<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221114111124/637217bd9c7e80680e0baa03jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1802" height="1160"/><figcaption>On 25 June 2021, China inaugurated a 435km section of the Lhasa-Nyingchi Electrified High-speed Rail. The ‘bullet train’ will have a top speed of 160 km/h and bring Chengdu closer to the Nepal border when completed in 2025. Photo: Xinhuanet</figcaption></figure>Nearly a decade since China adopted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and five years after Nepal signed it, the connectivity project is trying to rebrand itself.The $1 trillion program focused on trade, development and connectivity is financed largely by Chinese banks and SOEs.The Green Finance and Development Center of Fudan University says a total of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004016252100740X#bib0154">$755 billion has been spent</a> on BRI projects of which more than 65% has gone into energy and transportation.In 2013, President Xi envisioned the BRI as<a href="https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n9514/pdf/book.pdf"> an aspirational world</a> of peaceful connectivity and friendship — one that is free from conflict. Yet, over the years, its success has also drawn widespread criticism questioning its sustainability.Chinese infrastructure projects in BRI include energy, transportation and real estate require construction inputs — like steel, cement and glass that remain oversupplied in China.For example, the utilisation capacity of the total production of steel and oil refining in China had gone down by <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12439">10% from 80 to 70</a>% between 2008 to 2015, signaling bad loans for the banks due to overproduction and negative effects on its overall economy.BRI projects allowed the Chinese government to take steps to ensure that the vast majority of the <a href="http://www.axel-dreher.de/Dreher%20et%20al._Aid_China_Growth.pdf">construction inputs will be sourced</a> from China to offset its industrial overproduction. This allows a large volume of trade to be in China’s favour while creating a huge trade imbalance between China and recipient countries.In 2021, China’s <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=250850808">trade surplus with BRI countries</a> had reached $199.2 billion. For some countries like Italy which saw a rise of exports by 63% in 2021, others like Nepal <a href="https://kathmandupost.com/money/2022/02/05/nepal-s-trade-with-china-going-through-rough-patch">had a trade deficit of Rs232.9 billion</a>, when total exports was only Rs1 billion.One thing has remained clear: while Chinese exports will continue to grow until the BRI projects are completed, countries at the receiving end must bet on export competitive projects that can reduce the trade deficit and ensure sustainability.Secondly, the Chinese <a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/12/01/builders-from-china-from-third-world-solidarity-to-globalised-state-capitalism/">consider themselves</a> ‘builders’ rather than ‘financers’ projecting their capacity to build projects under the BRI. It is no surprise that China dominates international project contracting. By 2018, <a href="https://www.enr.com/toplists/2019-Top-250-International-Contractors-1">75</a> of the world’s top 250 international contracting firms were Chinese.Most BRI projects have been funded by large state-owned banks of China and implemented by Chinese international contractors and SOEs, at times they have been subject to reproach due to poor labour relations including a lack of awareness of local rules and regulations, and especially on the hiring of Chinese labourers in large numbers instead of locals.Maria Carrai, Professor of China Studies at NYU Shanghai argues in favour of  <a href="https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65743046/WD_1_s2.0_S0305750X20305167_main-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1651327708&amp;Signature=OG1O4XNvHSblwIsYUfrb5blQwbiy0b~SuXiq9aKfw-STjlYGahGVTKHwgN7DXOm3WDAerWqfKY0iHspunM2n9IAGOfzYkuZCryKq8eq0PPgvLwdQG6Ufl3HoizzJTEQAHgj3x627V3359aWAyCxLSa-H6SYYTD2VxbkPQpV2vpOrNQ2YzX886Y0NK0t-s9WCt6Lf7ZlMy2evz54aewwDQJvS3Ki-P2ybBibKxQ5mNtJBd1xZYEe19UvN15ZLL3rmNXTCus2QW6mO6BflTSeGGcPbMsOiD-e-977Qh7KUg46GKxIvGJ8houVVqpvyq7-OoDY3nVJVjAgi3NPhOU0yVQ__&amp;Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA">local adaptive governance</a> because the success of BRI projects relies on effective communication of its social responsibilities to recipient countries with their local governments and making sure that working with the contractors or SOEs can enhance good governance.The Addis - Djibouti SGR railway operation and maintenance <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1634659/ethiopia-kenya-struggle-with-chinese-debt-over-sgr-railways/">were awarded to construction contractors with no actual railway operation experience</a> resulting in a lack of adequate technical capabilities to complete the project.Yet, the major challenge is still that Chinese BRI projects are heavily invested in countries that have historically demonstrated poor and weak governance, lack of transparency and are vulnerable to political shocks and instabilities.Since the start of the BRI in 2013, more than 80% of total Chinese foreign assistance <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/three-key-shifts-development-cooperation-chinas-2021-white-paper">has gone to low-income countries</a>, and for some like Angola, and Montenegro the BRI loans continue to risk having an <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf">unfavorable degree of dependency</a> on China as its prime creditor.Despite this, BRI in itself has gradually undergone reform over the years. From its lofty and vague ambition in early 2016 that did not indicate its focus, we now know its priority areas.President Xi during the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in 2019 <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/de/blog/chinas-white-paper-and-the-bri-can-we-expect-china-to-deliver-on-the-sdgs/">called for cleaner, greener, high-quality infrastructure projects</a> that are “sustainable, affordable, inclusive and accessible”.Chinese-backed projects have previously been under heavy scrutiny due to a lack of transparency and growing debt burden. A 2021 white paper on Belt and Road highlights the need for high-quality sustainable projects and the 2022 MOFCOM’s ‘Guidelines for ecological environment protection of foreign investment cooperation’ stresses the need for Chinese investments to meet international standards of environmentally sustainable projects.In 2021 China declared to <a href="https://greenfdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/21_07_22_BRI-Investment-Report-H1-2021.pdf">not to invest in coal-power plants</a> and also to cut funding for loss-making projects. Regulatory scrutiny has forced Chinese contractors under BRI to significantly up their game, which means we will see it focusing on smaller and fewer projects of higher quality, particularly in areas of the green and sustainable energy sector.It has been five years since Nepal signed the MoU but has so far seen little in terms of the impact. The BRI projects use the <a href="http://www.edcnepal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DAY-4-LECTURE-5-NHDP_Hydropower-Financing-Traditional-Project-Finance-EPC-and-EPC-F_2018-11-29_FINAL.pdf">Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Financing (EPC-F)</a> used in infrastructure projects and are particularly preferred in developing countries where debt markets are less mature and there may be wide variations in the availability and cost of debt financing.The EPC contractor will be responsible to finance a large portion of the project and the government has to provide a sovereign guarantee to safeguard lenders’ interests and provide payment security guarantees on behalf of off-taker, usually government-owned entities.This has generated controversy for the huge risk involved to the host country. The selection process tends to be restrictive to a particular country or set of manufacturers, in this case only to Chinese contractors.For example, only a few weeks back the government of Nepal <a href="https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/china-miffed-with-deuba-govt-s-decision-to-deny-chinese-company-to-develop-budhi-gandaki-hydro-project/">revoked the license</a> issued to the Chinese state-owned China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) for the development of the Budi Gandaki Hydropower Project under the EPCF modality with a total cost of around <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepal-refuses-china-s-offer-to-fund-multi-billion-dollar-power-project/story-cfRJPHSKJkn2gqyon7anUL.html">$2.73 billion.</a>After the 2017 BRI agreement, for the first time, Nepal developed a project under the EPC financing modality of $88 million financed by China and with MoU between Nepal’s People’s Energy and China’s Chongqing Water Turbine Works Co. Ltd.The agreement was to develop a 48.8 MW Khimti-2 hydropower project on the border of the Ramechhap and Dolakha districts in Province 3. However, the project suffered a major setback: 500 Chinese workers were prevented from coming back to Nepal due to the Covid-19 outbreak. Similarly, the EPCF model requires the contractors to be present in the project while the main construction takes place.The high-interest rates associated with BRI loans with a relatively short payback period is another drawback for Nepal which prefers grants. Furthermore, in BRI projects there is a right to bid reserved exclusively for Chinese firms, but the Nepali side demands to be open to all.Back then the BRI used to run projects on an ad-hoc basis but by 2022 it has undertaken various reforms to properly guide sustainable infrastructure development.Because the BRI is enshrined into the CCP’s constitution, there is no question regarding its sustainability, but as BRI puts its focus on environmentally friendly infrastructures, countries like Nepal should prioritise projects that can yield better results and help strengthen Sino-Nepal relations.Abiral Khatri is with the NIFRA bank and is a research scholar based previously at Erasmus University Rotterdam, IIM Bangalore and Renmin University of China. Raunab Singh Khatri is the co-founder of The Araniko Project and is a Yenching Scholar in Chinese studies at Peking University.

