The five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) reign supreme, each wielding a veto over whatever the other 192 members might want. That is why Israel, owing to US support, can <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/israel-ignores-un-cease-fire-resolution-to-keep-pummeling-gaza">blithely ignore countless UN resolutions</a>, and why Syria, owing to Russian and Chinese support,<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/04/555292"> handily escaped sanctions</a> for its use of chemical weapons. Owing to the disproportionate power they wield, the Permanent Five share an old, decidedly British sense of empire. The authors of two recent books on empire, Lawrence James and Nandini Das, offer no thoughts on how the UN might, or indeed should, be reformed, would agree. In The Lion and the Dragon, James, a prolific historian of the UK’s role in world affairs, follows Britain’s relations with China from the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/20/hk.history.01/">nineteenth-century Opium War </a>until the return of Hong Kong and today’s tensions over Taiwan. And in Courting India, Das, a professor at the University of Oxford, concentrates on the very beginnings of the British Empire and its covetous reach into what was then the Mughal Empire in India. What this history shows is that empire is still very much with us. Though Americans, proud of throwing off the rule of King George III, tend to bristle at the idea, their own military, technological, and commercial power is as imperial and pervasive as Britain’s territorial dominance ever was. As James notes, we can thank the post-World War II Pax Americana for the mostly stable international relations that prevailed during the aptly named Cold War with the Soviets and their own empire. Read more: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/two-new-books-on-conflict-and-conservation">Two new books on conflict and conservation</a>, Kunda Dixit A perennial question, especially during periods of geopolitical upheaval, is not just how empires emerge, but how they fade. Though Britain and France still indulge their memories of empire, they have long since accepted being ‘middle powers’ at best. Ever since the Suez crisis of 1956, when the threat of US sanctions forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt’s Suez Canal, Britain has supinely followed America’s lead in international relations. (UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to send troops to Vietnam in the 1960s is the exception that proves the rule.) At the same time, France has sought comfort in the collective embrace of what became the European Union. Vladimir Putin’s Russia is on a hopeless <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/what-does-defending-europe-mean">quest to reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union</a> and recreate the empire of Peter the Great. And China already sees itself, with some justification, as wielding global influence to rival that of the American empire. China’s pursuit of superpower status is born of not just current economic and political realities, but also its deep-seated resentment over the ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1949) that it suffered at the hands of European (and Japanese) imperial powers. Of course, similar sentiments also animate Putin’s revanchism, as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dismissiveness of diplomatic overtures from post-Brexit Britain. In William Faulkner’s oft-quoted words, ‘The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.’ <h2>Passage To India</h2> The trite answer to the question of why empires fall is that they become victims of their own success, growing too large, too corrupt, too exhausted to fend off energetic newcomers. As the Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun argued in the 14th century, empires are like living organisms: they grow, mature, and die. As Das’s wonderfully researched book shows, the Mughal Empire was almost mature when the British arrived in the 1600s. Its Muslim rulers, with their roots in Central Asia, are fascinating figures. Emperor Jahangir, a generous patron of the arts, was addicted to opium and wine, whereas his wife, Nur Jahan, wielded significant political influence. The emperor’s son, Shah Jahan, was a ‘king of the world’, whose love for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, is permanently commemorated in the Taj Mahal. Mughal India was both a place of immense wealth and a bastion of religious tolerance (unlike Europe, with its centuries-long Inquisition against Muslims, Jews, and heretics). Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-smallpox-virus-in-british-india">The smallpox virus in British India</a>, Tom Robertson By contrast, the British Empire was barely in its infancy when its clash with Mughal India began. In Courting India, Das paints a vivid picture of the experiences – mostly endured, rather than enjoyed – of King James’s ambassador, Thomas Roe, at the Mughal court. But more than that, she also offers a rich description of Jacobean England as it was emerging from the first Elizabethan age and jostling for power with Portugal, Spain, France, and Holland. Roe’s own journals are a major primary source, but so, too, are the cultural interpreters of the period, from William Shakespeare to the poet John Donne (a friend of Roe). Theirs was an England full of energy, seeking its fortune in the Americas and the Indies. However, it was nowhere close to as sophisticated as courtiers like Roe seemed to believe. Indeed, Roe was almost a caricature of the Englishman abroad. He refused to learn any language that might have helped his mission (be it Farsi or Turkish), and he insisted that he and his staff wear English wool and silk, even through the Indian summer. While he eventually came to admire the pragmatic tolerance of Mughal society, he remained convinced of England and Protestant Christianity’s superiority. Never would he have allowed himself to ‘go native’. Roe was answerable not only to King James but also to his financial backer, the East India Company, which had been granted its charter by Elizabeth I in 1600. This meant he was constantly tussling with the miserly company for money (its traders were always jealous), as well as struggling to quell, or at least make excuses for, the riotous behavior of English sailors. Read also:<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/buried-in-history"> Buried in history</a>, Lisa Choegyal <h2>Century of Humiliation </h2> Two centuries later, the East India Company, as it appears in James’s book, would still be clinging to the same assumptions that Roe had held. The superiority and integrity of Christian Britain went unquestioned, and still stood in stark contrast to “Asian greed and despotism.” The biggest change, in the meantime, had been the collapse of the Mughal Empire. Mughal India, the wealthiest place in the world at the end of the 17th century, was steadily enfeebled by internal dissent and Persian and Afghan invasions. In 1857, the East India Company formally dissolved the empire, setting the stage for <a href="https://www.royal.uk/encyclopedia/victoria-r-1837-1901">Queen Victoria</a> to establish the “British Raj” and direct rule over the Indian subcontinent the following year.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2" data-rendition-name="original" width="842" height="596" loading="lazy" alt="The Mughal Empire's Treaty of Allahabad by Benjamin West NT"><figcaption>A painting by Benjamin West of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II conveying the Treaty of Allahabad to Robert Clive in August 1765 after the Battle of Buxar that gave the Company the right to collect taxes -- marking the beginning of British India rule.</figcaption></figure>  To paraphrase Ibn Khaldun, 19th Britain was no longer an infant with imperial ambitions; it was now an adult with all the energy and ruthlessness needed to extend its reach around the world. As such, the British lion had no misgivings about disgracing the Chinese dragon. Looking back on this period, it is easy to see why Chinese President Xi Jinping is so determined to expunge the century of humiliation from the national memory. That century began in 1839 with the First Opium War. When China tried to block imports of East India Company opium from Bengal, Britain responded with all its (industrialised) military might. By 1842, British warships and soldiers had crushed all opposition and compelled China’s Qing emperor to sign the Nanjing Treaty. That opened China to international trade and ensured that British citizens in ‘treaty ports’ would be subject to British, not Chinese, law. Another consequence of the war was that Britain took possession of Hong Kong, which it would hold until 1997. Whereas Das describes India principally through Roe’s eyes, James is keen to present a balance between British actions and Chinese reactions. In doing so, he stresses that China was not reacting only to British imperialism. After all, this was a time when ‘a spirit of predatory imperialism … pervaded the foreign ministries of Russia, France, Germany and China’s near-neighbour, the newly industrialized Japan’. Seized by their own commercial ambitions, all four ‘regarded China as a land mass to be partitioned and shared out in the same way as contemporary Africa’. But these other imperial projects hardly give Britain a pass. In arguing that ‘Britain was reluctantly sucked into the complex geopolitics of great-power empire building in the Far East’, James simply is not convincing. Britain, the world’s leading naval power and the home of the Industrial Revolution, was already adept at the game of geopolitics and quite prepared to protect its interests in China, not least because that would also protect its interests in India. By the 18th century, the Qing Dynasty had expanded from its Manchu roots and established an empire extending from Mongolia and Tibet to the Pacific. But by the 19th century, it was too exhausted to withstand the pressure not only from the other imperial powers but also from its own people. The century of humiliation always refers to foreign interventions, but equally important were domestic embarrassments such as the 1850-64 Taiping Rebellion – in which some 30 million people died – and the 1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion. The dynasty’s ‘Mandate of Heaven’ was clearly slipping from its grasp. It finally came to an end in 1912, when the Western-educated Sun Yat-sen, following a brief revolution, established the ‘Republic of China’. <h2>Remember Thucydides</h2> Today, that title applies only to the island of Taiwan, whereas Xi presides over the ‘People’s Republic of China’, which was established in 1949 with the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist Party over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces. Since the 1970s, most countries – including both rival Chinas – have embraced the fiction that the ROC and the PRC refer to a single country. But there is a constant fear that Taiwan could formally declare its independence and destroy the fiction, thus provoking an invasion from the mainland. If President Joe Biden is to be believed, the US would then come to Taiwan’s rescue and the South China Sea would witness a Sino-American war with far-reaching regional and global consequences. Given his focus on Britain and China, James understandably devotes only a handful of his final paragraphs to US analysts’ ‘bleak’ prognosis of a future war over Taiwan. Moreover, throughout the preceding chapters, he deals deftly with other instances when conflict erupted between rival regional powers. These include the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, which led to Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, Japan’s bloody expansionism in the 1930s, and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought America into World War II. The big risk today is that China and America could end up at war as much by accident as by design. Graham Allison of Harvard University has famously warned of the ‘Thucydides trap’, an allusion to the Peloponnesian War, in which Sparta, the incumbent hegemon, was ‘destined for war’ with the rising power, Athens. It is tempting to dismiss Allison’s argument as alarmism. But over the past 500 years, there have been 16 instances of an incumbent power facing off with a rising power, and war was avoided in only four of them, the most famous being America’s rise to replace Britain as the leading world power in the early twentieth century. Notably, James recalls that China was ‘stunned’ by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887">Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union</a>. The message pushed by Chinese state-controlled media was that the UK had surrendered to ‘a losing mindset’. Clearly, the current Chinese leadership has no intention of showing weakness. The good news is that political and military leaders on both sides of the Pacific are aware of the risks. As Xi said in 2015, on his first state visit to America, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” The bad news, however, is that all countries are prone to ‘miscalculation’. <h2>Tick-Tock</h2> Almost a half-century ago, John Bagot Glubb, a British general who commanded the Jordanian army from 1939 until 1956, published a book entitled The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. His thesis was essentially the same as Ibn Khaldun’s, only with the added claim that almost all empires rise and fall over a period of roughly 250 years. Putting aside the obvious flaws in Glubb’s arithmetic (the Ottoman Empire certainly did not ‘end’ in 1570), the core idea should not be dismissed. After all, historians now give the Qing Dynasty a lifespan of 267 years, and the Mughal Empire of Das’s book began to lose territory after only two centuries. A pessimist might say today’s China began with Communist victory in 1949, and that America’s quasi-imperial power began 201 years ago with the Monroe Doctrine. Time may not be on the side of those who place their trust in America to protect democracy and ‘liberal Western values’. John Andrews, a former editor and foreign correspondent for The Economist, is the author of The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Troublespots. © Project Syndicate  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36.jpg" data-media-id="editor_11" data-image-id="20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>

