Like many Nepalis, Surendra Dhami left his home village in Darchula for Malaysia in the hope of improving his family’s quality of life.&nbsp; He returned in a few months because the work and pay were not what he had been promised by the recruiter. But there were no jobs in Darchula, and farming in the rugged arid mountains would not feed his family. So, like many other mountain farmers Dhami, 36, migrated with his family down to the Tarai to settle in the village of Gharkheda in Kailali’s Chure Rural Municipality. It was a good move. He sold 10,000kg of oranges last year, and Surendra and his wife Bhaka have diversified into vegetables.&nbsp; “So far, we can make a living with our farming. At least, it is better than in Darchula,” says 30-year-old Bhaka Dhami.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240404110448_465a967ef1604772e7cc00f1decb97323b77f28d10834d785ac472a1fdb1359f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20240404110448_465a967ef1604772e7cc00f1decb97323b77f28d10834d785ac472a1fdb1359f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Families that farm together stay together Page 9 NT #1206"> <figcaption>Surendra and Bhaka Dhami</figcaption> </figure>  Neighbour Krishna Devi Kandel and her husband Devendra have involved all five of their children in their farm. The orange trees are not doing well because of infestation, and the failure of winter rains affected crops.&nbsp; “We do not have irrigation and do not get as much rain as we used to,” says Devendra. Chure village is full of families who have moved down from Darchula, Baitadi and other mountain districts to the north. But even here, erratic rains due to the climate crisis have impacted farming.&nbsp; Diversifying crops is the best way to cope, which is what Pabitra Sapkota has also done. After her orange trees died, she has moved to vegetables.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240404110448_938c7c0c69d85899ecbd2a77e1acaa9b318eba2d0072f2f033e1dda057e21ab5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20240404110448_938c7c0c69d85899ecbd2a77e1acaa9b318eba2d0072f2f033e1dda057e21ab5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Families that farm together stay together Page 9 NT #1206"> <figcaption>Pabitra Sapkota</figcaption> </figure>  “The tomatoes that my son planted in this greenhouse are nearly ripe,” she says, clutching a lush bunch of mustard greens. &nbsp; The Chure range in western Nepal rises to elevations of 2,500m, unlike in the east where it is less than 500m. It is the youngest, lowest and weakest of the folds that form the Himalayan range, and the first ridges to rise up from the plains. The Chure covers nearly 13% of Nepal’s area, and runs through 37 of the 77 districts from Jhapa in the east to Kanchanpur in the west. It is a fragile range, where deforestation has led to frequent landslides and floods.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240404110448_5e15ae431ab995109fdeac871bae4e769d0c979bc67a02fc2785d6098229fe53.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20240404110448_5e15ae431ab995109fdeac871bae4e769d0c979bc67a02fc2785d6098229fe53" data-rendition-name="original" width="1777" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Families that farm together stay together Page 9 NT #1206"> <figcaption>Aftermath of a flood</figcaption> </figure>  “The Chure watershed is deteriorating and there are frequent droughts, further declining farm productivity,” explains Sushmita Dhakal of the President Chure Terai-Madhes Conservation Development Board set up in 2014.&nbsp; One way recent migrants from the mountains to Chure are adapting to the crisis is through family farming, without hired labour for better food security, nutrition and to protect the environment. The United Nations declared 2019-2028 a Decade of Family Farming to preserve traditional agriculture, increase the involvement of youth, recognise women’s leadership, promote sustainable agriculture and improve livelihoods. In doing so, family farming also protects households from the climate crisis by &nbsp;diversifying crops. It is also an antidote to water-intensive commercial farming with its use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides. &nbsp;&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240404110448_94b4e92d15a772e0f6e538221aba1f60a610d95e2580daf26fffda20fc8aef9c.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20240404110448_94b4e92d15a772e0f6e538221aba1f60a610d95e2580daf26fffda20fc8aef9c" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Families that farm together stay together Page 9 NT #1206"> <figcaption>Devendra and Krishna Devi Kandel</figcaption> </figure>  At one point, more than 80% of Nepal’s population depended on agriculture, and most were family farms. But the figure has come down to 62%. Agriculture now contributes only 25% to the GDP. Agronomists say that family farming can reverse the decline by making agriculture profitable again. Vegetable farmers of Lisbeli village prove that: their products have a ready market in the towns of western Nepal.&nbsp; Dammari Bhatta works on her vegetable patch with her family and does not hire anyone else. The cabbages, cauliflowers and tomatoes are enough to feed her family all year around, and she sells the surplus to pay for the education of her children.&nbsp; Her husband Madanraj Bhatta leads the Lisbeli Farmers’ Group which sold 1,700kgs of cabbage and 700kgs of tomato this winter.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240404110448_a74b7748e4f0ede7eb6f8a76c5fe786d9801738c70325a3aaae84ba1c5cd1c00.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20240404110448_a74b7748e4f0ede7eb6f8a76c5fe786d9801738c70325a3aaae84ba1c5cd1c00" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Families that farm together stay together Page 9 NT #1206"> <figcaption>Dammari and Madanraj Bhatta</figcaption> </figure>  None of the 30 families here in Lisbeli use chemical fertilisers, and apply organic manure instead. This in turn has reduced pest infestation and diseases in the crops all the while restoring soil quality. &nbsp; “Home fertiliser has increased harvest, and made the soil more fertile,” says Manju Jagriti, an ex-teacher, now a full time farmer. “The whole family farms, and we do everything together,” says Manju proudly. Family farming is nothing new in Nepal, it has been the traditional method of agriculture. But many families moved away as commercial farming using agrochemicals took over. Now, families are moving back to the old method of growing food.&nbsp; Says agriculture scientist Binayak Bhandari: “We need to go back to our old sustainable farming ways, protect the environment and find the fine balance between nature and livelihood, especially to adapt to the climate crisis.”

