China’s sharp economic slowdown has raised alarm bells around the world. But it has also thrown into relief the rise of another demographic powerhouse next door.&nbsp; The Indian economy grew at an impressive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-economic-growth-set-accelerate-its-fastest-year-2023-08-31/">7.8% annual rate</a> in the second quarter of 2023, and the country recently reached an important milestone by becoming the first to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/23/science/chandrayaan-3-india-moon-landing.html">land a spacecraft</a> on the Moon’s potentially water-rich south pole. India’s ascent, unlike China’s, has not been accompanied by an increasingly assertive foreign policy. As India’s geopolitical, economic, and cultural clout grows, so does its global footprint. China’s ‘<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/29/opinion/china-economy-decline.html">decline</a>’, as some have begun to call the conclusion of the country’s four-decade-long economic boom, opens new opportunities for the Indian economy and other developing and emerging countries. Earlier this year, India reached another milestone when its population officially <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">surpassed that of China</a>, which had been the world’s most populous country for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/19/world/asia/india-china-population.html">more than 300 years</a>. While China’s shrinking, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3207047/china-population-2022-marks-first-population-decline-60-years">rapidly aging</a> population is likely to impede economic growth and may curtail its geopolitical ambitions, India – one of the world’s <a href="https://indbiz.gov.in/one-of-the-youngest-populations-in-the-world-indias-most-valuable-asset/">youngest</a> countries, with a <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/#:~:text=The%20population%20density%20in%20India,1%2C202%20people%20per%20mi2).&amp;text=The%20median%20age%20in%20India%20is%2028.4%20years.">median age of 28.2</a> – is poised to reap a huge demographic dividend. But the driving force behind India’s emergence as a major global power is its rapid economic growth. While India’s GDP is still smaller than China’s, the country is currently the world’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2023">fastest-growing</a> major economy and is projected to account for <a href="https://t.co/SMFH21oTa0">12.9% of global growth</a> over the next five years, surpassing the United States’ 11.3% share.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231029081036_781e265ec0c9f72b3c2596697419554293b721f2c4e8c93b963d66e35f4aa3c1.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20231029081036_781e265ec0c9f72b3c2596697419554293b721f2c4e8c93b963d66e35f4aa3c1" data-rendition-name="original" width="696" height="477" loading="lazy" alt="India China graph NT"> </figure>  In addition to fueling a consumption boom, India’s youthful population is also driving innovation, as evidenced by the country’s world-class information economy and its recent moon landing, which the country managed to achieve despite a national space budget equivalent to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/india-races-russia-to-be-first-to-land-on-moons-south-pole-ad5d9d05">roughly 6%</a> of what the US spends on space missions. Having already surpassed the United Kingdom, its former colonial ruler, India’s GDP is poised to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/01/india-to-leapfrog-to-third-largest-economy-by-2030.html">overtake</a> that of Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030, behind the US and China. Given its increasingly unstable neighborhood, it should come as no surprise that India has the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time">third-largest</a> defense budget. The deepening <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Pakistan-China-and-terrorism">strategic alliance</a> between China and Pakistan underscores India’s precarious position as the only country bordering two nuclear-armed <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-becoming-chinese-client-state-by-brahma-chellaney-2016-05?">revisionist states</a> with expansionist ambitions. Moreover, for the past three years, India has been locked in a tense <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-cannot-win-india-himalayan-border-dispute-by-brahma-chellaney-2023-04">military standoff</a> with China along its Himalayan border. Bilateral relations, marked by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/12/india-china-arunachal-border/">intermittent clashes</a> in the disputed Tibet-Ladakh border region, are at their lowest point in decades. By confronting China despite the risk of a full-scale war, India has challenged Chinese power in a way no other country has done in this century. But despite leaning toward forging closer ties with the West, India remains hesitant to enter into formal military alliances with Western countries. Western powers are partly to blame. US President <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s reluctance to comment on the Sino-Indian military standoff, let alone openly support India, has sent a clear signal that India is responsible for its own defense. Given that the country’s future growth hinges on its ability to defend itself against external threats, India will likely step up its efforts to modernize its conventional armed forces and enhance its nuclear deterrence. The escalating geopolitical rivalry between China and India could also impede efforts to unite the Global South and transform the BRICS group into a credible alternative to the G20 and G7. The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) recently agreed to expand the group by adding <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/xv-brics-summit-johannesburg-ii-declaration-24-august-2023">six new members</a>: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, Argentina, and Iran. Given the 11 members’ divergent interests, BRICS+ will likely find it even harder to reach consensus on any major issue.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231029081040_43ee34df0da045fc9466deb8642e67e778412c7494d5aa1275da28fc08e002e9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_20" data-image-id="20231029081040_43ee34df0da045fc9466deb8642e67e778412c7494d5aa1275da28fc08e002e9" data-rendition-name="original" width="599" height="402" loading="lazy" alt="India China NT 2"> </figure>  Meanwhile, China’s economic slump could prompt President Xi Jinping to double down on his expansionist agenda. Biden recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/11/us/politics/biden-china-criticism-economy.html">characterized</a> the stagnating Chinese economy as a “ticking time bomb,” warning that, “When bad folks have problems, they do bad things.” China’s controversial <a href="https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1696104724691570945">new national map</a>, which depicts vast areas of India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Bhutan (and even a bit of Russia) as Chinese territory, underscores the threat posed by China’s increasingly aggressive behavior. In addition to these external threats, India’s future will be shaped by its response to domestic economic challenges. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/asia/in-india-government-tracks-its-own.html">great strides</a> in modernizing the notoriously outdated Indian bureaucracy and promoting e-government to reduce red tape and attract foreign direct investment. His government has invested heavily in upgrading and expanding the country’s infrastructure, implemented regulatory reforms, and sought to boost domestic manufacturing through Modi’s <a href="https://mea.gov.in/Images/attach/Make_in_India_Initiative.pdf">“Make in India” initiative</a>. But to transform itself into a global manufacturing hub, India must invest in human capital, particularly in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp012202">education and training</a>. Moreover, India’s size and diversity also pose enormous challenges. India may be the first developing economy that, from the beginning, has pursued modernization and prosperity through a democratic system. But as one of the world’s most culturally diverse countries, its seemingly never-ending election cycle has often fueled division and polarization. But, despite its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/divided-families-and-tense-silences-us-style-polarization-arrives-in-india/2019/05/18/734bfdc6-5bb3-11e9-98d4-844088d135f2_story.html">US-style polarized politics</a>, India’s democratic framework has served as a pillar of stability. By fostering open expression and dialogue, the Indian political system has empowered grassroots communities and individuals, enabling members of historically marginalized classes and castes to rise to the highest levels of policymaking. Whether India can maintain its current upward trajectory will depend on its ability to maintain political stability, rapid economic growth, domestic and external security, and a forward-looking foreign policy. Success would enhance India’s <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-us-china-balance-of-power-without-formal-alliance-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-06">global standing</a> and help advance <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-india-emerge-as-a-rival-to-china-manufacturing-population-it-investment-trade-youth-regulatory-reform-11673895652?mod=opinion_featst_pos2">US interests</a> in the Indo-Pacific, the world’s new geopolitical fulcrum and home to its fastest-growing economies.&nbsp; © Project Syndicate Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research, New Delhi and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin. His book <a href="https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/Water">Water: Asia’s New Battleground</a> (Georgetown University Press, 2011) for which he won the 2012 <a href="https://asiasociety.org/media/press-releases/brahma-chellaney%E2%80%99s-water-asia%E2%80%99s-new-battleground-wins-2012-asia-society-bernard">Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award</a>.

