<figure><img width="2560" height="1967" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110111152/636cd8519c7e80680e092e37jpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>The origin of the Nanda Devi massif rockslide and the debris flow on a CubeSat image at 10:30 IST, just before the flood reached the Tapovan Hydropower Project site 22km downstream. The dotted black line shows the sediment deposited on the adjacent slopes of the river valley, with the rockslide marked in red. Image: ICIMOD</figcaption></figure>More than a month after the catastrophic flashflood in Chamoli district of the Indian Himalaya, scientists say that the cause was failure of a rock face, and not just the result of a glacial lake burst caused by climate change.Early reports had suggested that the flood of water and debris that raced down the Rishiganga on 7 February, damaging four hydroelectric plants and killing more than 200 people, may have been caused by a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF). <img width="640" height="463" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110111152/636cd8549c7e80680e092e38jpeg.jpg" alt="">However, analysis of satellite images before and after the disaster show that there were no lakes on the Ronti Glacier in the Nanda Devi (7,816m) massif, and the disaster happened in winter when the supra-glacial ponds were frozen. <figure><img width="2048" height="1449" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110111152/636cd8569c7e80680e092e39jpeg.jpg" alt=""><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Scientists have concluded that a 500m wide section of the face of Ronti Peak broke off at 10:30am on 7 February at an elevation of 5,500m and fell with tremendous force on the glacier below. The kinetic energy of an estimated 22 million cubic metres of falling rock also melted ice deposits from a previous avalanche in 2016.Scientists say that the disaster was not directly caused by global warming, but <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-did-climate-change-contribute-to-indias-catastrophic-glacial-flood" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-did-climate-change-contribute-to-indias-catastrophic-glacial-flood&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463312000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFgdSlP7mXxpGofYUH2Q6dgxNd1xw">climate change could have contributed</a>. Uttarakhand state recorded its warmest January in six decades this year, and there had been winter storms the previous week that had deposited a lot of snow on the slopes. Ice also cements rock fissures at higher elevations, and when it melts the rocks can come loose.‘The Chamoli flood was not caused by a GLOF as there were no significant glacial lakes in the area,’ write a group of researchers led by Arun B Shrestha in a recent paper for the Kathmandu-based International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD),  ‘… (but) the <a href="https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-did-climate-change-contribute-to-indias-catastrophic-glacial-flood" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.carbonbrief.org/factcheck-did-climate-change-contribute-to-indias-catastrophic-glacial-flood&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463312000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFgdSlP7mXxpGofYUH2Q6dgxNd1xw">increased thaw-freeze cycle of permafrost could have partially contributed to the event.’</a>Even so, researchers at the <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/uttarakhand-underground-glacial-lake-led-to-flash-floods-says-iisc-analysis-101612842535639.html" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/uttarakhand-underground-glacial-lake-led-to-flash-floods-says-iisc-analysis-101612842535639.html&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463312000&amp;usg=AFQjCNHUxxKYGuO-LH5Lmhia8nvW3Oi2HA">Divecha Centre for Climate Change at Indian Institute of Science in Bengaluru</a> used glacier thickness mapper data to detect a sub-surface lake containing 4.5 million cubic metres of water stored in a bedrock depression near the Nanda Devi Glacier terminus that could have caused the flood.  Scientists note that not all Himalayan hazards can be attributed to the climate crisis. An <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Anatom-of-a-Himalayan-tsunami,1330" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Anatom-of-a-Himalayan-tsunami,1330&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEsZOhcMFA8vxHbbwUxFh8HOESRwQ">identical rock slip on Annapurna IV</a> in Nepal on 5 May 2012 caused a flashflood on the Seti River that killed at least 72 people. The <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/the-courage-and-endurance-of-the-langtangpa/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/the-courage-and-endurance-of-the-langtangpa/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNHonfzkoR0q5xry76GBTl4UyM05-w">deadly avalanche on Langtang</a> on 25 April 2015 killed nearly 200 people, and was triggered by an earthquake. Another flood that blocked the Arun River in eastern Nepal in July 2017 was traced to a <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/more-himalayan-tsunamis/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/more-himalayan-tsunamis/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFvsIDn5dmC06mGMdSJ_ogC8tBCYg">rock-fall that caused a glacial lake to top over.</a> <figure><img width="850" height="478" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110111152/636cd8599c7e80680e092e3ajpeg.jpg" alt=""><figcaption> </figcaption></figure><a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-glacial-lakes-in-danger-of-bursting/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-glacial-lakes-in-danger-of-bursting/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFTEiergMkJv8bcv86ZOG8uUmM3_Q">GLOFs</a> happen when ice and snow melted by the climate thaw accumulates in enlarging lakes, which can burst due to increased water pressure, or when avalanches fall into them.  And while there are frequent GLOFs, especially in the eastern Himalaya, scientists agree that it was not the main trigger of the Nanda Devi disaster last month.  The other disasters on Himalayan rivers are caused by <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/more-himalayan-tsunamis/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/more-himalayan-tsunamis/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFvsIDn5dmC06mGMdSJ_ogC8tBCYg">bishyari</a>, a local word that refers to a floods due to a landslide blocking a river to impound a lake that suddenly bursts, as what happened in <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/One-month-after-the-mountain-fell,1637" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/One-month-after-the-mountain-fell,1637&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEpOyzNu1-11qUQhioHciDTUNZdGQ">Jure of Sindhupalchok on 2 August 2014.</a>Another catastrophic example is the co-seismic mountain slide that blocked the Seti River about 500 years ago, creating a huge lake that then burst depositing the 200m thick sediment layers on which the city of Pokhara is now located.   Nepal’s former water resource minister and hydropower expert Dipak Gyawali says that bishyari are known to happen in 10-15 year cycles in Nepal. The etymology of the word itself shows that human dwellers of the Himalaya have known of the phenomenon for thousands of years, he says.“Even if these floods are not directly caused by climate change, it can exacerbate the disaster because of extreme weather events,” Gyawali said in an interview.Himalayan floods therefore pre-date climate change, and are caused by the vulnerability of these young, fragile mountains to natural and human-induced processes like the indiscriminate use of heavy earth-moving vehicles on poorly-engineered roads.  Such ‘bulldozer terrorism’, has exacerbated the frequency of landslides in central Nepal  after the 2015 earthquake, according to a recently published paper in the journal, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590061721000193" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2590061721000193&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFfGOeUwHuVmX29jd0yc9zjQ9LTRg">Progress in Disaster Science.</a> <figure><img width="499" height="397" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110111152/636cd85d9c7e80680e092e3bjpeg.jpg" alt=""><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>After analysing remote sensing data, the researchers conclude that although the number of landslides had started falling after 2015, there has been an uptick since 2017 possibly due to the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/dozers-and-nepals-development/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/dozers-and-nepals-development/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1615627463313000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEh-pzzDl7j405T7swUxTKR34tVPg">proliferation of rural road construction</a> around the time of the elections. (See graph, above.) Gyawali suggests that a solution could be better-planned infrastructure and settlements that take into account known hazards. As the Chamoli flood showed, expensive hydroelectric projects located closer to the high mountains are more at risk. He suggests investing in smaller hydropower plants in side tributaries rather than the main stem of major Himalayan rivers to mitigate the danger, and to spread the risk. However, most of Nepal’s planned large hydropower projects are on rivers like the Tamor, Arun, Dudh Kosi, Bhote Kosi and Budi Gandaki. The Himalaya is a young and unstable mountain range that is battered by a heavy monsoon three months a year. Into this high-risk zone, there is now the added threat of climate-induced disasters. Says Gyawali: “We cannot completely remove these disasters from happening, but we can try to understand them and plan to minimise the risk.”

