This year’s COP 29 in Baku, the capital of the oil state of Azerbaijan (fossil fuels make up 90% of the country’s exports), was dubbed the ‘finance COP’. The focus of negotiations was on a ‘new collective quantified goal’ (NCQG) for climate finance, which is supposed to support the countries of the Global South in climate change mitigation and adaptation. Current climate funding is indeed totally inadequate, hundreds of billions of dollars per year are needed. 
While international public attention was on the COP negotiations about money, other issues also played a role in Baku, including the climate-peace nexus. Let us have a closer look.
On 15 November, which was the COP 29 ‘Peace, Relief and Recovery Day’, the COP Presidency (Azerbaijan), in collaboration with Egypt, Italy, Germany, Uganda, the UAE and the UK, launched the ‘<a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP29_Letter_to_Parties_and_observers.pdf">Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief, and Recovery</a>’. It was presented as “<a href="https://cop29.az/en/media-hub/news/cop29-presidency-launches-baku-call-on-climate-action-for-peace-relief-and-recovery">a milestone initiative aimed at addressing the urgent nexus of climate change, conflict, and humanitarian needs</a>. 
It is a response to the growing recognition that climate change’s adverse effects – such as water scarcity, food insecurity, land degradation, displacement, and livelihood disruptions – can act as catalysts for conflict and instability, especially in vulnerable regions”. 
The Baku Call draws attention to the “disproportionate impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable countries and communities”, which at the same time are often the countries and communities which suffer from violent conflict or are particularly fragile and conflict-prone.
The Baku Call addresses several issue areas which link climate change and (potential) conflict, such as water scarcity, food (in)security, land degradation, climate-induced displacement, and the security implications of “loss of land of some states caused by sea level rise, in particular for small low-lying island States”. 
It calls for “risk-informed, conflict-sensitive and peace-positive climate change adaptation and resilience-building measures in vulnerable areas”, and it promises to “foster solutions to mobilize climate finance for the most climate-vulnerable countries and communities affected also by conflict and humanitarian crisis”. 
Finally, the Baku Call established the ‘<a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP29_Letter_to_Parties_and_observers.pdf">Baku Climate and Peace Action Hub</a>’ as a cooperative platform designed to facilitate collaboration between national, regional and international peace and climate initiatives.
The Call builds on the ‘<a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/cop28-declaration-on-climate-relief-recovery-and-peace">COP 28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace</a>’ from last year’s COP in the UAE, which in the meantime has been signed by over 90 countries. COP28 had been the first COP at which the linkages of climate change, conflict, peace and security were a prominent topic (with its own Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace Day on 3 December 2023). 
With its activities and its Declaration, COP28 firmly established the climate/conflict/peace nexus as an issue for future COPs. And it has to be welcomed that this topic played a role again at this year’s COP and in the course of its preparations, with <a href="https://www.ecosystemforpeace.org/cop29">almost three dozen events dealing with the topic</a>, and various international networks (such as the ‘<a href="https://links-europe.eu/bonn-contact-group">Bonn Contact Group on Climate Peace and Security</a> ahead of COP29’ and Peace@COP or the UN’s Climate Security Mechanism) preparing reports and recommendations. 
This flurry of activity, however, cannot disguise the fact that no substantial progress has been made.
The Baku Call does not go beyond the COP28 Declaration, rather, it shares <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/cop28-massive-disappointments-slight-glimmers-of-hope.html">the 2023 Declaration’s shortcomings</a>. While it addresses some important issues, commitments regarding actual activities, and financing of such activities, remain vague. 
