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Story of Nepali history

<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221108141116/636a57449c7e80680e0547d1jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1400" height="934"/><figcaption>Photo: BIKRAM RAI</figcaption></figure>As hundreds of thousands of Nepali youngsters leave the country in search of greener pastures, a trickle have started to return with the intention of contributing what they can for the country. Karma Tamang, 43, is one of them, recently moving base from Germany to Nepal after two decades in Europe.Tamang is soft spoken, articulate and highly educated, not traits one normally associates with Nepal’s politicians. But that is what she wants to be: her passion for politics has led her home, leaving behind a husband and two teenage children.Tamang’s father was a driver in Kavre, before the family shifted to Kathmandu for his four children. After completing high school from St Xavier’s College, a German friend helped Karma go to Germany for higher education in 1995.She graduated in computer science at the University of Kiel, the first person in her family to attain a degree. She married a German man in 2003, had two children and worked in an IT firm. One day, she decided to quit and return to Nepal to become a politician.Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepali-scientist-returns-to-pinpoint-hazards-of-dirty-air/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nepali scientist returns to pinpoint hazards of dirty air</a>, Sonia Awale“I always knew that I would come back to Nepal, that was a part of the deal with my husband,” Tamang tells us. “I would have returned earlier, but my children were young and there was a war going on. Now is the right time: the children can take care of themselves, I am at the peak of productivity in life, when I can give my best.”Tamang is busy renovating her house and looking for a school for the children. They have given their wholehearted support for their mother’s move. And she wants them to live in Nepal for a year before they decide where to go next.But why politics? Like many of her generation, Tamang felt disillusioned with governance failure in Nepal, and wanted to see politics here driven by values.“Mainstream political parties in Nepal have the right intention and ideologies, but the wrong approach,” she says. “We have democracy but we need to work to make it sustainable, with the right practical approach. We need to practise value-based politics. Empowerment of women and youth, and use of technology is central to this idea.”Read also: <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/editorial-alternative-current,3860" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Alternative current</a>, EditorialTamang joined the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Between-the-lines/Bibeksheel-Nepali-work-post-earthquake-nepal,490" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bibeksheel Nepali party</a> soon after it was founded in 2012 by a group of idealistic young Nepalis, offering an alternative to the established parties. She recruited members in Europe, and now wants to run for a post in the party’s central committee and eventually contest legislative elections. Tamang wants to ultimately work on IT policy in Parliament.<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/Not-this-dog-day,936" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bibeksheel Nepali did not win any seats</a> in the 2017 federal election and 2 of 110 seats in the provinces. But that does not deter Tamang: “The party has long-term vision, we dream of being in leadership in the next 15 years. For now, we want to make people more aware of work ethics, value-based politics, and management.”Tamang is now working on a PhD on non-violent movements and is unfazed about her lack of practical experience in Nepal and the prospect of confronting men entrenched in government. She says: “By now, we know that power corrupts. The Nepali people’s hopes for politics of values have been dashed by every party that has ruled. To avoid that, we need checks and balances, which will ensure that politicians and parties remain true to their ideals.”For someone who has lived outside Nepal for so long, Tamang speaks Nepali fluently and naturally, but she has picked up some European ways. She finds order and coordination missing in Nepal, specifically in politics. “I know it is going to be a big challenge for me. People here may expect me to work in the same laid-back style, but I am here to change things, even if it is difficult.”Read also: <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Connecting-dots/Nepali-needs-alternative-politics,966" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Influencing the influencers</a>, Dinkar Nepal

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Karma’s karma

May 2017 was a milestone in Nepal’s transition from a unitary system to a federal state, but a year since <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/page/political-power-of-the-ballot-local-elections-nepal" target="_blank" rel="noopener">locally elected representatives took office</a>, the process of devolution to sub-national governments has been slow. New administrative requirements have created confusion over the roles and responsibilities in the three tiers of government. Despite this, elected local governments remain determined to govern while managing public expectations to deliver campaign commitments. How well local leaders negotiate and handle pressures of unmet expectations will impact the political ecology of this transition, either leading to a favourable outcome or running the risk of failure.While the constitutional mandate is clear, competing roles and the absence of consistent political will have caused uncertainties to persist. Mechanisms designed to settle disputes between layers of government have not yet been fully utilised, leaving room for bitter contestation. The continuation of this policy and structural vacuum means that chief ministers, mayors and ward chiefs use decentralisation to negotiate for more power, while lacking knowledge and capacity to govern effectively.Conversely, the exercise of legislative powers at the sub-national level has led to a backlash, delimiting the actual authority given to local governments. The series of federal directives sent to elected local governments discouraging drafting of local legislation is proof of this.Meanwhile, priorities and needs have begun to expand and multiply, signaling an end to the honeymoon period for elected representatives. Local governments are now under increasing pressure to administer their responsibilities and provide essential services to constituents. Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/?p=13560&amp;preview=true" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Grassroots democracy is delivering development</a> <a style="background-color: #ffffff; font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/trial-error-democracy,3713" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Trial and error democracy</a>, Om Astha Rai Coalitions within local executives have fostered democratic practices in local governments in some areas. In others, conflict and collusion have plagued the system, chipping away at the quality of service delivery. There are conflicts of interest, nepotism, arbitrary decision-making and misappropriations of grants. There is an ongoing struggle to exercise autonomy as local governments attempt to establish new lines of power. A clear example is the recent controversy over the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/from-the-nepali-press/taxman-cometh/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">tax increase by provincial and local governments</a>, which want to assert their powers defined in Schedule 8 of the Constitution to raise revenue. With the current budget allocations insufficient to meet the mandate to govern, elected representatives are looking to other avenues. The taxes have created an uproar in the private sector, however, which is concerned about double taxation and misuse of power. Tax hikes ultimately affect the public, which has to bear the additional costs of goods and services. Although the Federal Parliament has directed the government to look into tax increases, the National Natural Resources Fiscal Commission (NNRFC) is yet to be formally established. Nonetheless, Nepal’s first <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/privatisation-failed-khatiwada/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">federal budget 2018-2019</a>, presented in May, represents a significant departure in budgeting and planning processes carried out under the previous unitary system. This important policy instrument illustrates priorities of the elected government and the decisions taken to fulfill constitutional responsibilities. More importantly, it now includes resource allocations to sub-national governments. For the first time, local assemblies took part in the formulation of budgeting and planning needs. Other important markers of progress include the completion of the Organisation &amp; Management (O&amp;M) Survey to recommend the necessary requirements of Federal and Provincial government civil service needs. The O&amp;M survey for local governments is ongoing and once finished, it will establish organisation structures and staffing needs for local governments not yet fully functional. However, to what extent this will restructure the bureaucracy to adopt a bottom-up approach to service the three-tiered federation remains to be seen. Read also: <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/political-cartel-trying-to-back-pedal-on-devolution,3813" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Devolution Revolution</a>, Editorial<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2017/08/01/federalism-in-jeopardy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Federalism in jeopardy</a>, Iain Payne and Binayak BasnyatThe merger of the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/one-body-two-heads/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">UCPN and UML</a> marked a significant milestone in political restructuring and consolidation of power across three levels of government. The realignment of political positions and interests signals a shift towards adaptation to a new architecture of a federal republic. Despite this, the current structure still exhibits and reinforces a patronage culture reminiscent of a unitary state. While a strong national majority government does provide significant benefits in terms of stability and decision-making power, the results of devolution will depend on the transformation of political parties. Institutional growth and reform are a prerequisite if there is to be a departure from the traditional decentralisation of the 1990s. This is critical to re-engineer accountability channels that were previously centralised and hierarchical.Elected representatives heading judicial committees are trying to meet the high expectations of their constituents on one hand, while navigating the complexities of deciding on a just result amid competing economic, social, political and legal forces on the other. This raises fears that the poor and marginalised will continue to be ostracised, politicisation and corruption will continue to persist, and access to justice will continue to be difficult. Having an elected representation in a federal system after two decades is a real opportunity to deepen and institutionalise democratic practice in the 753 local governments. Institutional arrangements between the multi-tiered forms of government will determine the relationships, which will have to endure as power struggles define the boundaries of shared rule and self-rule. State and non-state actors, which have little history of cooperation, and who are suspicious of each other, must forge new ways of working together. Read also: <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/The-gadfly/ensuring-proportional-representation-without-federalism,435" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Devolution without federalism</a>, David Seddon<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/share-rule-and-self-rule/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Shre rule and self rule</a>, George VargheseAshray Pande and Namit Wagley are Program Officers at the Asia Foundation in Kathmandu.The views and opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of The Asia Foundation or its funders.

Federalism's birth pangs or death rattle?

