In July, the government announced an amendment to Nepal’s Printing and Publication Act, reportedly without the knowledge of the Minister for Communication and Information Technology Prithvi Subba Gurung.&nbsp;
The amendment gives Nepal’s Chief District Officer (CDO) exclusive authority to regulate the registration, operation and renewal of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/surveying-nepal-s-digital-landscape">online media</a>, relieving the Department of Information of a responsibility it had since 2016 through the Online Media Operation Directive.&nbsp;
This gives local bodies unchecked power to register and suspend <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-new-news-age">online news platforms</a> ‘as they deem fit’. This is the latest in a series of decisions to suppress Nepal’s constitutionally guaranteed press freedom.&nbsp;
Successive governments since 2015 have attempted to enact laws that suppress criticism of officials, disagreement with &nbsp;government policies and the right to information. Although veiled as an attempt to regulate excesses on social media, the primary targets of the draft Media Council Bill are <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/messaging-is-the-message">journalists and journalism</a>.&nbsp;
The Bill will replace the 1991 Press Council Act, and has been passed by the National Assembly and went to the House of Representatives three years ago, but ultimately lapsed after the term of the lower House ended in 2022.&nbsp;
It is being debated again in the House of Representatives since last month with provisions like the formation of a Media Council which will be headed by someone recommended by the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology, which can also arbitrarily sack the person. It can also take journalists to court and suspend their media IDs.
“The government, with zero opposition and increasing lenience from the judiciary, is setting up legal pathways to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/no-freedom-after-expression-y4inku06">retaliate against the media</a> for fulfilling its responsibility of check and balance,” says lawyer Om Prakash Aryal. &nbsp;
These provisions seek to weaken the existing Press Council, and give politicians and the bureaucracy almost absolute <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/media-matters">power over the press</a>. &nbsp;
Stakeholders have proposed amendments to the Bill during deliberations with the National Assembly’s Legislative Committee, but only a few of the concerns have been addressed.&nbsp;
The Nepali Congress had also introduced 24 amendments to the Bill, but has not backed them after joining the UML-led coalition.
Prime Minister K P Oli had appeared to favour a free press when he assumed office during this tenure last year, but recent press exposes about <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/higher-corruption-in-high-places">corruption in high places</a> has made him increasingly<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/nepal-has-press-freedom-but-no-freedom-after-press"> critical of journalists</a> and social media content.&nbsp;
He has publicly attacked the media’s “intolerance and unwillingness to report on the good work done by the government” and urged the press not to publish or broadcast news “that harms the country, causes confusion and weakens public morale”.
Even while the Bill is being debated, the government has repeatedly invoked the Electronic Transaction Act to harass journalists or accuse the media of contempt of court. Bizmandu, Nepalkhabar, Drishti Weekly, and Nepali Times sister publication Himalkhabar have all been charged.&nbsp;
Last week the Supreme Court published the full text of the verdict of the contempt of court against <a href="http://sidhakura.com/">sidhakura.com</a>, which was convicted last year after the outlet published news that included audio files claiming collusion between media operators and Supreme Court justices to dismiss corruption cases, which were determined to be fake following a forensic examination.
In the verdict, the Supreme Court states that while the media is guaranteed the right to print and publish news and audiovisual material, these rights are not absolute but ‘subject to restriction’, per constitutional provision, which is under Article 19 of Nepal’s Constitution.&nbsp;
But the top court’s interpretation and verbiage sets a precedent that allows for state intimidation towards the press for any content that it deems must be restricted, and subject media institutions to unjustified judicial penalties.&nbsp;
Despite its history of defending media freedom, the Press Council has become an instrument of government and corporate entities, and is so politicised that it has not gone beyond platitudes.&nbsp;
The Press Council has blacklisted 29 media outlets, instructed registered online portals <a href="http://pahilopost.com/">pahilopost.com</a> and News of Nepal, as well as unregistered portals to remove content, and shadow-banned other web portals.
Violations of the Press Council’s code of conduct were previously classified as disobedience. Now, the Council has gone as far as to have the Cyber Bureau go after the media.
The Press Council has written to the Bureau to take action against 43 YouTube channels, seven of them for content related to Prime Minister K P Oli. Diyopost was blacklisted for reporting on the Press Council and its former chair Balkrishna Basnet.