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The Evolution of Empire

<figure><img width="343" height="480" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110161152/636d1e9f9c7e80680e0af41ejpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>British envoy to Nepal William O’Connor and Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher after signing the treaty on 21 December 1923.</figcaption></figure>Nearly 100 years ago, the Rana ruler of Nepal signed a treaty with British India that redressed some of the humiliation that the Gorkha Empire suffered after its <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/where-nepals-banner-once-waved/">defeat in war</a> and the <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/kundadixit/2014/01/05/double-centennial/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Sugauli Treaty of 1816</a>.To celebrate the new treaty on 21 December 1923, Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher Rana decreed two days of national holidays, freed prisoners from jails, and temporarily lifted the ban on gambling.‘The signing of <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/the-rana-reign-a-recap-of-history,3751">the 1923 treaty with British</a> India was a national festival with public buildings illuminated and joy on the streets,’ Nepali diplomat Bhim Bahadur Pande writes in his memoir ‘त्यस बखतको नेपाल’. ‘Nepal had finally managed to erase the disgrace suffered 107 years ago with the Sugauli Treaty.’Historian Pramod Shamsher Rana agrees in his own book ‘राणाशासनको वृत्तान्त’ that the 1923 treaty went a long way in ‘healing the wounds of 1816’. Indeed, the Sugauli Treaty forced the Gorkha Empire to cede two-thirds of the territory it had conquered to British India.However, the treaty did not happen overnight. It took much skilful diplomacy and lobbying by Chandra Shamsher, who worked hard to prove to the British that Nepal was worthy of being declared an independent country. Drafts of the treaty went back and forth between Calcutta, London and Kathmandu for two years before being finalised.Part of the reason the British agreed to sign a treaty so favourable to Nepal was because Nepalis paid for it with their own blood. The Ranas sent 200,000 <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/lest-we-forget/">troops to defend the British during World War I</a>. There were 24,000 casualties in <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/gallipoli-and-the-gurkhas,2271">Gallipoli</a> and in the trenches of Belgium and <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/diary-of-a-nepali-soldier-in-france/">France</a>.Pande writes that Nepal also helped British India in its dealings with Afghanistan at a time when the October Revolution rocked the Russia, and assisted the Younghusband expeditionary force to enter Tibet.Read Also:<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/from-nalapani-to-kalapani/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">From Kalapani to Nalapani</a>, Alisha Sijapati<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/lest-we-forget/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Lest we forget</a>, David SeddonBesides, there was also symbolism to ingratiate the British to Nepal. The British envoy in Kathmandu, for example got a 20-horse escort and a 31-cannon royal salute when he travelled from Lainchour to Singha Darbar to sign the treaty. By treating the British ambassador as a king, <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=5358#.YcL4sGhByUk">Chandra Shamsher</a> was buttering him up.‘The 1923 Treaty Peace and Friendship Treaty helped Nepal to be recognised internationally as an independent country and not just another Indian princely state,” explains former ambassador Dinesh Bhattarai. “It opened a new era for Nepal on the world stage.”The Sugauli Treaty had allowed the East India Company to appoint a resident in Kathmandu, and after the 1923 the envoy was re-designated as ‘ambassador’.  Although the 1923 treaty is regarded as the main foreign policy achievement of Chandra Shamsher’s rule, historians say Kathmandu did not capitalise fully on its provisions, and Nepal’s ruler also went on to misuse the treaty to suppress dissent in India.For example, Nepal should have taken a reciprocal move to also establish an embassy in London on the same day that the British mission in Kathmandu became an embassy. Neither did Nepal apply for membership of the League of Nations established in 1918 after the end of the war in which so many Nepalis were killed.The 1923 Treaty had seven articles: the first deals with the establishment of friendly ties and guaranteeing each others’ sovereignty, the second said the Sugauli Treaty would remain in effect, the third required both to inform the other if there were problems with neighbours, the fourth disallowed the use of the territory of one country to be used against another, the fifth allowed Nepal to import weapons for its security, seventh removed customs duty for  Nepal’s imports and exports.A copy of the Treaty is preserved in Singha Darbar and bears the signatures of British Resident William O’Connor and Prime Minister Chandra Shamsher. Read Also:<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/inside-story-of-nepals-rana-dynasty/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Inside story of Nepal's Rana Dynasty</a>, Kunda Dixit <figure><img width="1329" height="928" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110161152/636d1ea19c7e80680e0af41fjpeg.jpg" alt=""><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Chandra Shamsher used this article to ask the British to suppress Nepali pro-democracy activists in India at the time, and the British did stop publication in 1922 of the Gorkhali newspaper from India that opposed Gurkha recruitment. Nepal’s lobbying for the treaty started three years after the war ended, and Chandra Shamsher hosted British Crown Prince Edward on <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/centennial-of-hunting-diplomacy-in-nepal/">a lavish hunting expedition in Chitwan</a> during his India tour in 1921. This ‘hunting diplomacy’ served its purpose.‘During the 1921 hunting expedition in Chitwan, Nepali and British officials reached a new understanding about Nepali independence,’ wrote historian Tom Robertson in <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/centennial-of-hunting-diplomacy-in-nepal/">an article in Nepali Times last week</a>. ‘They formalised things two years later in the Treaty of Friendship. Nepal would get weapons and a formal acknowledgment of its independence.’ <figure><img width="2000" height="1373" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110161152/636d1ea59c7e80680e0af420jpeg.jpg" alt=""><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Despite its importance for Nepal, the 1923 treaty does not get as much attention in Nepal, in Britain or India. Researcher Tika Dhakal thinks this is because it is squeezed between two other treaties, the 1816 Sugauli treaty and the 1950 Treaty of Friendship between Nepal’s last Rana rulers and newly independent India.Indeed, there has been criticism about the 1923 treaty, even from the very day it was signed. They came from those who opposed the Rana oligarchy in Nepal, or those against Gurkha recruitment by the British, and later from officials who maintained that the 1950 treaty superseded 1923.However, former ambassador Bhekh Bahadur Thapa says: “Of course, here are questions about the 1923 Treaty but that does not diminish its importance and relevance for Nepal.”

