaysian Prime Minister <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/anwar-ibrahim">Anwar Ibrahim</a>’s best efforts to broker a resolution, India’s vision of a connected, secure Indo-Pacific corridor could become untenable. 
To describe Pakistan as chronically troubled may sound dismissive, but it is an unfortunate truth. The country’s civilian authorities have been consistently undermined, as when <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/imran-khan-1">Imran Khan</a>’s elected government was ousted in 2022 at the military’s behest. Extremist groups thrive when politics becomes a blood sport, and Pakistan’s fragile economy only exacerbates this dynamic. 
From India’s perspective, Pakistan’s troubles are more than a domestic issue, because they regularly threaten to spill across the Line of Control in Kashmir, fueling terrorism, destroying any prospect for regional peace, and even introducing the specter of a nuclear catastrophe. This continuous instability chains India to the sub-continental chessboard, even when it wants to look outward. The Pakistan-China axis further complicates the status quo, which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
All these stories point to a larger worrying trend: democracy in India’s neighborhood is in retreat. Constitutions are being rewritten, and courts politicized. Sensing weakness, too many army generals see themselves as free to intervene, including by jailing or exiling political leaders.
For India – the world’s largest democracy – responding to this trend demands a more assertive regional strategy. Of course, for most of South Asia, barring Pakistan, India is the first responder when crises hit. But during periods when India’s neighbors do not think they need its help, they tend to shrug off its security concerns. 
And as if India’s neighborhood were not dangerous enough, the wider world adds its own layers of uncertainty. Trump’s policy toward the region has been arbitrary in the extreme, leading smaller states to hedge their bets. In Japan and South Korea, debates are underway about the wisdom of acquiring nuclear weapons, now that China is flexing its muscles and the US security umbrella has been called into question. 
Although India has stood its ground in the face of the storm, the regional and Trump-induced volatility is making it harder to maintain the country’s treasured strategic autonomy. The task now is no longer to deepen ties with America, but to maintain the strategic, technological, and economic core of the partnership while building resistance against sudden shifts in US policy. 
India is not seeking dominance in South Asia. Its goal is to build an inclusive, rules-based, and connected region – and thus transform a history of recurring crises into a future of enduring stability. © <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">Project Syndicate</a>
Nirupama Rao is a former foreign secretary of India and former Indian ambassador to China and the United States.

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India’s reckoning with its dangerous neighbourhood

The past year has been marked by a series of revolutions and political shocks as young people across Asia have taken to the streets, demanding accountable governments, fairer societies, and economic opportunities.
Binaifer Nowrojee has aptly termed this wave of upheavals 'youthquakes'.&nbsp;
The most dramatic upheaval took place a year ago in Bangladesh, where anger over politicised public-sector job quotas escalated into a nationwide movement to topple Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government, leading to the fall of Asia’s 'Iron Lady'.
While some celebrated Hasina’s ouster as a brave stand against authoritarianism, many viewed it as the beginning of a turbulent and uncertain period.&nbsp;
Some raised concerns about the threat of Islamist violence and heightened geopolitical tensions. Others attributed the uprising to public frustration with neoliberal reforms promoted by the IMF. Economist Jeffrey Sachs went further, dismissing the revolution as a US‑backed regime change.
But these interpretations overlook the enormous potential of a bottom-up, youth-led revolution. Despite facing powerful global headwinds, Bangladesh’s youth movement has continued to gain strength in the year since Hasina’s fall.&nbsp;
What began as street protests against corrupt and anti-democratic practices has evolved into a broader campaign for structural reform.
In the year since the revolution, youth activists have not only helped sustain the interim administration but have also laid the groundwork for a transition to electoral democracy. While the road ahead remains fraught with challenges, five key developments offer grounds for hope.
First, youth activism has catalysed the emergence of new civil-society platforms that have encouraged non-political elites to participate in critical public dialogues.&nbsp;
Since August 2024, new grassroots initiatives and professionalised NGOs have triggered a surge in civic engagement, fueling community-led conversations on how to confront discrimination, address systemic inequities, and advance essential pre-election reforms.
Second, the youth movement has made significant institutional gains. Young organisers have mobilised support for Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus’s interim government, helping to extend his mandate and secure domestic and international support for his election roadmap.&nbsp;
They have also pushed major parties to support the formation of a National Consensus Commission tasked with advancing reform discussions in five areas: the constitution, the judiciary, the electoral system, public administration, and anti-corruption.
Third, in addition to fuelling demand for institutional reform, young activists have taken a bold step into formal politics by launching the National Citizen Party (NCP) – Bangladesh’s first student-led political party. Once officially registered, the NCP aims to provide young voters with a viable alternative to traditional parties ahead of the anticipated election in early 2026.
Fourth, Bangladeshi youth are harnessing the energy of street protests to reshape the country’s political culture. For example, they are calling for lowering the voting age to 16 and promoting transparent, crowd-funded election financing instead of opaque or illicit political donations.
Lastly, strategic engagement with political elites has already delivered tangible results. Relentless campaigns by emerging youth and civic groups have brought together all major political parties to deliberate on a sweeping set of 166 reforms.&nbsp;
Following months-long negotiations, the National Consensus Commission is expected to release a manifesto – the much anticipated July Charter – a formal document listing agreed-upon fundamental constitutional and governance reforms and commitments on future implementation.&nbsp;
These include term limits for the prime minister, the establishment of a bicameral parliament with proportional representation, judicial and police independence, stronger opposition rights, mandatory legislative review of international treaties, and new mechanisms for public accountability, such as referenda and anti-corruption oversight.
A Warning Sign
Still, while the past year has shown that tech-savvy, cross-class youth coalitions can outmaneuver entrenched patron-client politics, the initial optimism may prove short-lived. Crucially, major fault lines could cause the Bangladesh revolution to end like the short-lived Arab Spring of the early 2010s.
The NCP’s growing credibility issues are a warning sign. With two members in government, it is considered a king’s party. Although it is still awaiting registration, the party is already facing corruption allegations, including accusations of institutionalising mob justice and exploiting privileged access to public institutions for political gain. Violent clashes with political opponents have further damaged its reputation.
At the same time, growing dissatisfaction could undermine the interim government’s efforts to extend its tenure. In July, the government’s mishandling of a fighter-jet crash exposed persistent coordination failures within Yunus’s cabinet.&nbsp;
And while the long-delayed trial of Hasina began this month – in absentia – human-rights organisations have raised concerns about the government’s use of arbitrary detention to target perceived political opponents.
Ultimately, Bangladesh’s political future hinges on the interim government’s ability to deliver a fair, clean, and violence-free national election in early 2026. The problem is that the once-united youth-led coalition that toppled Hasina’s regime appears increasingly fragile and divided.
The NCP’s youth leadership must recognise that meaningful policy change is a long-term process that will extend well beyond the next election. With the NCP and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party locked in a standoff over the pace of reforms, the country risks falling into its own version of the prisoner’s dilemma: unless they cooperate, both stand to lose.
To ensure that reform efforts yield more than a symbolic “one-day democracy,” Bangladesh’s youth leaders must prioritise dialogue over confrontation and work to resolve disagreements over timing and implementation.&nbsp;
Continued insistence on an all-at-once approach risks derailing progress and pulling the country back into a cycle of instability and repression, jeopardising Bangladesh’s future after its upcoming graduation from ‘least developed country’ status.&nbsp;
It could also allow Hasina’s Awami League to remobilise and reenter the electoral arena – an outcome that may align with the unspoken interests of a section of the military elite.
Regardless of the next election’s outcome, the fall of Hasina has irreversibly transformed Bangladesh’s political landscape. Having sparked a nationwide movement for structural reform, the country’s youth are now firmly rooted in the political transition they initiated. But as they are discovering, toppling a repressive regime is far easier than building a better one. © Project Syndicate
M Niaz Asadullah, Head of the Southeast Asia cluster of the Global Labor Organization, is a visiting professor of economics at the University of Reading.