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Non-climate cause of Nanda Devi flood

<figure><img width="873" height="581" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111011110/636ccc8b9c7e80680e08bc2bjpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>A weir built 20 years ago reduced the level of the water by 3m in the Tso Rolpa glacial lake in Nepal, but it needs to go down by 20m to reduce the danger of a Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF). Photo: RASTRARAJ BHANDARI</figcaption></figure>It should not take a tragedy for the Himalaya to change its approach to mountain development. Yet every disaster that occurs is a poignant reminder that narrow solutions to short term threats are not the way forward.On Sunday, 7 February, a glacier near Nanda Devi was bulldozed by a massive rockfall which triggered a tsunami-strength rush of water, killing hundreds downstream. This  flood was yet another sign that the Himalayan region must take a broader view on climate action--one that addresses the drivers of glacial instability and considers the climate system as a whole.The climate crisis is particularly potent in the Himalaya, where the glaciers on the roof of the world are disappearing at an <a href="https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/06/himalayan-glaciers-melting-alarming-rate-spy-satellites-show/">unprecedented scale</a>, losing over a quarter of their volume in the last four decades alone. Mountain dwellers and more than 1 billion people living downstream will suffer from its consequences.One fifth of the world’s population is now at <a href="http://www.nepalpolicynet.com/new/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EDITORIAL-INTRODUCTION_Pandey-et.-al.-2020.pdf">risk of water scarcity </a>as the frozen fresh water above them disappears, and downstream communities live in fear of being washed away in unpredictable floods. To make matters worse, ice melts to form lakes, which absorb heat and speed up the melting of the glaciers. <a href="https://www.icimod.org/new-glacial-lake-inventory-report-released-47-potentially-dangerous-glacial-lakes-ranked/">As of 2020</a>, Nepal alone held 2,070 of these glacial lakes, 47 of which were at high flood risk.There is a sizeable body of research on glacial lakes and their threats to downstream communities. Proposed solutions include risk knowledge and assessment, monitoring and early warning systems, and structural mitigation activities like <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/human-face-of-a-himalayan-climate-crisis/">construction of gated outlet channels</a> to control the release of water from swelling lakes. Yet, limited climate adaptation funding means that despite these potential solutions, returning to the example of Nepal, only two out of 2,070 lakes have had their <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-glacial-lakes-in-danger-of-bursting/">levels </a>reduced.If glacial lake outburst floods are such a pressing environmental threat, why is more action not being taken? Responsibility for managing future floods is passed like a baton from activists to scientists to policy makers and back, each group blaming something different for the lack of concrete action.We need more research, we have wasted too much time on research, we need more finance, we need science-based policy, why does the developed world not step in? And on and on. In this ever-changing blame game, no one takes responsibility, and it is the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/human-face-of-a-himalayan-climate-crisis/">most vulnerable who suffer.</a>The problem is not solely a lack of finance or research, but a flawed outlook on climate change itself. In a drought-prone region, it is costly and perhaps short-sighted to drain freshwater from natural reservoirs into the ocean through the Himalayan river system. The fact that there is not yet a way to safely harness glacial water should not serve as the end of our innovation.<a href="https://www.himalayanwaterproject.org/post/dr-alton-byers-podcast-highlights">Some experts have proposed </a>that these glacial lakes could work as dams to retain meltwater--which could be tapped to produce hydropower and help farmers in drought prone months. This is just one example of how innovation must look past immediate threats and solutions to address the broader systems of environmental change at work.For too long, the Himalayan region has overlooked the impact of their domestic policies and local environmental degradation, and instead blamed the west for the greenhouse gas in the atmosphere.Yet atmospheric carbon is not the only driver of ice loss. <a href="https://www.icimod.org/reducing-black-carbon-in-the-region-will-have-multiple-benefits-and-save-lives/">Black carbon</a> from fires, cookstoves and diesel engines is a growing threat to glacial stability lurking right in the Himalaya’s backyard. This regional pollution darkens the surface of the glaciers, accelerates melting, and cannot be blamed on faraway foreign governments.As sustainability has emerged as a key developmental agenda in response to climate change, the time has come to look beyond reliance on international finance and external blame It is time to reconceptualise the Himalayan region’s relationship with climate action and mountain development.The Himalaya hold a wealth of local and indigenous knowledge from communities who have lived in harmony with the mountains for centuries. Rather than relying on narrow technological solutions to the immediate threat of glacial floods, the way forward is to look at the Himalayan climate system as a whole. Local knowledge can point to a more thoughtful, effective path that taps into nature-based solutions and centers a systems science approach to climate action.We need an interdisciplinary approach that takes responsibility for our own contributions to the climate crisis while acknowledging our agency in creating regional results. We need to change the way we think about glacial melting and climate action in the Himalaya and introduce a broader view.It is time to end the blame-game, time to move away from narrow solutions that only address one aspect of the impact of the climate crisis on Himalaya. Glacial melting, ecosystem change, and water resource management are all connected and must be treated as such.Killian Dumont and <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-climate-connection-to-covid-19/">Rastraraj Bhandari </a>are both research fellows at the <a href="https://www.himalayanwaterproject.org/">Geopolitics &amp; Ecology of Himalayan Water</a>Initiative at NYU Abu Dhabi.

