With all the hot air and greenwashing going on at COP28 in Dubai, it is clear that most delegates do not have the vision or the political will to grasp the implications of global climate breakdown. Whether it is petrostates or those heavily addicted to fossil fuels, the Conference of Parties feels more like a conference of partying as if there is no tomorrow. This must be what it must have felt like as the band struck up a polka on the tilting ballroom of the Titanic. The heat, flood, sea ice loss, sea surface temperature and hurricane wind velocity records that were broken in 2023 should be proof enough that incremental calibration of petroleum use will not help. The world (mainly India, China, Europe and North America) is burning twice as much fossil fuel as is needed to meet the outdated 1.5 degree goal.&nbsp; That was a target set in 2015 at the Paris COP21 for 2050. We are already reaching that level of warming now (graph). There are 100,000 delegates at COP28, it is being held in the world’s top petroleum exporting country, and its President is a climate science denier.&nbsp; The Loss and Damage fund that was announced with drumrolls at the start of COP last week has turned out to be a PR stunt. The fossil industry is strongly pushing geo-engineering solutions in Dubai that already have acronyms: Carbon capture and storage (CCS) as well as Solar Radiation Modification (SRM).&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/not-climate-smart">Not climate smart</a>, Sonia Awale A new report by Climate Analytics shows that CCS alone would be a ‘carbon bomb’ because of the energy required to capture and store CO2. The worst polluters are still pushing ‘phase-down’ instead of ‘phase-out’. And they think they are being clever by adding that they are for phasing out ‘unabated’ fossil fuels. This is COP28’s newest buzzword: unabated. Unabated means CO2 from burning fossil fuels is released directly into the atmosphere. The biggest emitters are now qualifying their targets by saying they will phase out just unabated fossil fuels. This &nbsp;semantic gymnastics ignores that carbon capture scale-up is unproven, and pumping sulphur aerosols into the stratosphere will destroy the ozone layer. The bottom line is that fossil fuel exporters and high per capita users do not want to reduce their carbon footprints. If they cannot agree on accelerated phaseout targets, one-third of Bangladesh will be submerged by ocean expansion, and two-thirds of Nepal's remaining Himalayan glaciers will be gone during this century.&nbsp; We do not want to keep saying ‘we told you so’, but ever since the COP3 cop-out after Kyoto in 1997, journalists have been writing the same editorials verbatim over and over again.&nbsp; A site search on the Nepali Times home page during COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, or COP17 in Durban in 2011 shows that we have been arguing that decarbonisation was necessary to save Nepal’s economy, and it is something we can manage ourselves.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/loss-and-damage-as-a-common-climate-cause">Loss and Damage as a Common Climate Cause</a>, Naveeda Khan In an editorial titled ‘The Right Climate for Change’ in the 9-15 December 2011 edition of Nepali Times ahead of the Durban summit, we wrote 12 years ago this week:  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231207111256_e106bd1545d27d75297cc4f28ee983bed82c5e4aa1749b5b708aeaae5733672f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20231207111256_e106bd1545d27d75297cc4f28ee983bed82c5e4aa1749b5b708aeaae5733672f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1054" loading="lazy" alt="Editorial 12 years ago"> </figure>  ‘The Nepal delegation is (in Durban) in force with a 30-member delegation. Developed countries say they can no longer afford to clean up the carbon they have pumped into the atmosphere since the industrial age, backing down from pledges made at Kyoto to help poorer countries mitigate the effects of climate change.&nbsp; For smaller Asian countries like Nepal, the issue is different. Whether we switch to renewables or not is not going to save the planet, but it can save us. Nepal's increasing dependence on fossil fuels is certain to take this country down the path of economic ruin. Nepal's petroleum imports from India grew three-fold in the last five years, and we don't have money to pay for it anymore. As we have argued in this space before, Nepal's balance of payments gap with India is only going to grow in future making us even more dependent on the southern neighbour. The solution is right under our noses. Making the switch to a hydropower-based economy is both the short-and long-term solution. We can give speeches until we are blue in the face in Durban about how the western countries should compensate us for our melting glaciers, or to help us adapt and/or mitigate, but if we don't have a plan to wean this country away from fossil fuels we might as well forget about it. We need to ensure that future generations of Nepalis (50 million of us by 2030) will inherit a country that is self-sufficient in domestically-generated renewable energy to meet their transportation, industrial and household needs. Maybe we should have just sent the minister to Durban to deliver his speech, and the rest of the delegation should have stayed home to plan for the future.’ Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/fossil-fuels-poison-air">Fossil fuels poison air</a>

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Unabated greenwashing at COP28

With weather records being broken planetwide, the COP28 climate summit in Dubai this month is being ridiculed as a greenwash even before it begins. The UAE is the world’s fifth <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-greenwashing-in-glasgow">biggest</a> exporter of refined petroleum, and the president of the conference is the head of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC).
There is an even bigger irony: Expo City in Dubai is being readied for the conference 30 November-12 December by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/gulf-workers-need-protection-from-heat">migrant workers from Nepal </a>and other South Asian countries labouring outdoors in 42°C heat.
“Greenwashing, that is exactly what it is going to be,” says Shilshila Acharya of Avni Center for Sustainability in Kathmandu. “Every day we are bombarded with one dire projection after another which needs emergency action, but we now have oil barons leading climate talks.”
