This year’s COP 29 in Baku, the capital of the oil state of Azerbaijan (fossil fuels make up 90% of the country’s exports), was dubbed the ‘finance COP’. The focus of negotiations was on a ‘new collective quantified goal’ (NCQG) for climate finance, which is supposed to support the countries of the Global South in climate change mitigation and adaptation. Current climate funding is indeed totally inadequate, hundreds of billions of dollars per year are needed. 
While international public attention was on the COP negotiations about money, other issues also played a role in Baku, including the climate-peace nexus. Let us have a closer look.
On 15 November, which was the COP 29 ‘Peace, Relief and Recovery Day’, the COP Presidency (Azerbaijan), in collaboration with Egypt, Italy, Germany, Uganda, the UAE and the UK, launched the ‘<a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP29_Letter_to_Parties_and_observers.pdf">Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief, and Recovery</a>’. It was presented as “<a href="https://cop29.az/en/media-hub/news/cop29-presidency-launches-baku-call-on-climate-action-for-peace-relief-and-recovery">a milestone initiative aimed at addressing the urgent nexus of climate change, conflict, and humanitarian needs</a>. 
It is a response to the growing recognition that climate change’s adverse effects – such as water scarcity, food insecurity, land degradation, displacement, and livelihood disruptions – can act as catalysts for conflict and instability, especially in vulnerable regions”. 
The Baku Call draws attention to the “disproportionate impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable countries and communities”, which at the same time are often the countries and communities which suffer from violent conflict or are particularly fragile and conflict-prone.
The Baku Call addresses several issue areas which link climate change and (potential) conflict, such as water scarcity, food (in)security, land degradation, climate-induced displacement, and the security implications of “loss of land of some states caused by sea level rise, in particular for small low-lying island States”. 
It calls for “risk-informed, conflict-sensitive and peace-positive climate change adaptation and resilience-building measures in vulnerable areas”, and it promises to “foster solutions to mobilize climate finance for the most climate-vulnerable countries and communities affected also by conflict and humanitarian crisis”. 
Finally, the Baku Call established the ‘<a href="https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP29_Letter_to_Parties_and_observers.pdf">Baku Climate and Peace Action Hub</a>’ as a cooperative platform designed to facilitate collaboration between national, regional and international peace and climate initiatives.
The Call builds on the ‘<a href="https://www.cop28.com/en/cop28-declaration-on-climate-relief-recovery-and-peace">COP 28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace</a>’ from last year’s COP in the UAE, which in the meantime has been signed by over 90 countries. COP28 had been the first COP at which the linkages of climate change, conflict, peace and security were a prominent topic (with its own Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace Day on 3 December 2023). 
With its activities and its Declaration, COP28 firmly established the climate/conflict/peace nexus as an issue for future COPs. And it has to be welcomed that this topic played a role again at this year’s COP and in the course of its preparations, with <a href="https://www.ecosystemforpeace.org/cop29">almost three dozen events dealing with the topic</a>, and various international networks (such as the ‘<a href="https://links-europe.eu/bonn-contact-group">Bonn Contact Group on Climate Peace and Security</a> ahead of COP29’ and Peace@COP or the UN’s Climate Security Mechanism) preparing reports and recommendations. 
This flurry of activity, however, cannot disguise the fact that no substantial progress has been made.
The Baku Call does not go beyond the COP28 Declaration, rather, it shares <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/cop28-massive-disappointments-slight-glimmers-of-hope.html">the 2023 Declaration’s shortcomings</a>. While it addresses some important issues, commitments regarding actual activities, and financing of such activities, remain vague. 
It is generally acknowledged that fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS), which at the same time are severely affected by climate change, have immense difficulties to access climate funds, due to donor risk aversion. 
For addressing the climate-conflict nexus it would be highly important to “<a href="https://www.sfcg.org/report/navigating-the-peace-and-security-implications-of-climate-change-recommendations-on-the-climate-conflict-nexus-at-cop29/">establish direct access windows</a>” to climate finance for FCAS governments, local governments and civil society, and in particular “remove access barriers for vulnerable communities” in FCAS, at the same time “ensuring that local actors are not just consulted but are equal partners with decision-making authority”. That is missing in the Call.
A tax on the arms trade to finance climate adaptation, and taxing the arms industry more generally to fund climate action would be a good idea to help communities and people in FCAS. But ideas like that did not make it into the Baku Call, which is silent on the climate impacts of arms production, of militaries and wars. 
