The five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) reign supreme, each wielding a veto over whatever the other 192 members might want. That is why Israel, owing to US support, can <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/israel-ignores-un-cease-fire-resolution-to-keep-pummeling-gaza">blithely ignore countless UN resolutions</a>, and why Syria, owing to Russian and Chinese support,<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/04/555292"> handily escaped sanctions</a> for its use of chemical weapons. Owing to the disproportionate power they wield, the Permanent Five share an old, decidedly British sense of empire. The authors of two recent books on empire, Lawrence James and Nandini Das, offer no thoughts on how the UN might, or indeed should, be reformed, would agree. In The Lion and the Dragon, James, a prolific historian of the UK’s role in world affairs, follows Britain’s relations with China from the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/20/hk.history.01/">nineteenth-century Opium War </a>until the return of Hong Kong and today’s tensions over Taiwan. And in Courting India, Das, a professor at the University of Oxford, concentrates on the very beginnings of the British Empire and its covetous reach into what was then the Mughal Empire in India. What this history shows is that empire is still very much with us. Though Americans, proud of throwing off the rule of King George III, tend to bristle at the idea, their own military, technological, and commercial power is as imperial and pervasive as Britain’s territorial dominance ever was. As James notes, we can thank the post-World War II Pax Americana for the mostly stable international relations that prevailed during the aptly named Cold War with the Soviets and their own empire. Read more: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/two-new-books-on-conflict-and-conservation">Two new books on conflict and conservation</a>, Kunda Dixit A perennial question, especially during periods of geopolitical upheaval, is not just how empires emerge, but how they fade. Though Britain and France still indulge their memories of empire, they have long since accepted being ‘middle powers’ at best. Ever since the Suez crisis of 1956, when the threat of US sanctions forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt’s Suez Canal, Britain has supinely followed America’s lead in international relations. (UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to send troops to Vietnam in the 1960s is the exception that proves the rule.) At the same time, France has sought comfort in the collective embrace of what became the European Union. Vladimir Putin’s Russia is on a hopeless <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/what-does-defending-europe-mean">quest to reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union</a> and recreate the empire of Peter the Great. And China already sees itself, with some justification, as wielding global influence to rival that of the American empire. China’s pursuit of superpower status is born of not just current economic and political realities, but also its deep-seated resentment over the ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1949) that it suffered at the hands of European (and Japanese) imperial powers. Of course, similar sentiments also animate Putin’s revanchism, as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dismissiveness of diplomatic overtures from post-Brexit Britain. In William Faulkner’s oft-quoted words, ‘The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.’ <h2>Passage To India</h2> The trite answer to the question of why empires fall is that they become victims of their own success, growing too large, too corrupt, too exhausted to fend off energetic newcomers. As the Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun argued in the 14th century, empires are like living organisms: they grow, mature, and die. As Das’s wonderfully researched book shows, the Mughal Empire was almost mature when the British arrived in the 1600s. Its Muslim rulers, with their roots in Central Asia, are fascinating figures. Emperor Jahangir, a generous patron of the arts, was addicted to opium and wine, whereas his wife, Nur Jahan, wielded significant political influence. The emperor’s son, Shah Jahan, was a ‘king of the world’, whose love for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, is permanently commemorated in the Taj Mahal. Mughal India was both a place of immense wealth and a bastion of religious tolerance (unlike Europe, with its centuries-long Inquisition against Muslims, Jews, and heretics). Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-smallpox-virus-in-british-india">The smallpox virus in British India</a>, Tom Robertson By contrast, the British Empire was barely in its infancy when its clash with Mughal India began. In Courting India, Das paints a vivid picture of the experiences – mostly endured, rather than enjoyed – of King James’s ambassador, Thomas Roe, at the Mughal court. But more than that, she also offers a rich description of Jacobean England as it was emerging from the first Elizabethan age and jostling for power with Portugal, Spain, France, and Holland. Roe’s own journals are a major primary source, but so, too, are the cultural interpreters of the period, from William Shakespeare to the poet John Donne (a friend of Roe). Theirs was an England full of energy, seeking its fortune in the Americas and the Indies. However, it was nowhere close to as sophisticated as courtiers like Roe seemed to believe. Indeed, Roe was almost a caricature of the Englishman abroad. He refused to learn any language that might have helped his mission (be it Farsi or Turkish), and he insisted that he and his staff wear English wool and silk, even through the Indian summer. While he eventually came to admire the pragmatic tolerance of Mughal society, he remained convinced of England and Protestant Christianity’s superiority. Never would he have allowed himself to ‘go native’. Roe was answerable not only to King James but also to his financial backer, the East India Company, which had been granted its charter by Elizabeth I in 1600. This meant he was constantly tussling with the miserly company for money (its traders were always jealous), as well as struggling to quell, or at least make excuses for, the riotous behavior of English sailors. Read also:<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/buried-in-history"> Buried in history</a>, Lisa Choegyal <h2>Century of Humiliation </h2> Two centuries later, the East India Company, as it appears in James’s book, would still be clinging to the same assumptions that Roe had held. The superiority and integrity of Christian Britain went unquestioned, and still stood in stark contrast to “Asian greed and despotism.” The biggest change, in the meantime, had been the collapse of the Mughal Empire. Mughal India, the wealthiest place in the world at the end of the 17th century, was steadily enfeebled by internal dissent and Persian and Afghan invasions. In 1857, the East India Company formally dissolved the empire, setting the stage for <a href="https://www.royal.uk/encyclopedia/victoria-r-1837-1901">Queen Victoria</a> to establish the “British Raj” and direct rule over the Indian subcontinent the following year.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2" data-rendition-name="original" width="842" height="596" loading="lazy" alt="The Mughal Empire's Treaty of Allahabad by Benjamin West NT"><figcaption>A painting by Benjamin West of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II conveying the Treaty of Allahabad to Robert Clive in August 1765 after the Battle of Buxar that gave the Company the right to collect taxes -- marking the beginning of British India rule.</figcaption></figure>  To paraphrase Ibn Khaldun, 19th Britain was no longer an infant with imperial ambitions; it was now an adult with all the energy and ruthlessness needed to extend its reach around the world. As such, the British lion had no misgivings about disgracing the Chinese dragon. Looking back on this period, it is easy to see why Chinese President Xi Jinping is so determined to expunge the century of humiliation from the national memory. That century began in 1839 with the First Opium War. When China tried to block imports of East India Company opium from Bengal, Britain responded with all its (industrialised) military might. By 1842, British warships and soldiers had crushed all opposition and compelled China’s Qing emperor to sign the Nanjing Treaty. That opened China to international trade and ensured that British citizens in ‘treaty ports’ would be subject to British, not Chinese, law. Another consequence of the war was that Britain took possession of Hong Kong, which it would hold until 1997. Whereas Das describes India principally through Roe’s eyes, James is keen to present a balance between British actions and Chinese reactions. In doing so, he stresses that China was not reacting only to British imperialism. After all, this was a time when ‘a spirit of predatory imperialism … pervaded the foreign ministries of Russia, France, Germany and China’s near-neighbour, the newly industrialized Japan’. Seized by their own commercial ambitions, all four ‘regarded China as a land mass to be partitioned and shared out in the same way as contemporary Africa’. But these other imperial projects hardly give Britain a pass. In arguing that ‘Britain was reluctantly sucked into the complex geopolitics of great-power empire building in the Far East’, James simply is not convincing. Britain, the world’s leading naval power and the home of the Industrial Revolution, was already