She adds: “COPs have become a necessary evil but having this summit in the UAE sends the wrong message. The fossil fuel industry will obviously protect its own interests. We know the problems, we know the solutions but we do not have the right people in decision-making positions.”
In September, the human rights group <a href="https://fairsq.org">FairSquare</a> found evidence of Asian and African migrants working outdoors in excessive heat and humidity despite laws prohibiting it when the wet-bulb temperature exceeds 25°C.
Humans can handle wet-bulb temperatures up to 35°C for a limited time, but above that the body can no longer effectively cool itself via perspiration. Most Gulf countries have summer daytime curfew hours, but FairSquare found migrants working at the COP28 conference site even when the wet-bulb temperature reached 33°C.
Similar charges were made ahead of the 2022 Qatar World Cup when South Asian migrant workers were similarly made to work outdoors building football stadiums <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/my-uncle-died-in-qatar">with many fatalities</a>.
Nepal and other South Asian nations hope that the Dubai summit will take steps to set up the Loss and Damage Fund to help cope with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/lost-and-damaged">climate-induced disasters</a>. But the Biden administration has outright rejected it, and other industrialised countries are not too keen.
In July, COP28 president Sultan Al Jaber said the summit would fast-track phase out of fossil fuels, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/justice-delayed-justice-denied-byrx8a1c">push climate finance</a>, and allow climate activists access.
Bangladeshi climate scientist Saleemul Huq was a strong proponent of the Loss and Damage Fund, but passed away suddenly this week in Dhaka. In an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/nov/01/climate-destruction-rich-countries-cop28">op-ed printed posthumously in the Guardian</a> 1 November and co-authored by Farhana Sultana of Syracuse University, he wrote: ‘The fossil fuel industry continues to produce, maintain and benefit from greenhouse gas emissions, and must fundamentally change its business model. Meanwhile, greater efforts by local governments, civic groups and nonprofits remain crucial.’
Indeed, even while there is not much hope for action from the climate jamboree in Dubai, most climate action happens at the local level. Countries like Nepal do not have time to wait around for outside help to cope with disasters like the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">Sikkim glacial flood </a>that are sure to be more frequent.
However, besides paying lip service like during the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/he-came-he-saw-he-left">visit by UN Secretary-General António Guterres</a> this week, Nepal’s leaders show little inclination to act on climate preparedness with adaptation and mitigation strategies.
Instead of developing climate-smart infrastructure, leaders have green-lit ecologically and economically harmful projects like the $6.7 billion <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/fight-or-flight">Nijgad airport</a>. Meanwhile, much needed upgrades of existing highways and transmission lines face costly delays.
The draft Electricity Bill does not give enough priority to increase domestic consumption of surplus hydropower for Nepal’s energy transition, and instead emphasises power exports to India. For this, transmission lines and substations need urgent upgrades.
Both China and India have announced that they will stop manufacturing diesel and petrol vehicles by 2030. Nepal will be forced to go <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/1-step-forward-2-steps-back-in-nepal">all-electric </a>in six years, and we might as well be prepared.
In the past year, Nepal imported 2,000 electric 4-wheelers and 700 two-wheelers, reducing petrol and diesel consumption by more than 20,000 litres daily. In fact, by cutting just 10% of its LPG, diesel and petrol imports Nepal can save $260 million a year.
“Transportation, cooking, irrigation and industries are four clear pathways for a green transition in Nepal,” explains environmentalist Anil Chitrakar.
He adds: “We need to promote electric vehicles, but not everyone drives. However, all 30 million Nepalis have to eat, so subsidising rice cookers and electric stoves would reduce LPG use. Surplus electricity can be diverted to industries through dedicated feeders.”
In the current climate, investing in expensive cascade hydropower projects on rivers like the Arun exposes them to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-glacial-lakes-in-danger-of-bursting">glacial lake floods </a>like the Sikkim disaster. Energy experts propose diversifying Nepal’s renewable energy mix to include solar, wind and biogas.
Photovoltaic costs have plunged even further this year, and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-roof-is-the-limit">solar plants</a> are faster and cheaper to build. Industrial-scale biogas plants and waste-to-energy projects would also solve the problem of waste management.
“Irrigation pumps just in the Tarai consume 200MW of power. We can easily power them with solar panels and biogas can be upscaled again,” adds Chitrakar. “Nepal has proven solutions. We just need the political will to push them.”

Sonia Awale

Fossil Fools

<img width="640" height="481" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111016110/636d12869c7e80680e0a98dcjpeg.jpg" alt=""/>Youth climate activist Greta Thunberg calls COP26 in Glasgow the ‘Global North Greenwashing Festival.’ But it is also developing countries like Nepal that are using the occasion to make wild promises they are not serious about.
As a country that has taken a lead in championing the mountain agenda at climate summits, <a href="https://uk.nepalembassy.gov.np/statement-by-the-rt-hon-prime-minister-sher-bahadur-deuba-at-the-world-leaders-summit-during-the-26th-conference-of-parties-cop-26/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Nepal</a> put forth three targets this week:
<ul><li>Remain 'cumulatively net zero carbon’ from 2022-2045' and become carbon negative after that. </li>
<li>Halt deforestation and increase forest cover to 45% by 2030</li>
<li>Ensure all vulnerable people are protected from climate change by 2030</li>
</ul>Individually and collectively, these targets do not mean anything. What is more, the Nepali delegation commended itself as the ‘highest climate ambition country’. Even if that was true, it would be for someone else to say that, not us.