Bangladesh’s Youthquake

Earlier in August, after Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India following her violent suppression of a people’s movement, in Nepal pundits asked: ‘Is Nepal Next?”&nbsp;
The national narrative here focused on similar public discontent with leaders who have overstayed, disregarding public welfare while being neck-deep in corruption. They pointed out that the present NC-UML coalition government was ‘India-aligned’, just as Sheikh Hasina was.
Nepal’s cybersphere also shared Indian mainstream media’s magnified reports of attacks on Hindu targets in Dhaka, leaving out the fact that most were attacked for being close to the Hasina and her Awami League.&nbsp;
Some Nepali media also unquestioningly reported that Nepal’s border security was on ‘heightened alert’ for a ‘mass influx’ of Hindu refugees, forgetting that Nepal and Bangladesh do not even have a contiguous border.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">Peacemongers at India-Pakistan border</a>, Beena Sarwar
Regional upheavals have a long history of impacting Nepali politics. After Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed by the military in 1979, student protests erupted in Kathmandu and quickly turned into mass rallies against the partyless Panchayat system. King Birendra finally agreed to hold a referendum on the absolute monarchy.
When street protests in Sri Lanka forced out the Rajapaksa government and the economy went into freefall in 2022, Nepali commentators again asked: ‘Is Nepal Next?’ Nepal’s macroeconomic position was in a much sounder footing, but editors needed catchy headlines.
Bangladesh’s unrest was initially triggered by students protesting the quota for government jobs, and commentators here immediately drew parallels with constitutionally-guaranteed reservations for women as well as ethnic and caste minorities – even though in Bangladesh the anger was over the increased job quota for Awami League cadre.&nbsp;
If all this was not convoluted enough, add geopolitics to the mix. India and China are now in overt competition for influence in the Subcontinent, a region New Delhi regards as being in its sphere of influence. While Sri Lanka and the Maldives are strategic because of their location astride Indian Ocean maritime routes, Nepal, Bangladesh and to a certain extent Bhutan, are important buffers.&nbsp;
India was fully backing the secular Awami League despite Sheikh Hasina’s &nbsp;growing authoritarianism and her close trade and economic ties with China.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/selfies-on-the-prime-minister-s-bed">Selfies on the prime minister’s bed</a>, Guna Raj Luitel
In July, Hasina returned to Dhaka earlier than scheduled during a state visit to Beijing after being unable to secure a $5 billion loan from China. New Delhi had also leaned on Hasina to cancel China’s involvement in the Teesta contract, and award it to India.&nbsp;
In Sri Lanka, Chinese ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is said to have contributed to its economic collapse, pushing President Ranil Wickremesinghe closer to India and the West to cultivate support for its IMF bailout in June. Defence and maritime cooperation has followed hot on the heels of these deals.&nbsp;
The China’s Exim Bank did sign a $4.2 billion debt restructuring agreement with Sri Lanka in June, showing that Wickremesinghe is deftly trying to balance geopolitical ties.
In the Maldives, relations with New Delhi soured and broke into full-scale war on cybersphere after Mohamed Muizzu won elections earlier this year. But Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s was in Malé this week to ‘rectify’ Muizzu’s pro-Beijing tilt.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/retrofitting-saarc">Retrofitting SAARC</a>, Shristi Karki
In Nepal, China has made no secret of its wish to seek unity among myriad Communist factions, while India and the West have worked behind the scenes to wreck that plan. The latest coalition switch in July was a manifestation of this geopolitical jostling.&nbsp;
India’s new Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri made a courtesy visit to Kathmandu this week where officials were careful not to raise contentious issues like Kalapani, the Eminent Person’s Group report, new air routes, or to lift restrictions on buying surplus hydroelectricity from plants with Chinese involvement. Misri was formerly India’s ambassador in Beijing.
Interestingly, the Chinese who never openly commented publicly on Nepal’s internal affairs are now much more vocal, while the Indians who used to be very outspoken have taken a hands-off approach ever since the 2015 Blockade.&nbsp;
The latest example of this new Chinese mood is Ambassador Chen Song’s X posts with crude criticism last month of a Nepali journalist’s report on the Pokhara airport loan, or using undiplomatic language about the unsuccessful search for the twin buses that fell into the Trisuli, killing 59.&nbsp;
Still, the recent regime change in Dhaka is a warning to Nepal’s leaders not to take electoral mandate for granted, and to demonstrate results from better governance in the run-up to the next elections in 2027, or risk losing out to populist parties.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-love-triangle-with-china-and-india-impacts-investment">Nepal’s China-India love-triangle impacts investment</a>, Ramesh Kumar