It is obvious that “<a href="https://www.sfcg.org/report/navigating-the-peace-and-security-implications-of-climate-change-recommendations-on-the-climate-conflict-nexus-at-cop29/">military activity is exacerbating the climate crisis</a>”. But most countries do not mention their militaries’ contributions to their GHG emissions (and in Australia’s 2022 NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions), for example, the military is explicitly exempted from commitments). Reporting military emissions is voluntary, no country is obliged to report on the emissions caused by its military activities.
The Baku Call fails to address the massive contribution of militaries to the climate crisis and the climate impacts of wars, it does not demand action and accountability from military actors. And the “<a href="https://ceobs.org/what-to-expect-on-militarism-conflict-and-climate-at-cop29/">huge disparity between rising military spending and the developed countries’ unwillingness to mobilise funds for climate action”</a> did not figure in deliberations at COP 29 at all. Nor did the conflict-prone dangers of the green energy transition. 
This transition leads to massively increased demand for certain minerals (e.g. cobalt, lithium, copper). A huge expansion of mining can be expected, which can have massive negative environmental, social and cultural impacts in mining areas. Local, often indigenous, communities will be the victims, and there is an increasing danger of localised conflicts between mining companies, governments and communities.
More generally, the concerns and perspectives of local communities in the Global South, who are most affected by the climate emergency, did not matter in the COP29 discussions, and consequently, issues of climate, conflict and peace that go beyond Western, state-based, international hegemonic understandings and framings, were not talked about: structural, cultural, epistemic violence and more-than-human security and peace. 
Western anthropocentric understandings of climate, conflict and peace dominate the international climate/peace discourse, in Baku and beyond. Even if the aim to include peace and conflict into official COP negotiations in the future will be achieved, and even if there will be a ‘peace COP’, it is hard to imagine that it will take non-hegemonic, non-Western understandings of the issues at hand on board. 
This, however, would be indispensable in the interest of peace and the planet, given that “we are on a highway to climate hell with our foot still on the accelerator” according to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres. 
Let us not forget: 2023 was the hottest year on record, 2024 will be hotter still. Earth is heading towards 3 degrees Celsius of global heating – well beyond the COP 2015 Paris agreement’s threshold of 1.5C. Fossil fuel production has reached new highs, fossil fuel exporting countries, like Australia, keep approving and subsidising massive fossil fuel projects. Donald Trump will become US-President. It does not look good for the climate, the planet, and for peace.
 Volker Boege was Senior Research Fellow at Toda Peace Institute.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/cop-29-the-climate-peace-nexus-was-on-the-agenda-but.html">the original</a> with their permission.

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Climate and conflicts

It is that time of the year again, and another annual climate jamboree. Last year it was in the UAE, this year it is in another petrostate, Azerbaijan.&nbsp;
On the eve of the summit, the president of COP29 was exposed in a sting operation by World Witness while giving leads to a fake financier for fossil fuel projects in Azerbaijan. Like Dubai last year, this is another jumbo gathering with nearly 67,000 delegates. That is a large carbon footprint.
Even so, global climate negotiations are of critical importance, particularly to build a stronger case for Loss &amp; Damage (L&amp;D) and adaptation for countries like Nepal which are at the frontlines of climate breakdown.
Baku is billed as the ‘Finance COP’ and an agreement was signed for full operationalisation of the L&amp;D Fund to disburse money starting next year. On 13 November, Nepal also organised a prominent event in Baku to address loss and damage in mountain areas.
COP29 is also mandated to come up with a new roadmap to mobilise $100 billion every year to developing countries by the end in 2025, as agreed ten years ago in Paris. But much water has flowed down the Seine since then, and there is bickering between rich and poor countries on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). Who is going to fund the additional $671 billion annually for loss and damage, and $2.4 trillion a year by 2030 to meet emission targets?&nbsp;
The hardcore negotiations will not take place till the L&amp;D Fund board meet in Manila next month. But there are lots of things to iron out first to garner necessary political will in Baku. Who is going to pay, how much, is it going to be part of already committed development aid or is it new money, and besides, with frequent record-breaking disasters, we may need much more than $100 billion a year by 2030.&nbsp;
Nevertheless, the Nepali adviser to the LDC Chair at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Manjeet Dhakal is optimistic, and told us from Baku that this summit should build momentum to speed up the L&amp;D Fund.
The September floods in central and eastern Nepal claimed 244 lives, and damaged more than a dozen hydropower plants temporarily, slashing domestic generation capacity by half and caused billions of rupees in damage that will take years to recover. The Melamchi disaster in 2021, the Kagbeni flood in 2022 and Thame this year are other recent climate-induced calamities.