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Who builds Kathmandu?

Malaysia is slashing foreign worker intake from end-May, conflicts in West Asia <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/the-international-order-is-dying-in-gaza">risk engulfing the region</a>, and fortress Europe is building higher walls for migrants. 
All this means that Nepal’s economy, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/business/remittances-up-and-up">almost completely dependent on money its workers send home</a>, is as fragile as a house built on sand. Proof of that was the Covid pandemic, which impacted overseas jobs and remittance inflows. 
Malaysia has now capped foreign workers to only 15% of its 17 million strong workforce, and this will mean there will be much fewer jobs for Nepalis in its palm and rubber plantations, construction, manufacturing and service sectors.
Malaysia has instructed companies that no work visas will be issued after May. One saving grace is that the restrictions do not apply to foreign security guards, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/close-encounter-with-death">most of whom are Nepalis</a>.
Malaysia’s curb on foreign workers appears to be related to domestic unemployment, as well as an EU decision to phase out the import of palm oil as a renewable biofuel because of rainforest destruction. Malaysia is the world’s second-largest producer of palm oil after Indonesia.
There are an estimated 500,000 Nepalis in Malaysia, some of them undocumented workers. Of the 771,000 Nepalis who got labour permits from the Department of Foreign Employment in the last fiscal year, 259,000 went to Malaysia. 
“The fact that a major labour destination country like Malaysia is reducing the number of Nepali workers is not good news,” says labour migration expert Ganesh Gurung. “It will seriously impact on remittance inflows and the economy. It does not seem like the Nepal government has any concrete plans to deal with this issue.”
Rajendra Bhandari, President of the Nepal Association of Foreign Employment Agencies (NAFEA) agrees that Malaysia’s decision is concerning, especially as the demand for foreign workers in Gulf countries is also decreasing. He adds that unless the Nepal government finds alternatives, the number of Nepalis going abroad illegally and ending up doing dangerous work will increase. This is evidenced by the increasing number of Nepalis<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepalis-play-russian-roulette-in-distant-war"> killed in action while fighting for the Russian Army</a> on the Ukrainian front.
Yet even as Foreign Minister Narayan Kaji Shrestha is demanding that Russia send Nepali soldiers home, Labour Minister Dol Prasad Aryal, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/skeletons-in-the-cabinet-k5x6py1v">who is alleged to be involved in recruitment and remittance agencies</a>, reopened labour permits for Russia on Wednesday.
The value of Nepal’s exports is only one-tenth of its imports, and the country pays for imports with remittance income. Latest Nepal Rastra Bank figures show that the country earned $6.35 billion in the last six months of this fiscal year, and foreign exchange reserves hit a record $13.9 billion. 
Ganesh Gurung says that even though Malaysia’s decision might have seemed abrupt, such overwhelming dependence on remittances has always been a risky path for Nepal. Money the diaspora transfers to relatives in Nepal makes up an equivalent of 25% of Nepal’s GDP – one of the highest ratios in the world.
There are an estimated 2 million Nepalis in the Persian Gulf region, and a change in foreign labour policy or a regionwide conflict could jeopardise their jobs and in turn, impact the national economy. 
“This overwhelming reliance on foreign employment has meant that Nepal’s rulers have not been able to implement policy and incentives to create jobs domestically,” says Gurung. “It is inevitable that jobs overseas will dwindle eventually.”
With Malaysia closing, and earnings in the Gulf countries being less than what was promised by recruiters, Nepalis are increasingly <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/europe-now-favoured-destination-for-nepalis" target="_blank">looking to Europe</a> as an alternative. But while Europe needs cheap foreign labour, it is also becoming more restrictive.
Croatia was a favourite springboard for Nepalis seeking to go to Western Europe, but it joined the Schengen area last year. There are now an estimated 15,000 Nepalis in Romania, and more hope to make it there before the country also joins Schengen on 31 March. 
NAFEA’s Rajendra Bhandari says the hurdles are not just from Schengen states in Europe, but also from the Nepal government. Those seeking work in Europe need a work demand letter from a European country that is verified by a Nepal embassy in that country. But most European countries do not have resident embassies. 
“If the demand letters could be verified in Nepal itself, it would open the door for a lot of Nepali workers to go to Europe,” says Bhandari, adding that although the Labour Ministry is open to the idea, the Foreign Ministry does not think so.
Unlike migrant workers who go to other Asian countries to earn money, send remittance back home, and eventually return, Gurung says, most Nepalis who go to Europe more often than not settle there permanently. 
Overseas migration has been seen as a safety valve for Nepalis, but there are many thousands of domestic migrant workers at construction sites all over Kathmandu. 
Ensuring a basic minimum wage and labour protection for them would open up more <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/few-jobs-created-by-nepal-employment-drive">meaningful employment</a> within Nepal in semi-skilled jobs, many of which are being given to migrants from India.