The <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-can-up-forest-cover-to-45-by-2030/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">forestry target</a> is more realistic: increasing the current 37% forest cover to 45% in the next nine years is attainable. But how can Nepal justify clearing the last tract of native tropical forest in the eastern Tarai that is a migration corridor for wild elephants by building a white elephant <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/does-nepal-need-a-4th-international-airport/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">airport at Nijgad</a>?
Read Also <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/nepal-must-save-nijgad-forest-to-receive-climate-funds/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Nepal must save Nijgad Forest to receive climate funds</a>, Kashish Das Shrestha
Other infrastructure projects are undermining the success of community forestry, and Nepal is still reluctant in allowing private capital into climate action, and consequently the inclusion of private sector project developers.
Consumption and a throwaway plastic culture is growing in Nepal, recycling is almost non-existent, domestic aviation is flying high, and petroleum import is <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-doubles-its-carbon-footprint/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">doubling</a> every few years.  Black carbon deposits from factories, vehicles and cooking are accelerating Himalayan melting and exacerbating a public health crisis from pollution. 
And the third point about Nepal’s claim that it will ensure all vulnerable people are ‘protected from climate change by 2030’ has dumbfounded most experts I have spoken to. How exactly are we going to protect them in the next nine years, from what? And what is the criteria by which we can judge that they have been ‘protected’?   
A footnote in Nepal’s press statement in Glasgow is that these targets are conditional upon financial support and Nepal’s goal to raise Rs250 billion. Oops. Given Nepal’s history of unwillingness to allow the flow of private capital into climate projects, this is very unlikely.
As COP26 host, the UK has gone into overdrive with media hype about the successes: the Global Methane Pledge, Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use.
Every day brings forth a new declaration. Countries are picking up on this convenient way to make pledges they know they will not have to fulfill on reducing carbon emissions.  From Saudi Arabia to Israel, India to China, ‘net-zero’ has become the next big thing. 
Read Also <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/net-zero-is-not-zero/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Net Zero is not zero</a>, Maureen Santos and Linda Schneider
As a youth environmentalist, I am appalled by <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/blueprint-for-a-net-zero-nepal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">empty and reckless promises</a> being made at this make-or-break conference -- our last chance to save the planet from heating that will lead to societal upheaval, mass extinction, overflowing oceans and other calamities. 
While some see these commitments as a welcome sign that leaders are committed to transitioning to a carbon neutral world and implementing the Paris Agreement, the reality is different.
We need to phase out all fossil fuels by 2030 if we are to cap global temperature rise to 1.5. But national emission reduction ambitions do not reflect this. The fossil fuel lobby is prominently present in Glasgow, and national delegates have turned net-zero into political sloganeering, while ignoring the roadmap on net-zero put forth by the International Energy Agency. 
Climate change is a political agenda, but it is also a technical one. Ensuring a just and affordable transition to net-zero requires a global overhaul of the energy system while adopting a cross-sectional and integrated approach to addressing poverty. 
Sadly, COP26 presidency seems to have forgotten or completely ignored this. The newfound energy in enhancing climate ambition has dwarfed the real agenda of climate negotiations. Britain, as the cradle of the industrial revolution, has made dramatic national cutbacks, and wants desperately for Glasgow to deliver meaningful and realistic targets.
Read Also <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/climate-change-is-a-disaster-in-the-nepal-himalaya/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Climate change is a disaster in Nepal Himalaya</a>, Sonam Choekyi Lama
But negotiations on Article 6 are still contested and it seems unlikely that the Paris Rulebook will be adopted. Coal financing continues, negotiations on public climate finance and the $100bn target has not materialised.
Civil society plays a crucial role in ensuring climate action, ambition, and accountability. But twisting the truth about Nepal, and creating illusions is detrimental to action on climate that we must start taking. Inviting civil society to Glasgow and pretending to listen to them is a scam.
It is working: climate activists on Facebook are lauding the COP Presidency for helping Nepal make a bold pledge on an ambitious sets of targets. And when there is so much doom and gloom, even critics do not seem to want to speak against this ray of hope. 
This is not a COP to feel good about yourselves. It is not a COP to pawn our youth climate activists in <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/think-globally-in-glasgow-and-act-locally/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Glasgow</a> to create the illusion of inclusion. It is not a COP for industrialised countries to now pin the blame for the climate crisis on the developing world, without putting their money where their mouths are.  
The hearts of the delegates in Glasgow may be in the right place, but their actions are not. This is not your COP. It is my future, so stop messing with it.