The World Weather Attribution concluded that rapid urbanisation and climate change were key drivers behind the September disaster. Evidence such as this will increase Nepal’s case for L&amp;D Funds even though encroachment and quarrying contributed to the destruction.&nbsp;
Climate impact must therefore be addressed simultaneously with urban planning, better governance, with local adaptation and mitigation plans. Nepal has to put its own house in order for its loss and damage claims to have weight at the international table.&nbsp;
Nepal has already exceeded one of its climate goals of increasing forest cover to 45% of area, and recently received Rs1.6 billion from the World Bank for increasing its carbon reserves between 2018-24 by expanding forest cover in 13 Tarai districts. Nepal has also made notable progress in transitioning to clean energy by electrifying transport and cooking. However, electricity is a mere 3.5% of Nepal’s energy mix, with biomass taking a 80% share.&nbsp;
Nepal’s strategy moving forward should be to come up with a new Nationally Determined Contribution aligned with the Paris 1.5°C goal. This also corresponds with the other top priority of COP29, which is to guide countries to submit new 1.5°C aligned NDCs next year.
Even if the L&amp;D Fund does come through, it will be inadequate to fully make up for the harm that is sure to intensify in the coming decade. Even if we did get the money, it is doubtful given the lack of transparency and Nepal’s record of poor disbursement if it will ever get to the neediest people. In other words, we are on our own.
Writing emotionally for this paper in the aftermath of the September floods, climate finance expert Rastraraj Bhandari said, “We in the climate finance sector are lost in words, actions and false promises of organisations purporting to help vulnerable countries, communities and families.”
Echoing the helplessness of the survivors, he added, “I worked on projects to mobilise millions of dollars for climate action so that those most vulnerable would be safe. Yet, this weekend’s floods have shown me that on the ground, absolutely nothing has changed.”&nbsp;
Sonia Awale

Bad COP

Thirty years ago, two years after the Rio Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, a joint research project by Swisspeace and ETH Zurich came to the following conclusion: "The dramatic intensification of global, regional and local environmental crises is making ecological destruction an increasingly important factor in conflicts."&nbsp;
At that time, field research focused on the conflict potential of drought and desertification in the Sahel, of international rivers (for example, in Central Asia) and of destructive mining (including the copper mine on Bougainville).&nbsp;
Among other things, one dissertation dealt with the contribution of the human-ecological stress situation on the "thousand hills" of Rwanda to the genocide of spring 1994. CO2 emissions and climatic changes only emerged nebulously on the horizon as factors influencing crises and conflicts.
Meanwhile, "climate change" is pushing all other issues into the background. When run-down regimes, such as the one in Syria, blame all problems in the country on global climate change, you have to ask whether everything is going right.&nbsp;
It was precisely this question that was critically examined at a recent joint symposium in Hamburg organised by the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg and the Toda Peace Institute.&nbsp;
Researchers from the Pacific Islands Countries of Fiji, Tuvalu, Cook Islands, Samoa and Vanuatu, in dialogue with participants from Germany, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Norway and Denmark, among others, underlined the complex and multi-layered threats to the Pacific islands.&nbsp;
The action-oriented researchers opposed international "climate reductionism" and the deterministic view associated with it, according to which rising seas would mean the inevitable demise of the island world.&nbsp;
The indigenous populations counter the doomsday fantasies with an alternative narrative that draws on their rich philosophical and spiritual sources. This seems to be one of the reasons why, despite the enormous challenges, the indigenous people radiate an astonishing serenity and, contrary to the widespread 'victim' narrative, point to their own 'agency'. The indigenous researchers postulate: &nbsp;
"The whole thing must be preserved!"