While the Press Council has been monitoring journalists, the proposed Media Council attempts to control media companies themselves. This is a double-barrel targetting of journalism.
Nepal is still considered one of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/global-press-freedom-index-falls-to-critical-low">few remaining open societies in Asia</a>, but recent government moves threaten our hard won freedom. Although better than other countries in the region, Nepal still slipped from 74th place in 2024 to 90th place this year on the World Press Freedom Index.&nbsp;
The US State Department’s 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices briefly outlined <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/gagging-the-press-in-installments">Nepal’s press freedom scenario</a>, stating that the government generally respected the right to freedom of expression, including for members of the press and other media, but added that “the government did not make sufficient efforts to preserve the safety and independence of media”
The report is ironic coming from an administration that has defunded public broadcasting institutions, barred selected institutions access to the White House, and continued to be hostile to media and journalists. In April, the Committee to Protect Journalists, following Trump’s 100th day in office, released a report concluding that press freedom was ‘no longer a given in the United States’.&nbsp;
As it stands, Prime Minister Oli seems to be taking tips from Indian Prime Minister Modi on suppressing freedom of expression. The government is not just muzzling the press, but also constricting the right to peaceful assembly, dissent and debate. The end-goal seems to be to gag the press ahead of the 2027 elections.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/no-comment">No comment.</a>, Shristi Karki

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Command and control

Nepalis worship the sun, and mark its seasonal passage with festivals. Adding to that spiritual reverence now is the economic relevance of solar power. Fast-flowing Himalayan rivers give Nepal a total feasible hydropower generation capacity of 48,000MW, of which only 3,600 has so far been harnessed. Yet, Nepal’s total solar power potential has been calculated to be nearly 10 times higher at 432,000MW. &nbsp; With over 300 days of sunshine a year, the country could produce 3.6 to 6.2 units of electricity per square meter based on its solar radiation levels.&nbsp; This potential, combined with decreasing installation costs of Chinese-manufactured photovoltaic cells and other means, is a viable and affordable alternative to Nepal’s over-reliance on hydropower which faces concerns about the destruction of riverine ecosystems, as well as risk from glacial lake floods caused by climate breakdown. However, restrictive domestic energy policies and geopolitical sensitivities mean Nepal is failing to diversify fast enough to tap this tremendous solar energy potential. Nepal’s hydropower generation is almost entirely from run-of-river projects that do not have large reservoirs. Many such projects in Nepal and across the Himalaya have been swept away by glacial lake outburst floods in recent years.&nbsp; Such risks and limitations to hydropower should have prompted the Nepal government to jump-start investment into solar farms, but the main reason is that the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) caps solar power at just 10% of total capacity. There is no official explanation, but it is likely due to the outdated perception that solar technology cannot supply a consistent energy stream at evening and morning peak loads.&nbsp; But today, there are plenty of ways around it, including pump storage schemes that use daytime solar power to pump water from a river to a reservoir and drain it to generate electricity at night. Battery technology is now more advanced, and affordable enough to make grid-scale batteries feasible.&nbsp; But then there is an issue of tariffs, which are much lower for solar at Rs5 per energy unit, and competitive bidding forces companies to lower it even further. But there is no bidding process for hydropower and licenses are given out on a first-come, first-served basis with a fixed rate of Rs6.5 per unit regardless of location.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025112303118_c3280cddae6f3305d07319011dd9c187005822a9b905bb849c36b95e3ad0d516.png" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2025112303118_c3280cddae6f3305d07319011dd9c187005822a9b905bb849c36b95e3ad0d516" data-rendition-name="original" width="1109" height="887" loading="lazy" alt="Here comes the sun"> </figure>  SUPPLY VS DEMAND Hydropower is supply-driven, while solar responds to demand, so under such a discouraging scenario, solar power accounts for only 5% of Nepal’s total energy mix. “Given the environmental risks to hydropower, investors are now demanding tariffs on hydropower to be increased. So the question to the government is, are you paying more money for hydropower or willing to buy more of the cheaper solar power,” said energy entrepreneur Kushal Gurung. Solar investors are lobbying the government to raise the cap on solar power to 30% and expand zoning policies so that solar plants can be built in areas with high potential, such as Dolpo and Mustang in the trans-Himalaya. These regions are sparsely populated, arid, have a cold climate and high solar radiation levels — ideal conditions for photovoltaics. Solar power’s biggest advantage is its cost-effectiveness compared to hydropower, with the operating cost of a hydropower plant up to four times higher than of a solar plant of the same generation capacity. Investors are no longer assured of a return on investment on hydropower due to climate risk which have increased insurance premiums. “Last year, when the government opened a bidding for 800MW of solar power, the private sector was ready to invest 3,000MW. Both banks and investors were convinced about the potential for solar energy, but the government and especially the bureaucracy, was not on the same wavelength,” added Gurung.