Shristi Karki

The geopolitics of Nepal’s politics…

The scenes from Dhaka on Monday were eerily similar to the ransacking of the residences of Ferdinand Marcos or Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Protesters took selfies lying on Sheikh Hasina’s bed (pictured above), they lounged on her sofas, feasted on biryani, and looted whatever was portable.&nbsp;
As is usually the case, it only takes a spark to light a revolt when a people’s fury at ruthless rulers reaches the tipping point. Hasina’s regime cracked down brutally on demonstrators, killing more than 300.&nbsp;
After another day of bloodshed on 4 August, Hasina lost support of the security forces, and jubilant protesters watched as their <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/05/asia/bangladesh-prime-minister-residence-stormed-intl/index.html">prime minister of 15 years fly off to India</a>. Army Chief Waker-Uz-Zaman announced an interim government would be formed.
There is a vital lesson from what has happened in Bangladesh for the rest of South Asia and beyond. Rulers cannot rest on their laurels just because they were freedom fighters. If citizens do not benefit from regime change, they will sweep rulers into the dustbin of history.
History is replete with examples of despots who plunder, torture and kill opponents, but are overthrown sooner or later. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/aug/05/why-bangladesh-prime-minister-sheikh-hasina-resigned">Sheikh Hasina</a>, was elected for the fifth time in a rigged election in January that was boycotted by the opposition BNP, and accepted only by India.
Hasina's fate is also a lesson for regional powers who back tyrants for geopolitical reasons: what they gain from such support can be tenuous and short-lived.
Nepal is presently not ruled by an elected despot, our press is the freest in the region, and the check and balance of democracy here function relatively well. Yet, the events in Bangladesh have an important lesson for our elderly rulers and mass media.&nbsp;
Are we in the media also partly to blame for increasing public frustration with politics as usual that is making Nepalis cynical and apathetic?
Nepal’s new politicians have exploited the fecklessness of old rulers by using the new media to gather populist support. Journalists are seen to be comrades-in-arms of the legacy leaders, and are collectively held responsible for Nepal’s decline.&nbsp;
In the age of citizen journalism, there is a misconception that the mass media has become redundant. However, in-depth journalism is more essential than ever to help citizens navigate information overload, disinformation and deep fakes.&nbsp;
The mobile phone and its algorithm-driven networking platforms are more for entertainment than information. And if information is a major part of content, then more often than not it is fake news and toxic trolling. Readership has not decreased, it has just migrated, and the sources of information have changed.
The main reason Nepal's politicians and journalists find themselves targetted is because they played active roles together in the people power movements of 1990 and 2006.
Indeed, journalists have been at the forefront of the restoration and protection of democracy and in upholding press freedom — through the conflict years, and after king Gyanendra’s coup in 2005.&nbsp;
But <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/stemming-asia-s-democratic-decay">when democracy fails to deliver</a>, the public and populists tend to blame not just elected politicians, but also journalists.&nbsp;
The irony is that Nepal’s leadership is reluctant to credit the mass media for helping defend democracy and making it possible for them to get to power. Instead, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/press-for-people">many politicians would like to muzzle the media</a> because of its role in holding their power to account and exposing corruption in high places.&nbsp;
The media is playing its mandated adversarial role in Nepal’s democracy, but click-bait media and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/democracy-s-discontents">populist politicians</a> see public-interest journalism as competition for public attention.
We in the legacy media therefore find ourselves being distrusted by old guard politicians, and as rivals by YouTubers and TikTokers.
The state itself refuses thus far to recognise the communication enterprise as an industry, and successive governments <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/gagging-the-press-in-installments">have tried to weaken the traditional mass media by laws and policies</a>. The ban on alcohol ads on grounds of public health, even though such goods can be openly bought and consumed, is part of that strategy.&nbsp;
New leaders like Kathmandu mayor Balen Shah were propelled to power by new media. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepals-home-minister-vs-the-media">RSP’s Rabi Lamichhane</a> also fanned cyber-populism to get elected, which is why he is so dismissive of the ‘Dirty Dozen’ (१२-भाइ एडिटर) of the legacy media that exposed his wrongdoings.
The lesson from the Bangladesh upheaval for Nepal’s rulers who have been at the helm now for decades is this: clean up your act and start delivering, or else face a similar fate.
<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clywww69p2vo">Sheikh Hasina</a> persecuted the press, allowing social pressure to build up until it all exploded in her face. A free press is democracy’s safety valve, and it is in the self-interest of Nepal’s political parties to defend it.
Gunaraj Luitel is the Chief Editor of Nagarik Daily in Kathmandu.
@gunaraj