Alarm bells from Nanda Devi

<figure><img width="1859" height="1000" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110101156/636ccac69c7e80680e08bb88jpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>What remains of the Dhauliganga hydropower project in Chamoli district of India’s Uttarakhand state after Sunday’s deadly glacial flood. Photo: STR</figcaption></figure>The devastating <a href="https://theprint.in/science/uttarakhand-chamoli-disaster-likely-caused-by-landslide-not-glacial-outburst-satellite-images-reveal/600859/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">collapse of the Nanda Devi glacier</a> in India’s Uttarakhand state on 7 February that killed hundreds should be a warning for Nepal to be prepared for similar disasters in future.
A <a href="https://www.planet.com/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">PlanetLabs</a> image seems to confirm that a rock-ice slope detached completely from near the summit of the 7,816m high peak in the Garhwal Himalaya near Nepal’s western border, crashed on to the glacier below, and bulldozed the ice and debris into the Dhauliganga and the Alkananda Rivers.
There are tell-tale signs of new brown dust on the western side of the valley in satellite images. The ice melted as it reached a warmer, lower altitude and unleashed the flood that raced downstream. Two hydroelectric projects on the rivers were completely destroyed, highways were washed away and settlements buried under metres of water and debris. 
The Nanda Devi disaster is almost identical to the <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Anatom-of-a-Himalayan-tsunami,1330" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Seti River flash flood</a> of 2012 north of Pokhara that killed nearly 80 people. A massive chunk of rock near the summit of Annapurna IV broke off, fell on the glacier and the ensuing flood <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19479#.YCEipy8RoWo" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">barrelled down the Set</a>i, causing the fatalities.
Another <a href="https://nepalitimes.atavist.com/high-water" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">flash flood on the Arun River</a> in eastern Nepal in 2017 was traced to slope failure on a mountain on the Nepal-China border that fell on a glacial lake, triggering a flash flood that washed down so much debris that it dammed the main river.
In all three cases, disasters that at first thought to be a Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF) turned out to be rock-ice avalanches that led to a glacier collapse. The water and debris then cascaded down the valleys in a deadly paste obliterating everything in its path.
Whereas the increased risk of GLOFs in the Himalaya is linked directly to the climate crisis melting the ice and expanding moraine-impounded lakes, this does not appear to be the direct cause of the Nanda Devi event—just as it was not in the Seti and Arun. Rockfalls that lead to the collapse of glaciers, squeezing the water out of ponds in them and melting of the ice as it is pushed down to a warmer altitude.
Some of these glaciers may have lakes that top over when an avalanche or rockfall hit their surface, or global warming may have melted the ice within debris-covered glaciers. We do not know if these events are becoming more frequent due to a Himalayan thaw caused by the climate crisis.
Whatever the case, it is clear that the countries that share the Himalaya from Afghanistan to Burma have to be prepared for more frequent disasters of this type. The risk of GLOFs and flash floods have to be <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/human-face-of-a-himalayan-climate-crisis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">factored into planning infrastructure</a> and human settlements downstream.
Although GLOFs and glacial collapse get all the attention, the Himalaya are also prone to landslide-blocked dams during the rainy season. The mountains are relatively young, they are seismically active and their slopes very unstable. Monsoon rains have been known to trigger landslides the block major rivers, as happened on the Bhote Kosi in Jure in 2014.
Fortunately, the river found a way around the blockage. But there have been cases when the impounded lake is large enough to cause catastrophic bishyari floods downstream when the landslide dams collapse.
The flat terraces where the city of Pokhara is situated today was probably formed, geologists say, when a landslide blocked the Seti upstream some 700 years ago. It gave way, <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/kundadixit/2012/05/05/avalanche-flood-on-seti/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">unleashing a tsunami</a> at least 150m high. Pokhara is located in the debris fan of this flood which dammed side rivers, forming Phewa, Begnas and other lakes.
To warn that <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/tracing-past-glacial-floods-in-kangchenjunga/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">similar catastrophes can strike</a> in the Himalaya is not panic-mongering. It is a call to be prepared. And let us hope the worst-case scenario of a mega-quake causing multiple glacial lake outburst floods does not happen any time soon.A Himalayan <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-glacial-lakes-in-danger-of-bursting/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Glacial Lake Inventory</a> launched at a <a href="https://www.icimod.org/event/glacial-lake-inventory-launch/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">webinar</a> on Monday says that of the expanding glacial lakes in the Himalaya, 47 on the watersheds of Nepal’s three main rivers are at high risk of bursting, and causing catastrophic floods downstream. Of these, 42 lakes are on the Kosi River basin in eastern Nepal, three are on the Gandaki and two on the Karnali watersheds.A report last year by the <a href="https://www.icimod.org/event/glacial-lake-inventory-launch/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD)</a> and UNDP mapped 3,624 glacial lakes in the Kosi, Gandaki and Karnali basins and found 47 lakes at risk from bursting. Of these 25 are in Tibet and drain into rivers that flow into Nepal. For now, existing towns along the rivers must have early warning systems. Infrastructure planning must take into account the glacial flood risk. And because so many of the high-risk glacier-fed rivers flow across national boundaries, international cooperation must be a must.