It is generally acknowledged that fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS), which at the same time are severely affected by climate change, have immense difficulties to access climate funds, due to donor risk aversion. 
For addressing the climate-conflict nexus it would be highly important to “<a href="https://www.sfcg.org/report/navigating-the-peace-and-security-implications-of-climate-change-recommendations-on-the-climate-conflict-nexus-at-cop29/">establish direct access windows</a>” to climate finance for FCAS governments, local governments and civil society, and in particular “remove access barriers for vulnerable communities” in FCAS, at the same time “ensuring that local actors are not just consulted but are equal partners with decision-making authority”. That is missing in the Call.
A tax on the arms trade to finance climate adaptation, and taxing the arms industry more generally to fund climate action would be a good idea to help communities and people in FCAS. But ideas like that did not make it into the Baku Call, which is silent on the climate impacts of arms production, of militaries and wars. 
It is obvious that “<a href="https://www.sfcg.org/report/navigating-the-peace-and-security-implications-of-climate-change-recommendations-on-the-climate-conflict-nexus-at-cop29/">military activity is exacerbating the climate crisis</a>”. But most countries do not mention their militaries’ contributions to their GHG emissions (and in Australia’s 2022 NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions), for example, the military is explicitly exempted from commitments). Reporting military emissions is voluntary, no country is obliged to report on the emissions caused by its military activities.
The Baku Call fails to address the massive contribution of militaries to the climate crisis and the climate impacts of wars, it does not demand action and accountability from military actors. And the “<a href="https://ceobs.org/what-to-expect-on-militarism-conflict-and-climate-at-cop29/">huge disparity between rising military spending and the developed countries’ unwillingness to mobilise funds for climate action”</a> did not figure in deliberations at COP 29 at all. Nor did the conflict-prone dangers of the green energy transition. 
This transition leads to massively increased demand for certain minerals (e.g. cobalt, lithium, copper). A huge expansion of mining can be expected, which can have massive negative environmental, social and cultural impacts in mining areas. Local, often indigenous, communities will be the victims, and there is an increasing danger of localised conflicts between mining companies, governments and communities.
More generally, the concerns and perspectives of local communities in the Global South, who are most affected by the climate emergency, did not matter in the COP29 discussions, and consequently, issues of climate, conflict and peace that go beyond Western, state-based, international hegemonic understandings and framings, were not talked about: structural, cultural, epistemic violence and more-than-human security and peace. 
Western anthropocentric understandings of climate, conflict and peace dominate the international climate/peace discourse, in Baku and beyond. Even if the aim to include peace and conflict into official COP negotiations in the future will be achieved, and even if there will be a ‘peace COP’, it is hard to imagine that it will take non-hegemonic, non-Western understandings of the issues at hand on board. 
This, however, would be indispensable in the interest of peace and the planet, given that “we are on a highway to climate hell with our foot still on the accelerator” according to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. 
Let us not forget: 2023 was the hottest year on record, 2024 will be hotter still. Earth is heading towards 3 degrees Celsius of global heating – well beyond the COP 2015 Paris agreement’s threshold of 1.5C. Fossil fuel production has reached new highs, fossil fuel exporting countries, like Australia, keep approving and subsidising massive fossil fuel projects. Donald Trump will become US-President. It does not look good for the climate, the planet, and for peace.
 Volker Boege was Senior Research Fellow at Toda Peace Institute.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/cop-29-the-climate-peace-nexus-was-on-the-agenda-but.html">the original</a> with their permission.