Selfies on the prime minister’s bed

Fast-moving developments in Bangladesh on Monday are a lesson for political leaders in Nepal and the region that lack of accountability and violent suppression of dissent cannot contain popular anger. Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Bangladesh’s founding leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who was elected for the fifth time in controversial elections earlier this year, is said to have been airlifted to India as protesters stormed her official residence in Dhaka. Hasina presided over the country with an iron hand, using the government’s security agencies in the past month in a harsh crackdown that left at least 300 people dead. In the past 17 years after she came to power, she had been targeting opposition parties, persecuting independent journalists and civil society leaders, including Nobel-prize winning Muhammad Yunus.&nbsp; The student protests were sparked off by an increase in a government quota for civil service jobs that favoured supporters of Hasina’s parties. But it soon escalated into a nationwide mass movement that was fuelled by economic woes as well as the increasing authoritarianism of Hasina’s Awami League party. The lessons for other authoritarian regimes in the region are clear: leaders can use force to suppress dissent, dismantle press freedom, and protect their powers but not for long. And when frustration boils over, live bullets cannot stop a people power uprising.&nbsp; But there is also a warning from the events in Bangladesh to elected politicians in countries like Nepal who lack accountability, and have shielded themselves from prosecution from corruption. Nepal’s own politicians also came to power after massive street protests against an absolute monarchy in 1990 and 2006 that ultimately turned the country into a republic. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-bangladesh-tinderbox">The Bangladesh tinderbox</a>, Shahidul Alam  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240805130812_c1c25ff63aa5f3eb685168676ba7bd43f5023619542795afb4162142b87abccf.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20240805130812_c1c25ff63aa5f3eb685168676ba7bd43f5023619542795afb4162142b87abccf" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="854" loading="lazy" alt="Bangladesh solidarity protests NT"> <figcaption>Civil society activists had protested in Kathmandu last week in solidarity with Bangladeshi protesters. Photo: SUMAN NEPALI</figcaption> </figure>  Hasina used the police and her dreaded intelligence agency to deploy indiscriminate violence against the students, and later the general public, leaving hundreds dead — 90 of them on Sunday alone. This was the worst bloodshed Bangladesh had seen since the country’s liberation war in 1971. “We have been liberated for the second time,” Rumeena Farhana, former MP from the opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP), told Al Jazeera. &nbsp; Hasina was said to be getting ready to address the nation after meeting with the Army Chief when protesters started storming her residence and looting furniture. The Army Chief’s own address scheduled for Monday afternoon was also pushed back as hundreds of thousands of people poured out into the streets to celebrate.&nbsp; The Army Chief is reported to be working with political leaders to discuss setting up an interim government to defuse the situation and oversee elections. Hasina and her party were regarded as being close to India, although she also maintained close economic ties with China.&nbsp; Hasina’s father and entire family were assassinated in a coup in 1975, and she narrowly survived a grenade attack on her election rally in 2004. Since then, Bangladesh has had frequent military coups, and several generals have made a transition to civilian politics. She had been prime minister since 1996. Civil society activists had protested in Kathmandu last week in solidarity with Bangladeshi people power protesters suffering the violent crackdowns. Nepali students had been airlifted from Dhaka in the past weeks, and dozens of journalists, bloggers and activists had fled to Nepal in the past decade to escape the government's crackdown on media and democracy. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/the-death-of-democracy">The death of democracy</a>, Aditya Adhikari