adept at the game of geopolitics and quite prepared to protect its interests in China, not least because that would also protect its interests in India. By the 18th century, the Qing Dynasty had expanded from its Manchu roots and established an empire extending from Mongolia and Tibet to the Pacific. But by the 19th century, it was too exhausted to withstand the pressure not only from the other imperial powers but also from its own people. The century of humiliation always refers to foreign interventions, but equally important were domestic embarrassments such as the 1850-64 Taiping Rebellion – in which some 30 million people died – and the 1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion. The dynasty’s ‘Mandate of Heaven’ was clearly slipping from its grasp. It finally came to an end in 1912, when the Western-educated Sun Yat-sen, following a brief revolution, established the ‘Republic of China’. <h2>Remember Thucydides</h2> Today, that title applies only to the island of Taiwan, whereas Xi presides over the ‘People’s Republic of China’, which was established in 1949 with the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist Party over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces. Since the 1970s, most countries – including both rival Chinas – have embraced the fiction that the ROC and the PRC refer to a single country. But there is a constant fear that Taiwan could formally declare its independence and destroy the fiction, thus provoking an invasion from the mainland. If President Joe Biden is to be believed, the US would then come to Taiwan’s rescue and the South China Sea would witness a Sino-American war with far-reaching regional and global consequences. Given his focus on Britain and China, James understandably devotes only a handful of his final paragraphs to US analysts’ ‘bleak’ prognosis of a future war over Taiwan. Moreover, throughout the preceding chapters, he deals deftly with other instances when conflict erupted between rival regional powers. These include the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, which led to Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, Japan’s bloody expansionism in the 1930s, and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought America into World War II. The big risk today is that China and America could end up at war as much by accident as by design. Graham Allison of Harvard University has famously warned of the ‘Thucydides trap’, an allusion to the Peloponnesian War, in which Sparta, the incumbent hegemon, was ‘destined for war’ with the rising power, Athens. It is tempting to dismiss Allison’s argument as alarmism. But over the past 500 years, there have been 16 instances of an incumbent power facing off with a rising power, and war was avoided in only four of them, the most famous being America’s rise to replace Britain as the leading world power in the early twentieth century. Notably, James recalls that China was ‘stunned’ by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887">Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union</a>. The message pushed by Chinese state-controlled media was that the UK had surrendered to ‘a losing mindset’. Clearly, the current Chinese leadership has no intention of showing weakness. The good news is that political and military leaders on both sides of the Pacific are aware of the risks. As Xi said in 2015, on his first state visit to America, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” The bad news, however, is that all countries are prone to ‘miscalculation’. <h2>Tick-Tock</h2> Almost a half-century ago, John Bagot Glubb, a British general who commanded the Jordanian army from 1939 until 1956, published a book entitled The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. His thesis was essentially the same as Ibn Khaldun’s, only with the added claim that almost all empires rise and fall over a period of roughly 250 years. Putting aside the obvious flaws in Glubb’s arithmetic (the Ottoman Empire certainly did not ‘end’ in 1570), the core idea should not be dismissed. After all, historians now give the Qing Dynasty a lifespan of 267 years, and the Mughal Empire of Das’s book began to lose territory after only two centuries. A pessimist might say today’s China began with Communist victory in 1949, and that America’s quasi-imperial power began 201 years ago with the Monroe Doctrine. Time may not be on the side of those who place their trust in America to protect democracy and ‘liberal Western values’. John Andrews, a former editor and foreign correspondent for The Economist, is the author of The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Troublespots. © Project Syndicate  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36.jpg" data-media-id="editor_11" data-image-id="20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>