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Climate and conflicts

Samsung Nepal has opened pre-orders for the Galaxy A57 5G and A37 5G. Both phones run Samsung’s One UI 8.5, featuring AI capabilities like voice transcription, Circle to Search, and photo editing. They feature a 50MP triple-camera system, a Super AMOLED display, and six years of OS and security updates.

Galaxy A series

Know your Ministers

Prime Minister Balendra Shah on Wednesday broke tradition and met with 17 foreign envoys collectively, a move that was a notable departure from how his predecessors operated.&nbsp;
Shah had already set himself apart by talking less, listening more, and delegating to trusted friends. But by meeting all ambassadors at one go in the presence of the Foreign Ministry, he signalled a paradigm shift in how he wants Nepal to be seen: no longer just balancing India and China, but as a country confident about its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/tripolar-contestation-over-nepal">strategic importance and place in the world</a>.
In just two weeks, the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rsp-dos-and-don-ts">RSP has sprung into action </a>on multiple fronts to implement its ambitious 100-point, 100-days action plan. It has taken short-term measures to mitigate the impact of the Gulf war, as well as medium- and long- term measures to streamline the bureaucracy. A few high-profile figures have been made examples of to drive the message home.
Earlier this week, the government recalled six politically appointed ambassadors, the most notable being long-serving Shankar Sharma from New Delhi. The Kathmandu District Court issued arrest warrants against former prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his former foreign minister wife Arzu Rana on charges of money laundering and corruption.
Each ministry has been trying to clean up the accumulated rot from the past three decades: regulatory overhaul of microfinance, education, health and service delivery.&nbsp;
These actions widely disseminated campaign-style on YouTube and TikTok have made most Nepalis hopeful that the party they installed in power means business.
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BACKLASH
But such attempts to overhaul a long-entrenched political culture were bound to face backlash. In their impatience and enthusiasm to get things done, some of Prime Minister Shah’s ministers have over-reached.
It was common knowledge that government-paid advertising in the mainstream press was kickback-driven, but the PMO’s directive that official notices be published or broadcast only on state-run media has been denounced — especially as the media industry struggles to stay afloat.
More serious are some recent appointments by ministers of relatives and figures closely associated with the RSP to key positions. This has rankled because this party built its political plank on ending nepotism and graft.&nbsp;
News that Home Minister Sudan Gurung allegedly had not paid rent on leased land, which illegally encroached on the lake in Pokhara did not help. &nbsp;
Prime Minister Shah himself has come under scrutiny for appointing a kitchen cabinet full of male buddies from his time as Kathmandu mayor. To douse criticism he brought in as adviser investigative journalist Deepa Dahal, who has exposed corruption in high places of the previous coalitions.&nbsp;
Shah’s appointment of another political adviser Asim Shah to the head Constitution Amendment Task Force, is also seen as problematic. He is a filmmaker and former lawmaker, but does not have a background in constitutional law.&nbsp;
Even more controversial is the Cabinet’s decision to appoint RSP Chair Rabi Lamichhane’s legal counsel, Narayan Kandel, as Attorney General. Kandel used to be a UK permanent resident, and does not have as much experience practicing law in Nepal.&nbsp;
Kandel’s appointment drew flak and raised eyebrows, and with the pending legal cases against Lamichhane this appointment represents a flagrant conflict of interest.
Health Minister Nisha Mehta was also accused of favouritism after reappointing Junu Shrestha, wife of Labour Minister Dipak Kumar Shah, as member of the Health Insurance Board which had earlier suspended her. The Labour Minister’s rambling rant at the Board’s meeting on Tuesday has not helped the RSP’s image.&nbsp;
(UPDATE: On Thursday, Prime Minister Shah sacked the Labour Minister after the RSP found him in breach of the party's code of conduct and discipline. He served 14 days in the Cabinet, one of the shortest tenures for a minister in Nepal )
It is hard to know what <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/ball-in-balen-s-court">Balendra Shah is thinking</a>, and how Rabi Lamichhane is going to justify some of these moves. After all, making politics, governance, and bureaucracy a meritocracy has been the core tenet of the RSP, and it risks alienating its mainly youth base if these missteps persist.
But at least for now, most RSP supporters seem to be giving the party the benefit of doubt.