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India’s quiet rise

In an English city, my aunt had learned to call home, it was the pursuit of familiarity that really gave her the purpose to stay. One weekend, she sat on the stairs, making frantic calls. My uncle punched numbers on his Nokia cell phone. Where? What time? Are tickets available? They echoed one another. Both were trying to book tickets for the only screening of Bollywood’s <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0420332/">Veer Zara</a>, in a city near us.
My cousins and me, we waited with bated breath. This would be an opportunity to watch a Bollywood film on the big screen. In the early-2000s, screening of Bollywood in the cinemas had not yet become a thing in England, so South Asians would organise their own screenings.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/suburban-tales/light-of-the-absurd">Light of the absurd</a>, Pratibha Tuladhar
Tickets were finally booked and we rushed out, thrusting our arms through our coats as we hastily locked the door behind us. “This is as far as Nagarkot is from Kathmandu,” my uncle said aloud, as he drove. Would we have covered the same distance to go watch a “Hindi” film in Kathmandu? Probably not. But in the UK, we did, racing towards a collective, South Asian sentiment.
When we arrived, the theatre premise was packed with Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Nepalis. Immediately, there was the relaxing of the muscles you experience in the presence of the familiar.
Probably among the last people to buy the tickets, ours weren’t the best seats. We were on the very first row, and for the rest of the show, we would tilt our head up towards the screen, as though clamouring for some love, while the actors would virtually breathe down our necks.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/suburban-tales/memory-of-a-conversation">Memory of as conversation</a>, Pratibha Tuladhar
We weren’t the only ones with bad seats. Some in the audience had been accommodated on make-shift chairs. The auditorium was packed all the way to the exit.
As <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0451321/?ref_=tt_ov_st">Shah Rukh Khan</a> rescued <a href="https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0006689/?ref_=tt_ov_st">Priety Zinta</a> by slinging on a chopper, I remember flinching in my seat, as though they would fall on my face. A Nepali family friend, Mahesh Mahaseth, who happened to be sitting next to me, nudged and laughed at me when tears ran down my face as the India-Pakistan romance transpired. I remember thinking at that time how cruel-South-Asian-male that behaviour was-- teasing a girl in tears.
Even as my dislike for Shah Rukh Khan (SRK) continued to build-up, I joined other women and girls in the audience and cried during all the sad scenes. The men cleared their throat. And although it seemed like SRK was demonstrating that it is okay for men to weep, to be vulnerable and heartbroken, that precedent wasn’t quite set off screen.
Regardless, we all went home purged. Post-catharsis.
…
For many South Asian women, SRK is religion, said my friend Ayub, and sent me a snapshot of the book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Desperately-Seeking-Shah-Rukh-Independence/dp/9354891934">Desperately Seeking Shah Rukh by Shrayana Bhattacharya</a>. Ayub described SRK as “the resilient embodiment of liberalism.” I asked him to elaborate and we ended up hate-watching <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt15354916/">Jawan</a>. (Was he a convert by the end of the film? He might answer that in a separate article.)
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/suburban-tales/the-light-of-feet">The light of feet</a>, Pratibha Tuladhar
I cannot remember the last time I watched a Bollywood movie in the theatre. So, when the audience cheered and clapped every time SRK dismantled a bad guy, I was surprised. And while the audience responded in euphoria, I found that I was quickly disassociating: what was this film beyond a family drama steeped in violence, a revenge tragedy interlude, and family reunion with the Robin Hood of a son, all woven into the narrative of vindication of geopolitics? But the show was house-full and parents had their toddlers in tow.
There are no sanitised versions of the world here, for children.
“I was not expecting so much crowd for a Bollywood masala movie. I was surprised to be honest,” Hashim Ahmad Hakeem, video producer from India, who went to the film’s screening in Kathmandu with friends from South Asia, told me. “It was amazing bonding over the movie and realising most of us have grown up in the same Bollywood cinema.”
Hakeem was participating in the Adenauer Media Leaders Academy in Kathmandu. On the sidelines of the event, one of the things the fellows did together was watch Jawan.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/suburban-tales/of-anger-and-love">Of anger and love</a>, Pratibha Tuladhar
“I watched it because Bollywood movies are banned in Pakistani cinemas. Secondly, I wanted to watch with fellows from other countries, specifically India as they are very much enthusiastic about Shah Rukh Khan. So, I enjoyed their cheering more than the movie,” says Abbass Raza, an aspiring journalist from Pakistan.
For many South Asians, Bollywood movies are about coming home to culture and language they can relate to.
“Honestly, this will always be memorable,” says Navneeta Nandan, journalist with The Economic Times. “It signifies the strength of art. We can be geographically apart but this can always be something that will keep us connected- cinema, music from different countries.”
…
On a certain terrace restaurant in the heart of Kathmandu, a friend from Pakistan and I get talking about architecture and end up discussing Pakistani teleserials. In the 80s, Nepal Television used to broadcast Pakistani series as an endorsement of its friendly relations with Pakistan. Some viewers at the time, even named their children after their favourite characters.
My aunt who lives in an English city, which has become her home, still binges on Pakistani series and records Indian serials. In the solitude of a foreign land, content in languages she can speak have always been her friends.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/suburban-tales/a-letter-to-a-sister">A letter to a sister</a>, Pratibha Tuladhar
Soap operas were created for housewives, who would watch them after putting their day’s work to rest, as though visiting old friends in the emptiness of their days. While on weekends husband and children filled the hours, on weekdays, they would go back to conversing with their virtual friends: women who sometimes did not represent their reality, and sometimes, offered them the comfort of heroism.
At my request, my friend from Pakistan shared a very long list of recommended Pakistani dramas. I forwarded it to my aunt. And here’s what she wrote back: Thank you, chhori. I have watched ALL of them! :)

Pratibha Tuladhar

Navigating invisible borders

Libya, Greece, Spain, China — videos of catastrophic floods have flooded the international media.&nbsp; Floods swept away most of the Libyan city of Derna, killing more than 11,000 people. Climate change was blamed, but it was also caused by war and unheeded warnings about weak dams. The disasters are a warning to Nepal where a range of factors could worsen monsoon flooding in the coming years. The Melamchi flood in 2021 that nearly destroyed Nepal’s largest infrastructure project, and this monsoon’s destructive floods in eastern Nepal show that these disasters are already happening.&nbsp; But every monsoon there is also a flood of recrimination in India about Nepal releasing water on its rivers and unleashing floods — even though there are no reservoir projects and sluice gates on two border barrages on the Kosi and Gandaki, both controlled by India. &nbsp; Yet, every monsoon the media in the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh are full of headlines blaming Nepal.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-kosi-returns-to-its-old-ways">The Kosi returns to its old ways</a> The 2008 flood that affected 2.3 million people in Nepal and India was actually caused by a breach in the eastern embankment of the Kosi. The rain that year was not even heavy, so one wonders what would happen in a year when there is abnormal precipitation in the Kosi catchment.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023092204098_d8c61f36859d2d0f2aef053ea1c5a15358d618a3d8b2e772dba7ba06e8d38e0b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2023092204098_d8c61f36859d2d0f2aef053ea1c5a15358d618a3d8b2e772dba7ba06e8d38e0b" data-rendition-name="original" width="2500" height="1667" loading="lazy" alt="Kosi NT"> <figcaption>Photo: GOPEN RAI</figcaption> </figure>  “After the completion of Kosi Barrage in the 1960s, the embankments have collapsed about eight times until now, but the major one was 2008,” says Ajaya Dixit, a water expert.&nbsp; In 2008, the Indian media had ill-informed headlines like ‘Nepal opened the Kosi Barrage’ which has affected public opinion. The real story is about faulty engineering of the barrage and its embankments on the Kosi, which is a river with one of the highest sediment loads in the world. Eklavya Prasad, water campaigner who is with Megh Pyne Abhiyan in Bihar, says it is unreasonable to blame Nepal for annual floods in India. He explains: “Geographically, a large number of Himalayan rivers flow down from Nepal and discharge the waters and sediment into the north Bihar region. It is a natural drainage path that flows across the international boundary and beyond human capabilities.” Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-kosi-s-sorrow-and-scope">The Kosi’s sorrow, and scope</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit Kosi, also known as Sorrow of Bihar, is notorious for frequently changing its course. In the last 200 years, the Kosi has gradually shifted 120km westwards. “River always chooses the path of least resistance. And when it doesn’t get to flow, it forces its way through,” says Dixit.&nbsp; Ignoring this nature of the river when infrastructure and new settlements are designed on old floodplains is what has increased the intensity and impact of floods. In many ways, it is the same reason Kathmandu gets flooded every monsoon. Infrastructure has been sited along floodplains constricting rivers such that even moderate rain becomes destructive. “All of the 56 floodgates of the Kosi Barrage are operated by the Bihar government, and if they fail to open the Nepal side is flooded. If they are opened, the flood goes downstream,” says Dwarika Nath Dhungel, former secretary of the Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-water-and-electricity">The geopolitics of Nepal’s water and electricity</a>, Ramesh Kumar Although there is no clear clause on the operational right of the barrage in the agreement between Nepal and India, on the Kosi Project, Dhungel surmises that a subclause is being used by India to manage the barrage. Says Dhungel: “The same clause also uses the word 'maintenance' of barrage here, but there has been no maintenance effort from the Indian side.” The barrage impounds water forcing the river to deposit its sediment behind it so that the river is now flowing a few metres above the surrounding land — increasing the dangers of floods.&nbsp; The solution to transboundary floods is to look at the river system in totality. If India and Nepal are to prepare for cataclysmic water disasters in the future, the two countries must work together. The ‘national interest’ in harnessing Nepal’s rivers must be based on bilateral benefit. Says Ajaya Dixit: “Studying the nature of the rivers, not just where it floods but also from where it originates, and incorporating these elements while building infrastructure can minimise the risk of river-related disasters.” Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-nepal-ignore-climate-crisis-in-river-talks">India, Nepal ignore climate crisis in river talks</a>, Ramesh Bhushal