original

674x448

610x380

500x500

400x266

400x240

400x203

301x200

1250x600

1084x550

thumbnail

viewImage

The Evolution of Empire

A little more than one month into its six-month term, Nepal's interim government recalled ambassadors from 11 countries: China, Japan, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, Spain, Germany, the UK, the US, and Japan.&nbsp;
Mostly appointed by previous governments, they have to return to Kathmandu by 6 November. The envoys who were retained, even if they were political appointees, tended to be women or from various ethnic minorities.
The recall has met with criticism back home. Prime Minister Sushila Karki is blamed for borrowing a page out of its predecessors’ playbook. Although it was a symbolically inclusive move in a diplomatic corps dominated by established groups, the government may have got its timing wrong.
On Sunday, however, the Supreme Court issued an interim order against government decision to recall the 11 ambassadors. The court questioned the neccesssity and justification of such a move, concerned that it could affect Nepal's relations with the host countries.&nbsp;
Karki has said <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/future-imperfect">her priority is to hold elections in March</a>, and by recalling Nepal’s emissaries from important capitals like Washington, London, Bonn, Tokyo, Abu Dhabi and Kuala Lumpur her government has cut channels of communication and support from development partners and with the international community.&nbsp;
Nepal’s anti-corruption GenZ protest and the devolution of the youth movement into <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/relocate-reallocate-recover">arson, looting, and violence</a> after the targeted killing of protestors in September put the nation in the international spotlight. And the interest was especially keen in neighbouring New Delhi and Beijing.&nbsp;
The Nepal unrest has sparked similar protests across the world from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-genzs-inspired-filipinos">the Philippines</a> to East Timor, Madagascar and Peru. But there is also worry in India where exposure of #nepokids on social media as well as corruption in high places could instigate copycat youth unrest.
And in China, there is still a lingering memory of the deadly protests in 1989 Tiananmen Square. But the Chinese also suspect that some in the GenZ movement have links to free-Tibet. &nbsp;
Foreign policy experts in Nepal reject conspiracy theories about foreign backing for the GenZ, characterising it as mostly triggered by home-grown outrage over chronic corruption of the governing elite.&nbsp;
Throughout its history Nepal has always had to balance the geo-strategic interests of its neighbours: the British in India and the Chinese Empire, and more recently independent India and Communist China.
When former PM K P Oli resigned, he had <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/when-xi-meets-modi-and-oli">just returned from a visit to Beijing</a> and was a week away from making an official visit to India. A new Nepali prime minister typically makes the first visit to India, but Oli broke that tradition last year by going to China to sign the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework agreement.
"Oli was China's trusted partner supporting <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/china-syndrome">Nepal’s participation in BRI</a> and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization)," says geopolitical analyst Sanjay Upadhya. "Now, some in Beijing are apprehensive that there is external support for the youth protests that contributed to Oli’s sudden departure. It is perceived as a strategic setback for China."
Despite an ongoing dispute with India over a 364 sq km border territory, Nepal is heavily dependent economically on India with which it has an open border.&nbsp;
Rulers in Kathmandu have usually leaned over backwards to be closer to China to counterbalance India’s gravitational pull following a strategy of ‘equidistance’ between the two giant neighbours.&nbsp;
Growing American and Western disinterest in the region is making India and China more assertive towards smaller nations. Educator Dovan Rai says, “China is also becoming more aggressive and trying to show its presence in and around South Asia.”
She adds, “Nepal is an important neighbour for China, especially considering issues it regards as sensitive, like the Dalai Lama and Tibet.”
Indeed, the Chinese are said to be suspicious about the links that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-s-historic-youth-dissensus">GenZ movement</a> was infiltrated by elements linked with Free Tibet or with US-based interests.&nbsp;
What must have especially raised eyebrows at the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu was that the Dalai Lama’s office in exile in India congratulated Sushila Karki — the first time in history it has sent such a greeting to a new prime minister of Nepal.&nbsp;
Although Nepal’s two neighbours do not see eye-to-eye, both agree and are worried about instability in Nepal, and if it might trigger a refugee crisis, empower extremist factions, or attract Western interference.&nbsp;
Nepal’s September protests were preceded and succeeded by similar movements in the region and around the world. In light of this global eruption of youth frustration, and desire to lead from the front, the hardline governments of Nepal’s two neighbours are undoubtedly wary of the possibility of similar unrest within their own borders.&nbsp;
‘India advocates democratic legitimacy, while China prioritises control and predictability. Recent upheavals demonstrate that neither democracy nor stability alone suffices for sustainable nationhood,’ Upadhya wrote in a recent blog.
With early elections scheduled for 5 March, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/one-month-later">the main challenge for Karki’s transition government</a> is to maintain dialogue and establish consensus between youth groups, political parties, and other agitating forces to participate in polls — all while ensuring there is no covert external influence.&nbsp;
Indeed, with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-democracy-keeps-doubting-itself">Nepal’s democracy</a> at stake as well as new political forces with competing interests set to battle it out in a new political landscape, experts warn that there could be powers that will want to fish in troubled waters.&nbsp;
Explains Dovan Rai: “Along with soft power, foreign countries including our neighbours could intervene in the online information space to promote their interests in Nepal. Fake narratives and disinformation could be spread &nbsp;through digital platforms. We must be careful and vigilant about our digital space.”