People power removes Bangladesh leader

In the very first page of the first chapter of Nepal 2043: The Road to Prosperity are two maps. The first places Nepal right at the epicentre of Asia, and in the second the Kathmandu is at exactly the midpoint between Mumbai and Beijing. With his trademark optimism, author Sujeev Shakya says Nepal is not land-locked but land-linked to three billion people in China and India. We just need those two economic engines to pull us in the same direction. ‘With China and India becoming the two largest economies in the world in the next two decades … Nepal is the most valuable piece of real estate in the world,’ Shakya writes. For one thing, Nepal does not look beyond India and China for tourism — with the right policies it can attract millions of tourists just from those two countries. Nepal is set to graduate from a low- to a middle-income country by 2026 and to a high-income country in 2043 — hence the name of the book. The year 2043 in the Bikram Sambat calendar is also 2100 — a new Nepali century. The book delves into the past, present and future of Nepal and analyses enablers including hydropower, a fundamental transformation of which will drive the 2043 goal. The commoditisation of electricity will be the biggest transformation. Nepal can deploy ‘Cyber Gurkhas’ to attract foreign investors with the management of data centres with climate friendly renewable energy. Access to technology such as precision agriculture, a data-driven approach to farming to improve food production, reduce environmental impact and enhance profitability could be Nepal’s strategy into 2043 and beyond. ‘Earlier, we needed ploughs and strong hands in agriculture. Now, you need a computer and strong fingers,” Shakya writes, citing a neighbour’s son who inspects his crops from drone cameras. A farmer in an Ilam teashop tells the author he asks AI questions in Nepali, and it answers promptly. The biggest enabler of all is Nepal’s young demography with 62% of the population in the active 15-60 age bracket, while 28% are younger than 14. Nepal’s dependency ratio has dropped to the lowest in history with 100 Nepalis having to support 62 dependents. But this demographic dividend window is closing. Nepal’s total fertility rate declined from 2.62% in 1981 to 0.92% in 2021 — below replacement level. We have less than 30 years left to make the best use of the youth, many of whom are currently studying and working abroad. Nepal’s biggest resource, therefore, is its diaspora spread across the world who send home $20 billion a year. Migration is not just a necessity but an aspiration for many Nepalis, and they are an important source of contacts, investment and soft power. This young and educated group has taken advantage of connectivity and digitisation in all arenas of national life. TikTok and Instagram have become e-commerce platforms, or mobile app-riven digital services. Nepal’s software companies exported over $1 billion worth of IT products last year. Next we need a change in the bureaucratic mindset to eliminate paper and manual processes, which would also contribute to reducing corruption. Shakya comes up with many revelations: 81% of Nepalis live in houses they own, much higher than most other South Asian countries which means higher disposable income. Nepal has the highest tax-to-GDP ratio in South Asia. The banking sector is twice the size of Bangladesh despite Nepal having just one-fifth of its population. In 2021, 12.62% of the population had demat accounts in Nepal, while India had only 5.32%. For every five male investors, there are four women in Nepal while it is 10:1 in India. With such figures and prospects, how come Nepal just went through a violent uprising that took the shortest time to topple a democratically-elected government in modern history? One early chapter of 2043 is actually dedicated to how Nepalis have always thrived on chaos. When people faced up to 20 hours of power cuts a day, people worked around the load-shedding schedule, woke up at ungodly hours to cook and stock up on inverters. They did not put up a fight, or even protest. ''Generally, Nepalis are used to taking things lying down, and perhaps this also needs to change,' says Shakya, writing that line before last month’s uprising. ‘On the one hand, some of these issues speak volumes about the average Nepali’s patience and perhaps optimism that things will change in the long run. On the other hand, one is also forced to wonder how much longer they will be able to put up with unfavourable conditions if things don’t change.’ It does seem Nepali had enough with corruption, governance failure and political apathy to the concerns of ordinary people. The final chapter lists the non-negotiables to realise the 2043 Nepal Roadmap: democratic values and freedom of speech, a capitalist welfare state and socio-political transformation to tackle corruption and impunity. The book notes, ‘Countries transitioning to democratic rule experienced a 20% increase in GDP over a 25 year period compared to what they would have achieved under authoritarian regimes. After the end of the Shah rule in 2006, Nepal’s GDP rose from US$10 billion to US$44 billion by 2024.’ The government’s Vision 2030 document projects Nepal’s GDP at US$100 billion, and the Vision 2043 estimates that it will be a US$423 billion economy with a per capita of US$12,100. However, it will need more than optimism and practical action to make these projections real. China and India loom large throughout the book with examples of small city states like Singapore which have taken advantage of their strategic location. Despite the tension between India and China, the two will have to collaborate given the inherent advantages. China has replaced the United States as India’s biggest trading partner. Sujeev Shakya is a great admirer of former Singaporean diplomat and author Kishore Mahbubani, and he has written a blurb for the book. He quotes Mahbubani saying that for the past 2,000 years, apart from the last two hundred, Asian countries have dominated the world, and it is quite natural that the world’s economic centre is returning to Asia. And Nepal is strategically placed to make the most of it because of its location between two of the world’s fastest growing economies. We just have to get our politics right, and have a strategy for equitable growth in the new Nepali century.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251016091052_78b2d1495d59cd492a17693e0e770b65230c7cb749393ac6643f4676b73832ef.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251016091052_78b2d1495d59cd492a17693e0e770b65230c7cb749393ac6643f4676b73832ef" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sujeev Shakya book details NT"></figure>