original

674x448

610x380

500x500

400x266

400x240

400x203

301x200

1250x600

1084x550

BRI enters the tenth year

<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221108101144/636a25309c7e80680e0439b5jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="716" height="1000"/><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221108101144/636a25329c7e80680e0439b6jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="657" height="1000">Nothing has exposed the ideological chasm between the ex-UML and ex-Maoist components of the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) more than the two widely divergent statements issued on Venezuela this week.Who would have thought that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would loom so large in exposing fissures in a government of a country on the other side of the world with which the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal has no real strategic interests.Read also:<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/?p=20802&amp;preview=true" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Nepal now has to balance not just India and China, but also the West</a>, Bhairaja Pandey<a style="background-color: #ffffff; font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/?p=20801&amp;preview=true" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Eminently beneficial for India and Nepal</a>, Ajit Baral<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/hitching-our-wagon/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Hitching our wagon</a>The Co-chair of the NCP and prime minister-in-waiting Pushpa Kamal Dahal fired off a statement in full support of the glorious revolutionary comrades under Nicolas Maduro, and denounced US intervention.It has to be said that the US has indeed come across, as it has in the past, as a global bully throwing its weight around with sanctions and threats against a poor and badly-governed country. When will America learn to pick someone its size?But Dahal made a boo-boo by aligning his party, and by association Nepal, needlessly in a power struggle reminiscent of the Cold War.There were two problems with the NCP statement. First was the timing: why would Dahal want to issue it while his party co-chair Prime Minister K P Oli was in Davos trying hard to make a good impression on foreign investors?Oli had admitted before he left that his job was to convince the international community and multinational companies that his government was ‘Communist’ only in name, and that Nepal was open for business. Even if Oli had been only partially successful in removing the stigma, Dahal’s communique firmly identified Nepal as an adherent of an obsolete ideology and a relic of the past.The only explanation we can give to this juvenile behaviour is that Dahal has a sad case of FOMO. By launching a heat-seeking missile aimed at no one in particular, Dahal may also have been trying to re-establish his rather frayed Communist credentials. But the unnecessarily strong language denouncing American 'imperialism' which was creating 'chaos and violence’ was inappropriate, undiplomatic and counterproductive.Oli looked uncharacteristically flummoxed when asked about Dahal's missive when he returned from Davos. The statement also came less than a month after Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali’s meeting with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Washington DC during which the two discussed implementation of America’s $500 million assistance through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact for road and power connectivity.The two are also understood to have discussed America’s <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/between-two-oceans/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Indo-Pacific Strategy</a> which, together with the MCC, are seen as a counter by China as a challenge to its Belt Road Initiative (BRI) which Nepal has signed on to. Gyawali trod a tightrope to balance the geostrategic interests of the two global powers, and clarified that Nepal was not going to join any US-led alliance in the Indo-Pacific.The renaming of the US Pacific Command into Indo-Pacific Command last year, designating India as a <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/del-ktm /obor-or-not-obor-china-india,1051" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Major Defence Partner</a>, the joint Malabar 2017 exercise in the Indian Ocean involving the navies of India, Japan and the US, the revival of the Quad Alliance of Japan, Australia, the US and India as an effort to 'contain' China, are all indications that Sino-US competition is heating up in the region.Asian countries may be nervous about <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/what-china-really-wants/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">China’s growing economic and political clout</a>, but Beijing feels it is being encircled by America and its allies. Still, many Southeast and South Asian countries do not want to be forced to choose between America and China.Which is what makes Dahal’s statement on Venezuela so damaging for Nepal at a time when the Foreign Ministry is trying to steer a <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/Equidistance-or-asymmetry-nepal-geopolitics,3850" target="_blank" rel="noopener">neutral course</a> that would benefit Nepal’s trade, investment and infrastructure. The Ministry's damage control this week was with a much more balanced statement saying Nepal respected the democratic will of the people of Venezuela, and opposed foreign interference.During the war, as Chairman Prachanda Dahal famously paraphrased King Prithvi Narayan Shah to say that Nepal was “a dynamite between two boulders”. It seems he has not outgrown his penchant for hyperbole.There was a time when Nepal just had to worry about balancing its giant northern and southern neighbours, but the world is now multi-polar and getting to be a much more complicated place. Our neighbours are drawn into a global power struggle, and being <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/the-triangular-relationship,3332" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a yam between three boulders</a>, Nepal has to be careful about how <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/a-trump-world-us-nepal,3359" target="_blank" rel="noopener">America’s increasingly erratic behaviour </a>will affect its precarious equidistance between India and China.A place to start would be to forge a united and coherent foreign policy strategy that prevents outside powers from using one or other party or faction in Nepal to push their strategic agenda.<h2>10 years ago this week</h2>Just as issue of Nepali Times deals with Nepal’s geopolitical dilemma, ten years ago in <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/issue/436" target="_blank" rel="noopener">issue #436 of 30 January - 5 February  2009</a> Prashant Jha <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15620" target="_blank" rel="noopener">reported from New Delhi</a> about how India had a ‘wait-and-watch’ policy towards the newly-elected Maoist government led by Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Excerpt:'India is getting increasingly concerned about the slide in Nepal, but doesn't think it warrants a policy shift just yet. Indian officials admit that they are unhappy with the Maoists: "They have not delivered on their promises,"one official told us, "their commitment to democracy seems doubtful. They are warming up to China. Not good signs."            But sources insist India continues to support the peace and constitution writing process and will not destabilise the present arrangement. "It will be good if non-Maoist actors add pressure on the Maoists. But we will not back any effort to topple the government right now," one senior official told Nepali Times.’<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/issue/436"><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221108101144/636a25359c7e80680e0439b7jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="510" height="815"></a>

A YAM BETWEEN 3 BOULDERS

Energy is a critical ingredient for prosperity, and can be a catalyst for deeper regional integration. Energy security is a critical issue for <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/Cycling-Kathmandu-Lhasa,396">South Asia</a>, which is home to nearly one-fourth of the world’s population and where economies are growing by an average of nearly 7% each year.But South Asia’s GDP per capita is less than one-third of the global average, and per capita energy consumption is far below the rest of the world, hinting at unmet need in spite of increasing economic growth, industrialisation, an increasing population, and accelerating urbanisation. All of these changes increase the <a href="http://article/nation/nepal-india-thermal-power,3570" data-wplink-url-error="true">demand for electricity</a>.There have been several positive developments in energy cooperation: the 2014 SAARC Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation and the Power Trade Agreement between India and Nepal. Bilateral frameworks between India and Bangladesh, as well as India and Bhutan, have also been strengthened. Currently, around 2,300MW of power are traded in this BBIN sub-region.These demonstrate win-win benefits for all South Asian countries. For example, Bhutan’s surplus hydropower exports to India account for 25% of its GDP. Bangladesh began importing 500MW of power from India in 2013, helping it reduce load-shedding by 70% and generate annual savings of around $500 million. India also gains by earning revenue from electricity exports.A 2015 World Bank study found that regional electricity cooperation in South Asia could lead to savings of $19 billion per year over the next 25 years. A 2017 study by the USAID-funded South Asia Regional Initiative for Energy Integration (SARI/EI) showed that accelerated power trade between India and Nepal could increase Nepal’s GDP by over $120 billion in the next 30 years.Energy cooperation is therefore not just about increasing integration but also an essential building block for regional prosperity. The US government actively supports regional energy integration in South Asia. We are committed to fostering connections from Central Asia to Southeast Asia, and everywhere in between – through increased physical infrastructure, coordinated regulatory and trade institutions, and human and digital connectivity.<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/Chief-of-Indian-Army-Staff-General-Dalbir-Singh-in-Kathmandu,987">Regional integration</a> is not just good for South Asia, it is good for the world, including the United States. A more stable, prosperous, and integrated South Asia is more likely when countries of the region are linked through trade agreements and have greater physical infrastructure connections. Our activities include technical training on power contracts, procurement, regulation, and electricity system modeling as well as physical infrastructure – such as the planned 300 km of electricity transmission lines in MCC’s Nepal Compact.International experience has shown that most cross-border power trade begins with bilateral interactions which provide a foundation for multilateral arrangements and transactions. South Asia is moving along this path, and the next step is to coordinate regional energy regulations and policies by:Building strong and effective regulatory regimesDesigning competitive market pricing mechanismsDeveloping solid contracts and agreementsSetting up dispute resolution mechanisms, andSupporting a technical regional coordination agency to facilitate regional planning and development.The United States looks forward to working with both the public and private sector, as well as multilateral organiations, to em-power South Asia. Pun intended.Alaina B. Teplitz is the United States Ambassador to Nepal. This Guest Editorial is adapted from her speech to the 6th SAARC Business Leaders Conclave in Kathmandu on 17 March.Read also:<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/shared-futures/">Shared futures</a>, EditorialDifferent regionalisms,  Kanak Mani Dixit<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/photo-exhibition,402">Forget SAARC</a> ,  Pradumna B Rana<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/Cycling-Kathmandu-Lhasa,396">Reimagining South Asia</a>,  Anurag Acharya