Neighbourhood watch on Nepal

Climber, expedition leader and later a supplier of bottled oxygen to Himalayan mountaineers, Henry Barclay Todd died on 3 November 2025 in his favourite place on earth, Kathmandu.&nbsp;
Todd was larger than life, a metaphor often used, yet it could not be more fitting. Standing nearly 2m tall, and possessing an unshakeable will, he lived life on a grand scale, both in body and spirit.&nbsp;
Todd was a pillar in the Himalayan climbing community, supporting many mountaineers across Nepal and Pakistan, making it possible for them to fulfil the dream of standing on the world’s highest peaks. He believed deeply in the strength, skill, and potential of the Sherpa people, and offered them opportunities that might otherwise have remained out of reach.&nbsp;
“Thank you, Henry. Your trust changed my life. Rest in peace, my leader, my teacher, my friend,” said Dorjee Gyelzen Sherpa in his tribute.
Born in 1945 to Royal Air Force officer Henry Todd and May Todd of the Women’s Royal Air Force, Henry spent his early years in Singapore. He led a lively childhood with his two brothers, far removed from the mountains that would later define his path.&nbsp;
A gifted swimmer like his father, Henry never pursued the sport professionally. Instead, after returning to Dundee as a teenager and attending seven different schools, he set off for London, where he began working for an insurance company before finding his true calling in adventure.
Henry Todd first came to Nepal in the mid-1980s and made his first attempt on Ama Dablam in 1987, an expedition that marked the beginning of an extraordinary and colourful climbing career. <a href="https://www.himalayandatabase.com/" target="_blank">The Himalayan Database</a> lists 61 expeditions that he led in Nepal alone — there were more in the Karakoram, Argentina and the Alps.&nbsp;
But Todd would joyfully say that a few hard Scottish ascents held a more personal meaning to him than even the greatest Himalayan summits.
Over the decades, he crossed paths with many legendary climbers like Anatoli Boukreev, Jerzy Kukuczka, Doug Scott and Chris Bonington as well as celebrities including members of Pink Floyd and Nobel Prize laureates whom he befriended.&nbsp;
He had a gift to never name-drop, but would simply mention that he had had lunch with Minnie Driver (niece of his long-time friend Andra) or that he had bought his first car from Donald Sutherland. For Todd, these were not bragging rights, they were simply part of the colourful tapestry of his life.
Todd’s life was filled with extraordinary experiences from surviving plane crashes, avalanches and earthquakes to quietly solving countless problems, which was one of his favourite past-times. His hands, famously large and steady, were always ready to help whether in the chaos of the mountains or the calm of a base camp.&nbsp;
With his sharp sense of humour and the beloved exclamation “Whoopie!”,he could bring lightness even to the toughest moments. He never tired of taking on challenges or helping when someone was in need, and he enriched so many people’s lives with his endless stories.
His legacy is immense. He helped build the human backbone of Himalayan climbing, enabling generations of climbers to test themselves in the world’s highest places. With his passing, an era of bold, spirited Himalayan guiding has come to a close.
Todd survived by a loving family, many close friends and a global community of climbers and Sherpas who will never forget him and his endless tales.&nbsp;
His family said in a statement: ‘Henry’s strength, warmth and unyielding belief in others will live on far above the clouds. He was indestructible in our eyes and in our hearts, he always will be.’
There will be a memorial service at Pashupati Temple in Kathmandu on 8 November 2025 around lunchtime.