The term "(Pasifika) relationality" is intended to highlight the deep and ultimately boundless relationships between man and nature, past and future, ancestors and future generations. The individual only exists as part of the whole. Or, as one participant from Samoa put it, "We have no land, we are the land. We have no sea, we are the sea."&nbsp;
The land is "the anchor of our identity", added a participant from Fiji. This means that the indigenous population has no choice but to use all their physical and spiritual strength and the innovative application of traditional knowledge that spans generations in order to maintain their "place" together with the graves of their ancestors on the land they have inherited.&nbsp;
Resettlements—if at all possible—from coastal to higher areas, for example, are therefore painful and traumatic events. It is important that resettlement is a community decision and that it is taken voluntarily and after all other adaptation steps have been exhausted. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
The indigenous people certainly see climate change as a major challenge. It is not only causing the sea to rise, but also an increase in devastating cyclones and other extreme weather events. These cause them more concern in their everyday lives than the supposed sinking of the islands. Islands are not the Titanic. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
The indigenous people experience the threat and the possible loss of their "place" in a double sense: &nbsp;
<ul>
 <li>Climate change affects the indigenous population in the form of structural violence, which is the fault of the industrialised countries and the former colonial rulers. The violence, which is perceived as global injustice, manifests itself as a growing gap between the current situation and what is possible and feasible in the future to lead the island world into a secure future.</li>
 <li>The current and expected loss of livelihoods leads to social upheaval and political tensions, especially when local governments allow themselves to be taken in by the former colonial rulers for quick "solutions" without consultation. These include evacuations, resettlement programs and forced forms of climate migration, for example, to Australia, New Zealand and the USA (especially Hawaii). The loss of land brought about by "false emergency aid" and local politics is perceived by the indigenous people as "cultural violence", which threatens the very core of the community by breaking up the holistic relationality.</li>
</ul>
Structural or cultural violence does not necessarily lead to physical or armed violence. As the Pacific islanders impressively demonstrate, they are trying to achieve innovative and peaceful results through dialogue, resilience and international diplomacy. So far, only Bougainville has seen a major civil war in the greater region, which was partly caused in the 1990s by the catastrophic environmental impact of a copper mine operated by Rio Tinto Zinc. &nbsp;
For comparison, in other geographical contexts, massive acts of violence can also be attributed to environmental changes. As the civil war and mass displacement in Darfur (West Sudan) show, the increasing pressure on land resources, changing land use rights and patterns, pronounced droughts and climate-induced desertification have fueled inter-tribal as well as regional and cross-border violent conflicts.&nbsp;
With the help of the military junta of El Bashir, these culminated in the genocidal civil war that broke out in 2004, displacing millions of people. As the then leader of the janjaweed militia and war criminal Hemeti could not be handed over to the ICC, he is still able to reduce Sudan to rubble in a power struggle with General Burhan; he is doing this not least with the help of the Wagner Group and the subsequent Russian Africa Corps, which is particularly keen on the gold mines in North Darfur.&nbsp;
What is happening in Darfur today applies to the entire Sahel region: fragile statehood, military coups, terrorist and criminal violence and dysfunctional gerontocracies (Cameroon) now characterise an entire region of the world where livelihoods are already under widespread threat from climate change and local environmental degradation. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Learning from the Pacific way could also be a constructive approach elsewhere that strives for peace, security and sustainability. Against the backdrop of potential conflicts and an island population that has become vulnerable, the widely supported "Toda Pacific Declaration on Climate Change, Conflict and Peace" of 2018 is a milestone. After an introductory description of the problem, it states: "Therefore, responses to climate change adaptation require both conflict prevention measures and conflict-sensitive approaches that prioritize local contexts and the maintenance of peace."&nbsp;
A whole list of concrete measures follows, ranging from the adaptation of international environmental law and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions to local, culturally adapted and nature-related activities. "Rights of nature" are contrasted with an anthropocentric exploitation scheme. The motto is to grow together and not at the expense of others (other people and other non-human living beings as well as future generations). &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Those who are literally in danger of losing the ground under their feet should remember their roots. "After me, the deluge" has never and nowhere been a sensible answer.
Günther Baechler, PhD, was head of the joint research project by Swisspeace and ETHZ project in the 1990s: Environmental Degradation and Conflict. After 2007, he returned to Darfur as Switzerland's special envoy. He was a mediator in the "Doha Process" led by the UN and the AU.&nbsp;
&nbsp;This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/we-have-no-land-we-are-the-land.-we-have-no-sea-we-are-the-sea.html">the original</a> with their permission.

We Have No Land, We Are The Land. We Have No Sea, We Are The Sea

Project Syndicate: Being especially vulnerable to climate change, the Global South is open to receiving financial, technical, and other forms of support from wherever they can get it. Are America and its allies squandering an opportunity here?
Ian Bremmer: At this point, developing economies are open to climate finance support from any quarter. With simultaneous major geopolitical conflicts, inflationary pressures, and pivotal elections happening this year, America and its allies view climate partnerships with emerging markets as a lower priority. The EU’s top priority is Ukraine, and the US has been consumed with the Gaza conflict.
The Global South will therefore strengthen ties with China and Middle Eastern countries, as we’ve seen happening since the last United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28). Diversifying partnerships makes sense for these governments, since wealthy countries have made it clear they won’t significantly ramp up support anytime soon. Although <a href="https://cop29.az/en/news/letter-to-parties-and-constituencies#:~:text=The%20COP29%20Presidency's%20top%20negotiating,priorities%20of%20developing%20country%20Parties." target="_blank">climate finance</a> will be a major topic at COP29 in Azerbaijan, the $1 trillion target will go unmet, leading to frustration and even more collaboration with non-traditional partners.