More Himalayan tsunamis

This is the first instalment in a new limited series in Nepali Times on the historic transportation infrastructures of Nepal. Nepal’s Forest Railways As<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-border-trains-that-connected-nepal"> India’s railway network </a>expanded in the 1890s and 1900s, the demand for wooden railway sleepers, called ‘ties’ in America, likewise increased. The <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/the-rana-reign-a-recap-of-history,3751">Rana regime</a> realised that western Nepal’s dense forests, from which sal trees could be extracted and sold, represented a valuable source of revenue. There was a problem of accessing large tracts of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-tarai-s-shrinking-forests">Tarai forests</a>. However, once Indian railway lines are extended to Nepal’s border in several places, this issue could be resolved by constructing logging railways, also known as ‘tramways’ or ‘light railways’. The Nepal Government awarded a contract to Punjabi timber contractors to supply 15,000 sal sleepers to Chandan Chauki station of India’s Oudh &amp; Rohilkhand State Railway in 1908. The contractors also received a concession to construct a steam tramway to run 48km into <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/reviving-nepals-community-forestry-success-story">Nepal’s forests</a> for cutting and transporting trees. The author found no records, however, indicating that such an ambitious tramway was built in 1908. The hewn logs were probably carried into India by bullock carts or <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/elephants-become-white-elephants">elephants</a>. The earliest known forest railway in Nepal was built in 1914 in the southwestern corner of the present-day Parsa district. A British engineer went to the Indian border town of Bikna Thori to plan a 4-mile portable light railway for the transport of timber from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/on-the-tri-junction-of-wildlife-conservation-conflict-and-co-existence">the forest of Chitwan </a>to the Thori depot on the Bengal &amp; Northwestern Railway. This short line was laid upon wooden sleepers, and its rails could be taken up and repositioned when logging in one section of the forest was completed. This forest railway was in operation at least through 1917.&nbsp; A few year down the line in 1923, J V Collier of the Indian Forest Service built a narrow-gauge railway in Kailali district also to export of timber to India. This line, the Nepal Government Forest Railway, departed Chandan Chauki in Uttar Pradesh and ran 48km northwest into Nepal.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250824150820_84ddef57433c2f847b2c7e56c2d9c924084b6e6a504bbca905d2c593fac8eabd.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250824150820_84ddef57433c2f847b2c7e56c2d9c924084b6e6a504bbca905d2c593fac8eabd" data-rendition-name="original" width="1130" height="689" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal's little railways"> <figcaption>A Nepal Government Forest train in Kailali District hauling sal sleepers in 1925. Photo: DAVID CHURCHILL </figcaption> </figure>  It was a 2-foot railway supported by 11kg rails. The line was ‘temporary’ in that as sal trees were thinned out in one area, railway tracks were shifted to uncut areas of the forest. The railway crossed seven small <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/saving-what-is-left-of-himalayan-rivers">rivers</a>, but the bridges were taken down during the summer and monsoon. Trains ran only from November to April. This forest railway purchased four 4-6-0T ‘tank’ engines built in Leeds, England. Each bogie could carry 100 broad-gauge sleepers, and two engines were needed to haul a 21-car train loaded with 2,100 sleepers. This huge commercial forest operation once employed about 14,000 men, most of them Indians. During one season, nearly 800,000 broad and metre-gauge sleepers were exported to India. When India suffered a depression in 1930, large scale operations came to an end. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rust-in-peace?fbclid=IwAR1_eg88TCOS6RGRW1af7WvaWx5mzh_rY8-vT1MnJxSs41QtCpaA988oXk8">Rust in peace</a>, Daniel W Edwards  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250824150828_13a0b894b9ea0c478904d358028f0c976d84f284432ee25106787366598d38e5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20250824150828_13a0b894b9ea0c478904d358028f0c976d84f284432ee25106787366598d38e5" data-rendition-name="original" width="6000" height="4000" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal's railways"> <figcaption>Rails extended north from this spot into the virgin sal forests of Bardia in western Nepal 100 years ago.  DANIEL W EDWARDS</figcaption> </figure>  A third railway was built in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-big-bulls-of-bardia">Bardia </a>where some scattered rails and signs of an old roadbed were seen in the 1960s. It ran from Nishangada in India to Khairbhatti in Nepal. From there, stations heading south were Ranipur, Karmak, Taratal and Madhuwan. Collier likely <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-train-project-struggles-to-stay-on-track">built this railway </a>as well in the 1920s. An elderly man in Bardia in 2022, whose father had worked on this forest railway, was interviewed for this account. Kathmandu Valley’s Motor (Trolley) Railway Merchants importing goods from India via the<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/business/ropeways-connecting-nepal,1749"> ropeway</a> Chandra Shamsher built in 1927 had to go to the ropeway’s terminus at Matatirtha near Thankot to claim their goods and then haul them 6km to the customs house Bhansar Adda at Teku for clearance and payment of customs duties. The Motor Railway was built to carry goods from the<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=16839"> ropeway station </a>directly to the customs office, making it cheaper and more convenient for merchants to receive their shipments. In December 1931, Prime Minister Bhim Shamsher issued an order (sanad) putting Lt Gen Singha Shamsher Rana in charge of building this rail line to Teku and on to ‘Nabalak Khana’ in Tripureswar, a distance of 10km. The project was subdivided into four sections or ‘phant’, and for each, budgets and timelines were established. There was bato phant (constructing the roadbed), lik sleeper and jordne phant (laying sleepers and joining the rails), culvert phant (installing culverts) and pul phant (building bridges). Colonel Kishore Narsingh Rana was put in charge of the sleeper and rail section, while Colonel Dilli Jung Thapa, an engineer at Ghar Kaj Adda, also was involved. The Motor Railway was completed by the end of 1933. In the beginning, the railway’s small wagons may have been pulled and pushed by men and bullocks. However, in 1938 a British railway manufacturer sent Nepal a four-wheel, 5½ ton, 2-foot narrow-gauge diesel-powered locomotive with mechanical transmission, hence the name motor railway. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-railways-janakpur-test-drive?fb_comment_id=3554227181262227_4263866616964943">Nepal Railways Janakpur test drive</a> Leaving Matatirtha, the trains passed Satungal, Naikap, the Bishnudevi Temple, crossed an iron bridge over Balkhu Khola, then to Ghattepakha, Sunagau, through what is now a section of Kuleshwor (‘Lik Marg’) to the Customs Office at Teku.