<img width="1400" height="1050" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221107161120/6369229f9c7e80680e03a13bjpeg.jpg" alt=""/>In the three decades after 1960 when political parties were banned, there were Village Panchayats. After the democratic changes in 1990, they were called Village Development Committees (VDCs) of which there were nearly 4,000 all over the country. In the new Constitution, VDCs have been merged into 460 Rural Municipalities (Gaunpalika).Whatever the name they go by, elected village councils in Nepal have been at the grassroots of democracy and development. After last year's elections, the new municipalities are asserting themselves.Dhan Bahadur Thapa Magar is 87, and old enough to remember the time he was elected to head the Village Panchayat of Chure village of Kailali in Province 7. He says: “There is now a lot more development budget than in the past. Combined with local surplus budget, villages can speed up their own development provided the budget is not misused.” VDCs used to get annual grants of Rs2 million for development from Kathmandu. Today, rural municipalities get up to Rs200 million and it includes three types of budgets provided by the central and provincial governments: conditional, lump-sum and matching funds. If the development budget of three former VDCs combined was Rs 6million, as a single rural municipality, it would now gets up to five times more.Read also: <a style="background-color: #ffffff; font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/?p=13549&amp;preview=true" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Federalism's Birth pangs or Death Rattle?</a><a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=6256#.W6N5VM4zbIU" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Devolution, not revolution</a>, Alok Bohara <img width="1400" height="1050" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221107161120/636922a29c7e80680e03a13cjpeg.jpg" alt="">“In my Gaupalika, in the last fiscal year, the total budget received was about Rs300 million. Of this, one third went into overheads,” says Hem Raj Joshi, Chief Administrative Office of Chure village. “The rest was development budget, and the municipality could not spend the conditional budget because it could not come up with specific projects.” The main challenge for village councils has been the lack of capacity for participatory development planning as demanded by constituents. Additionally, the inability to spend the allocated conditional development budget has made it difficult to allocate resources for health, education, energy, or for women or marginalised groups. “In my village, I set aside money for women’s income generation activities last fiscal year, and informed the women to make use of it by coming up with a project proposal, but did not get a single proposal,” says Urmila Thami KC of the Jugu Village. She is vice chair of Gaurishankar rural municipality in Dolakha district. The question now is: are local governments really equipped to deliver development?  “The people have to be active and make the local authorities accountable, and development will definitely happen,” says Dhan Bahadur Thapa Magar, the former Village Panchayat head. Read also: <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/guest-editorial/radio-sagarmatha-anniversary-resuscitating-democracy-guest-editorial,912" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Revolution through devolution</a>, Bharat Dutta Koirala<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/power-centre,4041" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Power Centre</a>, Om Astha RaiIn remote <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/from-nowhere-to-nowhere/?utm_source=rss&amp;utm_medium=rss" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Bajhang district</a> in western Nepal, there are still rural municipalities like Saipal where the nearest road head is two days walk away. On a recent flight from Dhangadi to Kathmandu, the chair of Saipal Rajendra Dhami said proudly: “With the development budget we got last fiscal year, we built two micro-hydros of 22 kilowatts, each which has electrified two wards in the municipality. We promised it to the people, and we delivered.”In the first fiscal year 2017/18 since rural municipality councils were elected, an estimated 90% of the budget has been spent on infrastructure, mainly roads. There have been media reports of the roads being the result of misuse of funds and corruption, but it is also true that people want roads and there is pressure on elected officials to deliver.“As farmers in remote gaupalika, we need roads and irrigation first,” says Jogendra Thakur in Sarlahi district of Province 2. Indeed, a road to Dalit communities in the village opened up the area to development and provided access to market. It is better than distributing a goat or sewing machine.Several generations of Nepalis have been made guinea pigs to test out development fads by donors, experts, scholars, NGOs and INGOS. Yet, after more than 60 years, there was still no clear path to development. Under federalism, however, locally elected officials have found a way to give citizens a voice in spelling out their priorities directly to elected officials. Finally, they can identify and demand the kind of development they need, and force elected officials to be accountable and deliver on promises. Read also: <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15160#.W6N5aM4zbIU" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Power to the people</a>, Mallika Aryal<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/GUEST-COLUMN/Syndicated,108" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Syndicated federation</a>, Bihari K Shresth

Grassroots democracy is delivering development

It was 30 years ago this month that investment into ‘Baby Arun’, the 201MW first phase of the run-of-river Arun III project, was brought to a screeching halt when the World Bank officially withdrew its support. This brought about profound and fundamental changes in the way Nepal’s power sector subsequently developed. Nepalis suffered debilitating power outages between 2008-2016 due to shortages attributable to the cancellation. At the same time, the gap left by Baby Arun was filled by private sector investment in ways that were not obvious in 1995. It took 30 years, but in many ways Nepal’s power sector is more healthy today than it has ever been, and likely better than if the project was built as planned. At a projected budget of $1.08 billion, Baby Arun would have cost the equivalent of Nepal’s entire annual government expenditure in 1995. It was to be funded by concessional grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral funders, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), KfW, and investment by the government itself. At the time, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity was only 230MW, and the trajectory of the power sector changed dramatically following the cancellation. In the past 30 years, $5.4 billion has been invested in the power sector led by private investors, and much of it from domestic banks and pension funds (table, right).  