In 2025, two seemingly disconnected acts of violence shattered the illusion of stability in the region. In March, <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/16f7f947-1e96-4206-9844-891378adc683" target="_blank">militants hijacked a passenger train</a> near the Bolan Pass in Balochistan, executing soldiers in cold blood. A month later, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/22/world/asia/kashmir-terrorist-attack.html" target="_blank">gunmen in Kashmir’s</a> Pahalgam Valley massacred tourists. 
In both Islamabad and New Delhi, <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/25/were-cursed-kashmiris-under-attack-across-india-after-pahalgam-killings" target="_blank">the reaction was reflexive:</a> condemn the violence, <a href="https://www.economist.com/asia/2025/04/22/india-and-pakistan-could-come-to-blows-over-kashmir" target="_blank">blame external enemies</a>, declare the situation contained. But South Asia’s leaders are not fighting terrorists alone. They are fighting the consequences of their own betrayals.
Across <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26272897" target="_blank">Balochistan</a>, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11693674" target="_blank">Kashmir</a>, <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/india/346-finding-way-out-festering-conflict-indias-manipur" target="_blank">Manipur</a>, and beyond, decades of <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/projects/enforced-disappearance-in-south-asia/" target="_blank">enforced disappearances</a>, broken promises, and brute militarisation have hollowed out the social contracts meant to hold these nations together. The grievances that drove rebellions from the 1940s through the 1990s – demands for dignity, recognition, and political agency – were never meaningfully addressed. They were buried beneath asphalt and propaganda, paved over by development projects and security checkpoints.
States may claim victory. But their victories are mirages, dissolving the moment anyone looks too closely. South Asia’s unfinished wars are not relics of a violent past. They are live ammunition, loaded into the future.
<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/24/he-only-wanted-revenge-the-bloody-insurgency-in-balochistan-gaining-lethal-momentum" target="_blank">Balochistan</a> has been at war with Pakistan for most of its modern history. Rich in gas, minerals, and coastline, the province has been plundered for decades under the language of national development. 
Projects like the <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/11/26/pakistans-three-evils-cpec-and-good-governance/" target="_blank">China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)</a> promise progress but deliver exclusion: minerals are mined, ports are secured, but Baloch homes are raided. 
The insurgency endures not because of foreign conspiracies, as Islamabad endlessly insists, but because the Pakistani state remains incapable of seeing its <a href="https://thebalochistanpost.net/2025/01/enforced-disappearances-in-balochistan-in-december-2024-tbp-report/" target="_blank">Baloch citizens</a> as anything other than a security problem to be managed.
In <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/ranisingh/2016/07/12/kashmir-in-the-worlds-most-militarized-zone-violence-after-years-of-comparative-calm/" target="_blank">Kashmir</a>, the Indian government claims to have <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/08/world/asia/kashmir-village-defense-committees.html" target="_blank">“normalised” the valley</a> after revoking its autonomy in 2019. It <a href="https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan" target="_blank">looks a lot like occupation</a>. Soldiers outnumber local leaders, dissent is criminalised, internet shutdowns suffocate public life. Tourism campaigns and investment summits cannot erase a generation raised under curfew and surveillance.
<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66260730" target="_blank">Manipur’s descent into ethnic bloodshed</a> in 2023 exposed another fault line Delhi prefers to ignore. Long-simmering tensions between the Meitei and Kuki communities erupted into violence that shattered any illusions of northeastern integration. The central government’s delayed, politicised response made clear what many Manipuris had always suspected: they are citizens of India only when convenient.
Even the <a href="https://msf.org.au/rohingya-worlds-largest-stateless-population" target="_blank">Rohingya, stateless and exiled from Myanmar</a>, find themselves entangled in South Asia’s ethnonationalist calculus. Fleeing genocide, they are criminalised anew in Bangladesh and India – trapped between the countries that reject them and the memories that refuse to let them go.
South Asia’s states have excelled at suppressing rebellion. But failed at extinguishing the reasons rebellions rise in the first place. And the wars South Asia tries to forget at home have found new life abroad.
Across <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-06-17/modis-indian-government-accused-of-spying-silencing-critics/103974414" target="_blank">Canada, Australia, Britain, and the United States</a>, diasporic communities have become memory-keepers and, increasingly, <a href="https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/khalistan-supporters-hold-protest-outside-indian-consulate-in-vancouver-123092600087_1.html" target="_blank">the agitators</a> for the struggles their home states would rather erase.
Khalistan flags fly outside Indian consulates in Vancouver and <a href="https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/punjab/perturbed-over-waving-of-khalistani-flags-at-an-event-in-melbourne-india-warns-australia-of-khalistan-separatists-and-their-links-with-terror-groups-458320/" target="_blank">Melbourne</a>. Tamil activists march through London, demanding accountability for the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/19/grim-reminder-sri-lankas-tamils-mark-15-years-since-end-of-civil-war" target="_blank">massacres in Mullivaikkal</a>. Kashmiri protests in Washington and New York refuse to let India’s crackdown slip into diplomatic amnesia.
For host countries, these movements pose uncomfortable questions. Freedom of expression collides with fears of extremism. Clashes erupt between communities carrying wounds that their new homelands.
Meanwhile, South Asian states pursue their adversaries across borders. India faces allegations of <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/canada-says-india-home-minister-ordered-campaign-against-sikh-activist-rcna177972" target="_blank">targeting Sikh activists for assassination in Canada</a> and the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/10/27/g-s1-29561/sikh-separatist-assassination-india" target="_blank">United States</a>. Pakistan continues to court Kashmiri separatists abroad while crushing Baloch dissent at home. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/sri-lanka-tamils-civil-war-dead-5b372b0bba567837c5a4d94250040e7d" target="_blank">Sri Lanka</a> lobbies furiously to brand Tamil diaspora organisations as fronts for terrorism, even as it stonewalls investigations into its own wartime atrocities.
The old insurgencies have not been defeated. They have been globalised. South Asia’s governments have long mistaken silence for stability.
In Punjab, India broke the back of the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/06/india/india-canada-sikh-khalistan-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html" target="_blank">Khalistan insurgency</a> through brute force. The fields grew green again, the trains ran on time. But the wounds were never closed, the <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/why-is-indias-khalistan-separatist-movement-on-the-rise/a-65081729" target="_blank">movement’s heart beats</a> not in Amritsar but in Brampton and Surrey.