Says Gurung: “Continuing to depend on other countries to give Nepalis jobs, instead of providing jobs in Nepal for Nepalis, will mean trouble for us down the line.”

People's Movement

Nepal may have defused the population bomb, but its cities and towns are bursting at the seams. Federalism was supposed to improve rural living standards through more accountable governance. Failure to achieve this has accelerated rural outmigration. The 2021 census showed that Nepal’s population declined by 10% in the last decade. The total fertility rate has fallen below the 2.1% replacement level, and that could be a problem in the future. But for now, it is the continuous emptying of mountain districts that is assuming crisis proportions. None of the three levels of government seem to have internalised the gravity of this situation, let alone devised a strategy to reverse the trend. Most internal migration is to the Tarai, which already has 54% of Nepal’s population. Another 21% lives just in Bagmati Province which includes Kathmandu Valley. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/letter-from-sikles">Letter from Sikles</a>, Kunda Dixit  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301040316_c0efbe7eef4538830300b6aca776239a92c54c16fcb81cb28ac5f17380dadfff.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20240301040316_c0efbe7eef4538830300b6aca776239a92c54c16fcb81cb28ac5f17380dadfff" data-rendition-name="original" width="1937" height="1140" loading="lazy" alt="Nepalis are voting with their feet NT"></figure>  One-third of Nepal’s population is in rural municipalities, and two-thirds is in urban centres. Three-fourths of Nepalis live in just four of the seven provinces: Kosi, Bagmati, Madhes and Lumbini. The trend is even more alarming if we look at the data at district and rural municipality levels. Nearly all hill and mountain districts have seen sharp population declines. Some towns have not just added population from the hinterland, but also sucked up its resources. Municipalities have not been able to keep up with demand for jobs, quality education, affordable healthcare, or water supply. After the first federal elections to local governments in 2017, there was finally hope that local candidates would be held more accountable because of their proximity to the electorate. The campaign slogan of ‘Singha Darbar in every village’ raised hopes that democracy would finally deliver genuine local development. Some city dwellers even returned to their ancestral villages. But hopes were soon dashed because grassroots governments once again failed to deliver. Feeling let down once more, people moved from villages to cities, from the mountains to the plains, and from there many continued abroad. Migration patterns have changed. It is not just young males who are leaving for the cities, entire families are. Houses are padlocked, villages are empty, fields are fallow. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/eastern-nepal-s-depopulating-mountains">Eastern Nepal’s depopulating mountains</a>, Gopal Dahal <div class="embed-block"><iframe src="https://flo.uri.sh/visualisation/16960977/embed" title="Interactive or visual content" class="flourish-embed-iframe" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" style="width:100%;height:600px;" sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-forms allow-scripts allow-downloads allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation"></iframe><div style="width:100%!;margin-top:4px!important;text-align:right!important;"><a class="flourish-credit" href="https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/16960977/?utm_source=embed&amp;utm_campaign=visualisation/16960977" target="_top" style="text-decoration:none!important"><img alt="Made with Flourish" src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/made_with_flourish.svg" style="width:105px!important;height:16px!important;border:none!important;margin:0!important;"></a></div></div> Elected representatives in fancy new municipality offices have not responded appropriately to the enormity of the demographic change taking place. There have been two elections after the new Constitution in 2017 and 2022, meanwhile internal migration into Kathmandu has increased. More than half the population of Kathmandu Valley was not born there. There is urban-to-urban migration as people move from cities like Biratnagar, Birganj, Bharatpur to Kathmandu. Five of the municipalities with the highest population growth: Kageswari Manohara, Karkeswar, Nagarjun, Mahalaxmi, and Suryabinayak are all in Kathmandu Valley. Census data shows where the people have left. Five towns in Gandaki and Sudur Paschim Province have had the most dramatic population declines. Sanfebagar Muncipality in Accham had an annual population decline of 2.55% between 2011-2021. Jamini in Baglung, Galyang in Syangja, and Phalebas in Syangja all lost nearly 2% of their population every year (see map). Urbanisation is driven by aspiration. People move to where there are opportunities and a better quality of life. The mass movement happening now in Nepal is because local governments have not created good conditions in rural areas. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-last-men-standing">The last men standing</a>, Daman Rai  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301040320_63c86e52713ce1684b733409a9768dffd301489f561f267ba4a2968102138c21.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20240301040320_63c86e52713ce1684b733409a9768dffd301489f561f267ba4a2968102138c21" data-rendition-name="original" width="423" height="185" loading="lazy" alt="Nepalis are voting with their feet NT"></figure>  There is another change sweeping villages in Taplejung and Sankhuwasabha. Although their populations have decreased, the number of households has increased. This indicates a trend in rural areas to live in nuclear families instead of joint ones. The last census showed that of the 430 rural municipalities in Nepal, 250 had negative growth. In contrast, of the 293 urban centres, 224 saw population increases. Gandaki Province has the highest rate of outmigration, with 83% of rural municipalities decreasing in population. Only 3% in Madhes Province saw decreases. More than half of rural municipalities seeing population decline can only mean one thing – Nepalis are voting with their feet. Even though political power was theoretically devolved to municipalities and provinces, they were not allocated sufficient resources, and federal entities in Kathmandu still call the shots. Biratnagar, Janakpur, Hetauda, Pokhara, Surkhet and Dhangadi were chosen as provincial capitals, and all have seen a surge in population in the past six years. Perhaps what was needed was not just decentralisation away from Kathmandu, but locating provincial capitals in rural areas to boost job creation, trade and political opportunity. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepalis-moving-from-mountains-to-plains">Nepalis moving from mountains to plains</a>, Shristi Karki

Nepalis are voting with their feet