Henry Barclay Todd, 80

The autumn mountaineering season is not over yet, and already there have been 12 fatalities on Himalayan peaks in Nepal.
Of the 1,450 climbing permits issued, 436 were for Mt Ama Dablam (6,812m), 374 for Mt Manaslu (8,163m) and 186 for Himlung Himal (7,126m). There were deaths on all three mountains.
The death of two French climbers on Ama Dablam happened before unseasonal blizzards hit the mountains. But Cyclone Montha from the Bay of Bengal brought on high winds and up to 1m of snow in the peak trekking and mountaineering season.
This increased avalanche conditions, and made helicopter evacuation of stranded and injured climbers difficult. Lower down the mountains, more than 1,000 trekkers from Nepal and around the world were stuck in the Annapurnas, Manaslu circuit and the Khumbu.
However, there have also been allegations that it was not just the weather that delayed rescues. Multiple levels of bureaucracy and the need for flight permits to restricted areas like Manang and Manaslu critically delayed evacuation flights.
Italian climbers Farronato Stefano and Caputo Alessandro were found dead in their tent at Panbari Himal Camp I (6,887m) in the Manaslu area. They had been trapped by heavy snowfall since 28 October, and their bodies were found on 4 November by a team from the expedition organisers, Sherpa Alpine Trekking Service. The team was made up of high level mountain guides and expedition leader Valter Perlino.
The team had been climbing to Camp 3 but decided to descend to base camp because of thrombosis in Perlino’s left foot. The two climbers who would eventually get trapped decided to break at Camp I, a decision that would prove fatal after the projected six-day snowfall arrived two days early.
“They were sleeping in a tent and were buried under 2.5 metres of compacted snow. It happened during the night between Thursday and Friday. While they were sleeping, absurd,” said Perlino.
A deadly incident took place the morning of 3 November, when five foreigners and two Nepalis died in an avalanche on Yalung Ri at 5,630m in the Rolwaling. They were part of a larger group of 15 that were acclimatising for an attempt on the nearby Dolma Khang (6,332m).
Local authorities in Gauri Shankar Conservation Area say calls were immediately made to helicopter companies as well as various ministries in Kathmandu that have to issue permits to fly to the region bordering China.
But the permits for rescue flights to Rolwaling Valley were delayed by eight hours. Rescue flights in these areas require permission from the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Defence, the Home Ministry, and the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN).
Experts say this should be exempted in times of emergency when time is of the essence. CAAN spokesperson Pratap Babu Tiwari claimed to not know of the avalanche on Yalung Ri and deflected questions to the permission department.&nbsp;
There was a similar tragedy on Himlung Himal in Manang as well. Australian Chin-Tark Chan, 49, was climbing with 8K Expeditions and fell ill on 27 October at about 6,800m, developing snow blindness and loss of mobility. The guides immediately called the US insurance company Global Rescue for authorisation of a longline rescue.
Global Rescue refused, saying a rescue at that height would violate Nepal’s aviation rules and put the pilot at unacceptable risk. They asked the guides to transport Chan to Camp 3 at 6,400m to a permitted altitude. Seeing it was a life-or-death situation for its client, 8K called in an aerial rescue anyway, but the helicopter could not land due to bad weather. Chan died slightly below Camp 3 on 29 October.
Global Rescue said in a statement that it was ready to send in a helicopter after Chan had been transported to Camp 3, but several hours were lost for that attempt, and the weather did not get better in the next few days.
To underscore just how dangerous helicopter rescues in the Himalaya can be in bad weather, a chopper from Altitude Air skidded off the helipad at Lobuche below Mt Everest while trying to rescue trekkers in whiteout conditions.&nbsp;
CAAN announced a ban on flights during blizzards or dense fog. While rescue missions are often heroic and courageous, they should not be foolhardy if conditions are unsafe and the risk to pilots and rescuers too high. This autumn was a lesson for future expeditions and for the Nepal government.&nbsp;
The Italian duo on Panbari were caught out by snow that arrived two days ahead of schedule, but the group on Yalung Ri should have postponed their ascent after multiple warnings from the Department of Hydrology and Meteorology to avoid high altitudes.