In Sri Lanka, the <a href="https://www.academia.edu/4738983/The_Man_Who_Destroyed_Eelam" target="_blank">military crushed the Tamil Tigers</a> with <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/17/death-of-the-tiger" target="_blank">overwhelming brutality in 2009</a>. <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3264148/we-want-our-children-back-sri-lankan-families-still-demanding-justice-their-missing-loved-ones" target="_blank">Tamil families still search for their missing</a>, still mourn their dead – and still organise across the diaspora for justice that remains undelivered.
In Kashmir, Delhi boasts of new <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/2/4/kashmir-is-bleeding-its-economy" target="_blank">highways and investment corridors</a>, showcasing the region as a trophy of unity. But when the visitors leave and the cameras are packed away, <a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-134/from-domicile-to-dominion-indias-settler-colonial-agenda-in-kashmir/" target="_blank">the checkpoints, the raids, and the quiet despair remain.</a>
Victory parades fade. Grievance endures. Suppressing insurgency may end battles. It does not end the ideas that fueled them. In a region where <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/world/asia/kashmir-attack-india-pakistan.html" target="_blank">history is rarely past</a>, and memory is rarely voluntary, states that rule through repression are only ever buying time. And often, not very much.
South Asia’s unfinished wars are not accidents. They are the inevitable consequences of states that confuse conquest with consent, and erasure with reconciliation. They cannot legislate memory out of existence.
Every <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c15qyyzz89lo" target="_blank">disappeared son in Balochistan</a>, every <a href="https://medium.com/the-wvoice/the-half-widows-in-kashmir-fef80c6b88e9" target="_blank">half-widow in Kashmir</a>, every <a href="https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/focus/rohingya-refugee-crisis" target="_blank">refugee child born stateless in a Rohingya camp</a> carries forward the memory of betrayal – a memory that outlives soldiers, politicians, and peace accords alike.
The region’s future will not be decided by GDP figures or infrastructure projects alone. It will be decided by whether its governments can summon the political courage to face the truths they have long suppressed – or whether they will continue down a path <a href="https://theconversation.com/india-is-using-the-g20-summit-to-further-its-settler-colonial-ambitions-in-kashmir-205166" target="_blank">where forgetting is demanded</a>, and rebellion becomes inevitable.
Shyam Tekwani is a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii. This <a href="https://dkiapcss.edu/nexus_articles/ghosts-at-the-border-south-asias-unfinished-wars/" target="_blank">article</a> was originally published on <a href="https://dkiapcss.edu/security-nexus/" target="_blank">DKI APCSS Security Nexus.</a> The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of DKI APCSS, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) of the linked websites, or the information, products, or services contained therein. DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these sites.

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Balochistan to Kashmir

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh must be based on a win-win policy, rooted in mutual respect, non-hegemony, and the pursuit of shared prosperity and deeper understanding. 
For India, there have always been only two neighbours: China and Pakistan. The rest of us smaller South Asian countries are geographic entities to be praised, cajoled, reprimanded and even punished as the situation calls for.
Sheikh Hasina's last tenure in power (2009-2024) appears to have been a ‘praise’ period. However, after the student-led people's uprising toppled her regime in August, a powerful section of the Indian media has shifted into the ‘reprimand’ mode, with some even suggesting ‘punishment’. Much of the social media discourse seems to support this.
Oppression of minorities anywhere in the world, including in my own country, must be condemned and speedily resolved. It should never recur. Communal conflict has been an age-old phenomenon in South Asia following the British colonial policy of divide and rule. 
It is a regrettable fact that, after 77 years of the departure of the British, we have still not been able to solve it.
After the regime change in Bangladesh, the Indian media's coverage of events can, in my view, be categorised as follows: 
<ol><li>The events that toppled Sheikh Hasina was the work of Pakistan's ISI, the Islamists in Bangladesh, or pro-Chinese elements all aimed to replace the ‘India-friendly’ government with an ‘unfriendly’ one. There is no mention of the role of common people or of the students, of the killing of ordinary people. What is the source of all these assertions? </li><li>The new government in Dhaka is bent on persecuting Hindus and even committing ‘genocide’. Many of these stories were debunked by fact-checkers, including the BBC. But that did not stop or even slow down the tirade of stories demonising Bangladesh.</li><li>The US involvement was also referred to and linked with the events in Pakistan in toppling Imran Khan. So, the US toppled Sheikh Hasina.</li></ol>
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Sheikh Hasina government even resorted to firing on demonstrators using helicopters.
In a prompt action, the interim government fast-tracked the issuance of visas for journalists. However, Indian journalists who visited Bangladesh focused solely on the attacks on Hindus, ignoring the broader human rights abuses by the Hasina government. 
The Indian media’s coverage of the July-August uprising in Bangladesh was also striking in its one-sidedness.
The Indian media largely ignored the massive student-led people's movement, which saw millions take to the streets of cities across the country. Their focus remained almost exclusively on the sporadic violence against Hindus during the power vacuum in the first week of the transition.
The firing on unarmed demonstrators, resulting in at least 700 deaths by 5 August, was barely covered. This was one of the most barbaric crackdowns in the recent history of South Asia, yet the Indian media gave it little attention. 
In the <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEoyTkOZ8xE&amp;t=588s">six interviews I gave</a> to <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bDJgVVBDLg">mainstream Indian outlets</a>, there was almost <a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/world/sheikh-hasina-had-turned-very-dictatorial-mahfuz-anam-on-bangladesh-regime-change/cid/2038904">no mention</a> of the scale of <a href="http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2024/08/07/the-daily-star-journalist-mahfuz-anam-interview-bangladesh-protests-political-crisis.html">the uprising</a> or the civilian deaths, only the vandalism of symbols like Bangabandhu's statue or the burning of government properties.
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Indian media's coverage appears to be driven by the isolated attacks against Hindus of Bangladesh, rather than the people of Bangladesh. India should not see the recent events through the lens of Sheikh Hasina but through the lens of democracy.
In a recent video broadcast by the Indian news portal ThePrint, Meenakshi Lekhi, a BJP leader and lawyer, said, ‘The chief adviser… is seeking to rename the nation [Bangladesh] to be [the] Islamic republic of East Pakistan.’ 
Where did she get that from? Her column was filled with distortions and misinformation. When recounting Sheikh Hasina's rule, she omitted critical facts like the rigging of the 2014, 2018 and 2024 general elections, which were at the core of voters' outrage with her regime.