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0" data-rendition-name="original" width="984" height="521" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Nearly 70% of the new megawatts generated were by private independent power producers (IPP) in the past 30 years, while the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and its subsidiary companies added 30% of new capacity. Almost 80% of total debt financing came from domestic banks and employee retirement funds. International assistance for power generation dropped dramatically over this time, accounting for only about 15% of investment. Before 1995 new power projects used to be entirely dependent on foreign aid. Since 1995, 63% of new generation came from 171 small hydropower projects with an average capacity of 12MW, while 4% was from 21 solar photovoltaic and biomass projects developed by local IPPs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097" data-rendition-name="original" width="988" height="503" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Over three decades, investment in Nepal’s power supply came primarily from new actors that had never before been involved in this sector. The rate of electrification rose from 10% to close to 100% -- sufficient to meet domestic needs during most of the year, and in 2024 made Nepal a net exporter of power to India for the first time in its history. As practically all the new investment in this period went into run-of-river hydro and solar projects, rather than into hydropower reservoirs with seasonal storage, Nepal continues to rely on imports from India during the dry winter months. Surplus electricity generation for export during the monsoon is slated to grow rapidly as another 200 solar and hydro projects are nearing completion of construction, with over 5,000MW of power capacity. Private Power The cancellation of Baby Arun inadvertently accelerated the entry of the private sector into Nepal’s power generation. The government enacted the Electricity Act in 1992 to attract private IPPs and diversify away from total dependence from international aid, but had been struggling for several years to conclude the first agreement with the 60MW Khimti Project. There remained a large gap between the tariff that the government thought was reasonable versus what was demanded by the Norwegian investor Statkraft, and the private sector arms of the World Bank and ADB that were financing the project. The shock of World Bank withdrawal from Baby Arun put tremendous pressure on the government, then led by the UML as it is now. The Bank’s decision to terminate its involvement was ostensibly, at least partially, taken in response to a letter critiquing the project sent by the UML while it was in the opposition.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347" data-rendition-name="original" width="949" height="446" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>BAD NEWS: Newspaper clippings from the early 90s on tender announcement ahead of loan approval (left) and secrecy surrounding environmental assessment (centre) of Arun III before its eventual cancellation in August 1995.</figcaption> </figure>  The government was forced to soften its position and agree to the investors’ terms following the cancellation of Baby Arun. It directed NEA to sign a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Khimti. It was concluded in January 1996, and this was followed by a second PPA in July 1996 with Panda Energy, the American developer of the 45MW Upper Bhotekosi project. The expensive USD-denominated agreements to buy power from two international private producers, with price escalation clauses tied to the New York Consumer Price Index, sent alarm bells ringing. There was worry that the country was heading towards unaffordable tariff rates for the consumer and potential bankruptcy for NEA as a result of inevitable future weakening of the Nepali Rupee. The government had strong-armed NEA into signing these agreements, and realised that concessionary financing terms that Nepal was used to receiving for public sector projects such as Baby Arun and Kali Gandaki A, that included below-market interest rates and 40 years repayment period with a 10 year grace period before starting repayment, were not the norm for private sector investors. Nepal’s status as a less than attractive destination for foreign investment meant that the country had few options but to accept expensive dollar PPAs from international developers with the high commercial interest rates and short repayment periods imposed by their banks because of high investment risks. In the end, the government ended up having to additionally provide a sovereign guarantee in order to close the deal at the insistence of the lenders – committing it to repayment in case NEA defaulted on paying the IPPs. It is reasonable to assume that the extraordinarily high political cost of agreeing to the PPA terms would have meant that no government would have willingly agreed to them in 1995 had it not suffered the trauma of the loss of concessionary-financed public sector projects as large as the Baby Arun. It has taken NEA 25 years to consider offering dollar-denominated PPAs again: to cover the foreign exchange portion of the investment in the 216MW Upper Trisuli-1 and 120MW Rasuwa-Bhotekosi Hydropower projects. It seemed unlikely at the time, but it turned out that the dire situation Nepal found itself in 1995 planted the seed to mobilise investment for affordable power from within the country. Double Whammy After the dual shock of first losing investment in Baby Arun and having to sign expensive power purchase agreements with international IPPs, the first proposal for an alternative strategy to mitigate the risk of foreign currency investment into hydropower projects came from a group of engineers within the Arun III team at NEA. Led by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4900">Deputy Director Damber Bahadur Nepali,</a> engineers convinced the leadership that NEA needed to invest in a subsidiary company to build a series of locally-designed and domestically-financed projects that would have lower cost with rupee-denominated PPAs. They registered the Chilime Hydropower Company Limited (CHCL) in October 1995 with 51% shares from NEA, 25% from its employees, and 24% available for the general public, 10% of which was prioritised for local residents at the project site. The 22.1MW project is in Rasuwa on a tributary of the Trisuli, and mobilised debt financing from the Employee Provident Fund, which manages retirement savings for employees of the government, public enterprises, and private sector institutions. CHCL’s experience showed that NEA employees themselves believed that individual hydropower projects with operational independence from NEA could be developed profitably in Nepal by its own engineers -- and they were willing to put their own money on the line. Chilime also demonstrated that there was money in the country, particularly with retirement funds, looking for opportunities for long-term investments. Following completion of Chilime in 2003, CHCL led the formation of three other NEA subsidiary companies that completed construction in 2023 and 2024, producing 168.3MW using fully rupee-tied investment. NEA’s largest subsidiary, the Upper Tamakosi Hydropower Limited, completed construction of its 456MW plant in 2021.