&nbsp; Interim Energy Minister Kulman Ghising is said to be interested in increasing the cap on solar energy, but there is a question whether he will remain in office since he has launched his only Ujyalo Nepal party to contest elections in March. GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS In 2018, Nepal’s only foreign private equity form Dolma Himalayan Climate Fund (DHCF) pitched a proposal to generate 150MW from a solar farm and store 20MW of it in battery systems in Mustang to meet seasonal and daily peaks. It got approval from Investment Board Nepal (IBN) and had already poured millions into the project when the Department of Mines instructed all developers in Mustang to halt their projects, citing the discovery of uranium ore. But insiders say the real reason was due to pressure from the Chinese government’s security concerns about a Western investor being involved so close to the border with Tibet.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025112303118_5946a5f1ba63f34c88f900c6d12b37d0101effb76e8a7a5397cd6451c16cd5b2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2025112303118_5946a5f1ba63f34c88f900c6d12b37d0101effb76e8a7a5397cd6451c16cd5b2" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="450" loading="lazy" alt="Here comes the sun NT"> <figcaption>Photo: GHAM POWER</figcaption> </figure>  The same thing happened, but in reverse, when the Chinese company Risen Energy was interested in investing $190 million on a grid-connected 125MW photovoltaic generation system in Banke and Kapilvastu districts near the Indian border. Risen’s subsidiary, Risen Energy Singapore JV, was negotiating with IBN to commit $190 million in the project which would also store 20MW of daytime generation for morning and evening peak demand. But the agreement was not signed because the Indian authorities were concerned about Chinese involvement so close to their border. India has also refused to buy electricity from any hydropower plant in Nepal that has Chinese or other foreign investment or contractors. Indian state-owned companies are currently building or planning hydropower plants in Nepal to generate nearly 3,000MW, mostly for export.&nbsp; But not every Chinese-backed project has been blocked. In 2024, China handed over two solar-powered livelihood projects to a local community in Lalitpur — a community solar bathhouse and a rooftop photovoltaic power system. Funded by the Yunnan People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, the projects aim to improve living conditions. The initiative forms part of the Chinese Embassy’s ‘Happy Community’ program (幸福社区, Xìngfú Shèqū) under the China–South Asia Poverty Reduction and Development Cooperation Center.&nbsp; Says Gurung: “Hydropower is a geopolitical mess, but it has well and truly started in solar power too. It now all comes down to how we handle it, and we need deft diplomacy to make sure our projects are not indefinitely delayed as has happened in the past.”&nbsp; LOW-HANGING FRUIT Despite domestic restrictions and geopolitics, there are still small-scale opportunities for solar energy entrepreneurs to cash in, such as net metering. Most industries in Nepal have enough rooftop space to generate 500KW to 1MW of solar energy. Combined, they would generate a substantial amount of energy to feed into the grid. Factories, supermarkets and chain stores are often bankable and trusted by financial institutions from which they could easily get credit.&nbsp; China could also take advantage of Nepal’s high solar power potential. Given that the United States has only imposed a 10% tariff on Nepal, China could set up PV manufacturing plants in Nepal.&nbsp; However, this requires government-to-government which could run into trouble, again because of geopolitics. The same applies for the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism which is a carbon tariff on carbon intensive products, such as steel, cement and some electricity, imported to the European Union.&nbsp; Chinese products have suffered under this mechanism but Chinese products made in Nepal can be competitive in the European market given lower carbon tax for Nepal. Clean energy has long been an area where Nepal hopes to attract Chinese investment — not only in hydropower, but also in solar and wind energy.&nbsp; With contributions from Qian Sun, Global Voices.&nbsp;

Nepal, here comes the sun

There were two Bhutans on display during Narendra Modi’s visit this month. The first: a trusted partner, modernising rapidly with Indian support, inaugurating hydroelectric projects, and signing healthcare deals. The second: a nation that <a href="https://www.fmreview.org/gazmere-bishwo/#:~:text=In%201990%2D91%2C%20about%20a,are%20therefore%20not%20Bhutanese%20citizens.">ethnically cleansed 17% of its population </a>and has never been held accountable.