At The Daily Star, we studied 56 news items appearing in the Indian media between 9 July-20 November. Except for a handful, most could be categorised as ‘views reports’ and not ‘news reports’. They had headlines like: ‘To avoid election Yunus is using the excuse of reforms’, ‘Politics of revenge – 13 including ministers on trial’, ‘Will democracy at all return to Bangladesh?’, ‘China, ISI behind escalation of student-led protests in Bangladesh’, ‘ISI conspiracy to topple Sk. Hasina and established anti-India govt’, among others. 
Some TV news even called it an ‘Islamist takeover’. There were hardly any attempts to take a serious look at the events in Bangladesh.
If we analyse the sourcing of the news, the presentation, the headlines, and the language used in reporting, it becomes clear that it was directed at creating an impression that Hindus were not safe in Bangladesh to generate deep hatred in the Indian population.
The mindset of the Indian media and also that of a section of political leadership is dominated by a fundamental disrespect for our intellectual ability, and Islamophobia.
Indian media coverage clearly implies that we, as a people, are incapable of determining our future. It is the Pakistanis, Chinese or the Americans (not to name the Indians, which they do not of course mention) that must tell us what to do. 
This mindset is insulting to a nation that has fought against Pakistani cultural, economic and military oppression, and that has defeated them in an armed struggle with Indian help. 
It is insulting to a people who have dismantled dictatorships and who have now toppled what appeared to be an invincible regime of Sheikh Hasina. This mindset shows the disdain of the Indian media towards Bangladeshis. One political leader even compared us with termites.
The Indian media has a total misunderstanding of the deep roots of Islam in Muslim Bangladeshi psyche. People going to mosques, wearing Islamic headgear, keeping beards, using Islamic salutations, or referring to the Quran as a part of daily life are portrayed as extremists and terrorists.
If the revival and strengthening of Hindu religious practices, building more temples, enshrining Hindu cultural traits, and becoming more practising Hindus are part of the present-day Indian ethos, then why should we, the Bangladeshis, becoming more Muslim make us extremists? 
If mass-based groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS can propagate the Hindu religion, and if a political party like the BJP, whose aim is to establish Hindutva in India, can get elected three times, then why does the reappearance of Islamic groups make us a ‘fundamentalist’ country?
The Indian media and leadership must dig deep into the cultural and religious heritage of Muslim Bengal, and try to embrace us as we are, rather than define us as they would like us to be. 
We must accept what the Indian people decide is the India they want. Just as India must accept what the people of Bangladesh decide we are. 
That is the only way a durable Bangladesh-India relationship can be built. The lesson for India is that regime-based relationships must be replaced by people-based relationships. 
For that to happen, we must understand each other better, with sincerity and respect.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star. Reprinted with permission.

How the media shapes Bangladesh-India ties

The news headlines this week said: ‘The House of Representatives passed the Nepal Citizenship (Second Amendment) Bill that now makes <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-unequal-citizenship-law">acquiring citizenship through the mother</a> as equal as through the father.’&nbsp;
Could it really be true? There is genuine confusion or deliberate misunderstanding in the public about the Bill. Here is an explainer:
What is the Bill?
The Second Amendment to the Nepal Citizenship Act 2006 was tabled by the government on 11 March, 2024. The lengthy list of amendments underwent a detailed discussion within the State Affairs and Good Governance Committee of the HoR which presented a shortened list of agreed amendments.&nbsp;
The HoR passed this amended list of amendments on 28 June. While the original Bill contained eight amendment proposals, only three major amendments were presented by the Committee, and approved by the HoR.
Has it become law now?
No. It is yet to be passed by the National Assembly and endorsed by the President.
What exactly is contained in the amendments?&nbsp;
<ol>
 <li>Addition to Section 5 of the Act: ‘For citizenship applications, a father’s identity is deemed unknown if the applicant and their mother both provide a self-declaration stating that the father is unidentified, as per Section 5, even if his name is listed on the person’s birth registration, educational qualifications, or other certificates, yet his other identity is not available and is currently out of contact.’</li>
</ol>
This simply provides a definition to what the Act means by ‘father unidentified’ or ‘father untraceable’. Section 5 derives its authority from Article 11(5) of the Constitution that grants citizenship by descent to children whose mother is a Nepali citizen, but father is unidentified or untraceable.&nbsp;
The Nepal Citizenship Act 2006 and Regulation 2006 (both promulgated prior to the present 2015 Constitution) was amended in 2023 to incorporate the provisions of the new Constitution. In doing so, it included the procedural rule requiring both the applicant and their mother to sign a self-declaration form.
The result: a lot of people who claimed citizenship under this provision were still denied access, simply because their educational or other documents mentioned the name or address or some information about their father. The officials interpreted the presence of such information as father’s identity being known and assumed the applicants were hiding facts.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/no-state-for-women">No state for women</a>, Neha Gurung
The Supreme Court in one of such cases had clearly interpreted the meaning of ‘father unidentified’. In its overarching decision, the court stated the following:
‘It seems neither lawful nor just to compel an individual to accept someone as an identified father merely because their biological father’s name, surname, or address is claimed to be known or mentioned in educational or other documents. It would be just to consider the father’s identity as “unidentified”; if the individual has not received paternal affection or care, and the alleged father has never taken any responsibility, borne any obligation, or been physically present before the children, leading to a situation where the children haven’t even seen their face. Such an alleged biological father should remain “unidentified” for these children until they formally acknowledge them as their son or daughter, or, in their absence, their family provides reasonable proof to confirm the fact and identifies the relationship through a process acceptable to the children, or until such a confirmation becomes impossible.’
Based on this decision, multiple implementation challenges, and growing advocacy around this concern, the government included the above-mentioned addition in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-citizenship-amendment-bill-explained">the Bill</a>.
Is it new?
The proposed addition is neither an introduction of the new right, nor does it provide anything beyond what the Constitution mandates. Since the Constitution itself uses the term ‘father untraceable or unidentified’, the most a legislation can do is to ensure that the constitutional provisions are interpreted and implemented in its true meaning. Therefore, the current Bill only serves to clarify the existing misinterpretation of the phrase ‘father unidentified’.
In a country where about 17% of the population are <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Comment/stateless-daughters-in-nepal,863">single mothers</a>, this clarification may provide certain relief for those whose fathers name was mentioned in the document and the father is now unidentified. However, the addition does not grant anything new.