The donor pool is becoming a contentious topic in UN climate negotiations, because countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and China are not currently classified as ‘<a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf" target="_blank">developed economies</a>’. The United States and some EU governments are pushing to expand this list to achieve more ambitious goals, but it won’t happen. Many emerging markets support the current list because they don’t want to antagonise China, which firmly opposes being a donor and criticises developed markets for not delivering on climate finance.
Do strategic and ‘national-security’ considerations surrounding climate policy and green technologies ensure a zero-sum dynamic?
This collaboration has historically set global policy expectations, laying the groundwork for milestones like the Paris climate agreement, COP26 in Glasgow and COP28 in Dubai. The outcome of the US election will be crucial, but under a Democratic administration, robust climate cooperation could continue, particularly with the right climate envoys.
During the first three years of <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s presidency, US Climate Envoy <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/john-kerry">John Kerry</a> and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, demonstrated that meaningful <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-00692-7" target="_blank">progress</a> can still be made despite broader tensions. After the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/08/05/1115878668/china-taiwan-pelosi-climate-military#:~:text=BEIJING%20%E2%80%94%20China%20declared%20Friday%20it,Nancy%20Pelosi's%20visit%20to%20Taiwan." target="_blank">suspension</a> of climate talks following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, Kerry and Xie’s teams were among the first to resume discussions in 2023.
Even then, separating climate issues from US-China tensions will pose a challenge. Chinese officials have stressed that climate collaboration requires “overall stable relations”.
What about under a second Trump presidency? How much damage could he do to the net-zero transition, both in the US and globally?
Donald Trump is obviously no fan of climate policies, but he supports US industry. His administration would cut Inflation Reducation Act spending, and could do so significantly with full Republican support. These cuts would then ripple through the economy. But the US would still pursue aggressive industrial policies, challenging economic trade partners. A Trump administration would favour oil and gas, but its impact would be limited.&nbsp;
On the international front, you could expect a US withdrawal from UN climate talks altogether, which could derail progress at COP30 and significantly reduce funding for developing economies. This could weaken new climate commitments from all governments by 2025, eventually pushing global temperatures higher than currently projected.
And following the strong performance by far-right parties in the European Parliament elections, should we expect Europe’s ambitions under the 2020 EU Green Deal to be scaled back?&nbsp;
The EU has temporarily peaked in its adoption of environmental policies. Looking ahead, the bloc will largely focus on implementing existing regulations. Key among these is the <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en" target="_blank">Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive</a>, which will require companies to ramp up disclosures starting next year, with France already <a href="https://www.novata.com/resources/blog/csrd-unpacked-enforcement-compliance-and-penalties/#:~:text=France%20is%20the%20only%20country,not%20publishing%20the%20sustainability%20report." target="_blank">imposing</a> strict penalties for noncompliance. 
&nbsp;
Similarly, the <a href="https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/deforestation-regulation-implementation_en#:~:text=It%20will%20start%20to%20apply,Deforestation%20Free%20Products%20(EUDR)." target="_blank">EU Deforestation Regulation</a> will take effect this December, and countries around the world are already preparing for it. Seven key commodities will be barred from the EU market if their sourcing involves any kind of deforestation, legal or illegal.
Meanwhile, the recently adopted <a href="https://www.esginvestor.net/eu-approves-nature-restoration-law/#:~:text=EU%20member%20states%20have%20approved,targets%20in%20the%20bloc's%20history." target="_blank">Nature Restoration Law</a> – the EU’s flagship biodiversity legislation – requires that member states create action plans and set targets to increase their conservation and restoration efforts. The enforcement of these policies will lead to “<a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Nature_Positive_Guidelines_for_the_Transition_in_Cities_2024.pdf" target="_blank">transition risks</a>.” Multinational corporations and governments that fail to comply with sustainability-related regulations will face legal action.
Another elephant in the room is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set highly ambitious decarbonisation targets reaching <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59125143" target="_blank">net-zero by 2070</a>, but India has also been hoovering up Russian hydrocarbons at a discount and <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Indias-Coal-Consumption-and-Emissions-Hit-Record-Highs-in-Q1.html" target="_blank">increasing</a> its consumption of coal.&nbsp;
Actually, India’s net-zero target by 2070 is perceived by many as <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-net-zero-emissions-target-by-2070-little-too-long-term-hardeep-singh-puri/article67398684.ece" target="_blank">insufficiently ambitious</a>. But India faces a tough balancing act between long-term decarbonisation and immediate economic priorities. It still relies on coal for domestic security and is being cautious about phasing it out until renewable-energy capacity and alternative revenue sources for coal-producing regions are well established.