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250825020852_033f0cee9775d7dadde7811132f84da876f614c386e3677e560ba7aed79909d9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_15" data-image-id="20250825020852_033f0cee9775d7dadde7811132f84da876f614c386e3677e560ba7aed79909d9" data-rendition-name="original" width="2000" height="1333" loading="lazy" alt="railways in Nepal"> <figcaption>Lik Marg in Kuleswor, the former route of the Motor Trolley Railway. Photo: DANIEL W EDWARDS</figcaption> </figure>  In 1945, Motor Trolley had four engines, but spare parts was badly needed. The charge for transporting one maund (about 40kg) of cargo from Matatirtha to Teku was 50 paisa. Even though the trains ran slowly and only for a short distance, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/fatalism-and-fatalities">accidents were not unknown</a>. A train loaded with rice, salt and cotton derailed on a curve in July 1946, and two railway employees were crushed under the cars and killed, five others were injured. Besides the driver and a brakeman, guards rode the trains to prevent theft of goods.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250824150836_63a327d4db3b067a23dd5c6cf17a31ffe811ffd4a8429bc31011d62298a90060.jpg" data-media-id="editor_17" data-image-id="20250824150836_63a327d4db3b067a23dd5c6cf17a31ffe811ffd4a8429bc31011d62298a90060" data-rendition-name="original" width="6000" height="4000" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal's railways"> <figcaption>The author by the remains of the Balkhu Khola bridge built in 1932 with American steel. Photo: JEEVAN NEPAL</figcaption> </figure>  By 1953, government budget estimates indicated the Motor Railway would break even with an income of Rs70,000 against Rs71,000 in expenditure. It appears the railway stopped service around 1957 with the opening of the Raj Path and the extension of the ropeway from Matatirtha to Bhansar Adda. Bent steel beams of the bridge across Balkhu Khola and two plaques recovered from the river a few years ago are the only remains of this railway today. Photos of the Motor Trolley Railway in operation are hard to come by.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250825020848_3a7cd17d0ffc36bbf5fdad404f5f6e91c7aa0e4f4ed729ed2c7e9c186f32ca9b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_18" data-image-id="20250825020848_3a7cd17d0ffc36bbf5fdad404f5f6e91c7aa0e4f4ed729ed2c7e9c186f32ca9b" data-rendition-name="original" width="5189" height="1979" loading="lazy" alt="railways in Nepal"> <figcaption>Steel plaque commemorating the construction of a Motor Trolley bridge across the Balkhu Khola. Photo: DANIEL W EDWARDS</figcaption> </figure>  The Kosi Project Railway (KPR) As early as 1941, India and Nepal considered building a dam on<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-kosi-s-sorrow-and-scope"> the Kosi River</a> to prevent destructive floods caused by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/when-it-rains-it-pours-ksqprbu3">monsoon rains</a>. Floods in 1950 inundated 500 villages in Bihar and left 500,000 people homeless. The two governments signed an agreement in 1954 to build a barrage on the Kosi, and King Mahendra and Prime Minister Nehru laid the foundation stone in April 1959. To transport stones from a quarry near Dharan to use in mixing concrete at the construction site, the Indian government, in charge of building the barrage, made plans to build a narrow-gauge railway linking Bihar and its border town of Bhimnagar with Nepal’s settlements at Chakraghatti, Chatra and Ghopa, the outskirts of Dharan.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250824150816_fc5e13b01022c63c64f1e83589da0015eee7ecd002bdd3d97b88c98c1f3d45b7.jpg" data-media-id="editor_21" data-image-id="20250824150816_fc5e13b01022c63c64f1e83589da0015eee7ecd002bdd3d97b88c98c1f3d45b7" data-rendition-name="original" width="4011" height="2645" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal's railways"> <figcaption>Steel plaque commemorating the construction of a Motor Trolley bridge across the Balkhu Khola. Photo: DANIEL W EDWARDS</figcaption> </figure>  The section of the KPR in Nepal totaled 66km — the country’s longest railway to date. The stations south of Chakraghatti were Rajabas, Maduhuwan, Kushaha, Haripur and Bhantabari. The line built, operated and owned by the Indian Government, was opened in 1958 and known locally as Dhunge (stone) Rail. Procuring locomotives, wagons and other materials was a challenge. India’s Railway Board searched the country for old 41 lb rails, and located steam engines, most built around 1910, in poor condition, and stored in ‘retirement’. These decrepit locomotives were later cannibalised for parts to keep the remaining engines running, and six newer locomotives built in Yugoslavia were sent to the KPR in 1960 to prevent the railway from shutting down and halting construction of the barrage.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250824150832_fd644f9e2674c5047a531de5dfeb2c8860b0f93dddc7a2df3db867bf31b2c94b.bmp" data-media-id="editor_22" data-image-id="20250824150832_fd644f9e2674c5047a531de5dfeb2c8860b0f93dddc7a2df3db867bf31b2c94b" data-rendition-name="original" width="3171" height="2069" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal's railways"> <figcaption>KPR locomotives, water tank and staff at Chakraghatti in Nepal. Photo: JOHN BENSON</figcaption> </figure>  Used bogie-wagons (gondolas) came from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-nepal-rail-diplomacy">Indian railways</a> that had been converted to metre-gauge, others were manufactured in Muzaffarpur without couplers due to the non-availability of steel. A hundred new wagons arrived from Japan, but only half could be put in service, as couplers from the other 50 were removed and attached to the Muzaffarpur wagons. This smorgasbord of equipment kept shop mechanics and work crews busy, but now-abandoned railways in Nepal always operated under less-than-ideal conditions. Although the purpose of the KPR was to transport gravel, stones and boulders to the site of the barrage, photographs show people riding in loaded wagons. Excluding Dharan, there was no bus service through the wild animal infested jungle between Dharan and Chakraghatti or along the dusty paths linking other small villages on the KPR, so patient locals sat in wagons at Dharan, waiting perhaps for hours for trains to depart.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250825020852_7d011dcc8e9b8cb0fe745b352486ebc4a84dac99419eadb35875333db20837c6.jpg" data-media-id="editor_24" data-image-id="20250825020852_7d011dcc8e9b8cb0fe745b352486ebc4a84dac99419eadb35875333db20837c6" data-rendition-name="original" width="3965" height="2659" loading="lazy" alt="railways in Nepal"> <figcaption>Ticketless riders on a train of gravel and stones in the forest between Dharan and Chakragatti in 1966. Photo: JOHN BENSON</figcaption> </figure>  Sons of former railway workers in Chakraghatti say that there were no fixed schedules, three or four trains ran both ways daily in the early 1960s. Southbound trains carried gravel, stones and boulders, while northbound trains would carry coal, cement and provisions, including sacks of coins to pay the workers. Trains even ran at night, and the crews worked long hours. Workers received free housing in project-built tenements but had to buy food supplies and items for personal use. The Babu Saheb or the superintendent lived at Chakraghatti, and at one time supervised more than 1,000 employees, nearly all of them from India. The barrage was completed in 1964, but by 1970, the Kosi Project Railway had passed into history. Daniel W Edwards was a Peace Corps volunteer in 1966 and is the author of several books on Nepal.