Modi chose to see only the <a href="https://kuenselonline.com/news/pm-modi-concludes-bhutan-visit-with-prayers-for-peace-and-prosperity">first </a>during his <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-announces-rs-4000-cr-concessional-credit-line-to-fund-energy-projects-in-bhutan/articleshow/125253915.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&amp;utm_medium=text&amp;utm_campaign=cppst">11-12 November visit</a>, granting $450 million in credit, offering birthday tributes to Fourth King Jigme Singye Wangchuk, and inaugurating another hydropower project.
New Delhi has opted for strategic silence on Bhutan’s systematic persecution of the Lhotshampas in the 1990s. The displaced remain scattered across the world and in refugee camps in Nepal, their property seized, their citizenship revoked.&nbsp;
Now, on that same contested land Bhutan is building the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/small-bhutan-dreams-big">Gelephu Mindful City (GMC)</a>, a megaproject intended to <a href="https://kuenselonline.com/news/pm-modi-announces-inr-40-billion-credit-line-new-rail-links-and-land-for-bhutanese-temple-in-varanasi">connect directly to Indian infrastructure</a>. The victims are gone, and democratic India’s values remain conspicuously absent.&nbsp;
With no Lhotshampas left to challenge the official narrative and India unwilling to raise it, Bhutan continues to suppress dissent with impunity.&nbsp;
Earlier this year, social media influencer Raghu Pati Subedi was arrested on the Assam side of Gelephu after returning from a visit to relatives in India. His family members reportedly came under intense pressure, including threats of arrest, accusing them of hiding his whereabouts. After his arrest, he was transported to Thimphu and imprisoned.
This was not an isolated incident. It is part of systemic repression that first gained international attention in the 1990s, when over 100,000 Nepali-speaking Lhotshampa were systematically stripped of their citizenship and forcibly exiled. This mass expulsion, which human rights organisations have characterised as ethnic cleansing, created a decades-long refugee crisis that continues to define the regional political and human rights landscape.&nbsp;
EXODUS
The Lhotshampa crisis of the 1990s was not a spontaneous event but the culmination of years of state-led discrimination. Through a series of legislative acts, notably the 1985 Citizenship Act and the 1989 Driglam Namzha, the ‘One Nation, One People’ policy, the Bhutanese state systematically dismantled the rights of its Nepali-speaking citizens.&nbsp;
The use of the Nepali language was suppressed, the traditional dress of the ruling ethnic group was mandated, and citizenship was revoked en masse, rendering a significant portion of the population stateless in their own homeland.
The new manuscript I am editing has harrowing accounts by the authors of those atrocities. The parallels with what happened to Subedi recently are striking and troubling, showing that even after 35 years the regime has not changed its spots. The methods may have evolved, but the repression against dissidents remains disturbingly consistent.
This refugee exodus was an immense and unasked-for burden on Nepal. Despite being a country grappling with its own political instability and limited resources, Nepal accommodated them on humanitarian grounds. Nepal has consistently advocated for a durable solution centered on the refugees’ right to safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation.
For years, it engaged in bilateral talks with Bhutan, culminating in a joint verification process. However, these efforts ultimately foundered on what Nepal described as ‘continued rigidity and non-implementation of the agreed decisions by the Bhutanese side’.
Nepal fulfilled its moral and humanitarian duty, but the international community largely failed to hold Bhutan accountable. Bhutan’s rulers deflected global attention with the masterful narrative of Gross National Happiness (GNH), while the grim reality in the refugee camps persisted.&nbsp;
Ultimately, with repatriation proving impossible, Nepal acquiesced to a third-country resettlement program led by a group of eight countries, including the United States, Canada, and Australia. From 2007 to 2016, more than 113,500 Bhutanese refugees were resettled in <a href="https://www.unhcr.org/media/nepal-factsheet">one of the largest group resettlement programmes globally</a>, though 6,365 remain in refugee camps in eastern Nepal.