Energy-storage limitations, fluctuating LNG prices, and other challenges have prompted a shift toward a combination of LNG and green hydrogen for industry, and a mix of solar and nuclear power for residential areas.
Owing to capital shortages, grid instability, minimal storage solutions, and reliance on emerging technologies, India <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/india-may-miss-2030-renewable-energy-targets-as-up-punjab-haryana-lag-say-experts/articleshow/90964081.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank">will not meet</a> its 2030 targets of 500 gigawatts of non-fossil fuel power capacity and a 45% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels. It is, however, expected to build its clean-energy supply chains by 2030 (leveraging a second-mover advantage), and this should help to accelerate its energy transition.
EVs are one bright spot. India has implemented <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/india-says-high-tariffs-evs-protect-chinese-imports-2024-06-14/" target="_blank">tariffs</a> to protect its budding domestic EV sector, and earlier this year it introduced a new <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2014858#:~:text=The%20Union%20Government%20has%20approved,by%20reputed%20global%20EV%20manufacturers." target="_blank">policy</a> to encourage EV manufacturing. This could attract investments worth billions of dollars from companies like Tesla or various Japanese firms.
In the past, you’ve proposed new bodies such as a World Carbon Organisation. Where does your thinking stand today in a world increasingly dominated by zero-sum strategic considerations?
Multilateral institutions will continue to face challenges, but they remain essential in an increasingly fragmented world. Their value lies in reaching global consensus and driving coordinated action, as seen with the Paris agreement’s impact on countries, companies, and communities. In that case, there was a clear ‘before and after’.
Yes, progress has been too slow, but to be fair, expectations for these negotiations are often too high, setting them up for failure. International fora should be seen as what they are: annual stocktaking exercises that help the world assess its current position and decide on necessary course corrections.
Unilateral initiatives, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Deforestation Regulation, face just as much, if not more, pushback. This highlights the need to improve multilateral systems – by creating new structures or overhauling existing ones – rather than abandoning them. Doing so is ultimately in everyone’s interest. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">© Project Syndicate</a>
Ian Bremmer is a political scientist and founder of Eurasia Group, a geopolitical risk advisory firm, and GZERO Media.

Climate security and geopolitics

Who is accountable for teacher-student relationships?

Of the nearly 19 million eligible voters in next week’s election in Nepal, an estimated 5 million are abroad and cannot cast their ballots. Many others within Nepal must travel to their home districts, and might decide not to because of the cost.
Flights into Kathmandu these days are full of global Nepalis returning just to vote, but almost as many are leaving for overseas jobs. Most of those coming or going are in the 20-40 age group, and a majority want Nepal to see a change in leadership.
Bangladesh held an election this month in which citizens overseas could vote by mail.&nbsp;
“Bangladesh made maximum use of technology not just for campaigning but also for polling itself. We could have also managed this, so people within Nepal did not have to travel to their home districts to vote,” says Mohna Ansari, former head of Nepal’s National Human Rights Commission who was an election observer in Bangladesh.
A 3-day holiday has been declared so people can travel to their home constituencies to cast ballots. Even if there was not enough time to manage ballots for overseas Nepalis, it could have been done for Nepalis within Nepal.
Former Chief Election Commissioner Bhojraj Pokharel reckons that physical voting in countries with a large Nepali diaspora would have been a logistical nightmare, but in the PR system, using electronic voting machines or paper ballot could have been piloted in some places. It is not possible to manage the entire voting process until we introduce the internet voting system.
“First of all, there needs to be political will to bring the policy and be ready to undertake that level of investment and it is not a one-time cost,” Pokharel says. “A government formed by the GenZ could have atr least issed an ordinance ensuring this right, piloted out-of-country voting where possible, which could have built pressure for the future Parliament and the government. It would have given people hope. It is a lost opportunity.”
All major political parties called for voting rights for global Nepalis in their manifestos, but these very leaders blocked legislation allowing it despite a 2017 Supreme Court ruling out of fear that it would be anti-incumbent.&nbsp;
<h2>Why so late?</h2>
Bangladesh delivered election results in just one day, but the final results of Nepal's last local polls in 2022 including that of Kathmandu constituencies took nearly a month.
Acting Chief Election Commissioner Ram Prasad Bhandari said this week that the results of the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) ballot counting would “likely” be published within 24 hours of the poll closing at 5PM on 5 March. But many are skeptical.
“I wonder if we lack the capacity or know-how to announce results as quickly as possible,” says Mohna Ansari.