A flood of recrimination

Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China comes as the season here in Beijing begins to shift from the summer to autumn.&nbsp;
As the Prime Minister alights from his aircraft at the Beijing Capital International Airport being greeted by still balmy conditions, he may very well wonder why his flight could not have touched down at the other (newer) colossal international airport in Beijing, Daxing International, designed by the award winning British architectural firm Zaha Hadid Architects.
That facility is not just a piece of art but is the world’s largest single-building airport occupying more than 7.5 million sq feet of ground space. Although by land-area, Daxing International is still significantly smaller than King Fahd International or even Denver International or Washington Dulles, the way in which the airport evokes, in combination, a sense of power, networks and a futuristic vision is inescapable.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/fixing-the-broken-parts-in-nepal-china-ties">Fixing the broken parts in Nepal-China ties</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit
This is not surprising at all because the People’s Republic of China is probably at this juncture of history the example par excellence of a Eurasian power vigorously straddling the super continent in almost every sense of the word: political, economic, cultural and certainly in respect to hard infrastructure systems.&nbsp;
It is also no surprise that it is exactly due to this position China currently occupies as a preeminent Eurasian power that it is bumping up with such great and increasing friction against not just the United States but <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/political-geography-of-india-nepal-china-ties">other leading powers in the system such as India</a> and so on.&nbsp;
The state of progressively intense upheavals that is consequently being generated within the international system is something that smaller powers such as Nepal will find almost impossible to circumvent let alone easily maneuver around.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-now-has-to-balance-not-just-india-and-china-but-also-the-west">Nepal now has to balance not just India nad China, but also the West</a>, Bhairaja Panday
It is within this broad lay of the land that Dahal's September sojourn to China must be viewed and analysed. Sino-Nepal relations do not exist in a vacuum, they are part of larger (and ever shifting) structural, geopolitical forces at play that can potentially pull Nepal against gravitational force into spaces not easily comprehensible, much less simple to navigate.&nbsp;
This comes back to the question as to what is the natural direction of Nepal’s foreign policy, where does the gravity of Nepal’s foreign policy lie, because it is against this question too that better inferences and assessments of the prime minister’s China visit can be brought to bear.&nbsp;
At any given point in history, the state of Sino-Nepal relations will be dictated as well by the overall <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/40-years-after-the-sino-us-thaw">nature and tenor of Sino-US</a>, Sino-Indian as well as Sino-Russian relations and different combinations of those bilateral relationships.&nbsp;
Nepal’s relationship with India and then the United States exerts a profound impact on its foreign policy towards China, and this is exponentially the case in contemporary times as larger and larger diaspora communities in those countries become more entrenched and organised, giving rise to push and pull factors that reverberate back into the corridors of power in Kathmandu.&nbsp;
It must not be forgotten as well that the Maoist party Prime Minister Dahal's visit to China takes place at a time in Nepal's history when its governmental and administrative apparatus is perhaps the most fragile and fungible they have ever been, and therefore prone to being malleable in general or definitely within certain distinct pockets.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/geopolitical-tectonics">Geopolitical tectonics</a>, Editorial
There are certain strong domestic lobbies in favour of China within Nepal’s political ecosystem, but it is hard to establish the extent to which these have the ability to triumph in forging real diplomatic success in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/sino-nepal-ties-in-the-post-afghan-era">Sino-Nepal relations</a>.&nbsp;
Surely in terms of big-ticket items in the bilateral relationship such as expansion of BRI and an elevated position for China in harvesting the green energy market in Nepal, it appears that Nepal’s position is currently circumscribed to a large extent by structural factors and that Kathmandu would need to approach cooperation with China with greater creativity encompassing an international approach.&nbsp;
For example, harnessing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">Nepal’s substantial hydropower potential</a> is a key objective of policy makers in the country but due to the divergent and fragmented geopolitical environment Nepal faces externally, it becomes challenging for any one of the great powers alone to plan and actually execute large scale infrastructure projects without inciting adverse pushback.&nbsp;
So would it be feasible for Kathmandu to think along the lines of gradually proposing and nurturing international consortia (by including within a single basket China, India and the United States, for instance) to address the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/balance-of-power">development of hydropower in Nepal</a> or other large scale infrastructure initiatives?&nbsp;
It is unlikely that such an approach can be made to happen, but it is certainly worth the effort by the prime minister to explore during his high-level engagements with leaders in China. Sticking to a strictly bilateral approach on this visit to China will be a safe bet for the Prime Minister Dahal and will not ruffle any feathers.
But if one can think out of the box as a means to inject more momentum from Nepal towards much needed regional economic growth, then why not at least try?
Bhaskar Koirala is an independent analyst with Peking University. Views here are the author's own.

Nepal's Maoist leader visits China

When landslides struck a pilgrimage route to the Kedarnath shrine in the Indian Himalaya last week, 13 of the 19 people killed were Nepalis. All of them were migrant workers from Jumla in western Nepal.
Largely ignored in Nepal’s migration statistics are the estimated 4 million Nepalis who are studying, working and living in India. They are undocumented as Nepalis do not need visas or passports for India, just as Indians do not need those travel documents to travel to Nepal.
Nepal has an 1,808km open border with India to its east, south and west, and recorded migration between the two countries can be traced back to the Treaty of Sugauli between Nepal and The East India Company in 1816 which allowed the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers into the British Army.
But following Indian independence in 1947, while the 2nd, 6th, 7th and 10th Gurkha Rifles became part of the British Army, the rest stayed with the new Indian Army. Even today, there are nearly 42,000 Nepali soldiers in the Indian Army.
Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-faith-in-politics">India’s faith in politics</a>, Shrijan Pandey
A large portion of Nepalis making their way to Uttar Pradesh and other Indian cities are seasonal workers from historically neglected far western Nepal looking for jobs to augment family expenses.
For people in the remote mountains of Nepal or Tarai towns, India is much closer than faraway Kathmandu. Dehradun is only seven hours by bus from Mahendranagar while Kathmandu can take up to 17 hours.
“I work for 12 hours a day for 12,000 Indian rupees a month,” says a native of Mahendranagar who has been working in a dhawa roadside restaurant in Haridwar for the past 10 years. He initially went to Saudi Arabia but the recruiter robbed him of his salary, and he was forced to come back. When he couldn’t land a job in Nepal, he left for India.
He adds: “Going to India was a more convenient option than coming to Kathmandu. I don't make much but I get to see my wife and son once every few months.”
Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/inconvenient-truths">Inconvenient truths</a>, Editorial
Nepalis make it to India via five main transit points: Kakadbhitta-Siliguri, Biratnagar-Jogbani, Bhairahawa-Sunauli, Nepalgunj-Rupediya, and Dhangadhi-Gauriphanta. But there are no exact figures on the total number of Nepalis in India, only rough estimates.
The Asian Centre for Human Rights says that some 350,000 to 400,000 Nepalis were internally displaced from their villages during the Maoist conflict, and many more crossed over to India to escape the violence. Many never returned.
While increasingly many Nepalis are making it big in the IT and management sectors in India, many more are still security guards and domestic workers. As unskilled workers, most earn only a little more than they would in Nepal.
Even so, according to the Nepal Labor Migration Report 2022, Nepal received Rs43.16 billion in remittances from India, just behind the top contributor Qatar. Even that could be a gross undercount since much more money comes in through informal channels.
Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-hard-working-students-overseas">Nepal’s hard working students overseas</a>, Sonia Awale
There are also Nepalis who have lived in India with their family for years. “My parents came here long ago and are now settled here,” says a 20-year-old Nepali worker in a restaurant in Srinagar. There were many others like him in Dehradun, Mussoorie, and Delhi with their families who first came looking for a job but are now settled in India.
Many lodges and restaurants in Delhi are run by Nepali migrants. “I sold my camera to come to Delhi for work,” says a 21-year-old working in Krishna Rooftop Cafe in Pahadganj. The staff is all Nepali and the whole establishment was buzzing with dohori folk songs.
Labour migration to the Gulf and Malaysia is rife with stories of exploitation and abuse. Things are as bad if not worse in India, with a near absence of safety mechanisms and legislation to protect the workers.
Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepali-nurses-gone-and-going-to-the-uk">Nepali nurses gone and going to the UK</a>, Nepali Times
Since Nepalis in India are largely undocumented, most cases go unreported, are un-surveilled and out of social policy. This poses an additional security risk for those involved in unregulated sectors such as sex trade and domestic work.
The National Human Rights Commission in 2019 estimated that 1.5 million Nepalis are vulnerable to human trafficking. The traffickers often target young girls from financially weak families belonging to marginalised communities. The open border between Nepal and India and lack of documentation make it virtually impossible to track these instances of crime.
Growing intolerance of minorities in recent years means Nepalis also sometimes face hostility.
In an era of right-wing nationalism, Nepali migrants can also face the heat. In fact, even Indians of Nepali descent were treated with much scrutiny when the dispute over much-contested Kalapani-Limpiyadhura territories broke out between Nepal and India in 2019. &nbsp;
Read also:<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Between-the-lines/More-Nepali-students-settle-overseas,528"> Losing our young</a>, Tsering Dolker Gurung