While this solution provided a lifeline for thousands, it was a tragic capitulation to Bhutan’s ethnic homogenisation project. The refugees’ right to return to their homeland has been denied. It is a cautionary tale about the limits of international diplomacy in the face of state intransigence.
Bhutan’s global brand is one of its most successful exports. The <a href="https://www.gnhcentrebhutan.org/">Gross National Happiness </a>doctrine, which promotes holistic well-being over just economic growth, has captivated the Western imagination and policymakers. It offers a vision of a mindful, environmentally conscious, and peaceful Himalayan kingdom. This carefully cultivated image has historically aimed to shield Bhutan from the level of scrutiny applied to other nations with similar human rights records.
The GNH facade, however, cracks under the weight of documented evidence. The same kingdom that champions ‘happiness’ has, for decades, maintained a justice system that human rights groups allege relies on torture, coerced confessions, and draconian laws to silence opposition.
The 1992 National Security Act, with its vague definitions of ‘treasonable acts’ against the Tsa-Wa-Sum (King, Country, and People), has been a primary tool for suppressing political dissent, particularly from the Lhotshampa.
Overlooked by the international community and ignored by global powers including India, in responding robustly to the ethnic cleansing of the 1990s sent a clear message to Thimphu: such actions could be undertaken with impunity. The monarchy emerged unscathed, its reputation burnished rather than tarnished.&nbsp;
This historical impunity now echoes in the case of Raghu Pati Subedi and the <a href="https://www.cijnepal.org/new-list-of-political-prisoners-expected-to-set-off-discussion-on-bhutans-human-rights-record">continued imprisonment of dozens of political prisoners</a> of conscience. The global community’s reluctance to challenge the GNH narrative has, in effect, become a form of complicity.
The arrest and sentencing of a social media influencer demonstrates how old tactics have been adapted for the digital age. Subedi, 40, was a new kind of threat to the state-controlled narrative and he had to be made an example of.&nbsp;
As the founder and administrator of the popular Facebook page ‘The Don of Asia’, he bypassed traditional, state-influenced media to speak directly to about 78,000 followers. His content, informational and satirical videos on rural poverty, corruption, and the GMC project, was the kind of social media activism that was deemed intolerable.
Subedi was arrested in early 2025 and sentenced to 24 years in prison. The charges allegedly stemmed from Subedi’s social media criticism of the GMC, a flagship project of Nepal-born Bhutanese fifth King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck.&nbsp;
For <a href="https://thenewamericansmag.com/2024/11/18/the-kings-gelephu-mindfulness-city/#:~:text=Ganga%20Lamitare%2C%20who%20owns%20four,ancestors%20in%20building%20the%20nation.">Bhutanese refugees like Gangaram Lamitare</a>, the GMC represents a bitter irony, a development rising on their confiscated ancestral lands.&nbsp;
Gangaram, who owns four acres where the GMC’s international airport is now under construction, says: “Many people from villages fled at night in 1990, leaving everything behind to escape oppression. Now, the Bhutanese king and ministers are spreading falsehoods worldwide, calling this land vacant, which actually belongs to those forced to leave the country.”&nbsp;
There are signs that international support that has benefited Bhutan may be waning. The United Nations has become increasingly vocal and last year the <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/detention-wg/opinions/session101/a-hrc-wgad-60-2024-bhutan-advance-edited-ve.pdf">UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention</a> said the detention of several Bhutanese political prisoners was arbitrary and illegal under international law.&nbsp;
In April 2025 from a group of six UN human rights experts raised grave concerns about the use of torture, denial of fair trials, and the ‘severe chilling effect’ of Bhutan’s legal framework on civic space. These developments owe much to the consistent advocacy of the Hague-based Global Campaign for the Release of Political Prisoners in Bhutan (GCRPPB) since its formation.