Nepal’s new government springs into action

In a classic arc of political sociology, a revolutionary figure takes several decades to complete their cycle: mobilisation, institutionalisation, and finally governance. 
However, the timeline of this trajectory has been telescoped in the case of Home Minister Sudan Gurung, who in 2025 described himself as a social activist and volunteer, has gone from the barricades of the GenZ protests to the mahogany desk of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Gurung is a personal pick of Prime Minister Balendra Shah, and played a pivotal role in getting him to join the RSP by mediating with Rabi Lamichhane. His journey serves as a real test bed for the ‘Outsider-to-Insider Transition’, raising a fundamental question about someone who now leads the very apparatus that he once fought against: the police, intelligence service, and the bureaucracy.
Social capital can indeed be built during a crisis exacerbated by state failure, and that is where we first see Sudan Gurung — expediting relief delayed by systemic corruption and red tape. Gurung’s delivery aid through a social-media-driven volunteer network bypassed the government. 
Whether or not he really rushed a dying child to hospital after the 2015 earthquake does not matter, it has become an urban legend. 
His work evolved into the non-profit Hami Nepal in 2020, serving as a ‘parallel state’ mechanism that would later become central to his public identity. Later, his group sprang into action during the Covid crisis, organising oxygen cylinders and beds . He was there after flood disasters in Manang and Sidhupalchok, and even organised Rs15m worth of aid to Turkey after the 2023 earthquake. 
Moral Legitimacy became his primary source of power, and he strategically positioned himself as an alternative emergency response system. But the real rupture happened on 8 September 2025 when years of frustration, corruption scandals, lack of transparency and state accountability culminated in a rally that the next day descended into anarchy. 
There was no single leader. The movement was fully decentralised, but as elsewhere such upheavals produces a recognisable face. Among them was Sudan Gurung. Who despite being a millennial himself, became the most visible interlocutor of the GenZ movement. 
He negotiated with the state’s key actors, including the president and the Chief of Army staff, during the period of uncertainty When the country was on the brink. This led to the dissolution of parliament and the formation of the interim government under Sushila Karki, paving the way for the election on 5 March.
Since then, Sudan Gurung’s role has become contradictory. Within days of touching Prime Minister Karki’s feet after her swearing in, he was at the gates of Baluwatar spearheading midnight demonstrations calling for her resignation. He accused her and Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal of not consulting the youth over Cabinet appointments and not arresting the previous government officials.
This oscillation became a hallmark of Gurung’s own version of the ‘Radical Flank Effect’ — erratic behaviour to force the establishment to make concessions. 
On 18 January Gurung formally joined the RSP, and started campaigning from his home constituency of Gorkha-1. He won decisively and was appointed home minister by Balendra Shah. The transition was complete. 
As minister his role spans core security areas: overseeing internal security through the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and the intelligence bureau. The man who took part in anti-government rallies is now in charge of the riot police that aresupposed control anti-government protests.
His portfolio also handles state administration matters such as citizenship, immigration, and border security, coordinates with the judicial system on prisons, detention, and policies related to punishment and clemency. For example will be overseeing the fraud case against his own party’s chair, Lamichhane.
In his book Power in Movement, political scientist Sidney Tarrow observes that social movement leaders encounter ‘institutional capture’ upon entering government. In a sociological paradox, the man who previously denounced the police for killing youth protesters is now the person who issues directives to those same forces.
Preventive detention, surveillance, and the control of public festivals are the same instruments that the former old guard employed to stifle his movement. The activist who demanded transparency at the B P Koirala Institute now manages the state’s most secretive security apparatus.
In this arc, Gurung is not alone, there are parallels around the world for leaders emerging from the ashes of revolt. It is not so much a prediction, but for Gurung the challenge is even more acute because youth expectations are so high.
The bar for performance has been raised by citizens demanding change and quicker, more efficient service delivery. He is under constant public scrutiny, which is why he has to take YouTubers every time he goes on inspections of the airport, the BP Highway, police stations, picking trash on the sidewalks or meeting the Swiss ambassador to ask about repatriating the ill-gotten wealth of politicians.
Sudan Gurung is facing intense public glare. There have been calls to reveal the truth behind Hami Nepal’s finances, the alleged links to Free Tibet, and lately not paying five years of rent for an illegal lakefront property in Pokhara. 
As minister, he will find that moral legitimacy alone is no longer sufficient, it must be reinforced by transparent and consistent institutional accountability. Sudan Gurung’s ascent is evidence that the public mostly trusts ‘outsiders’ during times of crisis. However, history also cautions us that the state only permits ‘insiders’ to operate. 
Gurung will have to organise systemic reform to inject the transparency of his volunteer days to the Home Ministry’s traditionally secretive disbursements. If he fails, he runs the risk of validating Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy, which would serve as a warning about how revolutionary energy is dissipated by the very structures it was intended to overthrow.
Nepal is watching the man who said he once held a dying child in his arms after an earthquake. The volunteer has become the Warden.
Nischal Raj Gautam is a student of Media Studies and Mass Communication at St. Xavier's College, Maitighar. He is a member of the EU Delegation's Youth Sounding Board (YSB), and a journalist for TheirWorld's The Education Issue 2026.

climate-peace-nexus

Climate and conflicts

Galaxy A series

Know your Ministers

Nepal’s new government springs into action

He said no to politics. Now he runs it.