It was 30 years ago this month that investment into ‘Baby Arun’, the 201MW first phase of the run-of-river Arun III project, was brought to a screeching halt when the World Bank officially withdrew its support. This brought about profound and fundamental changes in the way Nepal’s power sector subsequently developed. Nepalis suffered debilitating power outages between 2008-2016 due to shortages attributable to the cancellation. At the same time, the gap left by Baby Arun was filled by private sector investment in ways that were not obvious in 1995. It took 30 years, but in many ways Nepal’s power sector is more healthy today than it has ever been, and likely better than if the project was built as planned. At a projected budget of $1.08 billion, Baby Arun would have cost the equivalent of Nepal’s entire annual government expenditure in 1995. It was to be funded by concessional grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral funders, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), KfW, and investment by the government itself. At the time, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity was only 230MW, and the trajectory of the power sector changed dramatically following the cancellation. In the past 30 years, $5.4 billion has been invested in the power sector led by private investors, and much of it from domestic banks and pension funds (table, right).  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0" data-rendition-name="original" width="984" height="521" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Nearly 70% of the new megawatts generated were by private independent power producers (IPP) in the past 30 years, while the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and its subsidiary companies added 30% of new capacity. Almost 80% of total debt financing came from domestic banks and employee retirement funds. International assistance for power generation dropped dramatically over this time, accounting for only about 15% of investment. Before 1995 new power projects used to be entirely dependent on foreign aid. Since 1995, 63% of new generation came from 171 small hydropower projects with an average capacity of 12MW, while 4% was from 21 solar photovoltaic and biomass projects developed by local IPPs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097" data-rendition-name="original" width="988" height="503" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Over three decades, investment in Nepal’s power supply came primarily from new actors that had never before been involved in this sector. The rate of electrification rose from 10% to close to 100% -- sufficient to meet domestic needs during most of the year, and in 2024 made Nepal a net exporter of power to India for the first time in its history. As practically all the new investment in this period went into run-of-river hydro and solar projects, rather than into hydropower reservoirs with seasonal storage, Nepal continues to rely on imports from India during the dry winter months. Surplus electricity generation for export during the monsoon is slated to grow rapidly as another 200 solar and hydro projects are nearing completion of construction, with over 5,000MW of power capacity. Private Power The cancellation of Baby Arun inadvertently accelerated the entry of the private sector into Nepal’s power generation. The government enacted the Electricity Act in 1992 to attract private IPPs and diversify away from total dependence from international aid, but had been struggling for several years to conclude the first agreement with the 60MW Khimti Project. There remained a large gap between the tariff that the government thought was reasonable versus what was demanded by the Norwegian investor Statkraft, and the private sector arms of the World Bank and ADB that were financing the project. The shock of World Bank withdrawal from Baby Arun put tremendous pressure on the government, then led by the UML as it is now. The Bank’s decision to terminate its involvement was ostensibly, at least partially, taken in response to a letter critiquing the project sent by the UML while it was in the opposition.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347" data-rendition-name="original" width="949" height="446" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>BAD NEWS: Newspaper clippings from the early 90s on tender announcement ahead of loan approval (left) and secrecy surrounding environmental assessment (centre) of Arun III before its eventual cancellation in August 1995.</figcaption> </figure>  The government was forced to soften its position and agree to the investors’ terms following the cancellation of Baby Arun. It directed NEA to sign a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Khimti. It was concluded in January 1996, and this was followed by a second PPA in July 1996 with Panda Energy, the American developer of the 45MW Upper Bhotekosi project. The expensive USD-denominated agreements to buy power from two international private producers, with price escalation clauses tied to the New York Consumer Price Index, sent alarm bells ringing. There was worry that the country was heading towards unaffordable tariff rates for the consumer and potential bankruptcy for NEA as a result of inevitable future weakening of the Nepali Rupee. The government had strong-armed NEA into signing these agreements, and realised that concessionary financing terms that Nepal was used to receiving for public sector projects such as Baby Arun and Kali Gandaki A, that included below-market interest rates and 40 years repayment period with a 10 year grace period before starting repayment, were not the norm for private sector investors. Nepal’s status as a less than attractive destination for foreign investment meant that the country had few options but to accept expensive dollar PPAs from international developers with the high commercial interest rates and short repayment periods imposed by their banks because of high investment risks. In the end, the government ended up having to additionally provide a sovereign guarantee in order to close the deal at the insistence of the lenders – committing it to repayment in case NEA defaulted on paying the IPPs. It is reasonable to assume that the extraordinarily high political cost of agreeing to the PPA terms would have meant that no government would have willingly agreed to them in 1995 had it not suffered the trauma of the loss of concessionary-financed public sector projects as large as the Baby Arun. It has taken NEA 25 years to consider offering dollar-denominated PPAs again: to cover the foreign exchange portion of the investment in the 216MW Upper Trisuli-1 and 120MW Rasuwa-Bhotekosi Hydropower projects. It seemed unlikely at the time, but it turned out that the dire situation Nepal found itself in 1995 planted the seed to mobilise investment for affordable power from within the country. Double Whammy After the dual shock of first losing investment in Baby Arun and having to sign expensive power purchase agreements with international IPPs, the first proposal for an alternative strategy to mitigate the risk of foreign currency investment into hydropower projects came from a group of engineers within the Arun III team at NEA. Led by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4900">Deputy Director Damber Bahadur Nepali,</a> engineers convinced the leadership that NEA needed to invest in a subsidiary company to build a series of locally-designed and domestically-financed projects that would have lower cost with rupee-denominated PPAs. They registered the Chilime Hydropower Company Limited (CHCL) in October 1995 with 51% shares from NEA, 25% from its employees, and 24% available for the general public, 10% of which was prioritised for local residents at the project site. The 22.1MW project is in Rasuwa on a tributary of the Trisuli, and mobilised debt financing from the Employee Provident Fund, which manages retirement savings for employees of the government, public enterprises, and private sector institutions. CHCL’s experience showed that NEA employees themselves believed that individual hydropower projects with operational independence from NEA could be developed profitably in Nepal by its own engineers -- and they were willing to put their own money on the line. Chilime also demonstrated that there was money in the country, particularly with retirement funds, looking for opportunities for long-term investments. Following completion of Chilime in 2003, CHCL led the formation of three other NEA subsidiary companies that completed construction in 2023 and 2024, producing 168.3MW using fully rupee-tied investment. NEA’s largest subsidiary, the Upper Tamakosi Hydropower Limited, completed construction of its 456MW plant in 2021.