However, they also reflect broader shifts in international human rights scrutiny. This places Bhutan’s key international partners, particularly the European Union, in a critical position. Bhutan enjoys lucrative benefits under the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ trade scheme, which grants developing countries tariff-free access to the EU market contingent on respect for human rights.&nbsp;
The EU is also a significant provider of development aid to Bhutan which provides it with substantial leverage. In April 2025, members of the <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/saskiabricmont.bsky.social/post/3lmrn5mkmrs2q">European Parliament formally called on Bhutan</a> to release all political prisoners. This action signals a growing recognition that trade and partnership cannot be divorced from human rights obligations.&nbsp;
“Bhutan’s international partners and investors, including the EU, should make it clear that they expect Bhutan to comply with its human rights obligations and release them without further delay,” says Meenakshi Ganguly, of Human Rights Watch.&nbsp;
Bhutan stands at a crossroads. Its desire for deeper global economic integration is colliding with its unresolved history of human rights abuses. The international community now has a choice: either continue being charmed by the myth of a happy shangri-la or insist that the kingdom adheres to democratic values it professes to the world.&nbsp;
Nepal’s recent Gen-Z uprising offers a lesson to Bhutan. In September, when authorities attempted to ban 26 social media, Nepali youth took to the streets and, within hours, toppled the entire pro-establishment political apparatus. Their message was clear: in an age of digital connectivity and mass mobilisation, authoritarian tactics such as detaining social media influencers are both unjust and ultimately unsustainable.
This incident echoes the prophetic warnings of Devi Bhakta Lamitare, Bhutan’s first-generation democratic leader, who died in exile in India in 2022. In his seminal 1970 book
Dankindo Bhutan, Lamitare chronicled the systematic suppression of people’s rights and envisioned a path toward liberation.
Before his death, I worked with him to update and edit this work, which the Bhutan Media Society published posthumously in 2023. In a December 2020 interview I conducted for the book on the Ganga riverbank in Haridwar, Lamitare laid out a stark three-front offensive: political mobilisation from within India to awaken resistance inside Bhutan itself, relentless pressure on New Delhi to champion democracy, and a global ‘pamphlet war’ waged by resettled Bhutanese in the West.&nbsp;
Only through such sustained action, he argues, can Bhutanese citizens win the right to choose their own rulers, a principle India, the world’s largest democracy, should be championing, not abandoning.
Binod Dhungel is the Nepal correspondent for Reporters Without Borders.
<a href="http://linkedin.com/in/dhungelbinod" target="_blank">linkedin.com/in/dhungelbinod</a>, @BinodDhungel

Bhutan imprisons social media influencer

Bihar shares a 600km open border with Nepal. Right along the Tarai, there are linguistic, cultural and family ties binding the two sides together. In some places the border cuts right through households and farmlands.
Unlike what happened in Uttar Pradesh where the BJP was soundly defeated in the 2024 elections by the INDIA alliance, in Bihar’s election this month the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that brought the BJP together with the Janata Dal (United) secured 200 of the 243 seats in the state assembly.
In Nepal, we make fun of politicians who want to become prime minister for the sixth time. But Nitish Kumar took his oath of office last week for the tenth time as chief minister in 20 years.
Also unlike Uttar Pradesh, the vote was not polarised along religious lines, signalling a deep transformation of Bihari society and the rising political consciousness of its voters.
The most important change must be the massive participation of women voters. Women did not merely make this election decisive, but altered its very character. A polyphonic social configuration emerged from this election that has broken away from entrenched caste-based vote banks of the past.
In 2006 during his previous tenure as chief minister, Nitish Kumar gave half the representation in local political units to women. Many people ridiculed it at first because there was a tendency for male politicians to bring in their wives to fill the quota.
Even if a woman won, in practice the husband called the shots. But over time competent women leaders emerged at the grassroots.&nbsp;
Just before this election, the Chief Minister Women Employment Campaign provided INR10,000 as the first instalment to 12 million potential women entrepreneurs. Once they start their own enterprises they get INR210,000.&nbsp;
Bicycles were distributed to girl students to improve their mobility, and sense of independence. Such schemes are helping to increase women’s leadership and self-reliance. Bihar’s youth and women are driving change.
Nitish Kumar also used federal investment to improve roads, bridges, electricity supply and irrigation across Bihar (“बिज्ली, सडक, पानी”). The transformation is dramatic for those of us who remember the time when roads on the Indian side of the border were much worse than the highways in Nepal.
CRONY POLITICS
Most of this change is in Patna and the main cities, but nearly 90% of Biharis live in villages. And despite these visible changes, Nitish Kumar has failed to bring about an improvement in the quality of education and healthcare. He has also used patronage with cronies to ensure his political longevity.