Looking back at the 1923 Nepal-Britain Treaty

<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05b59c7e80680e0a5f21jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1451" height="852"/><figcaption>King Palden Thondup Namgyal, the last Chogyal (monarch) of Sikkim with his wife Hope Cooke.</figcaption></figure>Nearly half-a-century after the overthrow of Palden Thondup Namgyal, the 12th and last Chogyal of Sikkim and India’s formal annexation of the tiny kingdom, the ghost of Sikkim still haunts neighbouring Himalayan states.Till today, there are frequent dark references by media commentators to New Delhi’s plans for the ‘Sikkimisation’ of Nepal as well.Sikkim was the smallest of the three Himalayan kingdoms, sandwiched between Nepal and Bhutan to the west and east, and between China and India in the north and south. Its location magnified tiny Sikkim’s strategic importance.Although it was a sovereign country, after Indian independence in 1947, Sikkim (like Bhutan) had ceded to New Delhi authority over three important state affairs: defence, foreign relations and communication.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05b89c7e80680e0a5f22jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1682" height="809">After the British left India, under a treaty signed on 12 December, 1950 Jawaharlal Nehru gave Sikkim a special protectorate status, maintaining the kingdom’s independence under the Chogyal, the king.However, the Chogyal began to show an increasing desire to chart an independent course in foreign relations for his country. When Indira Gandhi became prime minister of India in 1966, she showed little patience for the Chogyal’s authority, and even less tolerance for Sikkim’s desire for increased independence.Internal political turmoil in Sikkim eventually gave India the pretext to wrest power from the Chogyal and install its own administrative head to rule the country in 1973. The Chogyal wanted to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty between Sikkim and India, and made attempts to establish independent foreign relations.<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05bb9c7e80680e0a5f23jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1263" height="705"><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Indira Gandhi was especially suspicious of the Chogyal’s American-born wife, Hope Cooke, and the influence she had on him. She was suspicious of Sikkim’s unusually large new embassy building in New Delhi’s diplomatic quarter.Then, in March 1975, the Chogyal and Queen Hope traveled to Kathmandu to attend King Birendra’s coronation, and even met Chinese and Pakistani leaders who were also attending.Moreover, while in Kathmandu, the Chogyal gave a press conference all but denouncing India as a hurdle in Sikkim’s attempts to raise its international stature. The Chogyal instantly became even more of India’s bête noire.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05be9c7e80680e0a5f24jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1048" height="1221">The Chogyal’s desire to break out of India’s influence was audacious, but the king may not have been a smart enough statesman or politician to challenge such a powerful neighbour. At a time when he needed public support within Sikkim to stand up to India, he made no effort to end his political discrimination against the Sikkimese of ethnic Nepali origin.This political alienation of Nepali-speakers, who then made up 75% of the population, proved to be fatally costly not only for this throne, but also for his kingdom.The Chogyal had internal political problems to deal with, and there was pressure building up for greater democracy. Several political organisations, especially the Sikkim National Congress led by Kazi Lhendup Dorji and Sikkim Janata Congress, had widespread support from Sikkimese Nepalis.The two parties demanded political freedom and preferred to put emphasis on the country’s development, in contrast to the Chogyal’s desire to break out of India’s traditional role as Sikkim’s master, especially in foreign affairs. In the eyes of the Nepali-speaking Sikkimese, the Chogyal was an unpopular autocratic ruler who wanted to disenfranchise them.Three days after the Chogyal returned to Gangtok from Kathmandu, the Indian Army surrounded his palace on 9 April 1975. New Delhi then carefully stage-managed a referendum to let the Sikkimese people decide whether the country should remain independent, or to be assimilated into India. The result was a foregone conclusion.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015118/636d05c09c7e80680e0a5f25jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="550" height="788">Ironically, Sikkim’s ethnic Nepali majority voted overwhelmingly in favour of Sikkim’s assimilation with India rather than endure what they saw as the Chogyal’s ethnic discrimination. The reign of King Palden Thondup Namgyal, the Chogyal, came to an end and Sikkim became India’s 22nd state on April 26, 1975.Kazi Lhendup Dorji became the first Chief Minister of the new Indian state of Sikkim. For Nepalis in Nepal, however, India’s stage-managed annexation evoked deep-seated fears that New Delhi could plan something similar.Unlike Nepalis in Sikkim, Nepalis in Kathmandu staged street demonstrations against India, calling the referendum a charade. To this day, politicians in Nepal perceived to be close to New Delhi swiftly earn the ‘Lhendup Dorji’ label in the media.Big BrotherIndia has loomed large right through recent Nepali history: the end of Rana rule, the Panchayat period and Nepal’s own referendum on the monarchy in 1980, the Indian blockade of 1990 and the subsequent People’s Movement, on to the India-brokered 12-point agreement to end the Maoist conflict in 2006, the new constitution and another five-month blockade by India in 2015.Nepali politicians have found India-bashing to be a potent tool during elections to drum up nationalist support. And India has often obliged by behaving like Big Brother.After the first Constituent Assembly abolished Nepal’s monarchy in 2008, there were murmurs of India’s ‘grand design’. These voices grew louder when Nepal’s first Vice President Parmananda Jha, a member of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) took his oath of office in Hindi.The MJF itself emerged as a credible political force, a power-broker and king-maker, and there was widespread belief in Kathmandu that it was New Delhi’s pawn. India was accused of using Nepal’s Madhesi population, just as it had used Nepali-speakers to foment unrest in Sikkim half-a-century earlier.The activities of successive Indian ambassadors after 2006 were minutely followed by the media, which reported on their actual and fictitious meetings with Nepali politicians. The envoys appeared to have direct access to parlours of politicians in breach of diplomatic norms, and the press had a field day covering what it saw as New Delhi’s meddling.Given Nepal’s overwhelming economic dependence on India, and the history of New Delhi’s heavy-handedness in its neighbourhood, paranoia about Indian intentions is understandable. But it is a bit of a stretch to fan fears of an imminent ‘Sikkimisation’ of Nepal.Nepal’s modern foreign policy history is starkly different from the Chogyal’s Sikkim, and the country’s geostrategic situation has much stronger stock value than Sikkim ever did. Nepal’s shares a substantially longer border with India and China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region, providing both neighbouring countries to the north and the south a strategic geopolitical buffer.The very fact that a neutral Nepal allows both China and India not to have to deploy the kind of military presence as they have amassed eyeball-to-eyeball in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh means huge savings in money, men and matériel.On the other hand, Sikkim’s much smaller size did not give it that advantage. Its location astride India’s ‘Chicken Neck’ corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh had made Sikkim too strategic for its