Deadly autumn in Himalayan climbing

Traditional donors have sharply scaled back their aid commitments to developing countries over the past year. Some, like the United States, have virtually eliminated their aid programs. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), official development assistance (ODA) from member countries <a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2025/04/official-development-assistance-2024-figures.html" target="_blank">declined by 7.1%</a> in 2024, its first annual drop in six years. This trend was not limited to a few major donors. Of the 33 members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 22 slashed their aid budgets, and only four countries met the United Nations’ target of allocating 0.7% of gross national income to ODA. The outlook for the coming year offers little hope for improvement, as major DAC donors have announced additional cuts. Most notably, US President Donald Trump’s administration has suspended most foreign aid and dismantled the Agency for International Development (USAID), which dispersed most US government aid dollars. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom plans to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyrkkv4gd7o" target="_blank">reduce aid spending</a> from 0.5% of GNI to 0.3% by 2027. Similar retrenchment across Europe and North America is reshaping international assistance, disrupting humanitarian and climate-related programs, and creating financing gaps in critical sectors such as health, education, and clean energy. In our 2017 book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/going-beyond-aid/B48F59C6D8D2790D403A1A0C44B37612" target="_blank">Going Beyond Aid</a>, we urged developing-country governments to reduce their dependence on foreign aid, not only because it was becoming an unreliable source of funding, but also because other, better ways of financing development were becoming more available. That message is more urgent than ever. As reliance on aid becomes untenable, the international community must mobilise a broader array of financing sources to advance green and sustainable growth. This includes national development banks, industrial investment funds, sovereign wealth funds, and institutional investment in public markets, as well as innovative mechanisms such as debt swaps and public-private partnerships (PPPs). These tools can unlock domestic resources, attract long-term investors, and create synergies between public goals and private capital. Equity investment offers a promising avenue for engaging non-traditional development partners while reducing developing countries’ dependence on debt. Government investment funds, public and private financial institutions, and other private actors can participate by taking equity stakes in public enterprises, financing infrastructure projects, or joining PPPs. Such participation not only alleviates debt burdens but also improves the performance and management of public assets. As government-funded, mission-driven institutions, public development banks (PDBs) have the potential to provide patient capital for green and sustainable investment in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). Building on the <a href="http://www.dfidatabase.pku.edu.cn/index.htm" target="_blank">pioneering database</a> of public development and financial institutions created by the Institute of New Structural Economics at Peking University, future research can identify effective ways to harness these institutions to fuel low-carbon growth. Responding to growing demand from the economies of the Global South, development partners have increasingly adopted an “entire value chain” approach to the green transition in recent years. This strategy facilitates transfers of low-carbon technologies, diffusion of digital innovations (including trade in services), and industrial modernisation, enabling countries included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to accelerate their shift toward sustainable development. Empirical research supports this approach. An analysis covering 139 countries <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-first-evidence-of-a-take-off-in-solar-in-africa/" target="_blank">finds</a> that, following policy directives to incorporate green and low-carbon principles into the BRI, carbon intensity (CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP) among participating countries declined significantly between 2013 and 2022. These findings are consistent with another <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-first-evidence-of-a-take-off-in-solar-in-africa/" target="_blank">recent study</a> showing how China’s solar-energy expansion has helped transform Africa’s power sector. Investment in infrastructure and industrial development can also generate positive spillover effects. Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jors.70023" target="_blank">shows</a> that the presence of at least one Chinese-financed infrastructure project in a second-order administrative region (comparable to a municipality) is associated with a 5% increase in nighttime luminosity – a widely used proxy for economic activity. Neighbouring regions experienced a 10-15% rise in luminosity, indicating that the benefits of such projects extend well beyond the immediate investment site.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251104131124_1a11d248a89b0785bc7d7f1d9f721e7e7a2563cbd579c3c672a0900220c19171.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20251104131124_1a11d248a89b0785bc7d7f1d9f721e7e7a2563cbd579c3c672a0900220c19171" data-rendition-name="original" width="720" height="405" loading="lazy" alt="development aid and China"></figure>  These outcomes underscore the critical role of infrastructure investment, particularly in energy and transportation projects. By improving electricity access, affordability, and connectivity, they reduce energy poverty, bolster public services, and stimulate economic activity in underserved areas. To meet the evolving challenges of development finance, both traditional and non-traditional donors and creditors should move beyond aid and adopt multidimensional strategies that combine trade, investment, infrastructure, green technology, and digital connectivity, including fintech solutions, to support EMDEs. Importantly, such collaborations should be viewed as a mutual learning process in which partners assume complementary roles and shared responsibilities. To be sure, there have been missteps along the way. China’s financing of coal-fired power plants before 2021, for example, had slowed reduction in CO₂ emissions. But these outcomes, once recognised as policy errors, can help strengthen accountability and foster self-correcting mechanisms within the international development ecosystem. Through ongoing learning and adaptation, global partners can build a more resilient, inclusive, and sustainable framework for development finance. © <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">Project Syndicate</a> Justin Yifu Lin, a former World Bank chief economist and Senior VP, is the honorary dean of the National School of Development and director of the Institute of New Structural Economics at Peking University. Yan Wang is Senior Academic Researcher at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center.

the-mughal-empire

The Evolution of Empire

Neighbourhood watch on Nepal

Henry Barclay Todd, 80

Deadly autumn in Himalayan climbing

Development finance must shift away from aid