Love thy neighbours

As the most populous country in the world, India’s democracy is tangled up in politics, religion, and the economy ahead of next year’s elections.&nbsp; India’s mainstream media has equated Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with prosperity, and a majority of the public in north India seems to buy that line. Indeed, India’s GDP has grown by 6.3% over the past nine years since Modi took office, its annual economic growth rate is the envy of the world. But the Modi government is also accused of strategically promoting crony capitalism, systematically tolerating attacks on minorities, and controlling the mass media. All this is already beginning to have a profound impact on Nepal’s own polity, with parties espousing Modi-style Hindutva becoming more vocal, their call for restoring the Hindu state sitting uneasily with the demands to also bring back the monarchy.&nbsp; This trip by a Nepali journalist across the stronghold of the Modi government ahead of the 2024 general election and coinciding with the Kanvar Yatra revealed both faith-driven politics as well as deep misgivings about India straying from its secular path. Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/news/india-s-hindutva-politics-influencing-nepal">India’s Hindutva politics influencing Nepal</a>, Santa Gaha Magar The Himalayan state of Uttarakhand was busy with the annual Bol Bom pilgrimage with hundreds of thousands of pilgrims walking to the source of the Ganga to collect its holy water for their own local Shiva shrines. Along a stretch of highway, devotees wore t-shirts emblazoned with the symbol Om as they ordered meals at a dhawa eatery. Their motorcycles were festooned in saffron flags with images of Hanuman. Unsurprisingly, they were vocal in their support for the Hindu nationalist BJP, their religious devotion having translated into political preference to strongly identify with Hindutva. “India should be a Hindu country and protect its religion and culture. After all, there are one too many Christian and Muslim nations in the world,” said one young pilgrim. At a tea shop in Rishikesh, devotees praised Narendra Modi and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath for their commitment to promoting Hindutva.&nbsp; “India has become a better place with Modi cracking down on crime and corruption,” affirmed one devotee in saffron attire. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/red-to-saffron">RED to SAFFRON</a>, Shristi Karki  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20230809110836_091ee141dcb1c1f3655680b9b81b9bede9ffb1844d56aa33bbdb91c3bf17b0d6.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20230809110836_091ee141dcb1c1f3655680b9b81b9bede9ffb1844d56aa33bbdb91c3bf17b0d6" data-rendition-name="original" width="2000" height="1333" loading="lazy" alt="India’s faith in politics NT"> </figure>  A group at a table lectured a visiting Nepali about how India needed a strongman with the “correct” ideology that asserted India’s greatness on the world stage. They credited Modi for giving India international recognition and respect it did not have before. The highways to Rishikesh were ablaze in saffron banners and posters of Modi and Yogi Adityanath on walls of highway bridges and the backs of buses. The roads were packed with convoys of trucks with loudspeakers belting out devotional music to which the pilgrims danced. In between, there were also songs exhorting people to vote for the BJP in next year’s elections. The BJP has tried to brand itself as the protector of Hinduism, facilitating, amplifying and even radicalising their beliefs. Bol Bom pilgrims looked visibly uncomfortable when asked about the attacks on Muslims across Northern India. Most dismissed the question entirely, with some suspicious about that line of questioning. We also tried to gauge the political pulse of the general public away from the religious processions. What did India’s Dalits and Muslims think of Modi and his saffronification of politics? &nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/nepal-pm-to-india-to-reboot-ties">Nepal PM to India to reboot ties</a>, Chandra Kishore Even Indians who do not identify with Hindutva politics are Modi fans because they credit his two terms since 2014 as being the reason for India’s rapid economic growth. A businessman from Gurgaon who runs an export business in India and Nepal praised Modi’s leadership for business expansion, providing better loan schemes for startups, and attracting foreign investment. Even so, while Cyber City Gurgaon or Noida on the outskirts of New Delhi offer glimpses of prosperity, the rural reality for much of the population is a different story. “I feel cheated, Modi did not deliver on his promises,” said a bookstore owner in Delhi, explaining that an increase in GDP didn't necessarily translate into higher living standards for many. Along the pavement near Delhi’s railway station are rows and rows of homeless. Unemployment is still high, and young men injected themselves with drugs in the shadows of underpasses of the capital and ghettos near Jame Masjid. The world’s largest democracy may have elected this prime minister, but his party has used populism, fear-mongering and censorship to consolidate its support. But no one dares to speak out for fear of retribution. Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-end-of-ideology-in-nepal">The end of ideology in Nepal</a> “If you point a finger against Modi, they will raid your home,” said the bookstore owner in a hushed tone. He voted for Modi’s BJP in 2014 and 2019, but says he is unlikely to do so in 2024 because he does not want to live in this state of fear. Media critics like journalist Ravish Kumar face constant harassment and death threats from government supporters. Adani Group buying out NDTV is viewed as a further move against the last remaining democratic voices. “No media channel is critical of the government,” said another interlocutor. It is an indication of the pervasive paranoia that none of the critics of the BJP wanted their name used. “The media is used for hate speech against minorities, to distract attention from the real problems, and to glorify India’s Hindu past and its future.”&nbsp; One has to turn to social media to find out the truth about lynchings, bulldozing of Muslim neighbourhoods or attacks on holy sites. The mainstream media either does not mention those attacks, or provides a distorted account. It is easy to be impressed with India’s impressive investment in infrastructure, the gleaming towers in its cities and the traffic jams on its roads. India might have taken a step forward in economic growth, but its democracy has taken two steps back. Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/religiously-following-politics">Religiously following politics</a>, Chandra Kishore