own good because of the proximity of China’s Chumbi Valley.In Nepal, suspicion and paranoia about India takes flights of fancy – especially among those living north of the Chure-Bhavar line. To some extent, given India’s looming presence and its actions in the past, the fear is justified.But for the most part, this unfettered obsession about Nepal being swallowed up by India distracts attention from the real danger – New Delhi’s unspoken expectation of subservience from landlocked Nepal. Even though Indian politicians and diplomats may not articulate it so clearly, India’s rowdy media is obsessed about ungrateful Nepalis always on the verge of selling themselves off to China.On the other hand, the single-minded preoccupation of Nepalis that we are about to be ‘Sikkimised’ comes from our own deep-seated sense of insecurity, magnifying and perpetuating it. This is not only unlikely, but also unfortunate and misdirected.Nepal never had the quasi-sovereign status that Sikkim had. It has always vigorously sought to establish independent foreign relations with other countries, establishing foreign missions, embassies and consulates.Diplomatic relations between Nepal’s kingdoms and the Chinese empire go back to the 7th century, when they first exchanged emissaries. Nepal is the only country with a consulate in Lhasa. Modern China after Mao’s revolution annexed Tibet just as India subsumed Sikkim. But although Chinese imperial regimes sometimes sought to bring Nepal under their sphere of influence, Beijing never attempted to ‘Tibetise’ Nepal.However, this is not to say that New Delhi and Beijing have no interest in Nepal, and both will leave Kathmandu to its own devices. They have tried, and will keep trying, to exert influence in Nepal for their own national and strategic interests.China may be comfortable with the status quo as long as Nepal is not a launch pad for Tibetan nationalism, while India will try to maintain the sphere of influence that it inherited from the British. The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, widely seen in Nepal to be unequal, is an example of New Delhi’s attempt to maintain its dominance.The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on 31 July 1950 by a newly-independent India with the Rana regime was skewed in some respects. For example, it requires Nepal to consult with India prior to importing weapons from other countries, a clause that was used to impose the blockade in 1980 when Nepal sourced anti-aircraft guns from China.The Treaty was an encroachment on Nepal’s sovereignty, and is at the root of much of the persisting anti-India sentiment in Nepal. It tends to crop up in the manifesto of just about every political party in Nepal at election time, including the Maoists’ 40-point demand before the start of the conflict in 1996.However, Nepalis have to recognise that the 1950 Treaty also gave Nepal what Sikkim never had. Article 1 explicitly provided that ‘there shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.’At least in letter and spirit, if not in action, India was bound by the Treaty to maintain peace with Nepal and not play the role of an aggressor. More importantly, India explicitly acknowledged 70 years ago that Nepal was an independent, sovereign country and that it respected its territorial integrity.Unless a Nepal government attempts to undermine India’s territorial integrity on its own, or by tilting too far towards China or Pakistan, New Delhi will have no reason to ‘Sikkimise’ Nepal. Besides, there are an estimated 60,000 Nepali nationals, apart from Indians of Nepali descent, enlisted in the Indian Army.Some Nepali analysts tend to exaggerate the parallels between Sikkim and Nepal, and this serves no purpose except to fan the paranoia. Nepal’s foreign policy may be mishandled from time to time, but it is distinctly independent. We have only ourselves to blame when it does not work, for example, with the failure of our vaccine diplomacy at the moment.Regionally, despite the signing of the 1950 Treaty with India, Nepal has strategically charted an equidistance with India and China. New Delhi diplomats tend to scoff at the word ‘equidistance’, but it has stood Nepal in good stead in keeping both giant neighbours at arm’s length.The policy is derived from King Mahendra’s attempt to establish warm relations with China. His son, King Birendra, took the policy forward with his Nepal as a Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposal, a not-so-subtle attempt to tell the world that Nepal wanted to wriggle out of India’s sphere of influence.Over 100 countries endorsed Nepal as a ZOP, with the notable exception of India. While it signaled to the world Nepal’s foreign policy aspiration, King Birendra’s proposal did not do much to keep India off Nepal’s back. By 1990, widespread street protests forced King Birendra to abolish the Panchayat system and turn himself into a constitutional monarch from an absolute one.Prior to the invasion and formal annexation of Tibet by China in 1950, India considered Tibet, not Nepal, as its strategic buffer with China. When the Chinese invaded Tibet, India needed Nepal not only as an ally but also to serve as the next buffer line against China.The Treaty of 1950 was a clear and distinct move by India to transform Nepal into a 900-km long frontier wall with China to protect its densely-populated Gangetic Plains of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal.This means that if India annexes Nepal, it will have to be on the frontlines with an economically and militarily ascendant China across the mountains. Why would India want to do that?Naturally, New Delhi would prefer to preserve and extend its influence in Kathmandu. After the bruising blockade in 2015, the Indian mission is not engaged in overt influence-peddling, preferring a more low-key approach. This does not mean it has lost interest, New Delhi possibly now sees a politically stable Nepal being more in its interest than its policy of ‘controlled instability’.It is now up to the Nepali people and their political leaders to be careful not to provide a motivation to rouse the Indian tiger with needless provocation to be an aggressive, expansionist force. Nepal must realise that its sovereignty is strengthened by domestic stability.The kind of perpetual infighting and disunity that has characterised Nepali politics especially in the past two years, only undermines our independent status. Even the Chinese, who usually left Nepal’s political parties to sort out their own problems, had to step in when infighting within the NCP last year ultimately split the party.Learning from the 2015 Madhes Movement and blockade, Nepal’s politicians should not allow Tarai politics to be a pretext for future Indian meddling. For this, Nepal must be a much more inclusive state, mindful of devolving political decision-making to neglected and marginalised groups. This ensures long-term stability, and cannot be seen as something that ‘disturbs communal harmony’.Externally, Nepal should show restraint when ultra-nationalist pressure groups bring up the reclamation of Nepal’s historical territory ceded to British India in 1816. However strong our claim to Limpiyadhura, it is too sensitive an issue for Nepal’s political factions to use as nationalist ammunition against each other.As long as Nepal seeks mutually respectful bilateral relations with India and China that builds on its own internal stability, it can play a positive role at a time of global polarisation and increased regional tension.Nepal must live its policy of peaceful coexistence, be a peace-keeper in areas of conflict, and move forward as a confident nation, once and for all shedding its fear of Sikkim’s ghost.Ajay Pradhan is an expatriate Nepali living in Vancouver who works for the Government of Canada as senior policy advisor for treaty negotiations and reconciliation on comprehensive land claims. <img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015118/636d05c39c7e80680e0a5f26jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="79" height="109">