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3" data-rendition-name="original" width="3000" height="1571" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>DAMNED: The $700 million 456MW Upper Tamakosi built entirely with domestic funds before it was destroyed by the September floods last year. </figcaption> </figure>  There were some delays and cost overruns on this run-of-river project, the largest in the country with a final cost of over $700 million -- all of it sourced domestically. The five subsidiary companies launched by NEA have produced almost two times as much new power as NEA has over the past 30 years. Seven other NEA subsidiaries are currently constructing projects to add another 474MW to the national grid. But even more important than NEA subsidiaries have been local IPPs: Nepali companies which have over the past three decades enthusiastically entered the hydropower sector. From a regulatory perspective, the credit for mobilising domestic private investment to engage in power generation goes to Minister of Water Resources Shailaja Acharya, who in 1998 offered a flat feed-in-tariff of Rs4/kWh for hydropower projects under 10MW. This upfront offer removed a major barrier that early developers had faced of having to spend money to carry out a detailed feasibility study before they could even start tariff negotiations with NEA. She had laid the foundation stone of the Chilime project, and proved to be the champion of opening up the sector for domestic IPPs. The guarantee of a PPA with a fixed tariff, irrespective of project specifications, gave small power developers the confidence to apply for survey licenses and invest in feasibility studies so they could directly approach commercial banks and make a case for their project producing required revenue to repay loans. Domestic IPPs started adding power to the national grid in 2002. Their contribution was initially modest, and first projects were small and commercial lenders who took time to be confident about providing debt financing to a sector which had previously not been considered suitable for private sector investment. While the first 10 years were slow, with less than 10MW being added to the grid each year, this increased twenty fold over the following ten years, resulting in the equivalent of a Baby Arun being added by Nepali IPPs to the grid each year. A total of 84 IPPs added 232MW, 328 MW, 454MW, and 400MW of new generation to the grid in 2021-2024 (graph). There was explosive, exponential growth as domestic developers have surged ahead to account for 76% of the new megawatts added to the grid since 2020, compared to 24% by NEA and its subsidiary companies. The megawatts that IPPs are adding have followed the classic ‘hockey stick curve’ with the ‘breakout point’, signaling the rapid growth phase in 2020. Private producers are expected to accelerate new generation in the coming years with 300 solar and hydropower projects adding 11,000MW. Another 166 hydropower and 96 solar projects are currently in the survey stage, and are in line to add another 11,000MW to the construction pipeline. One major challenge is finding financing required for the projects. Domestic investment will no longer be sufficient to finance this ambitious pipeline of renewable energy projects. Project developers as well as NEA and the Electricity Regulatory Commission will have to leverage their substantial experience accumulated through the construction of over 200 projects to attract regional and international investment and hedge the risks of dollar-denominated PPAs. Following the cancellation of Baby Arun, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Nepal developed a highly distributed power sector</a>. The national electricity grid is currently supplied with power from a remarkably decentralised array of hundreds of hydropower and solar photovoltaic projects spread across 43 districts and all seven provinces.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1228" height="867" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  This presents a sharp contrast to the pathway of a few large public sector hydropower projects with a sprinkling of private sector projects that was envisioned as part of NEA’s investment planning when Baby Arun was being considered the front runner for investment. The strategy then was to allow public sector investment in a few large hydropower projects with thermal plants to fill the gap. Knowing what we know now about acceleration of climate change impacts and increased extreme weather events, following this path would have made Nepal’s power sector highly vulnerable. Decentralised generation greatly improves the resilience of Nepal’s power supply as damage to power plants in one part of the country need not affect other areas that have their own generation. Following the investment plan where over two thirds of the country’s power supply would have come from power plants on the Arun River, would have greatly imperiled Nepal’s energy security. All rivers in Nepal are susceptible to flooding from cloudbursts made more frequent by climate change. The Arun River which is fed by glaciers in Tibet is also at risk to glacial lake outburst floods. Bikash Pandey is Director of Clean Energy and Circular Economy at Winrock International. People Power is his regular column in Nepali Times on global energy issues relevant to Nepal. <h2>Decentralised and Diversified</h2> In the 30 years since the cancellation of ‘Baby Arun’: Hydropower projects constructed cover capacities ranging from less than 1MW to 456MW and developed by IPPs from across the country with strong local involvement in purchasing equity shares. Renewable energy sources contributed to the generation mix through solar IPPs that further contribute to climate resilience, and cover shortfalls during low rainfall. The government is committed to solar contributing 10% of the power on the grid. Increasing solar beyond this target and providing incentives to project developers to invest in utility-scale battery storage would further improve resilience. BIG ARUN: The 900MW Arun III project under construction since 2018 at Num in Sankhuwasabha (pictured, below) is a separate initiative by a different project developer using a different financing modality. The ‘Baby Arun’ version of Arun III was cancelled in 1995.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1312" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> </figure>

30 years after Baby Arun

It cannot be a coincidence that after pushing bills to constrict freedom of expression and allow greater <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/security-or-espionage">surveillance of citizens</a>, Nepal’s government is now tightening controls on civil society.