India’s faith in politics

In addition to the many commodities India exports to Nepal, it is now also sending across its brand of Hindutva politics.&nbsp;
Journalists at an interaction in Kathmandu on Wednesday expressed reservations about how the nationalistic Hindutva ideology of India’s ruling BJP was influencing Nepali politics as well.&nbsp;
The 'Hindutva politics and Indian-Nepali Media’ interaction was organised by Free Press Nepal with its editor JB Pun Magar moderating a panel that included Deshsanchar editor Yubaraj Ghimire and journalist-author Kanak Mani Dixit.
The speakers said Hindutva had historically disrupted communal harmony and encouraged religious and political extremism in secular India, saying that its proliferation across the open border into Nepal was “alarming”.&nbsp;
Ghimire explained that the Hindutva ideology applied the Hindu faith in politics and rejected the concept of secularism. Hindutva became part of Indian socio-politics with the establishment of the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925.&nbsp;
In 1951, the RSS established the Bharatiya Jana Sangh as its political wing to expand its right-wing, Hindu nationalist ideology to mainstream politics. The Jana Sangh broke off and merged with other parties, and an iteration became the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980, having carried over much of the original rank and file into the new political collective.&nbsp;
The BJP established itself as an influential political party after the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya by leaders of the RSS and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad in 1992. The party cemented itself as a mainstay in mainstream politics after Narendra Modi, a former full-time member of the RSS, became Prime Minister of India in 2014, and his re-election in 2019.
Meanwhile, in Nepal, parties like the royalist-right Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) have long called for the abolishment of secularism and the re-establishment of Nepal as a Hindu state.&nbsp;
The RPP was considerably weakened after Kamal Thapa split and established his own RPP-N which was not for a restoration of the monarchy but backed the demand for a Hindu state.
The party itself has gone through periods of the Nepali public taking its ideology with various degrees of seriousness. Nepal’s public sphere, disillusioned with secular-republican politicians, has seen a shift to pro-Hindu and sometimes monarchist public discourse corresponding with Hindutva in India. And Nepal’s political leadership and aspirants have taken notice.
Political experts and analysts have said that Nepal’s Communist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal himself is trying to endear himself to India’s leadership by visiting Hindu temples in India and Nepal, while India is using Nepal’s political leadership to control national affairs.&nbsp;
Dixit, founding editor of Himal Southasian, said Hindutva politics was giving continuity to long-running interference of the Indian establishment in Nepal’s affairs.&nbsp;
“To understand Nepal’s Hindutva politics, we must go back and study India’s interventions in Nepal since 1951,” said Dixit, noting that Delhi’s involvement can be seen ever since the fall of the Rana regime.
“At present, the effects of Hindutva intervention can be seen in our water resources and aviation sectors,” he added.&nbsp;
Dixit described the increasing effect of Hindutva in Nepali politics as a “clear and present danger”.
He added, “Indian intervention is the elephant in the room that we refuse to address instead we focus on other mice in the corner.”&nbsp;
Ghimire also delved into how India’s governing party has had an impact on Nepal’s rulers by questioning the visits to the offices of the BJP by Prime Minister Dahal and his predecessor Sher Bahadur Deuba during their official visits to India.
"Why was there a need to call on a specific party’s office during a state visit?” asked Ghimire rhetorically.
Dixit said Nepal’s media had yet to report on how Foreign Minister NP Saud’s wife is the vice-president of the Nepal chapter of the Hindu advocacy group World Hindu Federation. He said such gaps in coverage showed that the media is itself being influenced by the Hindutva ideology.&nbsp;
“The RSS does not interfere in Nepal’s affairs in a way that is visible, but I know that Nepal’s political leadership has welcomed its representative in Nepal without exception and with open arms,” said Ghimire in an answer to a question from the floor.&nbsp;
Former Kantipur editor Sudheer Sharma also had a question to the panel on the objectives of the RSS in Nepal. Ghimire answered that the organisation wants to spread its worldview and ideology to countries outside India.&nbsp;
“In Nepal, the organisation wants people to learn not about Prithivi Narayan Shah, but about Shivaji Maharaj,” Ghimire said, referring to Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj ,a 17th-century Indian sovereign idolised and celebrated by the RSS as a ruler who defended his Hindu empire from invasion.&nbsp;
Disillusionment with Nepal’s three mainstream parties manifested in the rise of the independent RSP, while the RPP is trying to ride the Hindutva wave to back Nepal reverting to being a Hindu state.&nbsp;
Even leaders thought to be progressive like former BBC Nepali Service journalist Rabindra Mishra have called for a referendum on secularism, leaving his Bibeksheel Sahja Party to join the RPP.
Ghimire concluded, “We must learn from India’s secularism. If we do not want what is happening in India’s socio-politics to impact Nepal, we must carefully study their weaknesses and where they have gone wrong so that we might avoid the same mistakes here.”