Letting go of Sikkim's ghost

<figure><img width="1138" height="822" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022112916110/63861e9a9c7e80680e0ccdd6jpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>A woman in Kathmandu carrying her child infected by small pox in 1964. Photo: WHO</figcaption></figure>The smallpox virus plagued Nepali communities throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. As historian Susan Heydon has written about in a recent essay called ‘Death of the King’, smallpox destroyed families rich and poor alike, with tremendous personal and political consequences. In the late 1790s, <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/big-story-of-small-pox-in-nepal/">smallpox erupted in Kathmandu Valley</a>. Little is known about the outbreak, but at the time the Valley's cities were still recovering from Prithvi Narayan Shah's conquest three decades earlier. Kathmandu's population lived and worked on streets that one British visitor described as ‘excessively narrow, and nearly as filthy as those of Benares'.In 1799, King Rana Bahadur's favorite wife, Kantivati, came down with smallpox, igniting a series of events that reshaped court politics. Seeing his wife gravely ill, Rana Bahadur dedicated himself to prayers for her, and even abdicated the throne in favour of his two-year old son, Girvana. His efforts were to no avail: Kantivati succumbed to the disease. Rana Bahadur, distraught and furious, desecrates and destroys the temple of Hariti Ma (known to Hindus as Sitala) at Swayambhu.Rana Bahadur also orders children with the disease removed outside the Valley, all the way across the Tama Kosi in the East or the Marsyandi in the West. Because of the Valley's demographics, these were Newar children. A traditional Newar song recounts what happens. Called 'Sitalamaaju Mye', the song is addressed to 'Mother Sitala,' the smallpox goddess. Part I: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/big-story-of-small-pox-in-nepal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Big story of smallpox in Nepal</a>Part II: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-smallpox-virus-in-british-india/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">The smallpox virus in British India</a>Part IV: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-nepal-eradicated-the-smallpox-virus/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">How Nepal eradicated the smallpox virus</a>Part V: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/viruses-past-present-and-future/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Viruses past, present and future</a>'Oh Mother Sitala,' the first line goes, 'behold the piteous state of your people! The children were driven out of the country, surrounded by soldiers.' The song describes the stages of the disease, which touched most Nepali families at one point or another, through its appeal to three different deities. ‘We pray to Mother Kachala, who brings forth the smallpox blisters, to Mother Sitala, who fills them with water, and to Mother Bachala, who carries off the afflicted.’Parents faced heartbreaking difficulties. 'They led them away, carrying one child on the back, one child under the arm and dragging along a third child.' After a week, the families reach the Tama Kosi. There, a child dies. Unable to say goodbye the proper way, the devastated parents throw the body into the river. One of the legacies of these distant events, the 'Sitalamaaju Mye' song appears to use the tragic expulsion of families to symbolise the mistreatment and dukha Newars faced since the takeover of the Valley by the Shah regime in the 1770s. Observers this month have noted that the song speaks to the hardships faced by many Nepali migrant laborers, displaced from their worksites by Covid-19, trying to return to village homes.Rana Bahadur ends up in exile in India, and takes along with him a young Bhimsen Thapa. He returns to power in 1804, but is killed in 1806, opening the door for Thapa to seize power and go on to become one of the most important rulers in Nepal's early history.Smallpox struck again in 1816, and again shapes the power struggles in Nepal's tumultuous Darbar. Bhimsen Thapa still held power, but King Girvana, now 21, was a clear threat.The disease appeared first in the west of the country but found its way to Kathmandu by July. As historian Vikram Hasrat has documented, ‘Smallpox became so virulent in the country that hundreds and thousands of men, women and children, old and young, were swept away. The rivers, tanks, and canals were crowded with dead and dying; and in the streets a man had scarcely room to walk and the dogs dragged away the neglected and putrefied corpses and vultures died with surfeit of human flesh.’Fear gripped the palace. King Girvana had not contracted the disease as a child. He also had young children. Officials requested vaccinations from the British, who had been trying to spread the new practice in India for over a decade.As historian Heydon has documented, the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-smallpox-virus-in-british-india/">British sensed possible political advantage</a>: ‘It would not only be an act of humanity to introduce the Vaccination,’ the British resident Edward Gardner wrote his superiors in India on July 17, ‘but be a desirable object, perhaps to have the Raja and the Officers of the Court inoculated by us.’The British organised vaccinations around the Valley, beginning in Banepa. It is hard to say how many people actually got vaccinated. But one thing we do know: the king was not among them.  <figure><img width="1376" height="980" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022112916110/63861e9d9c7e80680e0ccdd7jpeg.jpg" alt=""><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>The exact reasons why are lost to history, but not the consequences. In late October, both of the king's children showed fever and then rash. One perished on 2 November. Gardner passed along news of the king's family to Calcutta: ‘His youngest son a child under two years of age I am sorry to add died this morning of that distemper and his eldest &amp; only remaining male child has also taken the disease.’ Two weeks later, on 18 November, Gardner learned that 'the Raja had unfortunately taken the smallpox'. He died two days later. The resident reported the event: ‘Alarming symptoms it seems made their appearances during the night which continuing unabated, the Raja was according to the usual custom in this country conveyed early in the morning to the temple at Pusputhnath, where he breathed his last about 11 o’clock am. As was Hindu custom, preparations were underway quickly for his funeral.’ Girvana's senior queen, Siddhi Rajya Laxmi, threw herself on her husband's funeral pyre, as tradition demanded.Gardner regretted the missed chance to prevent the king's death. ‘Many opportunities have unaccountably been neglected for him receiving the vaccination.’ It's hard to know why. There was, however, as historian <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/review/the-rest-is-history-for-john-whelpton/">John Whelpton</a> notes, 'speculation about foul play'. The young prince Rajendra recovered and was placed under the regency of <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/turning-a-shrine-into-a-temple-of-learning/">Tripura Sundari, a longtime ally of Bhimsen Thapa</a>. Girvana's death and Tripura Sundari's installation as the young king's regent helped <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/kundadixit/2014/01/05/the-pashmina-war/">Bhimsen Thapa</a> retain his grip on power, a grip he would not yield for another two decades.  Over the next century and a half, as Heydon shows, smallpox showed itself routinely in Nepal. Every spring communities would make prayers to ward off the disease. <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/kathmandu-in-the-time-of-cholera/">But periodically epidemics raged</a>. One observer in east Nepal in 1885, for instance, noted that a wave of smallpox had ‘carried off a large number of the inhabitants of Khumbu’.<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-is-a-microcosm-of-all-of-the-changes-in-world-health/">“Nepal is a microcosm of all of the changes in world health”,</a> Nepali TimesVaccination use was sporadic, and government efforts weak. At mid-century, the Kathmandu-based <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/pencilling-in-kathmandu-rajman-singh-chitrakar,3379">British doctor Henry Oldfield</a> noted that Jang Bahadur Rana held ‘great faith’ in vaccination and had his children and other royal children inoculated, but did little else. In the 1920s, British journalist <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=3351#.XqwdhS8w0Wo">Perceval Landon</a> noted, 'Vaccination is not compulsory but it is free to those who choose to avail themselves.' Several reasons explain why Nepalis did not use vaccination. Some people, particularly some Newars and Tarai groups, disliked the vaccine. But a far greater problem was that the Rana governments did little to make it widely available or to promote it. They never set up a health system to promote sound practices across Nepal. In contrast, in India by the early 20th century, the British campaign to spread vaccination had found its legs. Millions of ordinary Indians in Madras and other parts of the country started getting vaccines. In 1947 alone, the year the British left India, 21.3 million Indians received vaccinations or re-vaccinations.Nepalis who studied or traveled in India and those who served in the British Army noticed how little health service the Rana regime provided their countrymen. Smallpox was one of many diseases and ailments that modern medicine could help with. The Ranas' lack of concern about the people's health and welfare helped fuel the growing movement to drive them from power. After the 1951 revolution, successive Nepal governments tried to set up a modern health care system in the towns and villages. They implemented disease control programs, including <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-mosquito-that-changed-nepals-history/">a nationwide malaria eradication effort</a>, launched in 1959 with the help of the US and the WHO. A smallpox campaign for the Kathmandu Valley was launched in 1961 and became a nationwide eradication program in 1966.  After tormenting Nepalis for centuries and sometimes shaping their politics, smallpox was finally eradicated from Nepal in 1975. It is a tremendous success story -- a story of strong bureaucratic organisation, impressive scientific work, and tenacious implementation. But it is also a story of occasional heavy handedness by a government given unprecedented powers in the effort to maintain public health. This is the third in a <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/big-story-of-small-pox-in-nepal/">series of articles</a> about the history of disease in Nepal. The fourth installment will explore the eradication campaign in the 1960s against smallpox. <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/how-chitwan-was-opened,4159">Tom Robertson</a>, PhD, is researching the environmental history of Kathmandu Valley.