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3" data-rendition-name="original" width="3000" height="1571" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>DAMNED: The $700 million 456MW Upper Tamakosi built entirely with domestic funds before it was destroyed by the September floods last year. </figcaption> </figure>  There were some delays and cost overruns on this run-of-river project, the largest in the country with a final cost of over $700 million -- all of it sourced domestically. The five subsidiary companies launched by NEA have produced almost two times as much new power as NEA has over the past 30 years. Seven other NEA subsidiaries are currently constructing projects to add another 474MW to the national grid. But even more important than NEA subsidiaries have been local IPPs: Nepali companies which have over the past three decades enthusiastically entered the hydropower sector. From a regulatory perspective, the credit for mobilising domestic private investment to engage in power generation goes to Minister of Water Resources Shailaja Acharya, who in 1998 offered a flat feed-in-tariff of Rs4/kWh for hydropower projects under 10MW. This upfront offer removed a major barrier that early developers had faced of having to spend money to carry out a detailed feasibility study before they could even start tariff negotiations with NEA. She had laid the foundation stone of the Chilime project, and proved to be the champion of opening up the sector for domestic IPPs. The guarantee of a PPA with a fixed tariff, irrespective of project specifications, gave small power developers the confidence to apply for survey licenses and invest in feasibility studies so they could directly approach commercial banks and make a case for their project producing required revenue to repay loans. Domestic IPPs started adding power to the national grid in 2002. Their contribution was initially modest, and first projects were small and commercial lenders who took time to be confident about providing debt financing to a sector which had previously not been considered suitable for private sector investment. While the first 10 years were slow, with less than 10MW being added to the grid each year, this increased twenty fold over the following ten years, resulting in the equivalent of a Baby Arun being added by Nepali IPPs to the grid each year. A total of 84 IPPs added 232MW, 328 MW, 454MW, and 400MW of new generation to the grid in 2021-2024 (graph). There was explosive, exponential growth as domestic developers have surged ahead to account for 76% of the new megawatts added to the grid since 2020, compared to 24% by NEA and its subsidiary companies. The megawatts that IPPs are adding have followed the classic ‘hockey stick curve’ with the ‘breakout point’, signaling the rapid growth phase in 2020. Private producers are expected to accelerate new generation in the coming years with 300 solar and hydropower projects adding 11,000MW. Another 166 hydropower and 96 solar projects are currently in the survey stage, and are in line to add another 11,000MW to the construction pipeline. One major challenge is finding financing required for the projects. Domestic investment will no longer be sufficient to finance this ambitious pipeline of renewable energy projects. Project developers as well as NEA and the Electricity Regulatory Commission will have to leverage their substantial experience accumulated through the construction of over 200 projects to attract regional and international investment and hedge the risks of dollar-denominated PPAs. Following the cancellation of Baby Arun, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Nepal developed a highly distributed power sector</a>. The national electricity grid is currently supplied with power from a remarkably decentralised array of hundreds of hydropower and solar photovoltaic projects spread across 43 districts and all seven provinces.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1228" height="867" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  This presents a sharp contrast to the pathway of a few large public sector hydropower projects with a sprinkling of private sector projects that was envisioned as part of NEA’s investment planning when Baby Arun was being considered the front runner for investment. The strategy then was to allow public sector investment in a few large hydropower projects with thermal plants to fill the gap. Knowing what we know now about acceleration of climate change impacts and increased extreme weather events, following this path would have made Nepal’s power sector highly vulnerable. Decentralised generation greatly improves the resilience of Nepal’s power supply as damage to power plants in one part of the country need not affect other areas that have their own generation. Following the investment plan where over two thirds of the country’s power supply would have come from power plants on the Arun River, would have greatly imperiled Nepal’s energy security. All rivers in Nepal are susceptible to flooding from cloudbursts made more frequent by climate change. The Arun River which is fed by glaciers in Tibet is also at risk to glacial lake outburst floods. Bikash Pandey is Director of Clean Energy and Circular Economy at Winrock International. People Power is his regular column in Nepali Times on global energy issues relevant to Nepal. <h2>Decentralised and Diversified</h2> In the 30 years since the cancellation of ‘Baby Arun’: Hydropower projects constructed cover capacities ranging from less than 1MW to 456MW and developed by IPPs from across the country with strong local involvement in purchasing equity shares. Renewable energy sources contributed to the generation mix through solar IPPs that further contribute to climate resilience, and cover shortfalls during low rainfall. The government is committed to solar contributing 10% of the power on the grid. Increasing solar beyond this target and providing incentives to project developers to invest in utility-scale battery storage would further improve resilience. BIG ARUN: The 900MW Arun III project under construction since 2018 at Num in Sankhuwasabha (pictured, below) is a separate initiative by a different project developer using a different financing modality. The ‘Baby Arun’ version of Arun III was cancelled in 1995.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1312" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> </figure>

30 years after Baby Arun

It cannot be a coincidence that after pushing bills to constrict freedom of expression and allow greater <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/security-or-espionage">surveillance of citizens</a>, Nepal’s government is now tightening controls on civil society.