Read Also
<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/back-to-glasgow-where-it-all-began/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Back to Glasgow where it all began,</a> Ajaya Dixit

Nepal’s greenwashing in Glasgow

It was 30 years ago this month that investment into ‘Baby Arun’, the 201MW first phase of the run-of-river Arun III project, was brought to a screeching halt when the World Bank officially withdrew its support. This brought about profound and fundamental changes in the way Nepal’s power sector subsequently developed. Nepalis suffered debilitating power outages between 2008-2016 due to shortages attributable to the cancellation. At the same time, the gap left by Baby Arun was filled by private sector investment in ways that were not obvious in 1995. It took 30 years, but in many ways Nepal’s power sector is more healthy today than it has ever been, and likely better than if the project was built as planned. At a projected budget of $1.08 billion, Baby Arun would have cost the equivalent of Nepal’s entire annual government expenditure in 1995. It was to be funded by concessional grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral funders, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), KfW, and investment by the government itself. At the time, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity was only 230MW, and the trajectory of the power sector changed dramatically following the cancellation. In the past 30 years, $5.4 billion has been invested in the power sector led by private investors, and much of it from domestic banks and pension funds (table, right).  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0" data-rendition-name="original" width="984" height="521" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Nearly 70% of the new megawatts generated were by private independent power producers (IPP) in the past 30 years, while the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and its subsidiary companies added 30% of new capacity. Almost 80% of total debt financing came from domestic banks and employee retirement funds. International assistance for power generation dropped dramatically over this time, accounting for only about 15% of investment. Before 1995 new power projects used to be entirely dependent on foreign aid. Since 1995, 63% of new generation came from 171 small hydropower projects with an average capacity of 12MW, while 4% was from 21 solar photovoltaic and biomass projects developed by local IPPs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097" data-rendition-name="original" width="988" height="503" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Over three decades, investment in Nepal’s power supply came primarily from new actors that had never before been involved in this sector. The rate of electrification rose from 10% to close to 100% -- sufficient to meet domestic needs during most of the year, and in 2024 made Nepal a net exporter of power to India for the first time in its history. As practically all the new investment in this period went into run-of-river hydro and solar projects, rather than into hydropower reservoirs with seasonal storage, Nepal continues to rely on imports from India during the dry winter months. Surplus electricity generation for export during the monsoon is slated to grow rapidly as another 200 solar and hydro projects are nearing completion of construction, with over 5,000MW of power capacity. Private Power The cancellation of Baby Arun inadvertently accelerated the entry of the private sector into Nepal’s power generation. The government enacted the Electricity Act in 1992 to attract private IPPs and diversify away from total dependence from international aid, but had been struggling for several years to conclude the first agreement with the 60MW Khimti Project. There remained a large gap between the tariff that the government thought was reasonable versus what was demanded by the Norwegian investor Statkraft, and the private sector arms of the World Bank and ADB that were financing the project. The shock of World Bank withdrawal from Baby Arun put tremendous pressure on the government, then led by the UML as it is now. The Bank’s decision to terminate its involvement was ostensibly, at least partially, taken in response to a letter critiquing the project sent by the UML while it was in the opposition.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347" data-rendition-name="original" width="949" height="446" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>BAD NEWS: Newspaper clippings from the early 90s on tender announcement ahead of loan approval (left) and secrecy surrounding environmental assessment (centre) of Arun III before its eventual cancellation in August 1995.</figcaption> </figure>  The government was forced to soften its position and agree to the investors’ terms following the cancellation of Baby Arun. It directed NEA to sign a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Khimti. It was concluded in January 1996, and this was followed by a second PPA in July 1996 with Panda Energy, the American developer of the 45MW Upper Bhotekosi project. The expensive USD-denominated agreements to buy power from two international private producers, with price escalation clauses tied to the New York Consumer Price Index, sent alarm bells ringing. There was worry that the country was heading towards unaffordable tariff rates for the consumer and potential bankruptcy for NEA as a result of inevitable future weakening of the Nepali Rupee. The government had strong-armed NEA into signing these agreements, and realised that concessionary financing terms that Nepal was used to receiving for public sector projects such as Baby Arun and Kali Gandaki A, that included below-market interest rates and 40 years repayment period with a 10 year grace period before starting repayment, were not the norm for private sector investors. Nepal’s status as a less than attractive destination for foreign investment meant that the country had few options but to accept expensive dollar PPAs from international developers with the high commercial interest rates and short repayment periods imposed by their banks because of high investment risks. In the end, the government ended up having to additionally provide a sovereign guarantee in order to close the deal at the insistence of the lenders – committing it to repayment in case NEA defaulted on paying the IPPs. It is reasonable to assume that the extraordinarily high political cost of agreeing to the PPA terms would have meant that no government would have willingly agreed to them in 1995 had it not suffered the trauma of the loss of concessionary-financed public sector projects as large as the Baby Arun. It has taken NEA 25 years to consider offering dollar-denominated PPAs again: to cover the foreign exchange portion of the investment in the 216MW Upper Trisuli-1 and 120MW Rasuwa-Bhotekosi Hydropower projects. It seemed unlikely at the time, but it turned out that the dire situation Nepal found itself in 1995 planted the seed to mobilise investment for affordable power from within the country. Double Whammy After the dual shock of first losing investment in Baby Arun and having to sign expensive power purchase agreements with international IPPs, the first proposal for an alternative strategy to mitigate the risk of foreign currency investment into hydropower projects came from a group of engineers within the Arun III team at NEA. Led by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4900">Deputy Director Damber Bahadur