The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/are-women-not-nepali-enough">gender discriminatory citizenship </a>where the citizenship or legal identity of a person is always dependent on one’s husband or father still remains.
Additionally, the current addition does not completely incorporate the Supreme Court’s decision which is broader and more comprehensive, requiring that the father be considered unidentified irrespective of the knowledge of the father’s name, surname and address, if the applicant/person has not felt the paternal affection or care, and the alleged father has never taken any responsibility, or borne any obligation or been physically present before the children.
The Bill only takes ‘father’s name’ into consideration. It does not recognize the mention of surname or address in the applicant’s certificates, nor the absence of emotional and physical presence, and responsibility in their life.
2. Addition to Section 18 of the Act:
i. Unless otherwise provided in this Act, a person dissatisfied with an order or decision made by an official under this Act may file a petition with the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs within thirty-five days from the date of such order, through the District Administration Office or directly through Nepal Government.
ii. Upon receiving the report pursuant to sub-section (1), the Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs shall (must) issue their decision or order after obtaining the report from the official who issued the order or made the decision, within 30 days from the date of appeal, and such decision or order made by them shall be final.’
This provision is already present in the Act itself, and the Bill simply amends or adds the parts that are in bold letters. The positive part is that it makes the right to redress mandatory. Meaning, it not only ensures the right to appeal against the unsatisfactory decisions made by the local authorities, but also the right to receive the decision.
Earlier, it depended on the government's discretion to hear the appeal, but if this amendment is passed, it now becomes the State's obligation to ensure this as a due process of law.
This makes it easier for individuals denied citizenship, by the Chief District Office (CDO), to register an appeal in the higher office, which is the Home Ministry. However, in cases concerning a certain category of naturalised citizenship that falls under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry, its decision becomes final and cannot be appealed.
This means that Nepal has two categories of naturalised citizenship. One that falls under the jurisdiction of CDO, such as naturalised citizenship to foreign women via marriage relationship. Another that falls under the jurisdiction of the Home Ministry, such as naturalised citizenship to persons born to Nepali mother and foreign father or foreigners who intend to acquire citizenship via stay requirement.&nbsp;
While the former can be appealed if the applicant is not satisfied with the decision of the official, the former, which is the government's decision, cannot be appealed.
3. Addition of Section 22(a) to the Act: ‘Shall provide a minor’s identity card to a person who is under 16 years of age, if either mother or father is a Nepali citizen.’
This provision can be considered as a positive extension of the child’s constitutional right. The Constitution of Nepal in Article 39 (1) states that ‘every child shall have the right to name and birth registration along with his or her identity’. The current Bill extends this right to a minor's ID card.
However, a minor ID card does not guarantee a citizenship certificate, which in Nepal, a person is eligible to apply only at the age of 16. This means: even though the child has the minor’s ID card and perhaps also a passport based on it, while applying for citizenship at the age of 16 or beyond, the person is bound by citizenship laws — which as we have seen is heavily dependent on the father's identity.
The conclusion?
The current amendment does not ensure any dramatic legal reform nor ensure a complete <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/The-right%20-to-have-rights,2656">gender equality in nationality laws</a>, simply because it technically and legally cannot.
When the Constitution itself uses gendered language such as ‘mother’, ‘father', ‘Nepali citizen man’, and ‘foreign citizen woman’, a legislation cannot override it. Nevertheless, recent amendments to the Act, including the first amendment, shows the government’s leniency towards gender equal citizenship laws.
Additionally, Article 49 of the Constitution also recognises equal lineage right of women, meaning that the family descent is legally recognised to be carried on by both genders. Hopefully in the nearest future, Nepal will carry this same principle to shape its citizenship law as well.&nbsp;
A transformative reform by ensuring gender equal nationality rights through constitutional amendment is still possible. Nepal, a member state to the CEDAW and CRC, is still in the list of 24 countries in the world that have gender unequal citizenship laws. &nbsp;It has the obligation as well as potentiality to become a pioneer in recognizing<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/quality-of-equality-for-women"> women’s equal rights </a>to confer citizenship to their children and spouse in par with men.
Neha Gurung is a human rights lawyer dedicated to advocating for equal citizenship rights, and co-founder of the Citizenship Affected People's Network. A Fulbright scholar, Gurung obtained LLM from the Washington College of Law.

Full equality vs status quo

The sudden and massive flood on the Bhote Kosi early Tuesday morning washed away a strategic bridge on Nepal’s main border crossing with China for trade, tourists and pilgrims. Slurry from the nearly 10m high debris flow left 9 dead and 20 missing, 12 of them Nepalis and six Chinese nationals, and 150 others were rescued by helicopter.&nbsp; Four <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/climate-smarter-himalayan-infrastructure">hydropower plants</a> Rasuwagadi, Trisuli III, Trisuli, &nbsp;Benighat and the Trisuli substation sustained heavy damage, knocking &nbsp;out 230MW of Nepal’s power supply – approximately 8% of the total. Over 100 cargo trucks and new electric vehicles parked at &nbsp;Timure Dry Port were swept away. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mapping-kangchenjunga-glacial-flood-risk">Mapping Kangchenjung glacial flood risk</a>, Gabe Allen Officials had initially thought &nbsp;the Bhote Kosi had flooded due to heavy rain in Tibet. However, the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM) and the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority (NDRRMA) now say a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/living-below-nepal-s-melting-mountains">Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF)</a> is likely.&nbsp; NDRRMA spokesperson Suresh Sunar said it was too early to tell which one, but the flood was most likely the result of one of the glacial lakes in Tibet. Bhote Kosi begins on the north slope of the Ganesh Himal near the Nepal-China border, and its tributary Lende drains the catchment area north of Langtang. The slurry flood on Tuesday was on the Lende (map).&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250709110720_bbc99c5f3e3d61a3d340892e0273fee3605a8d334a2beb354126137bcf0c8d27.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20250709110720_bbc99c5f3e3d61a3d340892e0273fee3605a8d334a2beb354126137bcf0c8d27" data-rendition-name="original" width="629" height="759" loading="lazy" alt="Bhote Kosi flood map"> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250709110720_39e2f574ff8c12cecda2e5a999d2ba8a0310f599f6b2261dcad7dd43f94df2a1.