In a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/command-and-control">series of recent moves</a> journalists have been sued for contempt of court, imprisoned for YouTube videos, or ordered by courts to desist from investigating corrupt officials.
An amendment to the Print and Publications Act that would hand the power to shut online media to the Chief District Officer (CDO). Another draft Bill would allow a political appointee to head a new Media Council with the power to revoke a journalist’s license. The draft counter-intelligence Bill would let random officials to arbitrarily tap phones, read emails and trail citizens.
Now comes yet another draft Bill that would replace the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=10675">Social Welfare Council (SWC)</a> with direct government control over registration, regulation, and management of non-governmental organisations, nonprofits and charities. There are more than 54,000 NGOs, 200 international NGOs registered with the SWC.
The draft makes civil society organisations needlessly jump through hoops to carry out work that complements the government in the social sector. Critics say the Bill was drafted without any consultation with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/nepal-s-rights-groups-must-step-up-4r4z6ck4">civic groups</a>.
“This Bill’s content is questionable whether it intends to allow for civil society organisations in Nepal a free space to operate,” concludes Dr SP Kalaunee, Country Representative of BlinkNow Foundation and Chair of the Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN). “The draft seems oriented towards controling rather than facilitating the work of civil society organisations.”
The Bill will be open for feedback from the public, and integrates the National Directives Act (1961), Association Registration Act (1977), and the Social Welfare Act (1992) and proposes dissolving the SWC and replacing it with a new Social Welfare Department under the Ministry of Women, Children and Senior Citizens.
Non-government groups will now be required to get approval from the Registrar Office, the CDO or the provincial government depending on their area of operation. Those working across provinces will have to get permission from the federal government. &nbsp;
The government says the Bill is intended to vet organisations to see if they are engaged in espionage, violate national security, assist a foreign state, commit treason, cause strife between federal units, or incite communal violence.&nbsp;
CSOs working in Nepal have long called for legislation to better facilitate their work, minimise administrative and bureaucratic red tape which have posed operational challenges. But they are opposed to such drastic control.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-crow-and-the-scarecrow">The crow and the scarecrow</a>, Om Astha Rai
The NGO Federation of Nepal also issued a statement this week calling the Bill ‘retrograde and cumbersome’. It added: ‘Most of its provisions are intended to further constrain and control civil society organisations rather than facilitate and strengthen them, and reduce the role of citizen participation … it is an attack on our civil liberties, inclusivity, and transparency, and curtails our <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=5156">democratic values and constitutional rights</a>.’ &nbsp;
<a href="about:blank">Nepal’s graduation</a> from least-developed country status next year may mean less aid for Nepal, and higher interest rates on loans from multilateral creditors. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal">closure of USAID </a>and reduction in bilateral grants means the work of INGOs will be even more vital – especially to meet its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/target-2030-for-maternal-and-newborn-health">SDG targets by 2030</a>.&nbsp;
“We are competing with other countries at a time when the global aid environment is shrinking, so the support we receive is directly dependent on a conducive environment for INGOs to operate and function,” says Kalaunee. “INGOs follow regulations of the nations they operate in, they will not protest or wait around for governments to change their minds or policies.”
Social safety net
Since 1977, the work of non-governmental actors in Nepal has been regulated by the Social Service National Coordination Council (SSNCC) chaired by Queen Aishwarya.
After the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/one-moment-30-years-ago-today">1990 People’s Movement</a>, King Birendra set up the Social Welfare Council (SWC) as an autonomous body in 1992 through the Social Welfare Act. But since then the SWC has been dogged by controversy and allegations of corruption and extortion.
In 2018, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a Rs315 million corruption case against 14 individuals, including the Minister of Women, Children and Social Welfare and SWC chair Badri Prasad Neupane and other officials for violating public procurement laws to rent out three hectares of its property around Bhrikuti Mandap.
Civil society groups have for years called for reforms in the SWC, and a report was drawn up to restructure it before this Bill proposed its dissolution. INGOs in particular will now have to go through the Social Welfare Department and multiple ministries for permissions.
A particularly objectionable provision in the draft stipulates that NGOs must have a Board of Director made up almost entirely of secretaries of various ministries. The NGO Federation has urged the government to take a civil society-friendly approach and not tangle its work in red tape and control. It says the government has no option but to revise the bill in its current form.
“Civil society organisations need an open space to operate, and an autonomous body to oversee them,” says Kalaunee. “Non-government organisations support in the areas prioritised by the government but by definition they cannot be a part of government.”