Em-powering South Asia

Mention the acronym <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/Chief-of-Indian-Army-Staff-General-Dalbir-Singh-in-Kathmandu,987">SAARC</a> and eyes glaze over, people stop reading editorials like these and they turn the page – as some of you probably already have. The South <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/photo-exhibition,402">Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</a> has been a regional talk shop ever since it was set up more than 40 years ago, unable to fulfill many of the promises it made about co-prosperity, cooperation, poverty alleviation, energy self-sufficiency, and environmental protection.Unlike ASEAN or the EU, SAARC is hobbled by its asymmetry. One member state has 1,000 times more people than the two smallest countries in the grouping. That gravitational pull, and India’s aversion to multilateralism in dealing with neighbours (combined with a chronic lack of political will among those neighbours to make SAARC work) has hobbled the organisation. There is cynicism about SAARC, even officials from member states publicly poke fun at it. But, like the United Nations, SAARC can only be as effective as its members want it to be.Sub-regional groupings like <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/connecting-Bangladesh-China-India-Nepal,2966">BIMSTEC</a> (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar Economic Cooperation) and the Bay of Bengal Initiative are somewhat more tangible. There are also Track 2 think-tanks and private sector initiatives to get the SAARC juggernaut to roll.The 6th SAARC Business Conclave this week in Kathmandu was one such exercise where, besides the usual lament about unfulfilled aspirations, there was networking and useful sharing of ideas. As in all such SAARC-related events, the elephant in the room was India, and the need to balance its size with its status as an equal member state.However, the dragon in the room was China. How can these economic behemoths be hitched to pull in the same direction, and take South Asia along? So far, Beijing's foray into trade, investment and connectivity in South Asia have been bilateral, but its Belt Road Initiative hopes to go regional with the possible extension of the <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Tibet-train-Nepal,3102">Qinghai-Tibet railway through the Himalayan Range</a>, and across Nepal to India.SAARC has been held hostage by politics, specifically the strained relations between its two biggest members, for far too long. Trade, investment in energy, river sharing and better connectivity within South Asia could help bind the countries more closely, and build on existing bilateral agreements, as US Ambassador Alaina B. Teplitz argues in this week’s <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/em-powering-south-asia/">Guest Editorial</a>.It is incongruous that intra-SAARC trade constitutes only 5% of the international trade of countries in the region. Of all international investment in the region only 7% is between SAARC members. It is absurd that in this day and age the world’s most deprived region should not be working together to raise the living standard of its people.Read also:<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/em-powering-south-asia/">Em-powering South Asia,</a> Alaina B. Teplitz<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/Chief-of-Indian-Army-Staff-General-Dalbir-Singh-in-Kathmandu,987">Different regionalisms</a>,  Kanak Mani Dixit<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/photo-exhibition,402">Forget SAARC</a> ,  Pradumna B Rana<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/image/Cycling-Kathmandu-Lhasa,396">Reimagining South Asia</a> ,  Anurag Acharya