Nepali,</a> engineers convinced the leadership that NEA needed to invest in a subsidiary company to build a series of locally-designed and domestically-financed projects that would have lower cost with rupee-denominated PPAs. They registered the Chilime Hydropower Company Limited (CHCL) in October 1995 with 51% shares from NEA, 25% from its employees, and 24% available for the general public, 10% of which was prioritised for local residents at the project site. The 22.1MW project is in Rasuwa on a tributary of the Trisuli, and mobilised debt financing from the Employee Provident Fund, which manages retirement savings for employees of the government, public enterprises, and private sector institutions. CHCL’s experience showed that NEA employees themselves believed that individual hydropower projects with operational independence from NEA could be developed profitably in Nepal by its own engineers -- and they were willing to put their own money on the line. Chilime also demonstrated that there was money in the country, particularly with retirement funds, looking for opportunities for long-term investments. Following completion of Chilime in 2003, CHCL led the formation of three other NEA subsidiary companies that completed construction in 2023 and 2024, producing 168.3MW using fully rupee-tied investment. NEA’s largest subsidiary, the Upper Tamakosi Hydropower Limited, completed construction of its 456MW plant in 2021.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3" data-rendition-name="original" width="3000" height="1571" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>DAMNED: The $700 million 456MW Upper Tamakosi built entirely with domestic funds before it was destroyed by the September floods last year. </figcaption> </figure>  There were some delays and cost overruns on this run-of-river project, the largest in the country with a final cost of over $700 million -- all of it sourced domestically. The five subsidiary companies launched by NEA have produced almost two times as much new power as NEA has over the past 30 years. Seven other NEA subsidiaries are currently constructing projects to add another 474MW to the national grid. But even more important than NEA subsidiaries have been local IPPs: Nepali companies which have over the past three decades enthusiastically entered the hydropower sector. From a regulatory perspective, the credit for mobilising domestic private investment to engage in power generation goes to Minister of Water Resources Shailaja Acharya, who in 1998 offered a flat feed-in-tariff of Rs4/kWh for hydropower projects under 10MW. This upfront offer removed a major barrier that early developers had faced of having to spend money to carry out a detailed feasibility study before they could even start tariff negotiations with NEA. She had laid the foundation stone of the Chilime project, and proved to be the champion of opening up the sector for domestic IPPs. The guarantee of a PPA with a fixed tariff, irrespective of project specifications, gave small power developers the confidence to apply for survey licenses and invest in feasibility studies so they could directly approach commercial banks and make a case for their project producing required revenue to repay loans. Domestic IPPs started adding power to the national grid in 2002. Their contribution was initially modest, and first projects were small and commercial lenders who took time to be confident about providing debt financing to a sector which had previously not been considered suitable for private sector investment. While the first 10 years were slow, with less than 10MW being added to the grid each year, this increased twenty fold over the following ten years, resulting in the equivalent of a Baby Arun being added by Nepali IPPs to the grid each year. A total of 84 IPPs added 232MW, 328 MW, 454MW, and 400MW of new generation to the grid in 2021-2024 (graph). There was explosive, exponential growth as domestic developers have surged ahead to account for 76% of the new megawatts added to the grid since 2020, compared to 24% by NEA and its subsidiary companies. The megawatts that IPPs are adding have followed the classic ‘hockey stick curve’ with the ‘breakout point’, signaling the rapid growth phase in 2020. Private producers are expected to accelerate new generation in the coming years with 300 solar and hydropower projects adding 11,000MW. Another 166 hydropower and 96 solar projects are currently in the survey stage, and are in line to add another 11,000MW to the construction pipeline. One major challenge is finding financing required for the projects. Domestic investment will no longer be sufficient to finance this ambitious pipeline of renewable energy projects. Project developers as well as NEA and the Electricity Regulatory Commission will have to leverage their substantial experience accumulated through the construction of over 200 projects to attract regional and international investment and hedge the risks of dollar-denominated PPAs. Following the cancellation of Baby Arun, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Nepal developed a highly distributed power sector</a>. The national electricity grid is currently supplied with power from a remarkably decentralised array of hundreds of hydropower and solar photovoltaic projects spread across 43 districts and all seven provinces.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1228" height="867" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  This presents a sharp contrast to the pathway of a few large public sector hydropower projects with a sprinkling of private sector projects that was envisioned as part of NEA’s investment planning when Baby Arun was being considered the front runner for investment. The strategy then was to allow public sector investment in a few large hydropower projects with thermal plants to fill the gap. Knowing what we know now about acceleration of climate change impacts and increased extreme weather events, following this path would have made Nepal’s power sector highly vulnerable. Decentralised generation greatly improves the resilience of Nepal’s power supply as damage to power plants in one part of the country need not affect other areas that have their own generation. Following the investment plan where over two thirds of the country’s power supply would have come from power plants on the Arun River, would have greatly imperiled Nepal’s energy security. All rivers in Nepal are susceptible to flooding from cloudbursts made more frequent by climate change. The Arun River which is fed by glaciers in Tibet is also at risk to glacial lake outburst floods. Bikash Pandey is Director of Clean Energy and Circular Economy at Winrock International. People Power is his regular column in Nepali Times on global energy issues relevant to Nepal. <h2>Decentralised and Diversified</h2> In the 30 years since the cancellation of ‘Baby Arun’: Hydropower projects constructed cover capacities ranging from less than 1MW to 456MW and developed by IPPs from across the country with strong local involvement in purchasing equity shares. Renewable energy sources contributed to the generation mix through solar IPPs that further contribute to climate resilience, and cover shortfalls during low rainfall. The government is committed to solar contributing 10% of the power on the grid. Increasing solar beyond this target and providing incentives to project developers to invest in utility-scale battery storage would further improve resilience. BIG ARUN: The 900MW Arun III project under construction since 2018 at Num in Sankhuwasabha (pictured, below) is a separate initiative by a different project developer using a different financing modality. The ‘Baby Arun’ version of Arun III was cancelled in 1995.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1312" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> </figure>