Retrofitting Nepal for future shocks

In the aftermath of the GenZ protests last month, as new PM Sushila Karki chose the first members of her Council of Ministers, youth collectives urged that it reflect the country’s diversity by including women, youth and people from various ethnic and socio-cultural backgrounds.&nbsp;
It took another couple of weeks for Karki to include &nbsp;bureaucrat and public health expert Sangeeta Mishra as &nbsp;Health Minister in her next tranche of ministers. Almost immediately, people dug up a video of Mishra calling herself “Nepali, but a native Indian”.
She was telling it like it was: Mishra is a naturalised Nepali citizen. But there was outrage in the ultra-nationalistic cybersphere. Mishra’s name was withdrawn from the list of ministers, with government officials citing an ongoing investigation at the CIAA.&nbsp;
With her Cabinet still incomplete a month after taking office, Prime Minister Karki was preparing to induct GenZ as ministers. A leak in the media floated the names, one of which was of Tashi Lhazom, a climate activist and filmmaker from Humla’s Limi Valley.&nbsp;
Almost immediately, social media erupted with discriminatory, xenophobic and misogynistic epithets against her: that she supported a separatist movement, that she was a foreign agent, that her citizenship was disputed, that she did not ‘look’ or ‘speak’ like a Nepali.&nbsp;
Political figures like Gyanendra Shahi, a prominent voice calling for the restoration of a Hindu monarchy, added fuel to the fire by making bigoted and false remarks about her heritage.
The former Commissioner of the National Human Rights Commission, Mohna Ansari, wrote on social media that it was shameful to question Lhazom’s identity: ‘Ms Tashi Lhazom is as Nepali as you are. Our society’s ugliest face and biggest flaw is doubting our own. Real patriotism embraces diversity — fake nationalism must end.’
Ansari, a human rights lawyer and activist, has also often been subject to Islamophobic and derogatory comments on digital platforms. &nbsp;
In response, the Indigenous GenZ Collective released Lhazom’s Nepali citizenship certificate to debunk the mistruths spreading on digital as well as mainstream media.
What makes a Nepali? What does a Nepali look or sound like? Who is a Nepali?
‘Had my name been Tashi Poudel, Thapa, Bhattarai or Ghimire, this would not have happened,’ Lhazom said in an interview with Kantipur following an avalanche of bigotry against her. ‘They questioned me because I do not look Nepali, or speak Nepali like a Khas. Because it is not my mother tongue.’
It is an indictment of Nepali society that indigenous Nepalis have to present proof, at the slightest inconvenience of mostly the dominant groups, of being a citizen of this nation simply because they might not fit into an imagined idea of Nepali nationhood by virtue of physical appearance, speech, geography, or faith.
And while we celebrate the successes of Nepal-born naturalised foreign citizens (some now hold elected office in the US) we refuse to afford the same respect to naturalised Nepali citizens, and those born in Nepal to excluded groups, nor do we expect them to work in the national interest if they are given responsibility to govern. And women are singled out twice as much for scrutiny.
Then cyber Nepal went into a tizzy when videos appeared of a biker’s group clad in black t-shirts emblazoned with the acronym ‘TOB’ which was interpreted to stand for ‘Tibetan Original Blood’ and linked to the Free Tibet movement.
The accusations snowballed into disinformation, xenophobia, and even calls for violence against Nepalis of Tibetan heritage and the Tibetan community in Nepal.&nbsp;
In the aftermath of the September protest, the hope was that politics and the bureaucracy would finally be rid of orthodox political actors. But first, we as a nation need to collectively examine the biases and bigotry that exist in Nepal’s socio-cultural space.&nbsp;
Otherwise, Nepal’s multiculturalism will be limited to just words in the Constitution and political tokenism.
No one who is in government now or in future can be expected to be completely free of subjective opinions, ideology, affiliation to a cause, or prior activism. And such criticism falls disproportionately on activists, advocates, and members from underserved and underrepresented communities.&nbsp;
One cannot be apolitical and hope to participate in politics, and as we move forward to rebuild the system it must not just reflect diverse communities, but also celebrate diversity of thought and beliefs.&nbsp;
Resorting to ethnocentrism, racism and chauvinism with conspiracy theories and discriminatory dog-whistling about fellow citizens is a disservice to Nepali nationhood. It is Nepal’s diversity that makes us strong.&nbsp;
Shristi Karki

What makes a Nepali?