Shared futures

The daily 10-hour curfew at Tribhuvan International Airport from 8 November that will last five months has affected tourism during Nepal’s peak season, with some hotels and trekking agencies here reporting cancellations into spring next year. The reduced hours at Nepal’s main aviation gateway till 31 March means that a third of all flights have been cut. This has also caused ticket prices to surge by up to eight times of normal fares. For example a Kathmandu-Delhi ticket that used to cost Rs12,000 is now listed at Rs50,000, and even then seats are not available.&nbsp; “Especially if they are here to trek, change in flight dates can cause tourists to miss their connections,” says Jagan Timilsina, who runs a trail running and outdoor education business. &nbsp; Pokhara is feeling the brunt as hotels report last-minute cancellations for November because of flight disorders. Some hoteliers also say although there have been some cancelled trips, most itineraries have been rescheduled.&nbsp; Hari Prasad Sharma Gaire of the local chapter of the Hotel Association of Nepal says the Kathmandu airport closure should have been timed for the off-season. He told us: “Starting construction during the peak tourist season was a mistake and will cause the tourism industry to lose a lot of business. The upgrade could have been spread out over a longer time but closed for fewer hours at night so that disruption was minimal.”&nbsp; Nearly a third of the 1.2 million tourists who visit Nepal annually come to Pokhara, which is also the gateway to Mustang, the Annapurna treks and pilgrimage tourism to Muktinath. Located by scenic lakes with a range of adventure sports like hot air ballooning, paragliding, canyoning, bungee and ziplines, Pokhara is also popular among diaspora Nepalis. “Besides its own attractions, Pokhara is really the hub for central Nepal, and we have been trying to get visitors to extend their stay here,” says Timilsina, who started out as a trekking porter and rose up the ranks to be an expedition guide and entrepreneur. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111603114_0e071ce63ea9b0a9a7ee76f8c3cea0ff08c6767c41dd09f6bc4413d2db067a60.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024111603114_0e071ce63ea9b0a9a7ee76f8c3cea0ff08c6767c41dd09f6bc4413d2db067a60" data-rendition-name="original" width="3500" height="2333" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara's tourism woes NT"> <figcaption>Tourist arrivals in Pokhara have slumped since the disruptions at Kathmandu airport due to upgrading work. Photo: KRISHNA MANI BARAL/NEPALI TIMES ARCHIVE</figcaption> </figure>  Even without the Kathmandu airport closure affecting tourist arrivals, Pokhara was already suffering from a decline due to many factors like the poor state of the Prithvi Highway, the shortage of luxury accommodation for high-end tourists, and the reluctance of international airlines to start direct flights to Pokhara despite an expensive new airport that was inaugurated two years ago.&nbsp; “There was a lot of initial excitement on the construction of the international airport,” says Timilsina, “but it hasn’t delivered as expected due to politics. People have invested in nearby businesses, and have faced losses.” India has blocked direct flights from its cities to Pokhara because the facility was built by a Chinese company. Although tourists and pilgrims from India hit record levels this year, the poor state of the highways and the Indian bus accident on the highway to Kathmandu in July that killed 27 pilgrims from Maharashtra state dampened arrival figures. Gaire says, “While tourist arrivals to Pokhara are now approaching pre-Covid levels, we haven’t seen the improvement we were expecting. We need a better marketing strategy. What are our embassies abroad doing?”&nbsp; Indeed, Pokhara used to be a favourite destination for Chinese tourists. There was a boom in arrivals from China before Covid, especially after a popular Chinese tv serial was shot on location here. But arrivals from China have not really recovered since the pandemic because of the economic slowdown there. Promoting Pokhara airport to handle direct flights from Chengdu or Kunming could revive Chinese arrivals.&nbsp; Nepal’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAAN) has used the Kathmandu airport closure as an excuse to arm-twist international airlines to start flying to Bhairawa, which has barely been in operation for two years since it was inaugurated. So far, Fly Dubai, Thai AirAsia, Jazeera and Qatar are flying to Bhairawa, but most use it as a hop before flying on to Kathmandu, which does not reduce congestion at Kathmandu.&nbsp; An ideal situation could have been to get Pokhara to run to full capacity while Kathmandu is partially out of action. Pokhara entrepreneurs are puzzled why the CAAN and the national government have not taken more interest in promoting Pokhara as an alternative to reduce the congestion in Kathmandu. Nepal’s football team that was flying to Dushanbe this week couldn’t get tickets via Delhi, and took a domestic flight to Bhadrapur, crossed over to Bagdogra and flew on to Delhi to catch their flight to Tajikistan.