Former Chief Election Commissioner Pokharel says manual ballot paper counting in Nepal is inherently slow because of the large numner of political parties and/or candidates on the ballot, the counting mechanism, the political behaviour of the candidates/parties and some managerial issues during counting.
“Our present policy is to count all the ballot papers at the returning officers' officies, located at the district headquarters. It requires collecting ballot boxes safetly first. This takes time, and there have been cases of ballot boxes being damaged or stolen during transport. In a few highly difficult, geographically remote polling centres, we use a helicopter or transport. But sometimes, accommodating the party and candidates' representatives remains challenging,” explains Pokharel. A solution could be counting ballots at the very booths where they are cast.
Another reason for the delay is simply the number of political parties, and the need for each ballot paper to be examined by booth representatives for consensus. In close races, the smallest difference can lead to tense situations, further delaying results, even though counting centres are protected by metal fencing so there is no disruption.
After this, then it is the turn of Proportional Representation (PR) ballots to be counted. Weeks pass by the time the results of candidates and parties are tallied and verified. But the most common delay is because election officers think ballot counting is a nine-to-five job.&nbsp;
“The efficiency of poll station officers is most important, and they are incentivised for this,” says Ansari, adding that counting can even start within an hour after voting closes.
In remote areas, local resources could be mobilised to make counting quicker, but there is a crisis of trust, adds Ansari.&nbsp;
That could be easily solved with electronic voting which the EC implemented in the 2008 polls but discontinued because political parties felt the machines could be hacked or manipulated.

Nepalis Select Who To Elect

On Saturday, Iran retaliated with missile strikes on Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain and Qatar, a region where there are an estimated 2 million Nepalis working to send money home. In addition, thousands of Nepalis were preparing to board flights to Kathmandu from West Asian cities this weekend to vote in the 5 March election. Many are said to be stranded at various aviation hubs. A Qatar Airways flight from Doha took off just before the air space was closed, while Air Arabia and Kuwait Airways have diverted or cancelled flights. Nepalis in the West Asian region said things were relatively calm where they were, although some heard loud explosions at about noon local time. In Dubai, some thought they were Ramadan fireworks.&nbsp; In Kuwait, nearly 2,000 Nepalis working in the US military base as security guards and cleaners were evacuated before the strikes. In Bahrain where the US Fifth Fleet naval base is located and which was hit by two Iranian missiles, workers contacted by Nepali Times said the situation was under control and the authorities had told everyone to stay indoors and not use highways. The conflict also coincided with the beginning of Nepal’s trekking and mountaineering season, and tourists were either on their way or planning to leave European and North American cities for Himalayan hikes. Most of them transit through Doha, Dubai or Kuwait and all three airports are closed. Turkish Airlines flights via Istanbul are still operating.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260228130212_ab5e132d56da1df6a3fb1b6919648f845a168ad2c51d79f7587fb85a6e913b97.png" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20260228130212_ab5e132d56da1df6a3fb1b6919648f845a168ad2c51d79f7587fb85a6e913b97" data-rendition-name="original" width="1864" height="826" loading="lazy" alt="Qatar and UAE airspace closed"> <figcaption>Qatar and UAE airspace closed. Credit: Flightradar24</figcaption> </figure>  However, the main impact for the world could be a spike in the price of petroleum products if the strategic Strait of Hormuz is blocked. China relies on Iranian oil for their refineries, and Nepal could be affected indirectly if the economies of its neighbours are hit. Nepal imports all its diesel, petrol, LPG and aviation fuel from India which sources it mainly from the Gulf, and until recently from Russia. Petroleum makes up 25% of the value of all imports, and that is more than Nepal earns from all its exports. Saudi Arabia this year overtook the UAE as the main destination for Nepali workers, with the number now totalling 400,000. There are said to be as many in the UAE, and another 350,000 in Qatar. There are another 100,000 mostly women in Kuwait, and 50,000 each in Oman and Bahrain.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260228130220_d24ae633ff84f283835434becdb2f1351f84c415ce87ca34378bd4e2669661b3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20260228130220_d24ae633ff84f283835434becdb2f1351f84c415ce87ca34378bd4e2669661b3" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="West Asia Iran conflict"> <figcaption>Iran retaliated with missile strikes on Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain and Qatar on Saturday.</figcaption> </figure>  Nepal receives nearly $11 billion a year in remittances from overseas Nepalis (not counting India) through official channels, although the total is said to be much more. &nbsp;This makes up more than a quarter of Nepal’s GDP equivalent — one of the highest proportions in the world. More than half of the overseas remittances to Nepal comes from its workers in the Gulf, and it is the mainstay of the country’s economy. Nepalis in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE alone send home more than $3 billion a year, much of that helping support their families back home. An average Nepali worker in the Gulf sends home nearly $2,500 a year, and this is spent mainly for household supplies, children’s education and healthcare. There are also an estimated 7,000 Nepali caregivers and healthcare workers in Israel, and most of them are women. The Nepal Embassy has asked Nepalis in Israel to take caution and move to bomb shelters.