We were used to getting stuck in Kathmandu’s notorious traffic with gas fumes and horns blaring. We are still stuck in traffic, but now it is mostly the quiet hum of EVs, and street-level air is noticeably cleaner. Alongside Norway, Nepal has the highest combustion-to-EV conversion rates in the world. And we are not even a middle-income country yet. How did we get here?&nbsp; For the first time in Nepal’s history, 2025 saw an unprecedented turn of events: two back-to-back auto shows a week apart in August, independent of each other. This was timed for the warm up to the Dasain season. &nbsp;&nbsp; The first auto show 6-11 August was the <a href="https://naimanepal.org/mobility-expo" target="_blank">NAIMA Mobility Expo 2025 </a>by the newly established Nepal Automobile Importers and Manufacturers Association which saw 35 new models, many of them EVs with 50 participating brands like Toyota, BYD, Hyundai, Kia, MG, Mahindra, Omoda &amp; Jaecoo, Proton and Leapmotor.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025101711108_d8c03f5141f0086814d866543af4d95310f340a7191363e4705aedda8e4b73d0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2025101711108_d8c03f5141f0086814d866543af4d95310f340a7191363e4705aedda8e4b73d0" data-rendition-name="original" width="1770" height="1097" loading="lazy" alt="Electric cars in Nepal NT"> </figure>  The exhibition had a strong focus on two-wheelers aimed at affordable and easy mobility in a town now known for long traffic jams (see report). NAIMA attracted a record 100,000 visitors in six days.&nbsp; The second one was the Nepal Automobile Dealer’s Association Auto Show 2025 (<a href="https://youtu.be/emSd0mUuMjU" target="_blank">NADA</a>) to address the growing demands for cars and two-wheelers. It was a natural expression of new market forces at work, on one hand, and popular taste, on the other — one influencing the other.&nbsp; This year’s NADA Auto Show was its 17th iteration, and carried a hefty legacy: exhibiting a contemporary lineup from manufacturers such as Tata, Suzuki, Xpeng and Nammi, but also classics for vintage car lovers like the 1928 Ford Model A and a rare 1955 Austin Princess Dm4 sedan.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025101711108_dda7d264ddb12448cc10d9b1cb699632eee975741fc4c56055e4df904579c34f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2025101711108_dda7d264ddb12448cc10d9b1cb699632eee975741fc4c56055e4df904579c34f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1381" height="848" loading="lazy" alt="Electric cars in Nepal NT"> </figure>  It also showcased the Deepal eVTOL (a 2-seater drone), and a humanoid robot with dog. Curious onlookers at Bhrikuti Mandap thronged the show with footfall crossing 170,000.&nbsp; Earlier this year, I had traveled to attend India's largest auto show, the <a href="https://youtu.be/OgIIvXx6yOM?si=zNmMgklzCJpagTye" target="_blank">Bharat Mobility Global expo</a> in January in New Delhi. It was part of a <a href="https://youtu.be/GT6LBKiJvyg?si=r7YaxahjSAnsIfBY" target="_blank">roadtrip</a> from one capital to another with BYD Nepal on a Dolphin. The journey took three days through Bhairawa and then the Lucknow-Agra Expressway, covering a distance of 1200km one way.&nbsp; The drive through the horrid Narayanghat-Butwal corridor alone was testimony that EVs are no longer fragile and could handle a beating. And while both Nepal's economy pales in comparison to India, it was evident that the private passenger segment is well on its way to electrification. More than 70% of all vehicles sold in Nepal last year were electric. Sales representatives are unanimous: inquiries for EVs are at an all-time high and overshadow demand for ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) vehicles. Besides four-wheelers, a fast-growing proportion of scooters were also electric.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251017111016_e4cd988ca915ddd283a86d48fac332f22f98ff776b3d22391e10156ad56d7a1a.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20251017111016_e4cd988ca915ddd283a86d48fac332f22f98ff776b3d22391e10156ad56d7a1a" data-rendition-name="original" width="1389" height="863" loading="lazy" alt="Electric cars in Nepal"> </figure>  I have spent the last two years <a href="https://youtu.be/256YQa37Ol8?si=Sv1wQ8EdvgMCiTM_" target="_blank">reviewing</a> many of these EVs. The days of batter-powered cars being small toy cars, with sub-par build quality and the range of golf carts have long gone.&nbsp; Fit and finishing in both Chinese and Indian EVs are comparable to established brand names even in Japanese and European markets. But most significantly for us in Nepal, battery technology and range have made inter-city travel on our highways imaginable. The media sometimes portrays Nepal as a prime testing/dumping ground for EVs due to lack of regulation and the proximity to the world’s largest EV exporter (China) and our tough geographical conditions. That is just a part of the story. What actually stands out is the incredible appetite for risk among Nepali buyers.&nbsp; Since the Covid pandemic charging infrastructure has spread across the country. My early trips between Kathmandu and Pokhara saw the possibility of topping up with just one charging gun at the <a href="https://rsr.com.np/" target="_blank">Riverside Springs Resort in Kurintar</a> – and I would have to wait in line, or the charger simply would not be working.&nbsp; These days, by the time I cross Kurintar from Koteswor in my Kona, I will have passed at least 10 charging stations with multiple guns. &nbsp; On my <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@casuallyannoyeddriver" target="_blank">YouTube reviews</a>, people from across the globe ask about range and handling EVs on poor road conditions like ours. The occasional skeptics also leave comments like: ‘If this works in the higher altitudes and mountainous roads of Nepal, then it should be a breeze down here in the flats of Australia and/or hills around Auckland!’  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251017111016_8b4fbe59884538849be6428eb2ce9249627a8970ed9ef4cd3c792682bf26dbed.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20251017111016_8b4fbe59884538849be6428eb2ce9249627a8970ed9ef4cd3c792682bf26dbed" data-rendition-name="original" width="1139" height="787" loading="lazy" alt="Electric cars in Nepal"> </figure>  SATURATION? However, both the NAIMA and NADA auto show also confirmed that we could be hitting a peak EV. From having just one car in one budget segment, there are now multiple alternatives stretching from the entry of below Rs3 million to the premium and high-end Rs 10 million price point.&nbsp; Furthermore, the price wars on EVs that started in China a year ago have also trickled across to Nepal. Models such as the <a href="https://youtu.be/3wFN2I81Tq0?si=T6L4SAfRpoyNNvYC" target="_blank">MG S5</a>, Nammi Vigo, BYD Atto 2 (and 1) and <a href="https://youtu.be/y214kWbWTc4?si=bIevanDZEPQdkEs4" target="_blank">Deepal S05</a> saw aggressive pricing schemes and discounts that disrupted pre-existing quotas. Consumers can suddenly afford a lot more cars, and travel a lot further for a considerably smaller price tag.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025101711108_276afec1bdbd37497572939a4eada4bef74c9d075cd5851892c4dd1985edb9c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_13" data-image-id="2025101711108_276afec1bdbd37497572939a4eada4bef74c9d075cd5851892c4dd1985edb9c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1953" height="1107" loading="lazy" alt="Electric cars in Nepal NT"> </figure>  However, booking numbers at both auto shows did not necessarily translate into actual deliveries. The fact remains that almost 80% of registered vehicles in Nepal are still two-wheelers, and GDP per capita stands at just $1500 — among the lowest in the world.&nbsp; This means that early first-adopters are first-time buyers, and the remaining customers in the market are more skeptical and less willing. But there are also those that are unlikely to consider the EV suitable to travel to off-road rural areas. For the average Nepali family, upgrading or purchasing a new car is no small decision. It happens in five years or more with resale values being a big determinant. The EV boom may be reaching saturation.&nbsp; Both NADA and NAIMA shows drove home the message that Nepal’s transport sector is on an electric fast-track, but the road ahead will be bumpy.&nbsp; Soon after the shows, the glacial debris flow on the Bhote Kosi knocked out the Rasuwa-Kerung border with China, and earlier landslides had already blocked the Koradi checkpoint. Manufacturers are now using the less convenient Korala border in Mustang. BYD, Leapmotor and Omoda &amp; Jaecoo have begun rerouting their vehicles to make up for delivery deadlines.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025101711108_62fd70a476656062005959c247b38178d8efabf8570c73929295c0a103ff4013.jpg" data-media-id="editor_14" data-image-id="2025101711108_62fd70a476656062005959c247b38178d8efabf8570c73929295c0a103ff4013" data-rendition-name="original" width="1438" height="1031" loading="lazy" alt="Electric cars in Nepal NT"> </figure>  Although the distance from the capital to the Korala border (470km) is four times longer than from Rasuwa (128km) &nbsp;and Tatopani (112km), it is still considered faster and more cost effective than shipping via India using sea routes.&nbsp; And then Nepal was engulfed in turmoil after the youth-led protests of 8-9 September and its aftermath. Many automobile showrooms around Thapathali including Tata, Hyundai and CG were vandalised and torched.&nbsp; Sushila Karki leads a caretaker government till elections are held in March, and the unsettled situation will affect the economy and investment climate as well as the automobile sector. Arnav Upadhyay reviews automobiles and promotes road safety under the handle Casually Annoyed Driver on <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@casuallyannoyeddriver" target="_blank">Youtube</a>, <a href="https://www.tiktok.com/@casuallyannoyeddriver" target="_blank">Tiktok</a> and <a href="https://www.instagram.com/casuallyannoyeddriver/" target="_blank">IG</a>, and this monthly column Drive Line in Nepali Times.