Pokhara’s tourism woes

An excerpt of a conversation between an anthropologist and linguist Mark Turin, PhD and Lava Deo Awasthi, PhD, the first Chairperson of the Language Commission of Nepal. Nepali Times: What is the role of Nepal’s Language Commission and when was it formed? Lava Deo Awasthi: The Constitution of Nepal (2015) created a Language Commission (LC) with the following four core mandates: (a) to develop eligibility criteria for gaining status as an official language and offer recommendations to the Government of Nepal about the official language(s) in each province; (b) to offer recommendations to the Government about measures to be taken for the conservation, promotion, and development of languages; (c) to suggest possible ways of using mother tongues in education by assessing their stage of development; and, (d) to conduct studies, carry out research and perform monitoring functions about the response to the constitutional provisions for the federalisation of languages in Nepal. The Commission was founded in 2016 and I was appointed as the Chairperson of the Commission in September of the same year by the Cabinet of Ministers. What in your own professional and educational background helped to prepare you for the role? I have worked with the Government of Nepal for about 30 years, alongside holding teaching appointments at universities in Nepal. Prior to assuming the role of the Chairperson of the Commission, I served as permanent Secretary to the Government of Nepal and worked as the Chief Administrator of the Central Development Region. I was appointed as Director General of the Department of Education and completed my assignments as Joint Secretary at the Planning, Monitoring and Educational Administration Divisions of the Ministry of Education.&nbsp; In addition, I have taught courses as a visiting professor at Tribhuvan University and Kathmandu University for more than three decades. Later, I also started supervising MPhil and PhD students at the Far Western University in Mahendranagar, Kanchanpur. My PhD project from the Danish University of Education was dedicated to making sense of Nepal’s social construct and commitment to multilingualism, exploring the persistence of monolingual school practices in the face of constitutional promises and state commitments to multilingualism. I conducted a survey of Nepal’s languages and carried out a qualitative study of the Tharu language in the district of Bardia. I analysed language policy statements and explored classroom pedagogies in schools. I documented how teachers showed a tendency to resist change and maintain the status quo because they were not consulted when new educational language policies were introduced. Teachers also exhibited a deeply-held adherence to the Gurukul education system which appears to have been harnessed as a way to resist newer pedagogical ideologies imported from the West. Recognising how engrained these rich traditions of knowledge transmission are, I wanted to know how students’ engagement in the learning process appeared to have dwindled, creating a gap between children’s home languages and the language(s) of the school. Whilst statutory provisions for education in the mother tongue were oriented towards promotion, classroom pedagogies remained resolutely monolingual and exclusionary. The result was that multilingual education policies that had been introduced in Nepal did not result in meaningful changes in classroom practices. My research was also a reflection of childhood traumas I had experienced at the earliest stage of formal education. My home language, Baitadeli, has a strong oral tradition and no written literature. English is my fifth language in terms of exposure and competence, and my home district of Baitadi is well-known for its loyalty to the local language. I had to drop out of school after completing my sixth grade. Staying at home, I received much attention from my family and had much greater exposure to my native language, culture and environment. My overall impression is that dropping out of school had a surprisingly positive impact on my life. The opportunity offered a surprising dividend for me as I gained mastery in my mother tongue and received extensive exposure to folk literature and Indigenous knowledge and survival skills, cultivating my interest in language, culture, literature and local cosmologies.&nbsp; Now that I reflect on it, I appreciate how language has always played a key role in my life. I grew up in a multilingual environment: brought up with Baitadeli, Hindi, Sanskrit, Nepali and English. Language played a major part in my decision to leave school and my later success is closely linked to my competence in several languages. It was rewarding to be at home with my family as I deepened my understanding of native language and culture, which in turn helped me to harness and refine my art of living. Languages matter so much to me because they are both software and hardware. Later, when I was in secondary school, I realised that my command of my home language contributed significantly to enhancing my Nepali and English. I used my mother tongue as a form of linguistic capital to strengthen my competence in both English and Nepali.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111811110_5400ba54792bf9e4854e1c1effde8bf09804e99647f23513700b450cc49adc4a.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024111811110_5400ba54792bf9e4854e1c1effde8bf09804e99647f23513700b450cc49adc4a" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="Dr Lava Deo Awasthi"> </figure>  In your term as the Commission’s first Chairperson, what were your strategic goals and objectives? My first strategic goal was to create an environment conducive to implementing the provisions of the Constitution of Nepal in relation to language. My priority was to prepare a detailed action plan for my six-year tenure in consultation with language stakeholders, including language experts, professionals, activists, Indigenous community members and representatives of relevant national and local-level institutions. The Commission formed a body of high-level advisors to ensure that the Chairperson’s work was well-informed and credible. The advisors to the committee had highly visible professional and social reputations in Nepal and had much experience in the field of language conservation, promotion, research and development. Another strategy we adopted was to establish close institutional linkages with federal, provincial, and local level governments for collecting opinions and disseminating information widely.&nbsp; What critical issues did you have to consider while discharging your duty? When Nepal’s new Constitution was drafted, a number of concerns could not be adequately addressed. These related to the conservation of languages, the recognition of official languages at the provincial level, and the use of mother tongues at federal, provincial, and local levels. These unresolved issues and matters pertaining to the federalizsation of Nepal’s languages were passed on to the Language Commission to address and resolve.&nbsp; Regarding the recommendations for official languages, a five-year timeline had been set by the Constitution. With great effort, we succeeded in having all provinces agree to recognise their official languages as per the recommendations of the Commission.