Nepal’s five little railways

Turkish Airlines is official airline partner for the second edition of the Vatsalya Everest Women’s Volleyball League (EWV). The league, scheduled for 5-13 September, will take place in Pokhara and feature 18 international players alongside elite Nepali volleyball talent. The agreement was signed by Turkish General Manager Serkan Başar, and EWV CEO Snevy Chapagain. “Turkish Airlines’ support ensures a seamless journey and adds immense prestige to the league’s goal of women’s empowerment through sports as well as the agenda of sports tourism,” said Chapagain. “We are thrilled to partner with Vatsalya Everest Women’s Volleyball League as the official airline. With this association, we aim to support women role models in sports. We believe this association will connect countries to Nepali volleyball,” remarked Basar.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250825030844_36df66612152abbea71f15579358a2bb0fe797f21cbe7e7c7f28e3fe91655ae4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250825030844_36df66612152abbea71f15579358a2bb0fe797f21cbe7e7c7f28e3fe91655ae4" data-rendition-name="original" width="1920" height="1280" loading="lazy" alt="Turkish"> </figure>

Turkish to sponsor women’s volleyball league

India and China have a long-standing border dispute along their Himalayan border which has erupted in violent skirmishes. But Indian and Chinese officials last week agreed to ignore Nepal’s own border dispute with India to facilitate trade. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs this week flatly rubbished <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/territorialism">Nepal’s territorial claims</a> to the Lipulek Pass and the Kalapani Region, including Limpiyadhura, which Nepal considers as the source of the Mahakali River that forms Nepal’s western border with India. The latest episode in this dispute has come as Sino-Indian relations have thawed after US President Donald Trump slapped <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-and-the-us-india-tariff-tiff">sanctions on Indian exports</a>. The joint communiqué in Beijing said India and China had agreed to resume their border trade through the Nathu La, Sipki La and Lipulek during Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi. Lipulek is a pass 10 km north-east of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/there-is-precedent-to-settling-kalapani">Kalapani</a> which has been disputed ever since the Survey of India published its 1879 map, where the source of the Mahakali was suddenly shifted from Limpiyadhura to Lipulek.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250826060824_4e68dd5964e0995b91148de9978a1de52b19691e1b01f52a405924fd130c22bd.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20250826060824_4e68dd5964e0995b91148de9978a1de52b19691e1b01f52a405924fd130c22bd" data-rendition-name="original" width="2000" height="2083" loading="lazy" alt="Lipulek dispute explainer"> </figure>  This tributary of the Mahakali was called the Kali on this map, and is a fordable tributary and not the main channel of the border river. The main Kali River was renamed Kuti Yangdi, and this happened while the British were still in India presumably to gain access to the Lipulek in contravention of the 1816 <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/borderline-disorder">Sugauli Treaty</a>.&nbsp; This subterfuge continued even after India gained independence in 1947. Nepal has maintained that the main channel of the Kali is the border as per the 1816 treaty, when Nepal lost a third of its territory to British India. It is all well and good that India and China are now friendly enough to <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19447">open border trade</a> routes, but it should not be in violation of Nepal’s territorial integrity. Nepal should be called for diplomatic and political negotiations regarding the Lipulek pass and the Kalapani region comprising Limpiyadhura.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/when-xi-meets-modi-and-oli">When Xi meets Modi and Oli</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit China and India, but especially the latter, should invite Nepal to discuss these issues and iron out the disputes based on facts and evidence and maps. Nepal had sent seven diplomatic notes to India and three to China so far regarding the Lipulek and Kalapani. India has not responded to any of them. China replied once saying that Nepal and India should sort out their border disputes first before voicing their opinions. Nepal welcomes the recent talks between India and China that it hopes will positively impact on settling border disputes that are mostly stalled since the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the 73-day military standoff over the disputed Doklam region between China and Bhutan, and the 2020 Galwan clash in Ladakh. Nepal’s two large neighbours seem to have come to their senses and realised that it is in their interest to collaborate rather than confront each other when President <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">Trump is acting erratically</a> with threats of sanctions and tariffs.&nbsp; Prime Minister K P Oli should bring up Nepal’s grave concerns about the Lipulek during his state visit to India next month when he will meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Bodh Gaya. The two are also expected to meet next week at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin when Chinese President Xi Jinping will also be present. But even before that Nepal should send diplomatic notes to both the Indian and the Chinese governments regarding their agreement to resume border trade through the Lipulek.&nbsp; Here is a timeline of the developments regarding the Lipulek: Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 This 8-year Agreement on Trade and Exchange between Tibet and India was signed in Peking on 29 April, 1954 by the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Chang Han Fu and the Indian Ambassador Nedyam Raghavan.&nbsp; There was no explicit mention on the border settlements either on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) or on Ladakh, although trade and pilgrimage through Lipulek and other 5 passes (Sipki La, Mana Pass, Niti Pass, Kungri Bingri Pass and Dharma Pass) were agreed upon.&nbsp; Trade between Uttar Pradesh state and the Tibet Autonomous Region was through ‘border &nbsp;point of the agreement states: ‘With a view to facilitating the visits of persons engaged in border trade and the exchange of commodities and means of transportation, (India and China) have decided that Lipulek (Qiangla) be the border pass for the entrance and exit of the said persons, commodities and means of transportation from the two sides.’ The agreement expired on 6 June 1962 during the Sino-Indian war, and the two sides did not renew it. Bilateral ties started to normalise only in the 1990s with the Indian decision in 1988 to abandon its policy of settling ‘territorial issue’ for ‘normalisation of relations’. India There was no reaction from Nepal to the 1954 agreement since Nepal did not have diplomatic relations with China yet at the time. Sino-Indian Agreement of 2005 The Political Parameters and the Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question is detailed in 11 Articles, which outline the steps to be taken for a Peaceful and Tranquil Border. The agreement was a direct outcome of the Special Representatives mechanism that had been set up through a 2003 agreement. It also incorporated the Confidence Building Measures in Military Field along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Sino-Indian Border Areas signed in 1996.&nbsp; A protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas signed during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s India visit, which stated in Clause 2 of Article 5: ‘Both sides agree to extend in principle to expand the mechanism of border meeting points to include Kibithu Dhamal in the Eastern Sector and Lipulek Pass (Qing La) in the Middle Sector. The precise locations of these border meeting points will be decided upon mutual consultations.’ Nepal’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement in 2005 stating that Nepal had asked China about the issue and the Chinese Embassy clarified that the agreement had nothing to do with Kalapani. This was perhaps the first time that Nepal had objected to the Sino-Indian agreement on Lipulek. King Gyanendra had staged a coup d’état on 1 February 2005, just two months prior to this agreement. The Nepali press voiced criticism of China in particular for disregarding the country’s sentiment.&nbsp; Sino-Indian Agreement of 2015 India and China signed several documents during the state visit of Chinese President XI Jinping to India on 18 September 2011. Number one on the list was: ’Opening a New Route for Indian Pilgrimage (Kailash Mansarovar Yatra) to the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China’.&nbsp; The Indian foreign ministry stated: ‘The MoU provides for conducting the annual Kailash Mansarovar Yatra through Nathula Pass in Sikkim in addition to the existing Lipulek Pass in Uttarakhand’. On May 15, 2015, China and India issued a Joint Statement during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China. Point 28 under the ‘Trans-border Cooperation’, states that the two sides agreed to ‘hold negotiation on augmenting the list of trades commodities, and expand border trade at Nathu La, Quingla/Lipulek Pass and Sipki La Pass’. Nepal’s objection to the 2015 agreement was stronger than in 2005. Prime Minister Sushil Koirala called up Narendra Modi to express Nepal’s displeasure It was not until 2020 that Nepal’s Foreign Minister disclosed that ‘Nepal had expressed its disagreement in 2015 through separate diplomatic notes addressed to the governments of both India and China … including Lipulek Pass as a bilateral trade route without Nepal’s consent.’  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250826060824_d4497e2620bba81211d27e427393974877e09006abc26e13055508996e5b29ea.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250826060824_d4497e2620bba81211d27e427393974877e09006abc26e13055508996e5b29ea" data-rendition-name="original" width="1108" height="1550" loading="lazy" alt="Lipulek dispute explainer"> </figure>  The new political map of India published by the Survey of India in November 2019 that incorporated areas east of the Kali River including Kalapani as Indian territory sparked renewed public, and political, attention to the Mahakali dispute. The Nepal government then countered by formally approving the publication of the new Political and Administrative Map of Nepal including all territories lying to the east of the Mahakali River on May 18, 2020. In June, the House of Representatives unanimously endorsed the second amendment to the Constitution of Nepal to update the country’s new political map in the national emblem. Sino-Indian Consensus of 2024 A 6-point Consensus on Peace and Tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was agreed on December 18, 2024 between the Special Representative of the People’s Republic of China, Wang Yi, and the Special Representative of the Republic of India, Ajit Doval.&nbsp; India has not denied that this is a consensus, while China made it clear that this was not a Joint Statement. This Consensus is in line with the 2005 agreement, and was agreed during the 23rd round of the Special Representatives talks held after a gap of five years aimed at restoring bilateral ties frozen because of the military standoff in Ladakh. The agreement included: cross-border communication and cooperation, promoting the resumption of pilgrimages by Indians to Xizang, cooperation on crossborder rivers, and trade at the Nathu La Pass. Nepal made no reaction to the statement despite Lipulek being the pilgrimage route for Mansarovar and Kailash.&nbsp; Prabhakar Sharma is a construction engineer and an international border expert who has worked as a survey engineer for the Cameroon-Nigeria border demarcation by the United Nations.