With 140 million people, Bihar makes up one-tenth of India’s population. But it is still the poorest state in India with an annual per capita income of $900 — one fourth of the country’s national average. Its main industry, just like in Nepal, is the export of manual labour to richer states in India and to the Gulf.
Bihar has had a chronic problem with kidnapping, and this affects Nepal because many criminals seek refuge on our side of the border.
There is a long tradition of rewarding not only corrupt politicians but also their criminal cronies. The criminalisation of politics and politicisation of crime has sustained Bihar’s economy.&nbsp;
The direct impact of this has always been on the state’s development. As <a href="http://xn--bihars%20economy%20has%20two%20special%20characteristics-xn09a.xn--%20first,%20bihars%20development%20is%20halted%20and,%20despite%20having%20potential,%20it%20lags%20other%20states-wn37e.%20second,%20one%20aspect%20of%20its%20backwardness%20is%20also%20that%20the%20people%20of%20bihar%20have%20lost%20hope%20that%20their%20state%20can%20rise%20in%20comparison%20with%20others%20-%20something%20the%20nitish%20kumar%20leadership%20has%20not%20been%20able%20to%20revive%20in%20the%20last%20twenty%20years.xn--%20here,%20the%20political%20business%20of%20sushashan%20(good%20governance)%20has%20flourished%20a%20lot,%20yet%20it%20remains%20trapped%20in%20the%20same%20fate%20of%20ruktapur-w459iof./" target="_blank">Shekhar Gupta of The Print</a> wrote this month in his column National Interest, one in ten Indians is ‘living a sub-sub-Saharan Africa quality of life’.
A culture of looting has been institutionalised, and the word ‘dacoit’ has entered the English lexicon. Nitish Kumar did crack down on crime, but the kidnapping mafia simply moved to a safer and more lucrative business to become contractors.&nbsp;
Large infrastructure projects are built with federal grants, but the budget is skimmed with politicians and their cronies dividing up the spoils. This must sound familiar to us in Nepal.
Bihar’s economy has grown, but it started out at a low base and the other states of India, especially in the south, have grown much faster — so the gap is widening. The very word ‘Bihar’ within India is synonymous with ‘poverty’ and ‘backwardness’.
This is ironic because Bihar is also where democracy was born, where Gandhi launched his satyagraha against the exploitation of indigo workers, where politicians like Jayaprakash Narayan made upliftment of the poorest his agenda.&nbsp;
The Buddha may have been born in Lumbini, but he preached and attained enlightenment in Bihar. Maoist Naxalites rose up against oppression by zamindars in rural Bihar.&nbsp;
Biharis are obsessed with politics, and the mediasphere is full of opinion and debate about various parties and candidates. But somehow politics has not delivered development.
Bihar’s economy has two special characteristics that are similar to Nepal. First, despite huge potential in terms of natural and human resources and the demographic dividend, development has lagged behind.
Second, Biharis, especially the youth, have lost hope that their state can rise up and catch up with the rest of India. The fact that a ten-time chief minister is back after being 20 years in politics provides even less prospect.&nbsp;
Although Bihar's railway network has seen progress, it lacks severely in its management and the joke there is that trains stop even at non-scheduled stations if passengers demand. Such stations even have a name: रुक्तापुर.
The train of Bihar’s development also keeps making unscheduled stops at रुक्तापुर.