30 years after Baby Arun

Nepal has shut down dozens of social media platforms in a move that is widely seen as an effort to tax the revenue they generate in the country, and to control content critical of government. The sites were blocked as of midnight on Thursday, 4 September and affects all Meta products including WhatsApp and Messenger, Threads, and others. Although YouTube, Google and X are also on the government’s list, they were still working as of Friday midday.&nbsp; The government says it took the action after repeated warnings to the platforms to open offices in Nepal, a Cabinet decision last month setting a deadline, as well as a 17 August Supreme Court ruling also requiring them to register and pay requisite taxes. However, the Bill cited in the ban, ‘The Operation, Use, and Regulation of Social Media in Nepal’ has not yet been passed by Parliament. Some social media platforms which were already paying taxes in Nepal even though they are not officially registered, have also been blocked. The move is the latest in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/big-beautiful-bills" target="_blank">a slew of draft legislations</a> designed to undermine Nepal’s open society. A Bill amending the Print and Publications Act would allow district bureaucrats to shut down media. Another draft Bill would allow political appointees to head a new Media Council with the power to revoke the licenses of journalists.&nbsp; A counter-intelligence Bill would let just about anyone in government to arbitrarily tap phones, read emails and trail citizens. On Wednesday the government announced new immigration requirements that would allow it to track the movement of all foreigners in the country. Yet another draft Bill has been set to Parliament to dissolve the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=10675" target="_blank">Social Welfare Council (SWC)</a> and move registration and monitoring of non-governmental organisations, nonprofits and charities to the Ministry of Social Welfare. Seen in this light, the blockage of social media platforms this week is seen as the latest government attempt to constrict freedom of press. Nepal is one of the few remaining open societies in Asia, and now appears to be drifting towards authoritarianism. The government’s sudden shutdown of social media has been greeted with howls of protest on platforms that still remain open, like Viber and TikTok, as well as in Nepal’s mainstream press. Even senior members of the ruling UML-NC coalition have sharply criticised the move, asking if the government is trying to “turn Nepal into North Korea”.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025090508098_a2ab330e403e8418a7006cd5e915607382628dd6984524332bf7b99c74743656.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2025090508098_a2ab330e403e8418a7006cd5e915607382628dd6984524332bf7b99c74743656" data-rendition-name="original" width="4280" height="5187" loading="lazy" alt="social media ban in Nepal"> </figure>  The Regional Director of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Beh Lih Yi said in a statement: ‘Nepal’s sweeping ban on social media sets a dangerous precedent for press freedom. Blocking online news platforms vital to journalists will undermine reporting and the public’s right to information. The government must immediately rescind this order and restore access to social media platforms, which are essential tools for exercising press freedom.’ Besides undermining press freedom, blocking social media platforms will also hurt commerce and the economy since so many small and medium business trade through Instagram, Facebook and other platforms. Nepal’s vibrant social media has also been a boost or citizens to assert identity, build solidarity against injustice and play an adversarial role when the mainstream media does not do it. Social media platforms have also become the tenuous link for Nepali families scattered across the world to keep in touch with each other — its importance growing with the increasing size of the diaspora. The government wants social media platforms to register, pay taxes and remove posts on their sites that ‘undermine the national interest and Nepal’s territorial integrity, disturb social and religious harmony’.&nbsp; In response, rights activists have said while there is need for the government to regulate extreme content and hate speech, officials appear to be more intent on clamping down on free speech and trying to force platforms to share the revenue. On Friday, the government had allowed WhatsApp back online, but there were reports that it had instructed the Nepal Telecommunication Authority (NTA) to instruct mobile and internet service providers to block by Friday night all platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp, X (Twitter), YouTube, LinkedIn, Reddit, Threads, Snapchat, Pinterest, Signal, Clubhouse, Rumble.&nbsp; Platforms that have registered and are allowed include TikTok, Viber, Nimbuzz, Popo Live, WeTalk, Global Diary and the Nepali portal Hamro Patro. TikTok was banned last year for ‘disturbing social harmony’ and it was lifted after the platform registered its office in Nepal. But even while it was banned, many users simply switched to VPN. Telegram was also banned for ‘financial crimes’ and it has since also been allowed back. NTA officials confirmed that some Asia-Pacific regional offices of platforms, including Meta had been in touch overnight inquiring about the registration process.&nbsp; Nepal is not alone in regulating social media. China bans most Western platforms, Russia and Turkey regulate their and require platforms to locate their data servers in the country. Gulf countries allow social media but keep a tight control on dissent.&nbsp; Experts have said even the government will not dare close down YouTube since so many Nepali individuals and companies make money with posts on that platform, and closing it would also impact on Google and Gmail. Facebook had also just launched a monetisation scheme for videos and reels, and Nepalis uploading content would lose revenue.&nbsp; Blocking the platforms has already hit content creators, influencers and cut small businesses from reaching customers. A survey of social media use in Nepal by Sharecast Initiative showed that 94% of those with smart phones used YouTube, followed by Facebook (92%) while TikTok was in the 50-60% range. X and Instagram were in the single digits. A YouTube ban will also hurt the mainstream media since up to 20% of the revenue of Nepal’s main tv channels came through YouTube. Some 11.1 million Nepalis watch YouTube content every day, the survey showed. ‘For global giants like Meta or Google, Nepal is a small market, and they may not even flinch — but for millions of Nepalis, these platforms are central to daily life, livelihoods, and connections across the world,’ wrote AI consultant Naresh Newar in a LinkedIn post. Some experts said the government’s sweeping ban on social media networks was untenable and the government would be forced to rollback sooner or later. Said editor Shiva Gaunle: “The platforms had given citizens a voice and broken the monopoly of the government, legislators, the courts and journalists over public opinion. This is an effort to reassert that monopoly, but Nepal can never be turned into a North Korea.”