&nbsp; What were your greatest achievements during your term? One of the greatest achievements was that we succeeded in setting a language agenda at all levels. Nepal’s language communities and other stakeholders expressed the view that this was the first time their languages were recognised and their voices heard by the state. People participated in debates and discussed issues relating to language that in all likelihood had never before happened in their lifetimes, at least not in ways that were supported by the state. We encouraged people to speak in their own language(s) and provided translators during plenary sessions and group discussions. Another major achievement was developing criteria for the status planning of languages at federal, provincial, and local levels, and to recommend 11 province-level official languages, in addition to the Nepali language. Similarly, a notable achievement was recognising Indigenous languages spoken by smaller communities, all of whom faced ongoing marginalisation and high levels of endangerment. The Commission identified 9 new languages that had not been reported in the 2011 census, and provided a framework for recognising official languages within a municipality. The commission emphasised the need for documentation and digitisation of languages for developing corpora and archives at national and sub-national levels.&nbsp; Languages of historical importance as well as classical languages were given recognition for their protection, growth, and development. Recommendations were made for the conservation, promotion and development of Nepal’s marginalised languages that are threatened by majority languages and for those languages that hold particular power at local and global levels. Recommendations were also made for how best to safeguard Nepal’s languages from the ever-growing spread of English and other powerful, globalising languages.&nbsp; A further important aspect of the Commission’s work was to emphasise mother tongue medium instruction in schools across the nation. Recognising the role of language in children’s cognitive, socio-emotional and academic development, the Commission suggested strategies for linking schools with ward-level language clusters for use in the classroom. The importance of nurturing and respecting a child’s first language was reiterated in the Commission’s recommendations for children’s learning and all-round development. By the end of my term, a remarkable change could be observed in terms of building trust within and across Nepal’s diverse language communities. A network of language groups and stakeholders across the country proved to be a powerful way of bringing all language communities under one roof for a collective review of and response to the process of federalising language policy. The many language stakeholders across Nepal appreciated the opportunity to work within a coordinated framework, and—feeling empowered by this—seemed genuinely enthusiastic about the initiatives taken by the Commission.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111811114_b45297fdd2fedf17bdb6313e495a1062c0d87f1a19fa5349f871f220b75f93ab.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2024111811114_b45297fdd2fedf17bdb6313e495a1062c0d87f1a19fa5349f871f220b75f93ab" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Dr Lava Deo Awasthi NT"> </figure>  What were the most significant challenges for you as Chairperson? One of the major challenges was winning people’s trust in advocating for the mission of the Language Commission. I faced considerable resistance as I sought to emphasise the use of native languages in families and communities. While the Commission advocated for multilingualism and promoted linguistic diversity, the prevailing policy circles and central level institutions had been deeply influenced by a one-language discourse and ideology of Nepali only. The spread of English also poses a huge threat to Nepal’s languages. However, people in power do not seem to see this as a problem. They tend to abandon their own languages in preference for English. The way that Nepal’s municipalities are increasingly introducing English as a medium of instruction at the earliest stage of a child’s school-based education has proven to be detrimental to their cognitive development, socio-emotional wellbeing and academic success. Most of Nepal’s elites have been heavily influenced by the spread of English and remain unaware about its impact on their home languages as well as on the inter-generational transmission of Indigenous languages in the country. I wish that we could have produced more compelling evidence to show the consequences of making poor policy choices for our children’s education. Demystification calls for a collective response. To make change happen across this entire, complex and federalising country was daunting work and left like a race against time. I feel that I could have done more to offer concrete examples in favour of using the mother tongue as a medium of children’s education at the earliest stages of a child’s education. What do you see the Language Commission achieving in the next 5-10 years? The Language Commission will have to ensure that all of its key recommendations are implemented at all levels of government. In 10 years’ time, all seven of Nepal’s provinces will have their official languages in place. These languages will also be recognised as languages of federal business, alongside Nepali. I anticipate that all official languages in the federal and provincial systems will have a national portal for inter-language corpora using machine translation to fulfil their federal, provincial and local level language functions, and that all languages spoken in Nepal will be represented through a digital database in the national archive. The Office of Statistics will monitor the status of Nepal’s languages over time. By the end of the next decade, each municipality in the country will have recognised one or two official languages at the local level, based on speech populations. Other local languages will have received community-level legal recognition and official status to fulfil their functional roles. Languages that are highly endangered or at risk will be entitled to receive state grants for enhancing local level capabilities to encourage families and young learners to speak the language. Incentive schemes will be introduced in municipalities that promote language within the family and at home. Inter-generational transmission of languages will have received welcome and timely attention across Nepal. It is my hope that all schools—public and private—will have introduced mother tongue medium instruction at the earliest stage of school education, at least up to class five. Nepali, English and other national as well as classical and foreign languages will be taught as subjects. The existing policy of English medium education at the early stage of education will be abolished. The Government of Nepal will be held accountable if the number of speakers of any language decreases or if local communities face language loss and greater endangerment. Under the aegis of the Language Commission, a Centre for Language Research and Innovation will be created with world-class facilities for language documentation and archiving in collaboration with Tribhuvan University’s Central Department of Linguistics and other relevant institutions. Harnessing the vastness of Nepal’s linguistic diversity, the Language Commission will morph into a centre of excellence for national and international communities to engage in collaborative language research, to share experiences and document best practices at in service of global linguistic diversity and Nepal’s many Indigenous languages.