West Asia war and Nepalis

If you did not watch the understated movie उनको स्विटर / (The Woolen Sweater) after it was released in May last year, you missed a major turning point in Nepali cinema. Much-hyped films fall short of expectations, but here is an exquisitely acted and directed production with a strong underlying message of tolerance. What a contrast from formulaic melodramatic Kollywood fare — a love story so simple, cinematography so subtle in capturing the beauty of the monsoon on mountain pastures, and a background folk song accompaniment that evokes the flavour and tenor of multi-ethnic eastern Nepal. Since its release, Unko Sweater received praise in Nepal, but it was in multiplexes across Nepaliphone India where the movie became a rage. Positive reviews spread by word of mouth on social media, where the script, performance and camera work were praised for reflecting a genuine and unsullied rural Nepal. The movie is a layered portrayal of caste, ethnicity, gender and culture with the tender romance between the shy Dharanidhar Kafle (Bipin Karki) and Phool Gurung (Miruna Magar) in which the two, despite being soulmates, have to deal with societal norms and gossip. They do this without rebelling, in their own quiet way. In the first scene in a crowded jeep, people are seen discussing an election. An elderly greying Kafle is headed home, and the rest of the movie has back and forth flashbacks revealing the story of his unspoken affection for Phool. But there is an undercurrent of ethnic rigidity. When Kafle’s brother Dambar elopes with Iksha Limbu, the repercussions are borne by both families. Then Kafle’s uncle is banished for being an outcast.&nbsp; Miruna Magar as Phool, as an ebullient woman, is in contrast to the introverted Kafle, who does not say much but has a melodious singing voice. As the plot thickens, Kafle is shown to be bound by circumstances that pose obstacles to his love for Phool. The storyline delicately shows how life and situations constantly force people to shift direction. Despite underlying differences, the various castes and ethnicities in this fictitious village near the Sikkim border get along because they have to. There is an interdependence between highland farmers and other ethnicities living down the valley that is at the heart of Nepal’s ethnic harmony. Despite taboos about interethnic and intercaste relationships, people still have trust and faith amongst each other. There is no time reference to the story, but it does speak of a nostalgic era decades ago when rural Nepal was not yet connected by roads and phones, when people had no choice but to get along. Things have changed now with outmigration, and education has blurred ethnic lines. A QUIET LOVE Director Nabin Chauhan is not in your face with his message, giving viewers a hint of deep rooted traditional values that still govern society. Each character adds to the storyline, validating the way they behave, pushing the plot forward.&nbsp; There are many emotions that are intricately woven into the plot, and the most prominent, of course, is love. Not the showy, lustful way it is shown in flamboyant formula films, but a quiet bond that does not need words, a silence, a glance and a gesture conveying the universe of love. When Phool asks Kafle what he will do if they cannot be together, he says he will build her a house with a beautiful garden of flowers in the meadows where he herds livestock. He builds it awaiting her return, while Phool knits him a sweater, the symbol of their interwoven love. In screenings of the film in Nepal and India, there has not been a dry eye in the audience. The background score and music by Kobid Bazra and the powerful rendition by Jhuma Limbu of the ‘Kafle’ strike a strong chord. The cinematography by Chintan Rajbhandari does not glamourise Nepal’s rural landscape, it is shown in its raw misty beauty as a constant backdrop. The viewer is uplifted by the notion that love transcends social restrictions and orthodoxies.&nbsp; The ending is left deliberately unfinished, possibly to make way for a sequel which we can only hope will be as compelling as उनको स्विटर. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260301060348_42480e8b6934c9a5c518c44c2970748b341bbbf290c2b303b6aa6359d883567b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20260301060348_42480e8b6934c9a5c518c44c2970748b341bbbf290c2b303b6aa6359d883567b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="560" loading="lazy" alt="Unko Sweater"> </figure>  उनको स्विटर / (The Woolen Sweater) Artmandu Nepal, 2025 Directed by Nabin Chauhan 145 minutes Available now on YouTube <div class="embed-block"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/lCgtmgiII7M?si=MirwKOwKmxE3jLS6" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>

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