Lipulek dispute explainer

It was 30 years ago this month that investment into ‘Baby Arun’, the 201MW first phase of the run-of-river Arun III project, was brought to a screeching halt when the World Bank officially withdrew its support. This brought about profound and fundamental changes in the way Nepal’s power sector subsequently developed. Nepalis suffered debilitating power outages between 2008-2016 due to shortages attributable to the cancellation. At the same time, the gap left by Baby Arun was filled by private sector investment in ways that were not obvious in 1995. It took 30 years, but in many ways Nepal’s power sector is more healthy today than it has ever been, and likely better than if the project was built as planned. At a projected budget of $1.08 billion, Baby Arun would have cost the equivalent of Nepal’s entire annual government expenditure in 1995. It was to be funded by concessional grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral funders, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), KfW, and investment by the government itself. At the time, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity was only 230MW, and the trajectory of the power sector changed dramatically following the cancellation. In the past 30 years, $5.4 billion has been invested in the power sector led by private investors, and much of it from domestic banks and pension funds (table, right).  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0" data-rendition-name="original" width="984" height="521" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Nearly 70% of the new megawatts generated were by private independent power producers (IPP) in the past 30 years, while the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and its subsidiary companies added 30% of new capacity. Almost 80% of total debt financing came from domestic banks and employee retirement funds. International assistance for power generation dropped dramatically over this time, accounting for only about 15% of investment. Before 1995 new power projects used to be entirely dependent on foreign aid. Since 1995, 63% of new generation came from 171 small hydropower projects with an average capacity of 12MW, while 4% was from 21 solar photovoltaic and biomass projects developed by local IPPs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097" data-rendition-name="original" width="988" height="503" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Over three decades, investment in Nepal’s power supply came primarily from new actors that had never before been involved in this sector. The rate of electrification rose from 10% to close to 100% -- sufficient to meet domestic needs during most of the year, and in 2024 made Nepal a net exporter of power to India for the first time in its history. As practically all the new investment in this period went into run-of-river hydro and solar projects, rather than into hydropower reservoirs with seasonal storage, Nepal continues to rely on imports from India during the dry winter months. Surplus electricity generation for export during the monsoon is slated to grow rapidly as another 200 solar and hydro projects are nearing completion of construction, with over 5,000MW of power capacity. Private Power The cancellation of Baby Arun inadvertently accelerated the entry of the private sector into Nepal’s power generation. The government enacted the Electricity Act in 1992 to attract private IPPs and diversify away from total dependence from international aid, but had been struggling for several years to conclude the first agreement with the 60MW Khimti Project. There remained a large gap between the tariff that the government thought was reasonable versus what was demanded by the Norwegian investor Statkraft, and the private sector arms of the World Bank and ADB that were financing the project. The shock of World Bank withdrawal from Baby Arun put tremendous pressure on the government, then led by the UML as it is now. The Bank’s decision to terminate its involvement was ostensibly, at least partially, taken in response to a letter critiquing the project sent by the UML while it was in the opposition.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347" data-rendition-name="original" width="949" height="446" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>BAD NEWS: Newspaper clippings from the early 90s on tender announcement ahead of loan approval (left) and secrecy surrounding environmental assessment (centre) of Arun III before its eventual cancellation in August 1995.</figcaption> </figure>  The government was forced to soften its position and agree to the investors’ terms following the cancellation of Baby Arun. It directed NEA to sign a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Khimti. It was concluded in January 1996, and this was followed by a second PPA in July 1996 with Panda Energy, the American developer of the 45MW Upper Bhotekosi project. The expensive USD-denominated agreements to buy power from two international private producers, with price escalation clauses tied to the New York Consumer Price Index, sent alarm bells ringing. There was worry that the country was heading towards unaffordable tariff rates for the consumer and potential bankruptcy for NEA as a result of inevitable future weakening of the Nepali Rupee. The government had strong-armed NEA into signing these agreements, and realised that concessionary financing terms that Nepal was used to receiving for public sector projects such as Baby Arun and Kali Gandaki A, that included below-market interest rates and 40 years repayment period with a 10 year grace period before starting repayment, were not the norm for private sector investors. Nepal’s status as a less than attractive destination for foreign investment meant that the country had few options but to accept expensive dollar PPAs from international developers with the high commercial interest rates and short repayment periods imposed by their banks because of high investment risks. In the end, the government ended up having to additionally provide a sovereign guarantee in order to close the deal at the insistence of the lenders – committing it to repayment in case NEA defaulted on paying the IPPs. It is reasonable to assume that the extraordinarily high political cost of agreeing to the PPA terms would have meant that no government would have willingly agreed to them in 1995 had it not suffered the trauma of the loss of concessionary-financed public sector projects as large as the Baby Arun. It has taken NEA 25 years to consider offering dollar-denominated PPAs again: to cover the foreign exchange portion of the investment in the 216MW Upper Trisuli-1 and 120MW Rasuwa-Bhotekosi Hydropower projects. It seemed unlikely at the time, but it turned out that the dire situation Nepal found itself in 1995 planted the seed to mobilise investment for affordable power from within the country. Double Whammy After the dual shock of first losing investment in Baby Arun and having to sign expensive power purchase agreements with international IPPs, the first proposal for an alternative strategy to mitigate the risk of foreign currency investment into hydropower projects came from a group of engineers within the Arun III team at NEA. Led by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4900">Deputy Director Damber Bahadur Nepali,</a> engineers convinced the leadership that NEA needed to invest in a subsidiary company to build a series of locally-designed and domestically-financed projects that would have lower cost with rupee-denominated PPAs. They registered the Chilime