In a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/command-and-control">series of recent moves</a> journalists have been sued for contempt of court, imprisoned for YouTube videos, or ordered by courts to desist from investigating corrupt officials.
An amendment to the Print and Publications Act that would hand the power to shut online media to the Chief District Officer (CDO). Another draft Bill would allow a political appointee to head a new Media Council with the power to revoke a journalist’s license. The draft counter-intelligence Bill would let random officials to arbitrarily tap phones, read emails and trail citizens.
Now comes yet another draft Bill that would replace the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=10675">Social Welfare Council (SWC)</a> with direct government control over registration, regulation, and management of non-governmental organisations, nonprofits and charities. There are more than 54,000 NGOs, 200 international NGOs registered with the SWC.
The draft makes civil society organisations needlessly jump through hoops to carry out work that complements the government in the social sector. Critics say the Bill was drafted without any consultation with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/nepal-s-rights-groups-must-step-up-4r4z6ck4">civic groups</a>.
“This Bill’s content is questionable whether it intends to allow for civil society organisations in Nepal a free space to operate,” concludes Dr SP Kalaunee, Country Representative of BlinkNow Foundation and Chair of the Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN). “The draft seems oriented towards controling rather than facilitating the work of civil society organisations.”
The Bill will be open for feedback from the public, and integrates the National Directives Act (1961), Association Registration Act (1977), and the Social Welfare Act (1992) and proposes dissolving the SWC and replacing it with a new Social Welfare Department under the Ministry of Women, Children and Senior Citizens.
Non-government groups will now be required to get approval from the Registrar Office, the CDO or the provincial government depending on their area of operation. Those working across provinces will have to get permission from the federal government. &nbsp;
The government says the Bill is intended to vet organisations to see if they are engaged in espionage, violate national security, assist a foreign state, commit treason, cause strife between federal units, or incite communal violence.&nbsp;
CSOs working in Nepal have long called for legislation to better facilitate their work, minimise administrative and bureaucratic red tape which have posed operational challenges. But they are opposed to such drastic control.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-crow-and-the-scarecrow">The crow and the scarecrow</a>, Om Astha Rai
The NGO Federation of Nepal also issued a statement this week calling the Bill ‘retrograde and cumbersome’. It added: ‘Most of its provisions are intended to further constrain and control civil society organisations rather than facilitate and strengthen them, and reduce the role of citizen participation … it is an attack on our civil liberties, inclusivity, and transparency, and curtails our <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=5156">democratic values and constitutional rights</a>.’ &nbsp;
<a href="about:blank">Nepal’s graduation</a> from least-developed country status next year may mean less aid for Nepal, and higher interest rates on loans from multilateral creditors. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal">closure of USAID </a>and reduction in bilateral grants means the work of INGOs will be even more vital – especially to meet its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/target-2030-for-maternal-and-newborn-health">SDG targets by 2030</a>.&nbsp;
“We are competing with other countries at a time when the global aid environment is shrinking, so the support we receive is directly dependent on a conducive environment for INGOs to operate and function,” says Kalaunee. “INGOs follow regulations of the nations they operate in, they will not protest or wait around for governments to change their minds or policies.”
Social safety net
Since 1977, the work of non-governmental actors in Nepal has been regulated by the Social Service National Coordination Council (SSNCC) chaired by Queen Aishwarya.
After the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/one-moment-30-years-ago-today">1990 People’s Movement</a>, King Birendra set up the Social Welfare Council (SWC) as an autonomous body in 1992 through the Social Welfare Act. But since then the SWC has been dogged by controversy and allegations of corruption and extortion.
In 2018, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a Rs315 million corruption case against 14 individuals, including the Minister of Women, Children and Social Welfare and SWC chair Badri Prasad Neupane and other officials for violating public procurement laws to rent out three hectares of its property around Bhrikuti Mandap.
Civil society groups have for years called for reforms in the SWC, and a report was drawn up to restructure it before this Bill proposed its dissolution. INGOs in particular will now have to go through the Social Welfare Department and multiple ministries for permissions.