India’s Hindutva politics influencing Nepal

Much like in his <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/the-rana-reign-a-recap-of-history,3751">previous book Singha Durbar</a>, Sagar SJB Rana relives the political and physical landmarks along Nepal’s tumultuous road to democracy spanning 70 years in his sequel, Kingdom Lost. &nbsp; Chandra Shumsher Rana’s former palace at Singha Darbar was a symbol of the feudocracy of <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/inside-story-of-nepal-s-rana-dynasty">Nepal’s ruling clan</a> into which Sagar Rana was born. Even after 1951, Singha Darbar continued be the epicenter of power: from the brief experiment with democracy in 1959, three decades of Panchayat, the Maoist conflict, the federal republic right to the present.&nbsp; In <a href="https://www.amazon.com/KINGDOM-LOST-NEPALS-DEMOCRACY-1951-2008-ebook/dp/B0BZ8PBK6K">Kingdom Lost: Nepal’s Tryst with Democracy 1951-2008</a>, Rana chronicles the second act after his clan left the stage. He dives right in with a description of the euphoria on the streets as Nepalis tasted freedom for the very first time in February 1951.&nbsp; But a Rana-NC Cabinet with ailing Mohan Shumsher as prime minister and B P Koirala as home minister was a fraught coalition. King Tribhuvan and Crown Prince Mahendra across town at Narayanhiti Palace were getting impatient.&nbsp; Kingdom Lost is set in other historical landmarks that we pass every day in Kathmandu. <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/business/small-is-beautiful-boutique-hotels,3647">Baber Mahal</a>, the art and craft hub which was once the home of Bharat Shumsher (Sagar’s brother) who led the Gorkha Dal before its merger with the Nepali Congress (NC). Or Lalita Niwas, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/crime-and-or-punishment-in-nepal">today synonymous with corruption in high places</a>, which was nationalised by King Mahendra after 1960 because it belonged to another liberal Rana, Subarna Shumsher.&nbsp; Another political landmark is Sundarijal Jail where BP spent nearly a decade in his two-room lock-up, played badminton in a lawn within tall walls topped with an electrified fence. Here, BP wrote 11 of his 12 books, as well as a diary in English when he returned to Nepal from exile in 1977, which <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=6932">this paper serialised</a> every fortnight from 2001-2003.&nbsp; Today, just as <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/nepal-museums-reopen-after-8-months">Naryanhiti is a museum to the Shahs</a>, Sundarijal is a B P Museum. The rooms are as they were with the bed in which he died in Chabahil, low wicker chairs from his time in exile in Banaras. This detention centre for political prisoners after 1960 was once surrounded by forest and farms, but is today over-run by an expanding metropolis.&nbsp; The museum also houses the Royal Nepal Airlines DHC-6 Twin Otter 9N-ABB which was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Nepal_plane_hijack">hijacked on a flight from Biratnagar to Kathmandu</a> in 1973 by NC cadre to loot INR 30 million for the anti-Panchayat struggle. The plane carried passengers for another 41 years till it was damaged in a crash in 2014, was patched up and brought here as a dusty memorial to the heist.&nbsp; The BP Museum, Lalita Niwas, Baber Mahal, Singha Darbar all come alive while reading Kingdom Lost. They are like historical milestones to Sagar Rana’s chapters on BP’s brief 18 month stint as prime minister, <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/news/putsch-ek">Mahendra’s coup</a>, the Panchayat years, constitutional monarchy after 1990, the conflict, royal massacre of 2001, and the first Constituent Assembly. Two players stand out in the book: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/america-nepal-and-the-royal-coup">BP Koirala and King Mahendra</a>. The latter has been vilified for the coup and the Panchayat autocracy. But Mahendra also steered Nepal in a risky geopolitical tight rope between two giant neighbours not friendly to each other, and the Cold War.&nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><iframe src='https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=17xDdRdRNNP3eFwLaUxm7NfpXZ99fLo8HkhDBmkVjDSI&font=Default&lang=en&initial_zoom=2&height=650' width='100%' height='650' webkitallowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen allowfullscreen frameborder='0'></iframe></div> Mahendra deposed BP, saying “Nepal is not big enough for the two of us”, but the king and prime minister were not unlike each other in terms of their nationalism and statesmanship. While turning the pages of the first half of Kingdom Lost, the reader is forced to ponder: How would Nepal have fared if the two were on the same side?&nbsp; Sagar Rana’s book is replete with examples of how little Nepal’s politics has changed in the last 70 years. It has always revolved around a few men: the Ranas, the Shahs, the Koiralas, the alpha males of the three main parties, the Army, the Maoists.&nbsp; And off stage, there is always India. As early as 1951, BP described India’s first ambassador CPN Singh as believing that he was “greater than the king”, and when Jawaharlal Nehru in 1960 quizzed BP about why Nepal was establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, he replied ‘we are a sovereign nation, we can be friends with anyone we want’. No wonder New Delhi did not mind when Mahendra staged the 1960 coup.&nbsp; The NC also launched a three-year armed struggle against Panchayat in the early 1960s from India and it nearly compromised Mahendra’s position before China attacked India and started the Sino-Indian War. India pressured Subarna Shumsher to discontinue border raids and Mahendra was able to regain control of the situation. India’s role in the ultimate downfall of monarchy in 2008 and mainstreaming of the Maoists in 2006 bear all the hallmarks of the same modus operandi in 1951. Many insiders still believe that if Gyanendra had played his cards rights to reassure Delhi, he would not have been ousted. In its dealings with the Maoists, India was playing both sides. Sagar Rana also gives us a blow-by-blow of the triangular tension between the political parties, the Palace and the Army. And even within the Palace there was liberal King Birendra who had to stave off hardliners. His account of the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18246">massacre of royals on 1 June 2001</a> rightly concludes that Crown Prince Dipendra originally intended to only kill his father so he could become king himself, marry whom he wanted, and set the country right. The <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/all-is-fair-in-war-and-peace">Maoist conflict</a> also brought out the dual role India played in allowing sanctuary to leaders, including Nepal’s current prime minister. And the tug-o-war between Delhi Darbar and Naryanhiti Darbar for influence over the Maoist leadership. The underlying message in Kingdom Lost is that there were puppeteers in control, and ultimately it was the Nepali people who were caught in the crossfire.&nbsp; The dislike of India’s Congress for Nepal’s royals stemmed ostensibly from Sonia Gandhi being refused entry into Pashupati in 1984 for not being a Hindu. Later, the Congress-Left government in Delhi engineered Nepal turning into a secular republic – despite its earlier ‘twin pillar’ policy.&nbsp; But since 2014 the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/news/red-to-saffron">Hindu-right BJP is pushing to turn the clock back and restore Nepal as a Hindu state</a>, although maybe not the monarchy. It seems as if every time there is a change of government in India, we in Nepal have to also change our system.&nbsp; But the People’s Movement of 2006 is also a testament to politics in Nepal sometimes having its own dynamics that even India cannot control. On the morning of 21 April 2006, King Gyanendra under pressure from India agreed to hand over executive powers to a PM recommended by the agitating parties. But by then the street demonstrations in Kathmandu had already overtaken India’s roadmap, <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/issue/295">forcing Gyanendra to restore Parliament</a>.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023071213070_47685990669845e7b37a0e49ecac5aa84856ff990a4f0a600c0af7f6f9d0ca3e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_15" data-image-id="2023071213070_47685990669845e7b37a0e49ecac5aa84856ff990a4f0a600c0af7f6f9d0ca3e" data-rendition-name="original" width="674" height="404" loading="lazy" alt="Kingdom Lost book review"> </figure>  In the last segments of Kingdom Lost, the reader is swept by feelings of déjà vu. Everything that is happening today in Nepali politics seems to have all happened before. The powerful but now defunct Nepal Communist Party post-2018 <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-ruling-party-on-verge-of-split">fell victim to the power struggle</a> between K P Oli-Pushpa Kamal Dahal when Oli refused to keep his end of the bargain to rotate the premiership. <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=16912">Girija Prasad Koirala</a> and Surya Bahadur Thapa had a similar gentlemen’s agreement in 1998 to take turns being PM, but Girija played foul.&nbsp; The late 1990s was also rife with coalitions between parties of diametrically opposing ideologies, just like the jumbo coalition we have now. One wonders what BP would have made of the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-end-of-ideology-in-nepal">Nepali Congress and its alliance with the Maoists</a>. What would have been his take on the 2015 Constitution? Despite being a staunch NC member himself, Rana leaves it to us to make our own conclusions. Nepal’s history is punctuated by long political struggles, fleeting moments of euphoria at freedom regained, then of chances squandered by greed and ambition of those in charge. Kingdom Lost records those milestones: 1951, 1959, 1990, 2006, 2015 … While pulling back from cliff edge in one political crisis after another, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/institutionalised-inequality">pre-existing structural problems</a> of poverty, exclusion and inequality have not been fixed. Kingdom Lost is a stark reminder that the very politicians who once fought for democracy are undermining it today.&nbsp; Sagar Rana’s two books are must-reads for younger Nepalis to better understand the context behind contemporary Nepali politics since, as Rana quotes Robert A Heinlein, ‘a generation that ignores history has no past and no future’. <div class="embed-block"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-0masX9G7ok" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" allowfullscreen></iframe></div> Kingdom Lost stops in 2008, and much water has flown down the Bagmati since then. Sagar Rana should add a third book chronicling Nepal’s rocky transition to peace and federalism, the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/nepal-s-transitional-justice-and-the-west-s-recalibration">stalled transitional justice mechanism</a>, the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-contentious-constitution-day">new Constitution</a> and the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/rise-of-the-independents">rise of alternative politicians</a>. That would make a fine trilogy to set the records straight. School textbooks ignore Nepal’s political history, do not even mention the Maoist conflict, or are filled with one-dimensional hollow symbols of nationalism. The Ranas used to be portrayed as bad in the curriculum, now Mahendra and the Shahs are villains. It needed a member of the Rana clan to have a dispassionate, yet staunchly democratic, take on Nepali history.&nbsp; Sagar Rana is the great-grandson of Prime Minister <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/1923-2023-whsle7yp">Chandra Shumsher</a>, grandson of hardline general Baber Shumsher, son of educationist Mrigendra Shumsher and <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/a-brothers-tribute-to-bharat-shumsher">brother of Bharat Shumsher</a>. This lineage gives the author intimate knowledge of the often behind-the-scenes struggles in the corridors of power. This book is a tribute to those who fought for the freedoms that we take for granted in Nepal today, even when countries in the neighbourhood <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-should-be-open-for-south-asia">turn authoritarian and intolerant</a>. The Nepal they envisioned is the one we can still be.&nbsp;