Tom Robertson

Smallpox, politics and power in Kathmandu

The daily 10-hour curfew at Tribhuvan International Airport from 8 November that will last five months has affected tourism during Nepal’s peak season, with some hotels and trekking agencies here reporting cancellations into spring next year. The reduced hours at Nepal’s main aviation gateway till 31 March means that a third of all flights have been cut. This has also caused ticket prices to surge by up to eight times of normal fares. For example a Kathmandu-Delhi ticket that used to cost Rs12,000 is now listed at Rs50,000, and even then seats are not available.&nbsp; “Especially if they are here to trek, change in flight dates can cause tourists to miss their connections,” says Jagan Timilsina, who runs a trail running and outdoor education business. &nbsp; Pokhara is feeling the brunt as hotels report last-minute cancellations for November because of flight disorders. Some hoteliers also say although there have been some cancelled trips, most itineraries have been rescheduled.&nbsp; Hari Prasad Sharma Gaire of the local chapter of the Hotel Association of Nepal says the Kathmandu airport closure should have been timed for the off-season. He told us: “Starting construction during the peak tourist season was a mistake and will cause the tourism industry to lose a lot of business. The upgrade could have been spread out over a longer time but closed for fewer hours at night so that disruption was minimal.”&nbsp; Nearly a third of the 1.2 million tourists who visit Nepal annually come to Pokhara, which is also the gateway to Mustang, the Annapurna treks and pilgrimage tourism to Muktinath. Located by scenic lakes with a range of adventure sports like hot air ballooning, paragliding, canyoning, bungee and ziplines, Pokhara is also popular among diaspora Nepalis. “Besides its own attractions, Pokhara is really the hub for central Nepal, and we have been trying to get visitors to extend their stay here,” says Timilsina, who started out as a trekking porter and rose up the ranks to be an expedition guide and entrepreneur. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111603114_0e071ce63ea9b0a9a7ee76f8c3cea0ff08c6767c41dd09f6bc4413d2db067a60.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024111603114_0e071ce63ea9b0a9a7ee76f8c3cea0ff08c6767c41dd09f6bc4413d2db067a60" data-rendition-name="original" width="3500" height="2333" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara's tourism woes NT"> <figcaption>Tourist arrivals in Pokhara have slumped since the disruptions at Kathmandu airport due to upgrading work. Photo: KRISHNA MANI BARAL/NEPALI TIMES ARCHIVE</figcaption> </figure>  Even without the Kathmandu airport closure affecting tourist arrivals, Pokhara was already suffering from a decline due to many factors like the poor state of the Prithvi Highway, the shortage of luxury accommodation for high-end tourists, and the reluctance of international airlines to start direct flights to Pokhara despite an expensive new airport that was inaugurated two years ago.&nbsp; “There was a lot of initial excitement on the construction of the international airport,” says Timilsina, “but it hasn’t delivered as expected due to politics. People have invested in nearby businesses, and have faced losses.” India has blocked direct flights from its cities to Pokhara because the facility was built by a Chinese company. Although tourists and pilgrims from India hit record levels this year, the poor state of the highways and the Indian bus accident on the highway to Kathmandu in July that killed 27 pilgrims from Maharashtra state dampened arrival figures. Gaire says, “While tourist arrivals to Pokhara are now approaching pre-Covid levels, we haven’t seen the improvement we were expecting. We need a better marketing strategy. What are our embassies abroad doing?”&nbsp; Indeed, Pokhara used to be a favourite destination for Chinese tourists. There was a boom in arrivals from China before Covid, especially after a popular Chinese tv serial was shot on location here. But arrivals from China have not really recovered since the pandemic because of the economic slowdown there. Promoting Pokhara airport to handle direct flights from Chengdu or Kunming could revive Chinese arrivals.&nbsp; Nepal’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAAN) has used the Kathmandu airport closure as an excuse to arm-twist international airlines to start flying to Bhairawa, which has barely been in operation for two years since it was inaugurated. So far, Fly Dubai, Thai AirAsia, Jazeera and Qatar are flying to Bhairawa, but most use it as a hop before flying on to Kathmandu, which does not reduce congestion at Kathmandu.&nbsp; An ideal situation could have been to get Pokhara to run to full capacity while Kathmandu is partially out of action. Pokhara entrepreneurs are puzzled why the CAAN and the national government have not taken more interest in promoting Pokhara as an alternative to reduce the congestion in Kathmandu. Nepal’s football team that was flying to Dushanbe this week couldn’t get tickets via Delhi, and took a domestic flight to Bhadrapur, crossed over to Bagdogra and flew on to Delhi to catch their flight to Tajikistan.