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250709110720_39e2f574ff8c12cecda2e5a999d2ba8a0310f599f6b2261dcad7dd43f94df2a1" data-rendition-name="original" width="997" height="613" loading="lazy" alt="Bhote Kosi flood map"> </figure>  “Preliminary study suggest that the disaster was not caused by rain in Tibet, but by a glacial lake burst, or another accident,” said Kamal Ram Joshi of the DHM. The level of water at a self-monitoring station in Timure in Rasuwa increased by 3.5m at 3:10AM on Tuesday morning while 13km downstream in Syabrubesi, the level rose by 3.65m at 3:30AM. The same station recorded 5.37m ten minutes later, after which it stopped giving a reading, possibly because the station was also washed away. The flood reached <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/neither-side-lost-both-sides-won">Betrawati</a> by 5AM, and some of the debris flow reached Mugling during Tuesday. DHM’s Flood Forecasting Division noted that there was no major precipitation in the Bhote Kosi watershed in Nepal and China in the 24 hours preceding the flood.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250708100724_313a684b65fc5317064779e47409a40f2bbce2c0c84db995e7f8fc6e1c142105.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250708100724_313a684b65fc5317064779e47409a40f2bbce2c0c84db995e7f8fc6e1c142105" data-rendition-name="original" width="3600" height="1662" loading="lazy" alt="Bhotekosi flood"> <figcaption>The Miteri bridge before it was swept away by the flood in Bhotekosi on the Nepal-China border. Photo: SUBASH DHUNGANA / RSS</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250708100732_ec43f13bae979f7b61bc0db939db4157dc93d3f0767ed527f564bd5c3d12be27.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250708100732_ec43f13bae979f7b61bc0db939db4157dc93d3f0767ed527f564bd5c3d12be27" data-rendition-name="original" width="720" height="432" loading="lazy" alt="Bhotekosi flood NT 2"> <figcaption>The bridge after the flood.</figcaption> </figure>  On Wednesday, several remote-sensing experts using Copernicus &nbsp;satellite images pinpointed the cause of the flood to Purepu Cangbu where supraglacial ponds had merged in June to form a large lake which did not burst, but overflowed &nbsp;and found a channel through englacial conduits to the headwaters of the Lende. The river meets the Bhote Kosi at the Nepal-China checkpoint in Rasuwa.&nbsp; “Analysis of weather forecasts and satellite data shows the Tibet region did not receive enough rain to cause this scale of flooding,” explained Binod Pokharel, associate professor of hydrology and meteorology at Tribhuvan University. “The flood could have been caused by a GLOF."&nbsp; Two weeks ago, Chinese officials had reportedly warned the Rasuwa District Administration in Nepal to be on high alert for floods on rivers that originate in Tibet. It could be that Chinese scientists had observed the alarming<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-climate-crisis-is-a-water-crisis-in-the-himalaya"> expansion of glacial lakes</a> in the Lende and Bhote Kosi catchments. If that was the case, it is an example of the kind of trans-boundary forewarning that would be critical to save lives in future.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250708100736_1710142917b30d4f85b343ed52743554d723db918c708f0bade8a0491ba999b2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20250708100736_1710142917b30d4f85b343ed52743554d723db918c708f0bade8a0491ba999b2" data-rendition-name="original" width="1001" height="500" loading="lazy" alt="Bhotekosi flood"> </figure>  However, Rasuwa’s Assistant Chief District Officer Dhruv Prasad Adhikari seems to have no knowledge of any warning from the Chinese side, either formally or informally. &nbsp; “The Chinese Embassy has said the cause of the flood is unknown that it will coordinate with Nepal to find the cause," Adhikari told us. Chinese Ambassador Chen Song and Prime Minister Oli visited the border on Tuesday (pictured). &nbsp; The sharing of real-time trans-boundary rainfall and river flow data would be crucial in early warning about the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mapping-kangchenjunga-glacial-flood-risk">risk and consequences of GLOFs</a> to reduce human and material loss. But Nepali officials say China has been reluctant to share weather-related information and data not just in this disaster, but in the past as well. “There is no mechanism or system in place for us to obtain hydrological and meteorological data of the Tibetan region,” said DHM Director General Joshi. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/for-destruction-ice-is-also-great-and-will-suffice">Himalaya is melting twice as fast as the rest of the world</a> due to a phenomenon called ‘elevation dependent warming’, and receding glaciers have led to an increasing number of transboundary GLOFs.&nbsp; According to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/danger-nepal-s-glacial-lakes-are-filling-up">a 2018 ICIMOD study</a>, of the 47 of the most dangerous lakes that threaten Nepal, 25 are on glaciers in China, 21 in Nepal and one in India. Many of these glaciers are expanding rapidly due to global warming. One of the authors of the report, glacial lake expert Samjwal Bajracharya, says that the report was prepared based on data from 2015. But climate change has accelerated since then. Moreover, seismic activity has further destabilises the landscape, adding to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-glacial-lakes-in-danger-of-bursting">GLOF risk</a>.&nbsp; “Considering the rapid rate of snowmelt and consequent increase in size of Himalayan glaciers, studies should be conducted every year, and a monitoring system should be set up on the glaciers,” says Bajracharya. “However, no studies have been conducted in the Himalaya in a decade, which has been our biggest weakness.” &nbsp;

Rasuwa flood likely a GLOF

Former president Bidhya Devi Bhandari last week officially made her comeback to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/what-just-happened-in-nepali-politics">national politics </a>at an event commemorating her late husband UML leader Madan Bhandari’s 70th birth anniversary. Bhandari’s announcement was not a surprise, nor was the furious flutter it created both within and outside the UML. A former president returning to party politics sets a dangerous precedent, many said. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; “Now that I have been released of my previous political responsibilities, I have renewed my party membership with the righteous intention of remaining in the CPN-UML and continuing the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/post-convention-uml-eyes-set-on-elections"> party's political journey</a>,” Bhandari said, not very convincingly. Nepal’s Constitution does not prohibit a former head of state from returning to active politics once their presidential term is over, essentially leaving such decisions to ethics rather than any legality. But her return to the UML fold has angered party leaders who considered themselves Oli’s successors as well commentators who saw it as yet another example of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/the-business-of-politics-in-nepal">deep rot in Nepal’s politics</a>. ‘<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/coalition-set-to-snub-president-bhandari">Bidya Devi Bhandari </a>has not tired of ‘serving’ us despite having held multiple ministerial positions, high-level party positions, and serving two terms as President, but the country and its citizens are tired of her unceasing and immoral ‘service’,’ political commentator Muma Ram Khanal wrote sardonically on social media. ‘Please do not embarrass us through your lifetime ‘service’.’ Bhandari tried to mollify critics by pledging to forego all perks and facilities she is entitled to as a former head of state. This was met with enthusiastic cheers from supporters at the public function. Prime Minister KP Oli, sitting right beside her on the stage, remained stone-faced. He has been against Bhandari’s political comeback, and has tried to talk her out of it. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250711040740_0f2b201ed3ce2f85540554c83fc7aae6bcfcd1377aef614bbc3759eef30baa3f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250711040740_0f2b201ed3ce2f85540554c83fc7aae6bcfcd1377aef614bbc3759eef30baa3f" data-rendition-name="original" width="2400" height="1599" loading="lazy" alt="PM Oli and Bidya Devi "> </figure>  Oli has reasons to worry, as Bhandari has made it clear that she intends to run for party chair in the next UML general convention. There are also those within the UML who have grown resentful of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-government-changes-again">Oli’s leadership</a>, and this has polarised the party into two camps with leaders like Ishwar Pokharel in Bhandari’s corner. Oli wields absolute authority over the party, particularly after he sidelined and silenced rivals Madhav Kumar Nepal, Jhalanath Khanal, and Bamdev Gautam.&nbsp; He has removed the party’s 70-year age limit to hold leadership position so that he can continue to be chair even as he approaches the end of term limit, and questions about his health after two kidney transplants. Bhandari wasted no time in wading right into politics to forge alliances. Last week she met Kathmandu Mayor Balen Shah to discuss “latest developments”. She is said to have urged <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/kathmandu-s-balen-phenomenon">Kathmandu’s popular independent mayor</a> to enter national politics through a party. The mayor is keeping his cards close to his chest. &nbsp; The former president’s return to active politics has also not sat well with other parties, either. Nepali Congress (NC) president Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Oli’s coalition partner, is said to have raised issue with Bhandari’s comeback. The NC Central Committee meeting this week was abuzz with corridor talk about how retired presidents returning to politics affects not just the UML, but undermines <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/slapping-democracy">Nepal’s democracy</a>. &nbsp; The UML is not the only party roiled in internal strife. The NC Central Committee meetings turned lively as the rank and file fed up with<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/deuba-s-long-and-winding-road"> long-serving Deuba</a> and the higher political profile Foreign Minister Arzu Rana, his wife, demanded an overhaul of the leadership.&nbsp; The surname Koirala still has strong brand equity in the NC, and a rival faction led by Shekhar Koirala has questioned Deuba’s competence and has intensified calls for the party’s next general convention to be held on time. His cousin, Shashank Koirala also supports a constitutional amendment to revert Nepal back to Hindu state – possibly with an eye on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/women-first-in-2027-wfnchctq">the 2027 election</a>. The NC’s young turks are no longer young. Party General Secretary Gagan Thapa is approaching middle age while waiting for a greater leadership role with the promise of fresh new blood to rejuvenate the party. &nbsp; Meanwhile, CPN-Unified Socialists chair and former prime minister Madhav Kumar Nepal is facing calls for resignation from within his party after being charged with corruption by Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) for alleged involvement in the Patanjali land scam.&nbsp; Nepal, who has been stripped of his lawmaker status, is currently out on bail. He has said the case against him is politically motivated, fuelled by one-time comrade K P Oli's vendetta.&nbsp; The CPN-US members do not seem keen on Nepal taking the already beleaguered party down with him. Firebrand leader Ram Kumari Jhakri called for a new leadership at an event of the party’s youth wing last week, obviously pushing herself as a possible successor.&nbsp; “The party chair is facing legal and constitutional challenges, we cannot move forward with this dead weight on our shoulders,” Jhakri said, calling for an early general convention to choose new leadership. CPN-US leadership has since admonished her gently about her remark, but others like Jhalanath Khanal and Ghanashyam Bhushal have lent their support. Khanal, a former prime minister himself, even asked for Nepal’s resignation at the party’s secretariat meeting earlier this week.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250711050712_bed4145c696497f12eedc746dcd0308d251ca02312bef88c549a51d54a5032a8.png" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20250711050712_bed4145c696497f12eedc746dcd0308d251ca02312bef88c549a51d54a5032a8" data-rendition-name="original" width="262" height="402" loading="lazy" alt="Two to tango"> </figure>  Over at the Maoist-Centre, Pushpa Kamal Dahal is also said to be at loggerheads with top comrades, particularly Deputy General Secretary Janardan Sharma, who used to be a guerrilla commander during the conflict. &nbsp; Dahal and Sharma’s relationship has been strained since the party’s last general convention, when Dahal bypassed Sharma for General Secretary. The two have traded barbs in public and private since then. Sharma has long called for competition in party leadership, but like Oli and Deuba, Dahal is reluctant to give up the reins. Dahal has reportedly been reluctant to hold a general convention fearing he will be voted out of his chairmanship. &nbsp; In response, Dahal has attempted to fill the ranks with his own confidants, including actively lobbying for the return of former vice-president Nanda Bahadur Pun to active politics despite objections from the party. Like Bidya Bhandari, this has not been welcomed within the party and outside. And then there is the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/in-with-the-new-out-with-the-old"> Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)</a>, the fourth largest in Parliament whose chair, former tv anchor leader Rabi Lamichhane, is in detention for multiple charges of defrauding cooperatives. The three main parties see the RSP as a threat in 2027 and want to tie Lamichhane up with court convictions, but his prolonged detention has actually allowed him to gather some public sympathy – at least on social media. The RSP has rallied around Lamichhane in public, but there are rifts within the party. In April, MP Sumana Shrestha resigned as the party’s joint general secretary, levelling criticism at the leadership and the lack of intra-party democracy and calling for reforms. But Lamichhane’s legal troubles have put a dent on the RSP’s Mission-2084 election campaign, which has come to a standstill.&nbsp; Aisde from internal feuds in all the main parties, the four main parties are also jostling for advantage ahead of 2027. And last week, the Janata Samajwadi Party and Nagarik Unmukti Party both withdrew from the alliance. &nbsp; Speculation is rife of a rift between the two largest parties in the coalition. This is driven by the two parties, which have been bitter rivals since 1990 but are now partners in government, in the leadup to elections. &nbsp; In public, the two parties have maintained that the coalition remains strong as ever. Oli is said to be considering recalling some of his ministers to pacify the NC’s dissatisfaction with UML cabinet members. Deuba seems determined not to let the coalition collapse ahead of his turn to be prime minister for the sixth time next year as per a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with Oli.&nbsp; The cement that binds the coalitions together is the mutual threat they feel about <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/higher-corruption-in-high-places">corruption </a>probes of their leaders. The former RSP-NC-Maoist coalition collapsed last year after Deuba and Oli got wind that Home Minister <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-rise-and-fall-of-rabi-lamichhane">Rabi Lamichhane</a> had started investigating the involvement of their top leaders on the fake refugee and tea estate scams. &nbsp; For the moment, though, it seems as though the relationship between Oli and Deuba is more stable than the support both leaders have within their own &nbsp;parties. But the question as the elections approaches is, for how much longer.