Big, beautiful Bills

An average Nepali could live 3.3 years longer if air pollution is reduced to meet the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline, according the annual <a href="https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/">Air Quality Life Index</a> 2025 published this week. The annual average concentration of tiny suspended particles in the air (PM2.5) in Nepal in 2023 was 38.3 μg/m3, nearly eight times the WHO standard, and 10% higher than 2022. Thirty years ago, air pollution in Nepal was half the current levels. WHO says particulate concentration above 5μg/m3 &nbsp;is<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-invisible-is-more-dangerous"> hazardous to health</a>.&nbsp; The most <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/why-is-the-air-in-bhaktapur-so-bad">polluted parts of Nepal</a> are along the Indian border in Rutahat, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Parsa and Bara districts in Madhes Povince where average life expectancy is reduced by as much as 5.3 years.&nbsp; People in Sarlahi, Siraha, Saptari, Morang, Sunsari, Rupandehi and Jhapa are also dying at least 4 years earlier. The Air Quality Index 2025 report which is published annually by the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, says the figure is relatively lower for Kathmandu and Lalitpur at 2.6 and 2.4 years. After the Madhes, Kosi and Lumbini Provinces are the most polluted — especially in towns along industrial corridors and near the border. Karnali Province was by far the cleanest, followed by Sudurpaschim. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/epicentre-of-pollution">Epicentre of pollution</a>, Sonia Awale  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250828060856_136770cc84e114e8993af82e6a682c45d9458060e4ecf45f18e9f210673e1279.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250828060856_136770cc84e114e8993af82e6a682c45d9458060e4ecf45f18e9f210673e1279" data-rendition-name="original" width="753" height="584" loading="lazy" alt="AQLI map"> <figcaption>Potential gain in life expectancy from permanently reducing PM2.5 from 2023 concentration to the WHO guideline.</figcaption> </figure>  Air pollution is now the leading external<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/cleaner-air-longer-lives-0z0okfeu"> threat to life expectancy in Nepal</a>, exceeding both tobacco and diet-related risks, which reduced average lifespans of Nepalis by 1.9 years and 1.3 years respectively. The Air Quality Management Action Plan for Kathmandu Valley introduced in 2017 had identified vehicular emissions, brick kilns, and construction as the most polluting. It adopted measures to strengthen air quality monitoring, develop emissions inventory, and conduct impact assessments. Other major sources of emissions in Nepal include <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/no-smoke-without-fire-p7vb9dcj">forest fires</a>, crop residue and garbage burning as well as transboundary pollution from India and Pakistan. The report says India is the world’s most polluted country with the particulate concentration in 2023 at 41 μg/m3, an average resident in India could live 3.5 years longer if pollution levels were brought down to meet the WHO guideline. Residents of New Delhi on average would live 8.2 years longer if they breathed clean air. South Asia has some of the world’s most polluted cities. On some winter days, Kathmandu records the worst air quality in the world. In 2023, PM2.5 concentrations in South Asia declined by 9.6% between 2021 and 2022 due to lockdowns during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. ‘After a dip in 2022, particulate pollution in South Asia increased by 2.8% in 2023 — though it remained 7% lower than in 2021,’ <a href="https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/report/annual-update-2025">states the report</a>. ‘In the region’s most polluted countries, particulate pollution’s impact on life expectancy is nearly twice that of childhood, and maternal malnutrition and more than five times that of unsafe water, sanitation and handwashing.’ Elsewhere, unprecedented wildfires caused particulate concentrations to rise to levels not seen since 2011 in the United States and since 1998 in Canada. China also registered a decline in air quality, an increase of 2.8% in particulate pollution in 2023 relative to 2022, the first in a decade since the start of its ‘War on Pollution’ in 2014.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250828060856_94860b929d0fb161220ad72ecb76fcd29ba8e306bd6b844485a4171dadb6bb47.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250828060856_94860b929d0fb161220ad72ecb76fcd29ba8e306bd6b844485a4171dadb6bb47" data-rendition-name="original" width="754" height="501" loading="lazy" alt="AQLI line graph"> <figcaption>Annual average PM2.5 concentration in Nepal from 1998-2023.</figcaption> </figure>  Globally, the PM2.5 concentration in 2023 was 1.5% higher than in 2022, and nearly 5 times the WHO guideline. If global particulate pollution were permanently reduced to meet this guideline, an average person around the world would gain 1.9 years of life, adding 15.1 billion total life years to the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-future-is-older">global population</a>, the report adds. ‘Particulate pollution remained the greatest external threat to human life expectancy in 2023, with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/air-pollution-is-more-dangerous-than-smoking">its impact comparable to smoking</a> and surpassing other major health risks,’ the report says. ‘Its toll on life expectancy is more than 4 times that of alcohol use, 5 times that of transport injuries or unsafe water, sanitation, and handwashing, and more than 6 times that of HIV/AIDS.’ The report also highlights the need for open data, and says that accessible air quality information has translated into reduced particulate concentrations and gains in life expectancy in the United States, China, and Poland. Besides data, the report says, investment in monitoring and other air quality management infrastructure must be matched by political will, ambitious policies, capacity building, and sustained enforcement.