Pokhara’s tourism woes

An excerpt of a conversation between an anthropologist and linguist Mark Turin, PhD and Lava Deo Awasthi, PhD, the first Chairperson of the Language Commission of Nepal. Nepali Times: What is the role of Nepal’s Language Commission and when was it formed? Lava Deo Awasthi: The Constitution of Nepal (2015) created a Language Commission (LC) with the following four core mandates: (a) to develop eligibility criteria for gaining status as an official language and offer recommendations to the Government of Nepal about the official language(s) in each province; (b) to offer recommendations to the Government about measures to be taken for the conservation, promotion, and development of languages; (c) to suggest possible ways of using mother tongues in education by assessing their stage of development; and, (d) to conduct studies, carry out research and perform monitoring functions about the response to the constitutional provisions for the federalisation of languages in Nepal. The Commission was founded in 2016 and I was appointed as the Chairperson of the Commission in September of the same year by the Cabinet of Ministers. What in your own professional and educational background helped to prepare you for the role? I have worked with the Government of Nepal for about 30 years, alongside holding teaching appointments at universities in Nepal. Prior to assuming the role of the Chairperson of the Commission, I served as permanent Secretary to the Government of Nepal and worked as the Chief Administrator of the Central Development Region. I was appointed as Director General of the Department of Education and completed my assignments as Joint Secretary at the Planning, Monitoring and Educational Administration Divisions of the Ministry of Education.&nbsp; In addition, I have taught courses as a visiting professor at Tribhuvan University and Kathmandu University for more than three decades. Later, I also started supervising MPhil and PhD students at the Far Western University in Mahendranagar, Kanchanpur. My PhD project from the Danish University of Education was dedicated to making sense of Nepal’s social construct and commitment to multilingualism, exploring the persistence of monolingual school practices in the face of constitutional promises and state commitments to multilingualism. I conducted a survey of Nepal’s languages and carried out a qualitative study of the Tharu language in the district of Bardia. I analysed language policy statements and explored classroom pedagogies in schools. I documented how teachers showed a tendency to resist change and maintain the status quo because they were not consulted when new educational language policies were introduced. Teachers also exhibited a deeply-held adherence to the Gurukul education system which appears to have been harnessed as a way to resist newer pedagogical ideologies imported from the West. Recognising how engrained these rich traditions of knowledge transmission are, I wanted to know how students’ engagement in the learning process appeared to have dwindled, creating a gap between children’s home languages and the language(s) of the school. Whilst statutory provisions for education in the mother tongue were oriented towards promotion, classroom pedagogies remained resolutely monolingual and exclusionary. The result was that multilingual education policies that had been introduced in Nepal did not result in meaningful changes in classroom practices. My research was also a reflection of childhood traumas I had experienced at the earliest stage of formal education. My home language, Baitadeli, has a strong oral tradition and no written literature. English is my fifth language in terms of exposure and competence, and my home district of Baitadi is well-known for its loyalty to the local language. I had to drop out of school after completing my sixth grade. Staying at home, I received much attention from my family and had much greater exposure to my native language, culture and environment. My overall impression is that dropping out of school had a surprisingly positive impact on my life. The opportunity offered a surprising dividend for me as I gained mastery in my mother tongue and received extensive exposure to folk literature and Indigenous knowledge and survival skills, cultivating my interest in language, culture, literature and local cosmologies.&nbsp; Now that I reflect on it, I appreciate how language has always played a key role in my life. I grew up in a multilingual environment: brought up with Baitadeli, Hindi, Sanskrit, Nepali and English. Language played a major part in my decision to leave school and my later success is closely linked to my competence in several languages. It was rewarding to be at home with my family as I deepened my understanding of native language and culture, which in turn helped me to harness and refine my art of living. Languages matter so much to me because they are both software and hardware. Later, when I was in secondary school, I realised that my command of my home language contributed significantly to enhancing my Nepali and English. I used my mother tongue as a form of linguistic capital to strengthen my competence in both English and Nepali.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111811110_5400ba54792bf9e4854e1c1effde8bf09804e99647f23513700b450cc49adc4a.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024111811110_5400ba54792bf9e4854e1c1effde8bf09804e99647f23513700b450cc49adc4a" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="Dr Lava Deo Awasthi"> </figure>  In your term as the Commission’s first Chairperson, what were your strategic goals and objectives? My first strategic goal was to create an environment conducive to implementing the provisions of the Constitution of Nepal in relation to language. My priority was to prepare a detailed action plan for my six-year tenure in consultation with language stakeholders, including language experts, professionals, activists, Indigenous community members and representatives of relevant national and local-level institutions. The Commission formed a body of high-level advisors to ensure that the Chairperson’s work was well-informed and credible. The advisors to the committee had highly visible professional and social reputations in Nepal and had much experience in the field of language conservation, promotion, research and development. Another strategy we adopted was to establish close institutional linkages with federal, provincial, and local level governments for collecting opinions and disseminating information widely.&nbsp; What critical issues did you have to consider while discharging your duty? When Nepal’s new Constitution was drafted, a number of concerns could not be adequately addressed. These related to the conservation of languages, the recognition of official languages at the provincial level, and the use of mother tongues at federal, provincial, and local levels. These unresolved issues and matters pertaining to the federalizsation of Nepal’s languages were passed on to the Language Commission to address and resolve.&nbsp; Regarding the recommendations for official languages, a five-year timeline had been set by the Constitution. With great effort, we succeeded in having all provinces agree to recognise their official languages as per the recommendations of the Commission.&nbsp; What were your greatest achievements during your term? One of the greatest achievements was that we succeeded in setting a language agenda at all levels. Nepal’s language communities and other stakeholders expressed the view that this was the first time their languages were recognised and their voices heard by the state. People participated in debates and discussed issues relating to language that in all likelihood had never before happened in their lifetimes, at least not in ways that were supported by the state. We encouraged people to speak in their own language(s) and provided translators during plenary sessions and group discussions. Another major achievement was developing criteria for the status planning of languages at federal, provincial, and local levels, and to recommend 11 province-level official languages, in addition to the Nepali language. Similarly, a notable achievement was recognising Indigenous languages spoken by smaller communities, all of whom faced ongoing marginalisation and high levels of endangerment. The Commission identified 9 new languages that had not been reported in the 2011 census, and provided a framework for recognising official languages within a municipality. The commission emphasised the need for documentation and digitisation of languages for developing corpora and archives at national and sub-national levels.&nbsp; Languages of historical importance as well as classical languages were given recognition for their protection, growth, and development. Recommendations were made for the conservation, promotion and development of Nepal’s marginalised languages that are threatened by majority languages and for those languages that hold particular power at local and global levels. Recommendations were also made for how best to safeguard Nepal’s languages from the ever-growing spread of English and other powerful, globalising languages.&nbsp; A further important aspect of the Commission’s work was to emphasise mother tongue medium instruction in schools across the nation. Recognising the role of language in children’s cognitive, socio-emotional and academic development, the Commission suggested strategies for linking schools with ward-level language clusters for use in the classroom. The importance of nurturing and respecting a child’s first language was reiterated in the Commission’s recommendations for children’s learning and all-round development. By the end of my term, a remarkable change could be observed in terms of building trust within and across Nepal’s diverse language communities. A network of language groups and stakeholders across the country proved to be a powerful way of bringing all language communities under one roof for a collective review of and response to the process of federalising language policy. The many language stakeholders across Nepal appreciated the opportunity to work within a coordinated framework, and—feeling empowered by this—seemed genuinely enthusiastic about the initiatives taken by the Commission.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111811114_b45297fdd2fedf17bdb6313e495a1062c0d87f1a19fa5349f871f220b75f93ab.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2024111811114_b45297fdd2fedf17bdb6313e495a1062c0d87f1a19fa5349f871f220b75f93ab" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Dr Lava Deo Awasthi NT"> </figure>  What were the most significant challenges for you as Chairperson? One of the major challenges was winning people’s trust in advocating for the mission of the Language Commission. I faced considerable resistance as I sought to emphasise the use of native languages in families and communities. While the Commission advocated for multilingualism and promoted linguistic diversity, the prevailing policy circles and central level institutions had been deeply influenced by a one-language discourse and ideology of Nepali only. The spread of English also poses a huge threat to Nepal’s languages. However, people in power do not seem to see this as a problem. They tend to abandon their own languages in preference for English. The way that Nepal’s municipalities are increasingly introducing English as a medium of instruction at the earliest stage of a child’s school-based education has proven to be detrimental to their cognitive development, socio-emotional wellbeing and academic success. Most of Nepal’s elites have been heavily influenced by the spread of English and remain unaware about its impact on their home languages as well as on the inter-generational transmission of Indigenous languages in the country. I wish that we could have produced more compelling evidence to show the consequences of making poor policy choices for our children’s education. Demystification calls for a collective response. To make change happen across this entire, complex and federalising country was daunting work and left like a race against time. I feel that I could have done more to offer concrete examples in favour of using the mother tongue as a medium of children’s education at the earliest stages of a child’s education. What do you see the Language Commission achieving in the next 5-10 years? The Language Commission will have to ensure that all of its key recommendations are implemented at all levels of government. In 10 years’ time, all seven of Nepal’s provinces will have their official languages in place. These languages will also be recognised as languages of federal business, alongside Nepali. I anticipate that all official languages in the federal and provincial systems will have a national portal for inter-language corpora using machine translation to fulfil their federal, provincial and local level language functions, and that all languages spoken in Nepal will be represented through a digital database in the national archive. The Office of Statistics will monitor the status of Nepal’s languages over time. By the end of the next decade, each municipality in the country will have recognised one or two official languages at the local level, based on speech populations. Other local languages will have received community-level legal recognition and official status to fulfil their functional roles. Languages that are highly endangered or at risk will be entitled to receive state grants for enhancing local level capabilities to encourage families and young learners to speak the language. Incentive schemes will be introduced in municipalities that promote language within the family and at home. Inter-generational transmission of languages will have received welcome and timely attention across Nepal. It is my hope that all schools—public and private—will have introduced mother tongue medium instruction at the earliest stage of school education, at least up to class five. Nepali, English and other national as well as classical and foreign languages will be taught as subjects. The existing policy of English medium education at the early stage of education will be abolished. The Government of Nepal will be held accountable if the number of speakers of any language decreases or if local communities face language loss and greater endangerment. Under the aegis of the Language Commission, a Centre for Language Research and Innovation will be created with world-class facilities for language documentation and archiving in collaboration with Tribhuvan University’s Central Department of Linguistics and other relevant institutions. Harnessing the vastness of Nepal’s linguistic diversity, the Language Commission will morph into a centre of excellence for national and international communities to engage in collaborative language research, to share experiences and document best practices at in service of global linguistic diversity and Nepal’s many Indigenous languages.