Uncontrolled instability in Nepal

The<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rasuwa-flood-likely-a-glof"> flood on the Bhote Kosi</a> on Tuesday morning was a timely reminder about the risks Himalayan communities face from melting permafrost and glaciers, as well as the need for transboundary early warning. In the spring of 2024, I visited the Kanchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA) again. While in the village of Kampuchen (4,145) I visited Nupu Sherpa, friend and owner of the Kampuchen White House Lodge, to share <a href="https://tc.copernicus.org/articles/18/711/2024/">a new paper we had just published</a> about a massive ice-debris avalanche that had occurred in 2022 in the upper Nupchu valley. Although Nupu was interested in the results and implications of the avalanche, he was even more concerned about the recent and rapid development of several large, pro-glacial lakes upon the terminus of the Kanchenjunga glacier, an hour walk north of Kampuchen and across the seasonal yak pasture of Ramdang Kharka (4,375m).&nbsp; Like many high altitude, low gradient glaciers in the Himalaya, those in the Kanchenjunga region had shrunk to mere shadows of their former selves during the previous 125 years, leaving behind debris-covered remnant ice and small meltwater ponds.&nbsp; Nupu’s fear was that the lakes might soon coalesce to form a large and potentially dangerous glacial lake. Given a large enough trigger, such as a massive landslide or avalanche, a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) could result that could damage Kampuchen, Ghunsa, Phale, the Kangchenjunga Base Camp trail, and even beyond to the lower Tamor into India.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071204070_31e28d1fd0f5a976ad96fc5597cc386586d7de5b7d9714835d5b479104209fed.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2025071204070_31e28d1fd0f5a976ad96fc5597cc386586d7de5b7d9714835d5b479104209fed" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1635" loading="lazy" alt="Meltpools in the Himalaya"> <figcaption>The Kanchenjunga Conservation Area (KCA), eastern Nepal.</figcaption> </figure>  Since I was on my way to the village of Lhonak (4,792m) I stopped to take a look at the new lakes. Sure enough, from a lookout point on the lateral moraine of the Kanchenjunga Glacier I could see as many as ten newly formed and growing meltwater ponds upon the terminal moraine region of the glacier.&nbsp; The prospect was reminiscent of early satellite images taken of Imja Glacier in 1962 by the French, showing a number of meltwater ponds that within 15 years had grown and merged into a glacial lake half a square kilometer in size and containing 45 million cubic meters of water. Ten years after that Imja had grown to more than a square kilometer in size, was at least 120 m deep, and contained an estimated, and growing, 90 million cubic meters of water. Would the same scenario play out for the lower Kanchenjunga Glacier? To try and understand the situation better, glaciologist Sonam Wangchuk of ICIMOD put together a time series composite of lake development over time, from 2016 to 2024, where it was clear that the majority of the new lakes had only formed since 2019.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071204078_c65a5ec574a251489c502f3efdf842033e0d238fd57947f7eee2c5793aac2a29.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2025071204078_c65a5ec574a251489c502f3efdf842033e0d238fd57947f7eee2c5793aac2a29" data-rendition-name="original" width="602" height="686" loading="lazy" alt="Meltpools in the Himalaya"> <figcaption>Time-lapse satellite images of glacial lake development from 2016 to present. Animation of the process can be seen at https://www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/w17101457/s1.</figcaption> </figure>  Sonam Rinzin of Newcastle University estimated the potential depth and volume of the future glacier lake using standard procedures based upon the surface slope of the Kanchenjunga Glacier combined with volume-area curves for similar glacial lakes, estimating that the future lake would have a volume of approximately 33 million cubic meters of water and depth of more than 116 m. Other modeling methods enabled the mapping of probable ice, debris, and/or rock avalanches into the lake that could trigger a GLOF.&nbsp; A third model was then used to simulate four different avalanche scenarios that could trigger a GLOF: from small (debris avalanche of 3 million cubic meters) to the worst case (15 million cubic meters) of fast-moving debris. Even under the small magnitude scenario, avalanche-triggered outburst floods would travel distances of almost 120km downstream, and under the worst-case scenario the floods would reach the Indo-Gangetic Plain and cross the border into India, damaging or destroying up to 90 buildings and 44 bridges. The prospective triggers of a future GLOF, however, are not limited to a nearby rock avalanche. A <a href="https://tc.copernicus.org/articles/11/443/2017/tc-11-443-2017.html">sudden release of water</a> from water-filled caves further up the glacier could trigger a surge wave capable of breaching the terminal moraine complex holding in the lake water.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250712040716_20ed87368a9ac416b5d0232cf8e02211195ca6bc9fff960a1f7e43a95bdfbbf9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20250712040716_20ed87368a9ac416b5d0232cf8e02211195ca6bc9fff960a1f7e43a95bdfbbf9" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1621" loading="lazy" alt="Meltpools"> <figcaption>Theoretical Kangchenjunga glacial lake of the future (blue) contained by a front moraine (purple) with a flood possibly triggered by a massive rock avalanche (red).</figcaption> </figure>  <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/the-not-so-permanent-frost">Weakening permafrost</a> at the highest altitudes could result in massive ice-debris avalanches, such as those believed to have triggered recent and catastrophic floods in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/remembering-the-seti-disaster">Seti River</a>, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-mountains-are-melting">Barun Khola</a>, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/non-climate-cause-of-nanda-devi-flood">Chamoli</a>, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">South Lhonak lake</a>, and Tuesday’s Bhote Kosi flood in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rasuwa-flood-likely-a-glof">Rasuwa</a>. Weakening and eventual collapse of the terminal moraine complex through sub-surface piping could also result in an outburst flood. And a range of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-mountains-are-melting">cascading processes</a> currently unknown to scientists could trigger a flood as well.