Languages are both software and hardware

Nearly 750,000 Nepalis went abroad for employment in the past year, and more than 100,000 left on student visas. Most of them were young Nepali men and women, and the number has been increasing every year. As with other sections of society, Nepal’s security agencies also face a recruitment crisis. Nepal Police opened recruitment for 64 inspectors in September, and received 2,239 applications, compared to 2,718 candidates last year. Police also invited candidates for 256 assistant sub-inspectors this year for which it received 17,756 applications – down from 19,932 last year. It is the same story in the Nepal Army, the number of applicants for the post of Officer Cadet (Second Lieutenant) went down from 6,144 for 400 open seats in 2019 to 4,390 in 2020. Meanwhile, applicants in the paramilitary Armed Police Force went down from 857 applications for 75 posts in 2021 to 536 applicants for 99 posts last year. While the number of applicants appears higher than the demand, the data shows a significant decrease in applications for vacancies in Nepal’s law enforcement agencies. Security personnel are recruited on the basis of rank and age in Nepal, and the age cutoff for entry into Nepal’s security agencies is typically 25 years. Sociologist and migration expert Ganesh Gurung says that the demographic of young, physically fit Nepalis emigrating abroad in search of better opportunities has impacted recruitment into law enforcement and the military here at home. “The returns from working in Nepal’s police and army are minimal, whereas overseas job opportunities are more attractive,” Gurung says. “The work may be physically demanding abroad, but the pay is a lot higher.”  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241116041148_a7e477e0ee2f56acf16c2559fdb24d8f0377f7bc1f9e56138bc40108fc4fa33f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20241116041148_a7e477e0ee2f56acf16c2559fdb24d8f0377f7bc1f9e56138bc40108fc4fa33f" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="534" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal Police"><figcaption>Nepal Police</figcaption></figure>  Nepal Police spokesperson DIG Dan Bahadur Karki agrees that the physical and mental demands of a law enforcement job is incomparable to the income that security personnel earn. “A young Nepali who works in Dubai earns enough to build a home in the village within four years, while a Nepali with the same qualifications and physical ability in a security agency here barely makes enough to survive,” says Karki. “Obviously the youth prefer foreign employment.” Security agencies are now worried about the quality of inducted manpower. “There is a difference in work ethic between an applicant chosen from a competitive pool of 50 candidates versus one chosen from a pool of three candidates,” explains Gurung. “Unmotivated employees hamper the overall performance of the state apparatus.” Nepal Army spokesperson Brigadier General Gaurab Kumar KC says recruitment has not been hampered by outmigration: “We have still been getting more than three times the applicants than there are open posts, so we are not yet worried.” Even so, the passing rates of aspirants have gone down for security forces after the Public Service Commission began examinations for military recruitment in 2015. In fact, the Nepal Army complained about the Commission’s involvement in recruitment. Still, the number of vacant military posts tends to exceed the number of passing candidates. Nepal Army’s KC says that the military will not compromise on intake criteria even if there are fewer passing applicants. “Unqualified persons will not be admitted even if there are less-than-required passing candidates. We will re-advertise if that is the case.” But Nepal’s security forces now also have to worry about retention of existing personnel. About 900 Nepal Army, 600 Nepal Police, and 300 Armed police personnel resign every year before the completion of their tenure.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241116041148_b8cd62f70eea3aac7d3d3778615a5b70b1e20550c9bd76321f051f9c766fd2a9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20241116041148_b8cd62f70eea3aac7d3d3778615a5b70b1e20550c9bd76321f051f9c766fd2a9" data-rendition-name="original" width="750" height="378" loading="lazy" alt="Armed police forces"><figcaption>Armed Police Force</figcaption></figure>  In 2020, Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa recalled almost 1,000 police personnel who had been deployed for the security of VIPs after long-standing criticism that security forces were being misused to cater to political and bureaucratic leadership. However, security personnel have continued to be assigned to high-ranking officials as glorified housekeepers. In December 2022, Rabi Lamichhane’s Home Ministry had instructed its offices to recall unauthorised security personnel assigned to high-ranking officials, following which 500 officers from Nepal Police and Armed Police Force were withdrawn from their details. But the Nepal Army does not have to follow such rules, and the practice of army personnel serving high-ranking active-duty and retired military personnel remains. Conditions here are dire enough that many active duty officers in Nepal’s military and police forces have chosen to leave their jobs to serve in the Russian Army to fight in the Ukraine war. The hierarchical culture and chain of command of politics, bureaucracy, law enforcement and military has also meant that abuse and mistreatment of subordinates is rife in Nepal’s security forces. “Feudalism is alive and well within our security institutions,” says Gurung. “When soldiers and security forces who swore to protect and serve the nation are made to be at the beck and call of politicians and bureaucrats, it is easy to understand why they are disillusioned with their jobs and why they choose to quit and find jobs abroad.”