Chandrakishore is a Birganj-based political commentator who writes this column BORDERLINES in Nepali Times. @kishore_chandra

Bihar’s elections and Nepal

Groundwater is like a phone battery, it needs to be regularly recharged. As springs go dry across the Himalayan foothills due to over-extraction and climate change, communities in eastern Nepal are reviving traditional knowledge to replenish aquifers. The town of Dhankuta is located along the spine of a ridge and is struggling with its water supply. Unregulated pumping is one reason, and weather extremes due to climate breakdown is the other. Since water is so important for life, necessity has become the mother of invention here. More accurately, it is the mother of re-invention — since recharging ground water is a traditional practice that has been discontinued. Communities are practicing sustainable water management again by reviving recharge ponds that had fallen into disuse as well as rainwater recycling. Some of these indigenous practices have eroded over time with outmigration and modernisation. The nearby village of Khambela is dominated by the indigenous Aathpahariya Rai community and is building on its ancestral practice of rainwater harvesting with new technology developed by the group, SmartPaani.&nbsp; Households collect rainwater during four monsoon months in tanks of up to 10,000 litres for household use and irrigating &nbsp;vegetable patches in the dry season.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251124031112_b48e18e9c85ed460210d475041dce6ba5917ab31db0a16aca2c8e0f0356c9038.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251124031112_b48e18e9c85ed460210d475041dce6ba5917ab31db0a16aca2c8e0f0356c9038" data-rendition-name="original" width="1125" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="Storing rain inside mountains NT"> </figure>  “The rainwater harvesting installation here uses a rapid sand filter system that allows rainwater to move rapidly through the builtin filtration unit,” says Jyotsna Lama from Kathmandu-based SmartPaani. “The clean water is stored in tanks for future use.” The initiative is supported by the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and local municipalities. Local households contribute Rs50 a month for maintenance. “During the rainy season there is enough water in the wells and springs,” says a local farmer Sangita Rai. “But storing monsoon rain is enough to last the whole dry season.” Dhankuta town itself has a recharge pond at Sukepokhari, which itself means ‘dry pond’. &nbsp;The 24m diameter pond can hold up to 200,000 litres and lets it seep slowly to recharge the aquifer. One in four springs in &nbsp;Dhankuta have dried up, and Sukepokhari is helping revive them.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251124031112_0db2a186eec5194d37492066e6d0b939569254e8feca6c6dd757d28147267b2f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20251124031112_0db2a186eec5194d37492066e6d0b939569254e8feca6c6dd757d28147267b2f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1125" loading="lazy" alt="Storing rain inside mountains NT"> <figcaption>Sukepokhari</figcaption> </figure>  The mountains around Dhankuta act like a sponge, absorbing water in the dry season and letting it out through springs. But water started becoming scarce when the town’s expanding population started pumping up water. Plastic waste and other pollutants contaminated the remaining water. Sukepokhari’s caretaker is Krishna Kumar Thakuri, fondly known as ‘Pani Ba’ by locals who regard him as a passionate father figure. He regularly monitors rainfall and the water level in the pond to gauge how much of it is seeping into the ground to recharge the groundwater.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025112403118_b412598c4473f2bb33900bab7e2084f584e7e88c1a92f6b9c09e940e23e4ce29.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2025112403118_b412598c4473f2bb33900bab7e2084f584e7e88c1a92f6b9c09e940e23e4ce29" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1475" loading="lazy" alt="Storing rain inside mountains NT"> <figcaption>Caretaker of Sukepokhari Krishna Kumar Thakuri fondly known as Pani Ba.</figcaption> </figure>  “We harvest rain that falls in the surrounding slopes,” explains Thakuri. “But a lot of leaves, vegetation and sediment also flows into the pond and has to be desilted every year.” The pond provides drinking water to around 150-200 households and enables irrigation to 10 households in surrounding areas. Water from the pond further flows and supports springs down the mountains.&nbsp; Off the walking trail is Dale Pokhari, another recharge pond in the scenic village of Dhojedanda. After the pond was revived two springs sprang back into life again, supplying water to six households. “There used to be multiple springs and water sources, and biodiversity was diverse, but as people started to dig up wells and drag water sources to their homes via plastic pipes, the water sources started drying up,” explains Phurba Sherpa. But now there is more water flowing out of springs.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251124031112_dd71cdc337f6275b179fdab9ded358a1dcdb53c5e286d493aa2182e3f35ce32e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20251124031112_dd71cdc337f6275b179fdab9ded358a1dcdb53c5e286d493aa2182e3f35ce32e" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1125" loading="lazy" alt="Storing rain inside mountains NT"> <figcaption>Dalepokhari</figcaption> </figure>  WATER IS LIFE Syaule-Sipting Homestay in Dhankuta has been using water sustainably after facing shortages. It has now built a bio-sand filtration system in the water tanks, so that water is safe for use by four households One of the homestays also uses a rainwater harvesting system. While the bio-sand and rainwater harvesting are used for cooking, washing and other purposes, table top filtration systems are used for drinking. Adequate safe drinking water is also helpful to revive the area’s eco-tourism potential. Safe drinking water is important so visitors are not turned off, says Anu K Lama of ICIMOD. She adds, “Health and hygiene are important for everyone. But foreigners do not have the strong immune system that locals have. Clean and adequate supply is necessary especially if we are targetting foreign guests.”

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