A particularly objectionable provision in the draft stipulates that NGOs must have a Board of Director made up almost entirely of secretaries of various ministries. The NGO Federation has urged the government to take a civil society-friendly approach and not tangle its work in red tape and control. It says the government has no option but to revise the bill in its current form.
“Civil society organisations need an open space to operate, and an autonomous body to oversee them,” says Kalaunee. “Non-government organisations support in the areas prioritised by the government but by definition they cannot be a part of government.”

Big, beautiful Bills

This is the 72nd episode of Diaspora Diaries, a Nepali Times series in collaboration with Migration Lab providing a platform to share experiences of living, working and studying abroad. My father ran a store and that is where I spent all my time till Grade 6. Doing my homework. Serving customers. I then moved to my maternal grandparents’ house because I used to get along with my cousin who was a year older than me. We did everything together, and were best friends. We took turns studying: I was a night owl, and he was an early riser. Before I went to bed after studying all night, I woke him up. My mother was 44 when I was born, the same year my eldest brother got married. My sister-in-law becoming a part of our family was how my mother referenced my age. I liked making money, and was always a hustler. In Grade 7, I learnt to handle a tractor and helped my brother-in-law to plough, earning Rs10 a day. As I got better, he paid me more. By Grade 9, I was already making Rs500 per day, but had to slow down to prepare for my exams. From an early age I knew I did not want a 9-5 job. There just wasn’t enough money in it. I wanted to get into business, and compared my brother who worked in the post office and what businessmen made. It did not help that my brother was honest, and never took bribes. A friend and I made money selling cheap Chinese phones at a premium to our friends. We blasted music on the phones and pretended that we were giving them a discount. After SLC, I started teaching math and other subjects. I was soon a shareholder in the same school and in the evening I was involved in our family’s floriculture business, growing amaranth and marigold for garlands.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4" data-rendition-name="original" width="955" height="1314" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  It was then that a friend suggested we learn the Korean language. We could be earning significantly higher in Korea for similar efforts. I had no plans to go abroad but he convinced me. I did not know anything about Korea, and was scolded at the language institute when I asked someone to point Korea on the map.&nbsp; It was only there that I learnt you had to pass an exam for the Korean Employment Permit System (EPS), and pay for language classes. After a week, I decided it was not for me and dropped out. But my friend convinced me to give it one more try. I did not prepare much for the exam, and it was no surprise that I failed. But it was just by one mark, and people would pity me for failing “just by one mark”. It was a brand of failure. It hurt my ego. I had to turn things around by taking the exams seriously, and locked myself up to study hard.&nbsp; Even when we had visitors, my wife told them I was not home. If I was not in my room learning Korean, I would be with a group of ten of us test-takers comparing notes and practicing late into the night. The exam was difficult, but this time I passed, the only one in my group who did.&nbsp; As someone who never liked the idea of doing a job, I still had my doubts about going to Korea. It did not help that one of my acquaintances had returned a month after he had left, and he discouraged me from migrating given that I was already making good money in Nepal.&nbsp; But my wife suggested that I give it a shot since I had worked so hard for it. And if it really turned out not to be my cup of tea, I could always return. What did I have to lose, I thought, at least I would get to visit Korea. My job there was in an electrical company that made circuit boards. I worked all day, earned good money. In the evenings, I kept myself busy with my real estate business back in Nepal. I had learnt the tricks of the trade from fellow real estate agents back home, but at the time did not have the capital to invest.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  In Korea, it helped that I had salary records that allowed me to get loans from financial institutions both in Korea and in Nepal. Ultimately, I started earning more from my real estate deals in Nepal than from my job in Korea. This was all thanks to my ability to take loans because of the EPS scheme. My wife has been managing the flower business while I was away. My finances grew stronger over the eight years I was in Korea. I paid off the loans that I had borrowed to buy land. But real estate did not satisfy me entirely. I wondered: what is my brand? What will I be known for? What is my contribution to society? Real estate is for wealth, but that is about it. I needed to sell one piece of land and use the revenue to start a venture. I took classes in business, and returned to Nepal six months ago and got back to my family’s ancestral roots in floriculture. In Nepal too, I am continuing the entrepreneurship training I had started in Korea with the Bridge International. Such exposure helps us reflect on our business such as our branding, vision, and proactive aspects like the importance of strong recordkeeping.&nbsp; I am now working to upgrade and expand my floriculture business. With a friend who is still in Korea I am building a cooling room to increase the shelf-life of flowers and other produce and set up a market in my village where others can sell their produce. Floriculture is our primary business, but it is seasonal and earns good money only during festivals like Tihar.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  So, I grow tomatoes to ensure year-round earnings. I also am engaged in other businesses like real estate and online shopping. I work round the clock in Nepal — a strong work ethic is something I picked up in Korea.&nbsp; My Korean bosses would work alongside us, that motivated us. I work just as hard in Nepal as I did in Korea. People here often ask me why I am pushing myself so hard. But making garlands comes easy to me, it is work my forebears were involved in. My childhood memories are about plucking flowers with my sister. I have a comparative advantage in this work. It comes naturally to me, it is easy and I enjoy it. And sometimes, if there are too many garlands to make, I can multitask while holding meetings. My fingers just fly. I am good at this job, but my wife is even better and faster.&nbsp; When there is too much load, we can also outsource the work. To be known as the flower guy would be great personal branding. The मखमली guy. Or the सयपत्री guy. I decided to come home for just this with a one-way ticket. “अब पासा: जाँदैन ल्हासा!” &nbsp;