Sonia Awale

Kingdom lost, republic gained

Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s three-day official visit to India starting Wednesday is being keenly watched in Kathmandu and these borderlands of the Tarai.
Relations between the two asymmetric South Asian neighbours at the moment are neither ‘chilly’ nor ‘warm’. Things have got a lot more cordial since UML Prime Minister K P Oli was replaced by a Maoist-Nepali Congress coalition led by Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2022.&nbsp;
The visit comes as Prime Minister Dahal tried to keep his shaky 9-party coalition intact, by even getting a presidential pardon this week for an MP convicted for the killing of policemen in Kailali in 2015.&nbsp;
Disillusionment with Nepal’s three mainstream parties has manifested in the rise of the independent RSP, while the RPP is trying to promote ex-king Gyanendra as a symbol of national unity, stability and the revival of a Hindu kingdom, hoping to ride the Hindutva wave in India.
Indeed, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s aggressive Hindu-right agenda is having a ripple effect across the border. Despite his BJP’s defeat in the Karnataka polls earlier this month, Modi seems to be on a roll because of India’s buoyant economy.
It has become somewhat of a tradition for a new prime minister in Nepal to fly to New Delhi on his first pilgrimage to pay his respects to rulers there, even if it is someone who is prime minister for the third time.
Questions have been raised about whether Dahal should necessarily &nbsp;follow this practice, but Dahal nevertheless cancelled what was to be his first visit to China in March to attend the Boao Forum in Hainan.
Dahal has to finely balance the need to appease Indian leaders to extract concessions on river projects, air routes, infrastructure assistance, while at the same time playing to the gallery back home by not kowtowing too much.
The chronic problem in India-Nepal relations has been a trust deficit in both capitals about each other. What does Nepal expect from India, and what does India want to do in Nepal? Bilateral relations should not depend on which leader or party is in power in New Delhi or Kathmandu, it should have continuity and be determined by what will benefit citizens of both countries.&nbsp;
In 2014, India had appeared to change its approach to Nepal by appearing magnanimous during Prime Minister Modi’s first visit, but the goodwill he built collapsed with the blockade and bilateral relations chilled as non-political actors started directing policy.
It will not work if one set of leaders in Nepal sanctifies India, while another vilifies it. This might serve their immediate political interest, but will do long-term harm to mutual ties. Leaders are also fickle and erratic in their stance: Prime Minister Dahal is the same person who during the conflict threatened to wage a ‘tunnel war’ against India.
Dahal’s visit to Delhi also comes at a time of heightened geopolitical tension in the region with growing Sino-US polarisation, India’s involvement in the Quad and the danger of Nepal being forced to choose sides between its neighbours. Nepal will need to deploy all its diplomatic skills to play its role in this new world stage.
India’s rulers may also need to ponder why the traditional close ties with Nepal have become frayed. True friends talk things over, and it is in the interest of both neighbours to rebuild trust. New Delhi strategists appear sanguine that whatever the noise on social media, its tactics in Nepal are working.&nbsp;
But many Nepalis still feel that India acts like Big Brother and pushes its weight around, promises a lot and delivers little. Dahal needs to take this up at the highest levels during his visit and obtain tangible results to reboot relations to at least 2014 levels.
Nowhere is the people-to-people relations between India and Nepal felt as keenly as in the Tarai. The open border, close cultural and family links and trade bind the two countries together.&nbsp;
However, even here there is a feeling that India is unfeeling. Every year, poorly-designed road, railway and flood control embankments in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh inundate Tarai towns. Every monsoon the Kathmandu media suddenly becomes ultra-nationalistic, laying all the blame on Indian state governments.&nbsp;
The Indian media also whips up anti-Nepal feelings by holding Nepal responsible for ‘unleashing water from its dams’ even though Nepal does not have any dams to let water out from and the border barrages are controlled by India.
Indeed, the national media (and increasingly social media posts) on both sides of the border are largely to blame for undermining the friendship between the people and governments of the two countries. Media should instead focus on evidence that embankment-building worsens water-logging in farms and towns on both sides of the border.
These floods are bound to get worse if the deforestation, sand mining and quarrying of the Chure Range resumes. Nepal will not just be exporting boulders and aggregates, but also increased sediment that will worsen floods and further lower the water table in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.&nbsp;
In 2010, President Ram Baran Yadav raised the issue of Chure conservation during his visit to New Delhi, but the demand in India for raw material to feed its construction boom is so great that Nepali contractors with political patronage want to plunder the fragile Chure ecosystem.
Even when relations between New Delhi and Kathmandu were strained in the past, there was a belief that people-to-people bonds were strong. That narrative is now increasingly frayed. Indians and Nepalis are needlessly harassed by each other’s border security.&nbsp;
Nepal-India relations have always been defined by how well or badly governments in their capitals get along. Rather than Indian or Nepali people, leaders of the two countries determine the state of relations.
How well neighbouring countries get along is determined by geography, history, culture, trade, politics, religion. And those factors have kept ties across the border stable all these years, but Nepalis in the Tarai are asking: does New Delhi determine its policy towards Nepal by seeing how they will be affected, or by maintaining its influence on the movers and shakers in Kathmandu?
The marriage of Ram from India and Sita from Nepal are often cited to prove how close Nepal-India bonds are. The Buddha was born in Nepal but got enlightenment in India. But when leaders talk about Janakpur-Ayodhya, or Lumbini-Bodh Gaya, they seldom take into account the people who live there.
Bilateral relations should not be limited to periodic summits between the leaders of India and Nepal, they need to translate into action on the ground that makes the lives of the people of the borderlands more convenient and sustainable through better connectivity and environmental safeguards.&nbsp;
Chandra Kishore is a Birganj-based political commentator. His monthly column BORDERLINES appears in Nepali Times every month. &nbsp;@kishore_chandra