Job insecurity in security forces

Earlier this month, Nepal received Rs1.6 billion from the World Bank as part of its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/will-nepal-ever-be-paid-for-saving-trees">Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)</a>, rewarding the country for increasing its carbon sink capacity. Nepal is the first in South Asia to benefit from this facility, and it is specifically to recompense the country for increasing forest cover in 13 Tarai districts between 2018-2024. “We are also trying to get another Rs13 billion from the facility while also preparing for free market-based carbon trading in the international market,” says Nabaraj Pudasaini of the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries) Implementation Centre. Big emitters of greenhouse gases are under pressure to reduce their carbon emissions, and many have signed agreements to do so by investing in decarbonisation projects in developing countries. Countries that emit more than a specified amount of carbon would be able to buy emission rights from countries that emit less. Nepal is internationally known for its community forestry program which has been largely credited for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/tree-mendous">increasing tree cover to over 45%</a> in less than three decades. But this achievement had not been adequately recognised or rewarded internationally before. Forests, especially in the tropics, absorb and store large amounts of carbon while releasing oxygen in a process known as photosynthesis. <a href="https://www.fao.org/forest-resources-assessment/en/">Preventing deforestation</a> and increasing canopy cover is considered a much more achievable goal than reducing emission in the scale necessary to limit global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. COP11 in Montreal in 2005 first proposed reducing carbon emissions by improving forest quality by halting degradation. By 2015, a new mechanism of financial assistance was created to help less developed countries with sustainable management of forests <a href="https://www.un-redd.org/">(called REDD+)</a>. Under this new mechanism, countries receive aid based on their efforts to prevent forest degradation and increase carbon sink, and in 2021 the World Bank was entrusted with implementing it. Nepal’s FCPF receipt this month was calculated on the basis of 2.4 million tons of carbon stored at a rate of $5 per ton. In the second phase, Nepal will receive more than Rs4 billion within the next year for storing an additional 7 million tons of carbon. Eighty per cent of this amount obtained from carbon trading needs to be spent on local beneficiaries and indigenous communities.&nbsp; But carbon trading is not easy, Nepal needs to prove that protected forests will not be destroyed in future.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241121091132_c8a381c9a95aa86fec558951650d97bb87914741f01766982ba2b086af001f16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20241121091132_c8a381c9a95aa86fec558951650d97bb87914741f01766982ba2b086af001f16" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="999" loading="lazy" alt="Greenbacks for greenery NT "> <figcaption>Photo: KUNDA DIXIT</figcaption> </figure>  Explains carbon trading expert Yugan Manandhar. “Forests should be handed over to the community and shown that they are managed sustainably. Proving this will be particularly challenging; forest encroachment and degradation is rife in the Tarai.” <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/nepal-is-going-up-in-smoke">Deliberate forest fires</a> have also added to the challenge because they increase carbon emissions and reduce the sink capacity of forests. The basis for the amount that Nepal received was set five years ago by calculating the carbon reserves of forests in the 13 Tarai districts. In the meantime, sustainable forest management, tree plantation, forest destruction and erosion control were prioritised to increase carbon reserves in those forests. Nepal is signing another carbon trading agreement during the ongoing Baku climate conference. The <a href="https://www.leafcoalition.org/">Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest finance (LEAF Coalition) </a>proposes to sell the carbon stored in the forests of Bagmati, Gandaki and Lumbini provinces. For this, Nepal signed the letter of intent three years ago at COP26 in Glasgow. The target is to store 70 million tons of carbon in 32 million hectares of forest in the three provinces per which Nepal will receive Rs13 billion in four years at $10 per ton with provisions to increase the rate if various conditions are met. However, the agreement in itself doesn’t guarantee the amount. According to the targets set by Nepal, forest degradation should be stopped and carbon reserves increased by protecting tree cover. Preparations are also underway for clean air carbon trade because it has offset fossil fuel use by introducing 30,000 electric vehicles. Nepal has been selected for the first round to receive $40 million within one and a half years through the Clean Air System of the World Bank. Given that most of Nepal’s energy mix is from biomass, replacing them with electric stoves can significantly improve health by reducing indoor pollution as well as strengthen the country’s capacity for carbon trade. “Nepal's goal now is to sell carbon in the free market where carbon credits are bought and sold based on supply and demand in an open and transparent manner,” adds Pudasaini of the REDD Implementation Centre. “Nepal can now set its own price and bargain with interested buyer countries and organisations.” Lately, India has been discussing setting up a carbon market. Nepal has exported Rs12.72 billion worth of electricity to India so far this fiscal year, which can be traded under Nepal’s carbon market. “Carbon trading can create significant economic benefits for Nepal, which will help reinvest in development and environmental protection projects,” says Manandhar. “But we must prioritise sustainable management of forests, cutting older trees and allowing regrowth as well as promoting electric stoves and electric vehicles.”

belt-road-initiative