Protest grows against Nepal’s social media ban

This is the 72nd episode of Diaspora Diaries, a Nepali Times series in collaboration with Migration Lab providing a platform to share experiences of living, working and studying abroad. My father ran a store and that is where I spent all my time till Grade 6. Doing my homework. Serving customers. I then moved to my maternal grandparents’ house because I used to get along with my cousin who was a year older than me. We did everything together, and were best friends. We took turns studying: I was a night owl, and he was an early riser. Before I went to bed after studying all night, I woke him up. My mother was 44 when I was born, the same year my eldest brother got married. My sister-in-law becoming a part of our family was how my mother referenced my age. I liked making money, and was always a hustler. In Grade 7, I learnt to handle a tractor and helped my brother-in-law to plough, earning Rs10 a day. As I got better, he paid me more. By Grade 9, I was already making Rs500 per day, but had to slow down to prepare for my exams. From an early age I knew I did not want a 9-5 job. There just wasn’t enough money in it. I wanted to get into business, and compared my brother who worked in the post office and what businessmen made. It did not help that my brother was honest, and never took bribes. A friend and I made money selling cheap Chinese phones at a premium to our friends. We blasted music on the phones and pretended that we were giving them a discount. After SLC, I started teaching math and other subjects. I was soon a shareholder in the same school and in the evening I was involved in our family’s floriculture business, growing amaranth and marigold for garlands.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4" data-rendition-name="original" width="955" height="1314" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  It was then that a friend suggested we learn the Korean language. We could be earning significantly higher in Korea for similar efforts. I had no plans to go abroad but he convinced me. I did not know anything about Korea, and was scolded at the language institute when I asked someone to point Korea on the map.&nbsp; It was only there that I learnt you had to pass an exam for the Korean Employment Permit System (EPS), and pay for language classes. After a week, I decided it was not for me and dropped out. But my friend convinced me to give it one more try. I did not prepare much for the exam, and it was no surprise that I failed. But it was just by one mark, and people would pity me for failing “just by one mark”. It was a brand of failure. It hurt my ego. I had to turn things around by taking the exams seriously, and locked myself up to study hard.&nbsp; Even when we had visitors, my wife told them I was not home. If I was not in my room learning Korean, I would be with a group of ten of us test-takers comparing notes and practicing late into the night. The exam was difficult, but this time I passed, the only one in my group who did.&nbsp; As someone who never liked the idea of doing a job, I still had my doubts about going to Korea. It did not help that one of my acquaintances had returned a month after he had left, and he discouraged me from migrating given that I was already making good money in Nepal.&nbsp; But my wife suggested that I give it a shot since I had worked so hard for it. And if it really turned out not to be my cup of tea, I could always return. What did I have to lose, I thought, at least I would get to visit Korea. My job there was in an electrical company that made circuit boards. I worked all day, earned good money. In the evenings, I kept myself busy with my real estate business back in Nepal. I had learnt the tricks of the trade from fellow real estate agents back home, but at the time did not have the capital to invest.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  In Korea, it helped that I had salary records that allowed me to get loans from financial institutions both in Korea and in Nepal. Ultimately, I started earning more from my real estate deals in Nepal than from my job in Korea. This was all thanks to my ability to take loans because of the EPS scheme. My wife has been managing the flower business while I was away. My finances grew stronger over the eight years I was in Korea. I paid off the loans that I had borrowed to buy land. But real estate did not satisfy me entirely. I wondered: what is my brand? What will I be known for? What is my contribution to society? Real estate is for wealth, but that is about it. I needed to sell one piece of land and use the revenue to start a venture. I took classes in business, and returned to Nepal six months ago and got back to my family’s ancestral roots in floriculture. In Nepal too, I am continuing the entrepreneurship training I had started in Korea with the Bridge International. Such exposure helps us reflect on our business such as our branding, vision, and proactive aspects like the importance of strong recordkeeping.&nbsp; I am now working to upgrade and expand my floriculture business. With a friend who is still in Korea I am building a cooling room to increase the shelf-life of flowers and other produce and set up a market in my village where others can sell their produce. Floriculture is our primary business, but it is seasonal and earns good money only during festivals like Tihar.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  So, I grow tomatoes to ensure year-round earnings. I also am engaged in other businesses like real estate and online shopping. I work round the clock in Nepal — a strong work ethic is something I picked up in Korea.&nbsp; My Korean bosses would work alongside us, that motivated us. I work just as hard in Nepal as I did in Korea. People here often ask me why I am pushing myself so hard. But making garlands comes easy to me, it is work my forebears were involved in. My childhood memories are about plucking flowers with my sister. I have a comparative advantage in this work. It comes naturally to me, it is easy and I enjoy it. And sometimes, if there are too many garlands to make, I can multitask while holding meetings. My fingers just fly. I am good at this job, but my wife is even better and faster.&nbsp; When there is too much load, we can also outsource the work. To be known as the flower guy would be great personal branding. The मखमली guy. Or the सयपत्री guy. I decided to come home for just this with a one-way ticket. “अब पासा: जाँदैन ल्हासा!” &nbsp;

The flower guy

It cannot be a coincidence that after pushing bills to constrict freedom of expression and allow greater <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/security-or-espionage">surveillance of citizens</a>, Nepal’s government is now tightening controls on civil society.