Chandra Kishore

Nepal PM to India to reboot ties

At the annual Nepal Power Summit in Kathmandu on 18-19 April, officials called on India to allow Nepal to export power at real-time prices, not just in the day-ahead market. Also discussed was a need for more flexible guidelines on market access for Nepal’s electricity to India which currently buys power on a project-to-project basis, pointedly boycotting those built by Chinese investment or contractors. India’s interest in regulating Nepal’s rivers is not new, but with the Himalaya becoming a geopolitical and climate hotspot, its strategic interest in regulating river flow has grown.&nbsp; Climate models show that the hydrology of Himalayan rivers will change dramatically in the coming decades, with peak water in the 2030s, and low flow levels in the dry season thereafter. With 70% of the annual discharge on the Ganga flowing down from rivers in Nepal, 75% of it in the four monsoon months, storage projects in the mountains will be ever more important. Because of this, New Delhi would like pliant politicians in place in Kathmandu that will not obstruct its plans to ensure future water supply, and given current geopolitical tensions, this also means keeping the Chinese out.&nbsp; Ever since Sher Bahadur Deuba became prime minister for the fifth time in 2021, he has fast-tracked a slew of projects in which Indian companies are involved, including the West Seti reservoir project that has languished for 20 years mainly because of Indian objections to Australian and Chinese investment. Most recently, Indian National Hydroelectricity Power Corporation (NHPC) Limited is in talks to be awarded the 480MW Phukot Karnali Hydroelectric Project in Kalikot jointly with Nepal’s state-owned Vidyut Utpadan Company Limited with a share ratio of 51% to 49%. The project will likely be launched during Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s state visit to India in May. India’s NHPC has already been granted licenses for West Seti and Seti River-6 projects, and is also eyeing another 1,902MW megaproject on the Karnali.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603050_10fc6c82b0d995c39b388d8d8628365ea5e2299a1f4d474e2c2d5b7f01d37d83.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2023050603050_10fc6c82b0d995c39b388d8d8628365ea5e2299a1f4d474e2c2d5b7f01d37d83" data-rendition-name="original" width="3776" height="2424" loading="lazy" alt="West Seti"> <figcaption>Sushil Bhatta of Investment Board Nepal and Abhay Kumar Singh of India's NHPC, after signing an agreement to develop the 760MW West Seti and 460MW Seti River 6 projects in 2022.</figcaption> </figure>  In fact, across Nepal, Indian companies are building hydropower projects which will add a combined total of 4,000MW to the grid, three of which were rushed through only in the past year. Three more Indian projects are in the pipeline.&nbsp; Why the sudden renewed Indian interest in Nepal’s rivers? And what is the hurry? The answer lies in the need to plan for the decades ahead when water is going to be an even scarcer commodity in the Indo-Gangetic plains than it is now because of climate change, increased industrial, agricultural and household consumption. Energy analysts say that although India’s interest seems to be in renewable energy from hydropower to fulfil its decarbonisation commitments, exports of power from Nepal is only projected at $800 million in the next three years, which will only be a tiny percentage of the 1,600 billion kWh that India generated in the last fiscal year.&nbsp; And although power demand is expected to rise with rising incomes, industrialisation and increasingly intense summer heat waves in the plains, India’s long-term interest is in reservoir projects to store monsoon water in Nepal’s rivers to reduce monsoon flood risk and keep rivers flowing in the dry season. And New Delhi has not tried to hide its distaste for any Chinese involvement in these projects.&nbsp; Hydropower Investment and Development Company Nepal (HIDCL) in which the government is a majority shareholder informed the Investment Board Nepal in February that it was withdrawing from the export-oriented 762MW Tamor Hydropower project.&nbsp; CEO Arjun Kumar Gautam is upfront about why: “We cannot sell electricity generated with Chinese involvement in the Indian market.” Tamor was one of the two projects agreed upon during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in October 2019. Soon after, Investment Board Nepal (IBN) signed up China Construction to build the project after completing a feasibility study. The HIDCL now wants to null the agreement with the Chinese contractor and bring in a new contractor more amenable to the Indians. Meanwhile, India’s state-owned <a href="https://sjvn.nic.in/">Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam</a>, which is involved in a cascade of projects on the adjoining Arun River to generate a total of 2,000MW, is said to be aggressively lobbying top Nepali officials to also build Tamor. Besides the 900MW Arun 3, Satluj was awarded the Lower Arun by the K P Oli-led government in 2021 without competitive bidding. Then in May 2022, the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led government suddenly awarded Arun 4 to Satluj (with a 51% share) during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lumbini.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20230506020556_4f38ffb96de37f17c662684914f0b65ab41adaaf98183a073273e88621de480b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20230506020556_4f38ffb96de37f17c662684914f0b65ab41adaaf98183a073273e88621de480b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="666" loading="lazy" alt="Arun 4 agreement"> <figcaption>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba look on as Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam's Nanda Lal Sharma and the NEA's Kulman Ghising exchange MoUs in May 2022 in Lumbini to build the 409MW Arun 4. Photo: RATNA SHRESTHA/RSS</figcaption> </figure>  But even though Satluj is said to be also interested in the 1,061MW Upper Arun, Kulman Ghising of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) says it is building the project. "Upper Arun is our first priority, we are planning to start the construction of the access road," Ghising told us. Arun and Tamor are both in eastern Nepal (see map), but India is also interested in rivers in western Nepal because of the proximity of its main load centres as well as to augment the dry season flow of Nepal’s rivers that flow into the Ganga.&nbsp; There was some hue and cry last year after the Deuba-led government abruptly handed over the 750MW West Seti Dam and Seti River-6 projects to two Indian state-owned companies without competition or transparency. Experts pointed out that Nepal’s Public-Private Partnership and Investment Act 2075 states that there should be competitive bidding.&nbsp; The Seti saga is three decades long. After successive partnerships with Australian, Chinese and private Indian companies fell through, India’s state-owned NHPC finally took the lead. Since the terms of the deal are opaque, many experts question how beneficial the $1.6 billion project that involves building a high dam in the Doti district will be for Nepal.&nbsp; Indian state-owned companies appear to move faster than private Indian companies interested in river projects in Nepal. The GMR Group (Gandhi Mallikarjun Rao) obtained a permit to build the 900 MW Upper Karnali and a Project Development Agreement (PDA) was signed with the IBN in 2014 with plans to start construction in two years after securing funding. The government's latest decision to extend the deadline for the GMR by two years is being challenged in Nepal’s Supreme Court.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603054_0b5cc52ed5ece09ac54bf7fd42d663e156bd8a721203fecad4470d449722bfd9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2023050603054_0b5cc52ed5ece09ac54bf7fd42d663e156bd8a721203fecad4470d449722bfd9" data-rendition-name="original" width="1083" height="834" loading="lazy" alt="Indian investment in hydropower in Nepal"> </figure>  Geopolitical games The export-oriented 456MW Upper Tamakosi project finally started production in June 2021 after much delay. But because a part of the Upper Tamkosi was built by the Sino Hydro of China, India refused to buy power from the project during the monsoon surplus last year – even though it was built with NEA investment.&nbsp; One international lender told Nepali Times: “Obtaining an Indian nod before building any big hydropower project in Nepal has now become a must.” Indian pressure manifests itself in its refusal to buy only 364MW of electricity which was recently increased to 452MW. This is the sum total of generation capacity with no direct Chinese involvement. Nepal also cannot sell its power to China as there are no trans-Himalayan transmission lines, and exporting to Bangladesh would need an Indian approval system without giving a free and open market to Nepali electricity, while also rejecting any Chinese involvement. India’s international electricity trade procedure issued in February 2021 prohibits the import of electricity from projects invested in third countries that do not have a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the energy sector. The fact that India does not have an energy cooperation agreement with China has therefore become an excuse, not just to blacklist projects in Nepal with Chinese investment, but even Chinese contractors. India has even stopped the supply of explosives for projects like the Tanahu and Upper Trisuli-1 Schemes being built by Chinese contractors.&nbsp; "Even though there is nothing in writing, India does not want any involvement of the Chinese in any capacity in Nepal's hydropower projects, they even have details of which country is the contractor and where are the machines being used from," explains Ganesh Karki of the Independent Power Producers Association Nepal (IPPAN). India first allowed imports of electricity only from the 24 MW Trisuli and 15 MW Devighat projects, both built by the Indian in the 1960s. But after Deuba signed an agreement on energy cooperation between the two countries in 2022, NEA was allowed to 364MW.&nbsp; Even so, Nepal must renew this export provision every year, which is a bureaucratic hassle. What this essentially means is that if Indian companies do not get licenses for new plants in Nepal, they may not renew the power-selling contract either. Nepali officials have been trying to convince the Indian side that it is in their own best interest if Nepal has a surplus in the coming years. Based on projections of generation capacity, NEA has sent a proposal to New Delhi to export an additional 600MW.&nbsp; The installed capacity of hydropower projects in Nepal has reached 2,400MW and is expected to cross 3,000MW after the completion of more projects this monsoon. Projects with a combined capacity of 3,200MW are under construction and will be completed in the next three years. On the demand side, the average domestic consumption at present is about 1,600MW and is expected to increase only to 2,000MW next year.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603054_1ba6d252b58558d3d1263b0f76e3abbfc1c9dd3c019f8d9d47bd8aa415651e3f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="2023050603054_1ba6d252b58558d3d1263b0f76e3abbfc1c9dd3c019f8d9d47bd8aa415651e3f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1171" height="834" loading="lazy" alt="Hydropower generation in Nepal"> </figure>  &nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><div class="flourish-embed flourish-chart" data-src="visualisation/13536204"><script src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js"></script></div></div> &nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><div class="flourish-embed flourish-chart" data-src="visualisation/13535503"><script src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js"></script></div></div> There are critics who say Nepal should not be exporting power to India at all since it will not make a big dent in the trade deficit, and the $85.8 million it earned last year is negligible compared to the $8.33 billion Nepal earned in remittances.&nbsp; They say the priority should be on increasing electricity consumption in cooking, transportation and industry. At present, 70% of Nepal’s energy is from biomass and only 5% is from electricity.&nbsp; Since most of the electricity in Nepal is from run-of-river schemes in which generation depends on the flow of water in rivers, Nepal will have to continue to import power from India during the peak winter months for the next three years. In the monsoon, though, generation is double of demand, but the Indian quota, inadequate transmission and low domestic demand mean much of this clean electricity is wasted.&nbsp; Dinesh Kumar Ghimire at the Energy Ministry says Nepal is looking to sign a 25-year export agreement with India. "We are preparing a draft for the agreement. If both sides are on board with it, there may be an agreement during the Prime Minister's visit to India.” Edging out China While India is awarded one hydropower project after another in Nepal, China is being edged out. Both Phukot Karnali and Tamor hydropower projects were supposed to be implemented under Beijing’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) scheme.&nbsp; Last month, Sichuan Wangping Energy Science and Technology gave up its license to build the 235MW Humla Karnali-1 and 335MW Humla Karnali-2 in partnership with a Nepali company. The survey permit for these projects has now been granted to Ruru Hydropower, a Nepali company. The 1,200MW Budi Gandaki reservoir project has been caught in a geopolitical tangle between India and Nepal for the past six years. In May 2017, the Pushpa Kamal Dahal government handed over the project to China’s Gezhouba Group without competition. A few months later in October, the Deuba-led government reversed the decision and said Nepal would build it. Fast forward a year later and the Oli-led government gave Budi Gandaki back to Gezhouba, only for the Deuba-led coalition government in March 2022 to reverse the decision again. Exasperated, the then-Chinese ambassador Hou Yanqi said abandoned diplomatic niceties and said publicly that it was wrong for Nepal to change its decision every time a government changed. Says Ganesh Karki of IPPAN: “We have to conclude that because of India’s stance, it is difficult to get Chinese investment in Nepal’s hydropower. The top political leadership should lobby with India to remove this obstacle.” The hydro of hydropower&nbsp; Nepal’s former energy secretary Dwarika Nath Dhungel is convinced India considers water a strategic commodity, and its emphasis on electricity export hides its real intention to secure water supply in the coming decades.&nbsp; “We in Nepal, on the other hand, have no idea about this, and there is no clarity about our own water and energy policy. In fact, our policymakers are not working in the national interest at all,” he adds. Studies have shown that water scarcity in the Indo-Gangetic plains will increase as Himalayan glaciers dry up, and the groundwater level falls due to over-extraction. And in the monsoon, there is too much water, so the world’s most densely populated region is hit by destructive floods. &nbsp; Building storage dams in Nepal is a win-win-win for India, reducing flood risk, augmenting dry season flow of Nepali rivers that flow across the border, and generating electricity. Nepal will get some export income, but will not benefit much from irrigation since it only has a narrow strip of land in the Tarai, and large tracts of its fertile mountain valleys will be inundated by future reservoirs. “Nepal’s export of a few thousand megawatts will not mean much for India's huge power system with a capacity of around 400,000MW,” adds Dhungel. “What India is fixated on is our water. And that is why it does not want any third parties involved, especially not China.” Former secretary at the Ministry of Energy Anup Kumar Upadhyay on the other hand is all for more Indian investment in Nepal’s hydropower, and does not think there is any ulterior motive. He argues that the model in which Nepal is allowing Indian companies to build projects is beneficial to Nepal in the long term. At present, Indian companies that have received permission to build hydropower plants have agreed to provide about 22% of electricity to the Nepal government for free. And after 25 years, these projects will be fully owned by Nepal. Says Upadhyay: "Whatever projects we are giving to India now, India does not even have the benefit of regular water flow from them, so there is no reason to be suspicious that India has a grand design to control our rivers." Indeed, there are many in Nepal, even those critical of Indian behaviour, who say Nepal cannot choose its neighbours and it might as well keep India happy by ensuring that the river agreements are fair to Nepal as well.

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