Warning: breathing is hazardous to health

This is the 72nd episode of Diaspora Diaries, a Nepali Times series in collaboration with Migration Lab providing a platform to share experiences of living, working and studying abroad. My father ran a store and that is where I spent all my time till Grade 6. Doing my homework. Serving customers. I then moved to my maternal grandparents’ house because I used to get along with my cousin who was a year older than me. We did everything together, and were best friends. We took turns studying: I was a night owl, and he was an early riser. Before I went to bed after studying all night, I woke him up. My mother was 44 when I was born, the same year my eldest brother got married. My sister-in-law becoming a part of our family was how my mother referenced my age. I liked making money, and was always a hustler. In Grade 7, I learnt to handle a tractor and helped my brother-in-law to plough, earning Rs10 a day. As I got better, he paid me more. By Grade 9, I was already making Rs500 per day, but had to slow down to prepare for my exams. From an early age I knew I did not want a 9-5 job. There just wasn’t enough money in it. I wanted to get into business, and compared my brother who worked in the post office and what businessmen made. It did not help that my brother was honest, and never took bribes. A friend and I made money selling cheap Chinese phones at a premium to our friends. We blasted music on the phones and pretended that we were giving them a discount. After SLC, I started teaching math and other subjects. I was soon a shareholder in the same school and in the evening I was involved in our family’s floriculture business, growing amaranth and marigold for garlands.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4" data-rendition-name="original" width="955" height="1314" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  It was then that a friend suggested we learn the Korean language. We could be earning significantly higher in Korea for similar efforts. I had no plans to go abroad but he convinced me. I did not know anything about Korea, and was scolded at the language institute when I asked someone to point Korea on the map.&nbsp; It was only there that I learnt you had to pass an exam for the Korean Employment Permit System (EPS), and pay for language classes. After a week, I decided it was not for me and dropped out. But my friend convinced me to give it one more try. I did not prepare much for the exam, and it was no surprise that I failed. But it was just by one mark, and people would pity me for failing “just by one mark”. It was a brand of failure. It hurt my ego. I had to turn things around by taking the exams seriously, and locked myself up to study hard.&nbsp; Even when we had visitors, my wife told them I was not home. If I was not in my room learning Korean, I would be with a group of ten of us test-takers comparing notes and practicing late into the night. The exam was difficult, but this time I passed, the only one in my group who did.&nbsp; As someone who never liked the idea of doing a job, I still had my doubts about going to Korea. It did not help that one of my acquaintances had returned a month after he had left, and he discouraged me from migrating given that I was already making good money in Nepal.&nbsp; But my wife suggested that I give it a shot since I had worked so hard for it. And if it really turned out not to be my cup of tea, I could always return. What did I have to lose, I thought, at least I would get to visit Korea. My job there was in an electrical company that made circuit boards. I worked all day, earned good money. In the evenings, I kept myself busy with my real estate business back in Nepal. I had learnt the tricks of the trade from fellow real estate agents back home, but at the time did not have the capital to invest.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  In Korea, it helped that I had salary records that allowed me to get loans from financial institutions both in Korea and in Nepal. Ultimately, I started earning more from my real estate deals in Nepal than from my job in Korea. This was all thanks to my ability to take loans because of the EPS scheme. My wife has been managing the flower business while I was away. My finances grew stronger over the eight years I was in Korea. I paid off the loans that I had borrowed to buy land. But real estate did not satisfy me entirely. I wondered: what is my brand? What will I be known for? What is my contribution to society? Real estate is for wealth, but that is about it. I needed to sell one piece of land and use the revenue to start a venture. I took classes in business, and returned to Nepal six months ago and got back to my family’s ancestral roots in floriculture. In Nepal too, I am continuing the entrepreneurship training I had started in Korea with the Bridge International. Such exposure helps us reflect on our business such as our branding, vision, and proactive aspects like the importance of strong recordkeeping.&nbsp; I am now working to upgrade and expand my floriculture business. With a friend who is still in Korea I am building a cooling room to increase the shelf-life of flowers and other produce and set up a market in my village where others can sell their produce. Floriculture is our primary business, but it is seasonal and earns good money only during festivals like Tihar.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  So, I grow tomatoes to ensure year-round earnings. I also am engaged in other businesses like real estate and online shopping. I work round the clock in Nepal — a strong work ethic is something I picked up in Korea.&nbsp; My Korean bosses would work alongside us, that motivated us. I work just as hard in Nepal as I did in Korea. People here often ask me why I am pushing myself so hard. But making garlands comes easy to me, it is work my forebears were involved in. My childhood memories are about plucking flowers with my sister. I have a comparative advantage in this work. It comes naturally to me, it is easy and I enjoy it. And sometimes, if there are too many garlands to make, I can multitask while holding meetings. My fingers just fly. I am good at this job, but my wife is even better and faster.&nbsp; When there is too much load, we can also outsource the work. To be known as the flower guy would be great personal branding. The मखमली guy. Or the सयपत्री guy. I decided to come home for just this with a one-way ticket. “अब पासा: जाँदैन ल्हासा!” &nbsp;

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