Languages are both software and hardware

Nearly 750,000 Nepalis went abroad for employment in the past year, and more than 100,000 left on student visas. Most of them were young Nepali men and women, and the number has been increasing every year. As with other sections of society, Nepal’s security agencies also face a recruitment crisis. Nepal Police opened recruitment for 64 inspectors in September, and received 2,239 applications, compared to 2,718 candidates last year. Police also invited candidates for 256 assistant sub-inspectors this year for which it received 17,756 applications – down from 19,932 last year. It is the same story in the Nepal Army, the number of applicants for the post of Officer Cadet (Second Lieutenant) went down from 6,144 for 400 open seats in 2019 to 4,390 in 2020. Meanwhile, applicants in the paramilitary Armed Police Force went down from 857 applications for 75 posts in 2021 to 536 applicants for 99 posts last year. While the number of applicants appears higher than the demand, the data shows a significant decrease in applications for vacancies in Nepal’s law enforcement agencies. Security personnel are recruited on the basis of rank and age in Nepal, and the age cutoff for entry into Nepal’s security agencies is typically 25 years. Sociologist and migration expert Ganesh Gurung says that the demographic of young, physically fit Nepalis emigrating abroad in search of better opportunities has impacted recruitment into law enforcement and the military here at home. “The returns from working in Nepal’s police and army are minimal, whereas overseas job opportunities are more attractive,” Gurung says. “The work may be physically demanding abroad, but the pay is a lot higher.”  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241116041148_a7e477e0ee2f56acf16c2559fdb24d8f0377f7bc1f9e56138bc40108fc4fa33f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20241116041148_a7e477e0ee2f56acf16c2559fdb24d8f0377f7bc1f9e56138bc40108fc4fa33f" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="534" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal Police"><figcaption>Nepal Police</figcaption></figure>  Nepal Police spokesperson DIG Dan Bahadur Karki agrees that the physical and mental demands of a law enforcement job is incomparable to the income that security personnel earn. “A young Nepali who works in Dubai earns enough to build a home in the village within four years, while a Nepali with the same qualifications and physical ability in a security agency here barely makes enough to survive,” says Karki. “Obviously the youth prefer foreign employment.” Security agencies are now worried about the quality of inducted manpower. “There is a difference in work ethic between an applicant chosen from a competitive pool of 50 candidates versus one chosen from a pool of three candidates,” explains Gurung. “Unmotivated employees hamper the overall performance of the state apparatus.” Nepal Army spokesperson Brigadier General Gaurab Kumar KC says recruitment has not been hampered by outmigration: “We have still been getting more than three times the applicants than there are open posts, so we are not yet worried.” Even so, the passing rates of aspirants have gone down for security forces after the Public Service Commission began examinations for military recruitment in 2015. In fact, the Nepal Army complained about the Commission’s involvement in recruitment. Still, the number of vacant military posts tends to exceed the number of passing candidates. Nepal Army’s KC says that the military will not compromise on intake criteria even if there are fewer passing applicants. “Unqualified persons will not be admitted even if there are less-than-required passing candidates. We will re-advertise if that is the case.” But Nepal’s security forces now also have to worry about retention of existing personnel. About 900 Nepal Army, 600 Nepal Police, and 300 Armed police personnel resign every year before the completion of their tenure.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241116041148_b8cd62f70eea3aac7d3d3778615a5b70b1e20550c9bd76321f051f9c766fd2a9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20241116041148_b8cd62f70eea3aac7d3d3778615a5b70b1e20550c9bd76321f051f9c766fd2a9" data-rendition-name="original" width="750" height="378" loading="lazy" alt="Armed police forces"><figcaption>Armed Police Force</figcaption></figure>  In 2020, Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa recalled almost 1,000 police personnel who had been deployed for the security of VIPs after long-standing criticism that security forces were being misused to cater to political and bureaucratic leadership. However, security personnel have continued to be assigned to high-ranking officials as glorified housekeepers. In December 2022, Rabi Lamichhane’s Home Ministry had instructed its offices to recall unauthorised security personnel assigned to high-ranking officials, following which 500 officers from Nepal Police and Armed Police Force were withdrawn from their details. But the Nepal Army does not have to follow such rules, and the practice of army personnel serving high-ranking active-duty and retired military personnel remains. Conditions here are dire enough that many active duty officers in Nepal’s military and police forces have chosen to leave their jobs to serve in the Russian Army to fight in the Ukraine war. The hierarchical culture and chain of command of politics, bureaucracy, law enforcement and military has also meant that abuse and mistreatment of subordinates is rife in Nepal’s security forces. “Feudalism is alive and well within our security institutions,” says Gurung. “When soldiers and security forces who swore to protect and serve the nation are made to be at the beck and call of politicians and bureaucrats, it is easy to understand why they are disillusioned with their jobs and why they choose to quit and find jobs abroad.”

Job insecurity in security forces

Earlier this month, Nepal received Rs1.6 billion from the World Bank as part of its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/will-nepal-ever-be-paid-for-saving-trees">Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)</a>, rewarding the country for increasing its carbon sink capacity. Nepal is the first in South Asia to benefit from this facility, and it is specifically to recompense the country for increasing forest cover in 13 Tarai districts between 2018-2024. “We are also trying to get another Rs13 billion from the facility while also preparing for free market-based carbon trading in the international market,” says Nabaraj Pudasaini of the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries) Implementation Centre. Big emitters of greenhouse gases are under pressure to reduce their carbon emissions, and many have signed agreements to do so by investing in decarbonisation projects in developing countries. Countries that emit more than a specified amount of carbon would be able to buy emission rights from countries that emit less. Nepal is internationally known for its community forestry program which has been largely credited for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/tree-mendous">increasing tree cover to over 45%</a> in less than three decades. But this achievement had not been adequately recognised or rewarded internationally before. Forests, especially in the tropics, absorb and store large amounts of carbon while releasing oxygen in a process known as photosynthesis. <a href="https://www.fao.org/forest-resources-assessment/en/">Preventing deforestation</a> and increasing canopy cover is considered a much more achievable goal than reducing emission in the scale necessary to limit global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. COP11 in Montreal in 2005 first proposed reducing carbon emissions by improving forest quality by halting degradation. By 2015, a new mechanism of financial assistance was created to help less developed countries with sustainable management of forests <a href="https://www.un-redd.org/">(called REDD+)</a>. Under this new mechanism, countries receive aid based on their efforts to prevent forest degradation and increase carbon sink, and in 2021 the World Bank was entrusted with implementing it. Nepal’s FCPF receipt this month was calculated on the basis of 2.4 million tons of carbon stored at a rate of $5 per ton. In the second phase, Nepal will receive more than Rs4 billion within the next year for storing an additional 7 million tons of carbon. Eighty per cent of this amount obtained from carbon trading needs to be spent on local beneficiaries and indigenous communities.&nbsp; But carbon trading is not easy, Nepal needs to prove that protected forests will not be destroyed in future.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241121091132_c8a381c9a95aa86fec558951650d97bb87914741f01766982ba2b086af001f16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20241121091132_c8a381c9a95aa86fec558951650d97bb87914741f01766982ba2b086af001f16" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="999" loading="lazy" alt="Greenbacks for greenery NT "> <figcaption>Photo: KUNDA DIXIT</figcaption> </figure>  Explains carbon trading expert Yugan Manandhar. “Forests should be handed over to the community and shown that they are managed sustainably. Proving this will be particularly challenging; forest encroachment and degradation is rife in the Tarai.” <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/nepal-is-going-up-in-smoke">Deliberate forest fires</a> have also added to the challenge because they increase carbon emissions and reduce the sink capacity of forests. The basis for the amount that Nepal received was set five years ago by calculating the carbon reserves of forests in the 13 Tarai districts. In the meantime, sustainable forest management, tree plantation, forest destruction and erosion control were prioritised to increase carbon reserves in those forests. Nepal is signing another carbon trading agreement during the ongoing Baku climate conference. The <a href="https://www.leafcoalition.org/">Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest finance (LEAF Coalition) </a>proposes to sell the carbon stored in the forests of Bagmati, Gandaki and Lumbini provinces. For this, Nepal signed the letter of intent three years ago at COP26 in Glasgow. The target is to store 70 million tons of carbon in 32 million hectares of forest in the three provinces per which Nepal will receive Rs13 billion in four years at $10 per ton with provisions to increase the rate if various conditions are met. However, the agreement in itself doesn’t guarantee the amount. According to the targets set by Nepal, forest degradation should be stopped and carbon reserves increased by protecting tree cover. Preparations are also underway for clean air carbon trade because it has offset fossil fuel use by introducing 30,000 electric vehicles. Nepal has been selected for the first round to receive $40 million within one and a half years through the Clean Air System of the World Bank. Given that most of Nepal’s energy mix is from biomass, replacing them with electric stoves can significantly improve health by reducing indoor pollution as well as strengthen the country’s capacity for carbon trade. “Nepal's goal now is to sell carbon in the free market where carbon credits are bought and sold based on supply and demand in an open and transparent manner,” adds Pudasaini of the REDD Implementation Centre. “Nepal can now set its own price and bargain with interested buyer countries and organisations.” Lately, India has been discussing setting up a carbon market. Nepal has exported Rs12.72 billion worth of electricity to India so far this fiscal year, which can be traded under Nepal’s carbon market. “Carbon trading can create significant economic benefits for Nepal, which will help reinvest in development and environmental protection projects,” says Manandhar. “But we must prioritise sustainable management of forests, cutting older trees and allowing regrowth as well as promoting electric stoves and electric vehicles.”