In a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/command-and-control">series of recent moves</a> journalists have been sued for contempt of court, imprisoned for YouTube videos, or ordered by courts to desist from investigating corrupt officials.
An amendment to the Print and Publications Act that would hand the power to shut online media to the Chief District Officer (CDO). Another draft Bill would allow a political appointee to head a new Media Council with the power to revoke a journalist’s license. The draft counter-intelligence Bill would let random officials to arbitrarily tap phones, read emails and trail citizens.
Now comes yet another draft Bill that would replace the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=10675">Social Welfare Council (SWC)</a> with direct government control over registration, regulation, and management of non-governmental organisations, nonprofits and charities. There are more than 54,000 NGOs, 200 international NGOs registered with the SWC.
The draft makes civil society organisations needlessly jump through hoops to carry out work that complements the government in the social sector. Critics say the Bill was drafted without any consultation with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/nepal-s-rights-groups-must-step-up-4r4z6ck4">civic groups</a>.
“This Bill’s content is questionable whether it intends to allow for civil society organisations in Nepal a free space to operate,” concludes Dr SP Kalaunee, Country Representative of BlinkNow Foundation and Chair of the Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN). “The draft seems oriented towards controling rather than facilitating the work of civil society organisations.”
The Bill will be open for feedback from the public, and integrates the National Directives Act (1961), Association Registration Act (1977), and the Social Welfare Act (1992) and proposes dissolving the SWC and replacing it with a new Social Welfare Department under the Ministry of Women, Children and Senior Citizens.
Non-government groups will now be required to get approval from the Registrar Office, the CDO or the provincial government depending on their area of operation. Those working across provinces will have to get permission from the federal government. &nbsp;
The government says the Bill is intended to vet organisations to see if they are engaged in espionage, violate national security, assist a foreign state, commit treason, cause strife between federal units, or incite communal violence.&nbsp;
CSOs working in Nepal have long called for legislation to better facilitate their work, minimise administrative and bureaucratic red tape which have posed operational challenges. But they are opposed to such drastic control.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-crow-and-the-scarecrow">The crow and the scarecrow</a>, Om Astha Rai
The NGO Federation of Nepal also issued a statement this week calling the Bill ‘retrograde and cumbersome’. It added: ‘Most of its provisions are intended to further constrain and control civil society organisations rather than facilitate and strengthen them, and reduce the role of citizen participation … it is an attack on our civil liberties, inclusivity, and transparency, and curtails our <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=5156">democratic values and constitutional rights</a>.’ &nbsp;
<a href="about:blank">Nepal’s graduation</a> from least-developed country status next year may mean less aid for Nepal, and higher interest rates on loans from multilateral creditors. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal">closure of USAID </a>and reduction in bilateral grants means the work of INGOs will be even more vital – especially to meet its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/target-2030-for-maternal-and-newborn-health">SDG targets by 2030</a>.&nbsp;
“We are competing with other countries at a time when the global aid environment is shrinking, so the support we receive is directly dependent on a conducive environment for INGOs to operate and function,” says Kalaunee. “INGOs follow regulations of the nations they operate in, they will not protest or wait around for governments to change their minds or policies.”
Social safety net
Since 1977, the work of non-governmental actors in Nepal has been regulated by the Social Service National Coordination Council (SSNCC) chaired by Queen Aishwarya.
After the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/one-moment-30-years-ago-today">1990 People’s Movement</a>, King Birendra set up the Social Welfare Council (SWC) as an autonomous body in 1992 through the Social Welfare Act. But since then the SWC has been dogged by controversy and allegations of corruption and extortion.
In 2018, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a Rs315 million corruption case against 14 individuals, including the Minister of Women, Children and Social Welfare and SWC chair Badri Prasad Neupane and other officials for violating public procurement laws to rent out three hectares of its property around Bhrikuti Mandap.
Civil society groups have for years called for reforms in the SWC, and a report was drawn up to restructure it before this Bill proposed its dissolution. INGOs in particular will now have to go through the Social Welfare Department and multiple ministries for permissions.
A particularly objectionable provision in the draft stipulates that NGOs must have a Board of Director made up almost entirely of secretaries of various ministries. The NGO Federation has urged the government to take a civil society-friendly approach and not tangle its work in red tape and control. It says the government has no option but to revise the bill in its current form.
“Civil society organisations need an open space to operate, and an autonomous body to oversee them,” says Kalaunee. “Non-government organisations support in the areas prioritised by the government but by definition they cannot be a part of government.”