Is Nepal reaching peak EV?

Nepali Times: You just climbed Mt Everest without oxygen and then skied down the mountain. How does one even train for something like that?&nbsp; Andrzej Bargiel: What made skiing down Everest possible was all the years of experience I’ve gained in high-altitude mountains. Spending a lot of time in the high mountains helps me read the snow, the conditions, and potential hazards. I need to ski often, especially in steep and exposed terrain, so that it becomes a place where I feel completely at home.&nbsp; I also climb regularly, I am an IFMGA mountain guide. I also run, ride a bike, and work out in the gym. Like in any endurance sport, I have to prepare my body for the demands of an expedition.&nbsp; What motivated you to do Everest? This was actually my third attempt on Everest. After many years of ski mountaineering and racing, I felt it would be great to use that experience to take on a meaningful project in the Himalaya. It’s about exploring what’s really possible, testing my limits, and seeing how far I can go. I was inspired by people like Davo Karničar, Fredrik Ericsson, and Hans Kammerlander, who showed that skiing in the high mountains can truly be done.&nbsp; What do you have to be most careful about when skiing at such high altitude? You really have to manage your energy well, because you need to be ready to spend many hours at very high altitude — even above 8,000 meters. Risk management is essential. You have to read the signals nature gives you and make the right decisions, choosing safe moments to move. The dangers are always there: avalanches, crevasses, extreme fatigue, and exposed terrain, so you have to stay fully aware and focused. Safety comes first, always. You also need to stay open to changing your plans, because in the mountains, things don’t always go the way you expect.&nbsp; Why did you choose autumn and not spring?&nbsp; Autumn is really the only season when you can think about making a full ski descent from the summit all the way to base camp. In the spring there’s much more ice left after winter, and the snow cover is broken. A full descent simply isn’t possible then, because too much rock and ice are exposed. Of course, in spring it’s easier to climb the mountain. The conditions are more stable, the snow is firmer, there’s less avalanche risk, and you don’t have to wade through deep snow. The autumn ascent is very complex and demanding, which is why so few expeditions attempt it. But in autumn, skiing becomes possible. Several meters of fresh snow fall on Everest’s slopes, covering the rocks and ice, and that transforms the mountain into something wild, beautiful, and most importantly skiable. What was your favourite part this time? The moment I remember most fondly was reaching the summit — and that first stretch just below the top, when I clicked into my skis and started moving down through surprisingly nice snow. It felt smooth and natural, a kind of free, easy glide down toward the Hillary Step. I could feel the movement, the flow, and at the same time this awareness that I was skiing from the highest point on Earth. It was just a really good feeling. The Icefall was another special moment. I felt from a skier’s point of view that it really worked. I could make my turns, and the descent itself was fun, technical, but a beautiful one too — full of variety, weaving through ice towers and seracs that looked incredible in the sunlight. It was challenging, but also just pure joy.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251015141012_e9e671e07b089a7d59e4b9ba34df993180ae2dfcae3786113a4d48c515427b3d.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251015141012_e9e671e07b089a7d59e4b9ba34df993180ae2dfcae3786113a4d48c515427b3d" data-rendition-name="original" width="1365" height="2048" loading="lazy" alt="Andrzej Bargiel NT"> </figure>  And what was most challenging? The hardest moment came on 14 September, during our first summit push attempt. We were breaking trail in deep snow and reached the South Col in the evening. I already knew we wouldn’t be going higher that night, so I decided to stay there, to use the climb to acclimatise.&nbsp; But after that attempt failed, the team completely lost faith that the project could still succeed. Almost everyone started packing up, convinced it was over, nobody thought that the snow would stabilise enough.&nbsp; I skied down from the Col early the next morning in really good conditions, while the rest of the team descended on foot. Rebuilding belief within the team that it could still be done was the toughest part, mentally. It took me several days to bring that energy and motivation back, to make everyone believe again that we could try once more. What was your support crew like?&nbsp; I want to thank the whole team — all team members from Poland, all those who contributed to the project, all the sponsors, and the Seven Summit Treks crew, especially Dawa Sherpa, who had the courage to go to the top with me.&nbsp; In the end, his courage made it possible. Doing it alone would have been almost impossible. With him there, I felt safe, and that made all the difference. What potential for skiing do you see in the Himalaya?&nbsp; Huge. There’s massive potential here both for ski touring and for a more recreational form of skiing. In the Himalaya, there are so many mountains you can ski from, and they don’t have to be eight-thousanders.&nbsp; There is an incredible amount of snow even in the lower valleys during the winter, which makes it a really interesting place for skiing. You can find great powder and enjoy long, wide runs.&nbsp; The key, I think, is to keep developing local guiding structures. There should be more certified guides in Nepal, Sherpas gaining guiding qualifications, and a proper professional rescue service. That would definitely increase the sense of safety for both skiers and tourists coming to the mountains. I’d love to come back to the Himalayas one winter just to ski in those lower parts — in deep snow, on much longer and wider skis – that would be pure pleasure. At those lower altitudes, the fun can be so much greater, with a more relaxed, freeride kind of feeling.

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