Hydropower Company Limited (CHCL) in October 1995 with 51% shares from NEA, 25% from its employees, and 24% available for the general public, 10% of which was prioritised for local residents at the project site. The 22.1MW project is in Rasuwa on a tributary of the Trisuli, and mobilised debt financing from the Employee Provident Fund, which manages retirement savings for employees of the government, public enterprises, and private sector institutions. CHCL’s experience showed that NEA employees themselves believed that individual hydropower projects with operational independence from NEA could be developed profitably in Nepal by its own engineers -- and they were willing to put their own money on the line. Chilime also demonstrated that there was money in the country, particularly with retirement funds, looking for opportunities for long-term investments. Following completion of Chilime in 2003, CHCL led the formation of three other NEA subsidiary companies that completed construction in 2023 and 2024, producing 168.3MW using fully rupee-tied investment. NEA’s largest subsidiary, the Upper Tamakosi Hydropower Limited, completed construction of its 456MW plant in 2021.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3" data-rendition-name="original" width="3000" height="1571" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>DAMNED: The $700 million 456MW Upper Tamakosi built entirely with domestic funds before it was destroyed by the September floods last year. </figcaption> </figure>  There were some delays and cost overruns on this run-of-river project, the largest in the country with a final cost of over $700 million -- all of it sourced domestically. The five subsidiary companies launched by NEA have produced almost two times as much new power as NEA has over the past 30 years. Seven other NEA subsidiaries are currently constructing projects to add another 474MW to the national grid. But even more important than NEA subsidiaries have been local IPPs: Nepali companies which have over the past three decades enthusiastically entered the hydropower sector. From a regulatory perspective, the credit for mobilising domestic private investment to engage in power generation goes to Minister of Water Resources Shailaja Acharya, who in 1998 offered a flat feed-in-tariff of Rs4/kWh for hydropower projects under 10MW. This upfront offer removed a major barrier that early developers had faced of having to spend money to carry out a detailed feasibility study before they could even start tariff negotiations with NEA. She had laid the foundation stone of the Chilime project, and proved to be the champion of opening up the sector for domestic IPPs. The guarantee of a PPA with a fixed tariff, irrespective of project specifications, gave small power developers the confidence to apply for survey licenses and invest in feasibility studies so they could directly approach commercial banks and make a case for their project producing required revenue to repay loans. Domestic IPPs started adding power to the national grid in 2002. Their contribution was initially modest, and first projects were small and commercial lenders who took time to be confident about providing debt financing to a sector which had previously not been considered suitable for private sector investment. While the first 10 years were slow, with less than 10MW being added to the grid each year, this increased twenty fold over the following ten years, resulting in the equivalent of a Baby Arun being added by Nepali IPPs to the grid each year. A total of 84 IPPs added 232MW, 328 MW, 454MW, and 400MW of new generation to the grid in 2021-2024 (graph). There was explosive, exponential growth as domestic developers have surged ahead to account for 76% of the new megawatts added to the grid since 2020, compared to 24% by NEA and its subsidiary companies. The megawatts that IPPs are adding have followed the classic ‘hockey stick curve’ with the ‘breakout point’, signaling the rapid growth phase in 2020. Private producers are expected to accelerate new generation in the coming years with 300 solar and hydropower projects adding 11,000MW. Another 166 hydropower and 96 solar projects are currently in the survey stage, and are in line to add another 11,000MW to the construction pipeline. One major challenge is finding financing required for the projects. Domestic investment will no longer be sufficient to finance this ambitious pipeline of renewable energy projects. Project developers as well as NEA and the Electricity Regulatory Commission will have to leverage their substantial experience accumulated through the construction of over 200 projects to attract regional and international investment and hedge the risks of dollar-denominated PPAs. Following the cancellation of Baby Arun, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Nepal developed a highly distributed power sector</a>. The national electricity grid is currently supplied with power from a remarkably decentralised array of hundreds of hydropower and solar photovoltaic projects spread across 43 districts and all seven provinces.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1228" height="867" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  This presents a sharp contrast to the pathway of a few large public sector hydropower projects with a sprinkling of private sector projects that was envisioned as part of NEA’s investment planning when Baby Arun was being considered the front runner for investment. The strategy then was to allow public sector investment in a few large hydropower projects with thermal plants to fill the gap. Knowing what we know now about acceleration of climate change impacts and increased extreme weather events, following this path would have made Nepal’s power sector highly vulnerable. Decentralised generation greatly improves the resilience of Nepal’s power supply as damage to power plants in one part of the country need not affect other areas that have their own generation. Following the investment plan where over two thirds of the country’s power supply would have come from power plants on the Arun River, would have greatly imperiled Nepal’s energy security. All rivers in Nepal are susceptible to flooding from cloudbursts made more frequent by climate change. The Arun River which is fed by glaciers in Tibet is also at risk to glacial lake outburst floods. Bikash Pandey is Director of Clean Energy and Circular Economy at Winrock International. People Power is his regular column in Nepali Times on global energy issues relevant to Nepal. <h2>Decentralised and Diversified</h2> In the 30 years since the cancellation of ‘Baby Arun’: Hydropower projects constructed cover capacities ranging from less than 1MW to 456MW and developed by IPPs from across the country with strong local involvement in purchasing equity shares. Renewable energy sources contributed to the generation mix through solar IPPs that further contribute to climate resilience, and cover shortfalls during low rainfall. The government is committed to solar contributing 10% of the power on the grid. Increasing solar beyond this target and providing incentives to project developers to invest in utility-scale battery storage would further improve resilience. BIG ARUN: The 900MW Arun III project under construction since 2018 at Num in Sankhuwasabha (pictured, below) is a separate initiative by a different project developer using a different financing modality. The ‘Baby Arun’ version of Arun III was cancelled in 1995.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1312" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> </figure>