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250712040712_76336a4597c08dd735e57b09ae9840b6bd3d89c85907bb39424d9e6f3163581e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_13" data-image-id="20250712040712_76336a4597c08dd735e57b09ae9840b6bd3d89c85907bb39424d9e6f3163581e" data-rendition-name="original" width="740" height="565" loading="lazy" alt="Meltpools in the Himalaya"> <figcaption>Jannu glacier in 1899. Note how the level of the debris-covered glacier reached the top of the lateral moraines over a hundred years ago. Photo: V. SELLA</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250712040712_707dd365923a002e889c64a88796b445695ea9ca692ec639179bc70217ed63c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_14" data-image-id="20250712040712_707dd365923a002e889c64a88796b445695ea9ca692ec639179bc70217ed63c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="5184" height="3888" loading="lazy" alt="Meltpools in the Himalaya"> <figcaption>Jannu glacier in 2022. The remaining debris-covered glacier is now several hundred meters below the crests of the lateral moraines. Photo: E. BYERS</figcaption> </figure>  But will a large and potentially dangerous glacial actually form at the Kanchenjunga glacier? There’s really no way to tell at this point, although the rapid development of lakes since 2016 is a strong indicator that a large lake is in the process of forming. And rather than wait and see, our current uncertainty does not diminish the need for a more proactive approach to the development of a large glacial lake at some point in the near future. For example, the lower Kanchenjunga Glacier clearly needs to be regularly monitored over the coming years to keep track of glacial lake growth and potential hazards. This could be done by the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology (DHM), ICIMOD, or Kathmandu University with results regularly shared with local people and local governments.&nbsp; In fact, such a service could be developed into a program that is offered to other communities throughout highland Nepal who experience similar situations of glacial lake development, growth, and prospective danger, especially since most communities presently feel that they have no one to turn to for similar information. Inexpensive, locally appropriate, user-friendly early warning systems (EWS) need to be developed for the Kanchenjunga region now, instead of waiting for a tragedy to happen. While the different options and costs are being assessed, the installation of new cell towers in the upper Ghunsa Khola would assure that local residents have access to one of the most effective and proven EWS systems available: cell phones, combined with a lake level monitoring device that broadcasts data and connects to cell phone alarm systems.&nbsp; For example, hundreds of lives were saved when upstream witnesses called their family and friends downstream to warn them of the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Anatom-of-a-Himalayan-tsunami,1330">Seti River flood</a> near Pokhara in 2014. New zoning policies that prohibit the construction of lodges and other infrastructure in high-risk floodplain regions need to be developed now. Where the infrastructure already exists, villages should be encouraged to install gabion rock-filled wire cages along susceptible river channel or river interfaces to divert the flow of water during a flood event, a method used successfully in both highland and riverine Nepal. Local and national hazard training and response programs need to be developed now. Several examples of excellent programs developed by different organisations in the upper Khumbu region exist that provide excellent models, such as those tested by the US Agency for International Development <a href="https://www.hillarymedal.com/Khumbu-Nepal-Local-Adaptation-Plan-of-Action-%20report.pdf">(USAID) and ICIMOD</a> between 2011 and 2015. Glacial lake reduction&nbsp; Nepal was recently awarded a $36.1 million award by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to directly confront many of hazards from glacial lake outburst floods jointly implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the DHM building on past successes at Tso Rolpa and Imja Lakes. There are some lessons learned over the past decades of field work based in Nepal and Peru: 1. The DHM wants to use the project to reduce GLOF risks in Kosi and Gandaki basins and glacial lake reduction programs are planned for Thulagi, Lower Barun, Lumding Tsho, and Hongu 2 glacial lakes.&nbsp; However, the planned lowering depth for Tso Rolpa in 2000 was 20m, with the project ending once 3m lowering was achieved due to lack of funds. Imja lake, which scientists also determined needed to be lowered by at least 20m, was in fact lowered by 3m in 2016 ‘because that’s what they did at Tso Rolpa’.&nbsp; If glacial lake reduction programs are to be implemented under the GCF program they should be based upon good science, and lowered to an effective depth, otherwise the activity will be a waste of funds. <a href="https://sinia.minam.gob.pe/sites/default/files/siar-%20ancash/archivos/public/docs/usaid_glacial_lake_handbookrfs_0-ilovepdf-%20compressed_0.pdf">Peru offers experience</a> for glacial lake lowering. 2. Although large glacial lakes (more than 1sq km) will always command the most media and even scientific attention, it has become abundantly clear in recent years that even small glacial lakes can be just as deadly, given the correct sequence of cascading events, rainfall, snowmelt, and/or other triggers.&nbsp; The 2017 <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10346-018-1079-9">Barun flood</a> and September 2024 <a href="https://www.stimson.org/event/the-%20thame-glof-disaster-climate-related-disaster-risk-management-in-the-high-himalayas/">Thame flood</a> are two excellent examples. Methods for assessing the flood risk of glacial lakes will need to be revised accordingly to include many of these smaller glacial lakes as well, in addition to the 21 large lakes already considered to be dangerous. 3. Existing and expensive EWS might benefit by some consideration of cheaper, more local, and possibly more effective alternatives. In 2015, for example, <a href="https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol37/iss2/7/">villagers</a> living below Tso Rolpa complained that they had no idea how the recently installed EWS worked, what it sounded like, and what to do in the event that it went off. With improved cell service and real-time lake level monitoring apps, local people could check on the lake whenever they wished, as opposed to waiting for some kind of communication from Kathmandu. 4. The GCF grant has the opportunity to become the ‘go to’ place for communities throughout highland Nepal to report any of their concerns related to glacial lakes and/or other observed cryospheric processes. This service could facilitate local people’s ability to adapt to, mitigate, or prevent a range of climate change-related hazards largely unknown to previous generations. Alton C Byers is a faculty research scientist at the Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research (INSTAAR) University of Colorado at Boulder and has visited the KCA including a six-month residency in Ghunsa supported by the Fulbright Nepal Scholar Program. This article is largely based on Evolution of a Potentially Dangerous Glacial Lake on the Kanchenjunga Glacier, Nepal, Predictive Flood Models, and Prospective Community Response. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3390/w17101457">Water</a>, 2025. (Byers AC, Rinzin S, Byers E, Wangchuk S.)

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