The flower guy

An average Nepali could live 3.3 years longer if air pollution is reduced to meet the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline, according the annual <a href="https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/">Air Quality Life Index</a> 2025 published this week. The annual average concentration of tiny suspended particles in the air (PM2.5) in Nepal in 2023 was 38.3 μg/m3, nearly eight times the WHO standard, and 10% higher than 2022. Thirty years ago, air pollution in Nepal was half the current levels. WHO says particulate concentration above 5μg/m3 &nbsp;is<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-invisible-is-more-dangerous"> hazardous to health</a>.&nbsp; The most <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/why-is-the-air-in-bhaktapur-so-bad">polluted parts of Nepal</a> are along the Indian border in Rutahat, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Parsa and Bara districts in Madhes Povince where average life expectancy is reduced by as much as 5.3 years.&nbsp; People in Sarlahi, Siraha, Saptari, Morang, Sunsari, Rupandehi and Jhapa are also dying at least 4 years earlier. The Air Quality Index 2025 report which is published annually by the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, says the figure is relatively lower for Kathmandu and Lalitpur at 2.6 and 2.4 years. After the Madhes, Kosi and Lumbini Provinces are the most polluted — especially in towns along industrial corridors and near the border. Karnali Province was by far the cleanest, followed by Sudurpaschim. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/epicentre-of-pollution">Epicentre of pollution</a>, Sonia Awale  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250828060856_136770cc84e114e8993af82e6a682c45d9458060e4ecf45f18e9f210673e1279.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250828060856_136770cc84e114e8993af82e6a682c45d9458060e4ecf45f18e9f210673e1279" data-rendition-name="original" width="753" height="584" loading="lazy" alt="AQLI map"> <figcaption>Potential gain in life expectancy from permanently reducing PM2.5 from 2023 concentration to the WHO guideline.</figcaption> </figure>  Air pollution is now the leading external<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/cleaner-air-longer-lives-0z0okfeu"> threat to life expectancy in Nepal</a>, exceeding both tobacco and diet-related risks, which reduced average lifespans of Nepalis by 1.9 years and 1.3 years respectively. The Air Quality Management Action Plan for Kathmandu Valley introduced in 2017 had identified vehicular emissions, brick kilns, and construction as the most polluting. It adopted measures to strengthen air quality monitoring, develop emissions inventory, and conduct impact assessments. Other major sources of emissions in Nepal include <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/no-smoke-without-fire-p7vb9dcj">forest fires</a>, crop residue and garbage burning as well as transboundary pollution from India and Pakistan. The report says India is the world’s most polluted country with the particulate concentration in 2023 at 41 μg/m3, an average resident in India could live 3.5 years longer if pollution levels were brought down to meet the WHO guideline. Residents of New Delhi on average would live 8.2 years longer if they breathed clean air. South Asia has some of the world’s most polluted cities. On some winter days, Kathmandu records the worst air quality in the world. In 2023, PM2.5 concentrations in South Asia declined by 9.6% between 2021 and 2022 due to lockdowns during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. ‘After a dip in 2022, particulate pollution in South Asia increased by 2.8% in 2023 — though it remained 7% lower than in 2021,’ <a href="https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/report/annual-update-2025">states the report</a>. ‘In the region’s most polluted countries, particulate pollution’s impact on life expectancy is nearly twice that of childhood, and maternal malnutrition and more than five times that of unsafe water, sanitation and handwashing.’ Elsewhere, unprecedented wildfires caused particulate concentrations to rise to levels not seen since 2011 in the United States and since 1998 in Canada. China also registered a decline in air quality, an increase of 2.8% in particulate pollution in 2023 relative to 2022, the first in a decade since the start of its ‘War on Pollution’ in 2014.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250828060856_94860b929d0fb161220ad72ecb76fcd29ba8e306bd6b844485a4171dadb6bb47.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250828060856_94860b929d0fb161220ad72ecb76fcd29ba8e306bd6b844485a4171dadb6bb47" data-rendition-name="original" width="754" height="501" loading="lazy" alt="AQLI line graph"> <figcaption>Annual average PM2.5 concentration in Nepal from 1998-2023.</figcaption> </figure>  Globally, the PM2.5 concentration in 2023 was 1.5% higher than in 2022, and nearly 5 times the WHO guideline. If global particulate pollution were permanently reduced to meet this guideline, an average person around the world would gain 1.9 years of life, adding 15.1 billion total life years to the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-future-is-older">global population</a>, the report adds. ‘Particulate pollution remained the greatest external threat to human life expectancy in 2023, with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/air-pollution-is-more-dangerous-than-smoking">its impact comparable to smoking</a> and surpassing other major health risks,’ the report says. ‘Its toll on life expectancy is more than 4 times that of alcohol use, 5 times that of transport injuries or unsafe water, sanitation, and handwashing, and more than 6 times that of HIV/AIDS.’ The report also highlights the need for open data, and says that accessible air quality information has translated into reduced particulate concentrations and gains in life expectancy in the United States, China, and Poland. Besides data, the report says, investment in monitoring and other air quality management infrastructure must be matched by political will, ambitious policies, capacity building, and sustained enforcement.

internal-migration