Nepal’s leaders often make grandiose promises that they will turn the country into Switzerland within a decade. We will be lucky if Nepal could even attain the per capita GDP of Swaziland.
Becoming another Switzerland or Singapore is the boastful fantasy of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/politics-as-usual">incompetent serial politicians</a> who keep getting themselves elected again and again.&nbsp;
So, what has to change?&nbsp;
It has to be <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/looking-ahead-to-nepal-s-2027-elections">through elections</a>, but there is spreading distrust of the democratic system bordering on nihilism among Nepalis. The three main parties must have sensed by now that they are doomed if they do not get their act together and inject new untainted blood into tickets in 2027.&nbsp;
One election will not clean up the muck that has accumulated over the past 35 years, but we have to start with the next one. Politics cannot be business as usual any more, voters are fed up with what is on offer.&nbsp;
Over <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/push-factors-driving-nepalis-out">one-third of young Nepalis are not even in Nepal</a>, and they are not allowed to cast their ballots. But we saw in 2022 that the diaspora can have an impact on how their folks vote back home, and this trend is bound to increase in 2027. It would finally break the vote banks on which the established parties have relied on to perpetuate misrule.
Nepal needs solutions urgently to address snowballing crises on multiple fronts: social inequity, joblessness and low purchasing power, failing agriculture, breakdown of services, a pandemic of corruption feeding mal-development, low capital formation, environmental woes, and to top it all off — a runaway climate emergency.&nbsp;
Yet, there are bright spots, many of which happened despite political instability: falling poverty rate, improved health and education status, increase in forest cover, conservation successes, growth in hydropower.&nbsp;
Just imagine how much further ahead Nepal would be if it was not plagued with chronic mismanagement, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/higher-corruption-in-high-places">corruption and conflict</a>.
It is because of these modest gains that <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/not-poor-but-not-rich">Nepal will graduate</a> from a ‘least-developed’ to a ‘developing country’ in November 2026, and transition to middle-income status by 2030 — even though it still has an annual per capita income below the $1,306 threshold.
The driving force for this growth comes almost entirely from remittances which make up 26% of the GDP — the third highest in the world. Inflows officially hit $12.54 billion last year, and nearly 65% of households depend on money <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/the-new-equaliser">family members send home</a>, spending most of it on basic needs.
A recent discussion at the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) titled Diaspora Dialogue: Innovation, Identity and Global Influence looked at leveraging the 4 million Nepalis who live and work abroad to spur investment and growth.
IIDS has been involved since 1979 in policy advocacy to propose sustainable solutions to governments under at least four different political systems. The fact that we are in the state we are in now must mean that not many of the policy priorities the IIDS put forward in the past 40 years have been properly implemented.&nbsp;
For decades, we’ve heard that Nepal’s path to economic growth lies in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/nepal-can-level-up-tourism-with-electricity">hydropower and tourism</a>, but that narrative has to change, noted IIDS Executive Director Biswash Gauchan.&nbsp;
“Forget falling water, forest and forex,” he said. “Nepal has to move to a knowledge economy, boost investment and look beyond our neighbours to the diaspora.”&nbsp;
There is an artificial bubble in real estate and banking due to remittances. Even if Nepal gets 3 million tourists a year and exports most its hydropower it will not be enough to take the annual per capita income to $6,000 by 2050.
A knowledge economy means thinking beyond enrolment rates and basic literacy to quality education relevant to the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/investing-in-people">human resources the country needs</a>. This will ensure jobs at home in import-substitution agriculture, value-added manufacturing and export of services.
And that is where global Nepalis come in. Connectivity means the end of geography, and diaspora talent and capital can be harnessed for investment and involvement in innovation to take Nepal into a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/smart-ageing-is-nepal-s-next-frontier">digital future</a>.&nbsp;
This needs a paradigm shift away from a rent-seeking state to a ‘whole-of-government’ strategy that can only come from a new crop of competent technocrats with integrity and vision to seize the moment. They have to see migration not as 'brain drain' but as 'brain circulation'.
Those Nepalis exist. In Nepal and all over the world. Swaziland’s anuual per capita income is $4,000 — think we can do it <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-in-2050-wk6r5r1j">by 2050</a>?
Kunda Dixit

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Size does not matter

<figure><img width="1500" height="1000" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110161132/636d19959c7e80680e0ac828jpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>Photo: AMIT MACHAMASI</figcaption></figure>This short book, Political Economy of Social Change and Development in Nepal, by Jeevan Sharma, a senior lecturer on South Asia and international development at the University of Edinburgh, packs a punch. Drawing on his own original field research and the ideas of Karl Polanyi on The Great Transformation (1944) as well as secondary literature, Sharma has produced a holistic overview and analysis of the economic, social and political transformation that Nepal has experienced over recent decades. `His work challenges many of the prevailing characterisations and explanations of that process, and identify some of the contradictions that underlie the more visible fault lines that others like Ram Sharan Mahat and Baburam Bhattarai also have identified. In his Introduction Sharma writes that ‘change, transformation and development have been recurrent themes, not only in everyday conversations, political rhetoric and social movements, but also in Nepali public culture and literary writings since the 1950s’. He then reviews both the main features of the changes that have taken place since the 1950s and also some of the different theoretical and empirical studies that have addressed those changes. Sharma warns against the uncritical adoption of Polanyi’s framework for ‘the Global South’, but argues that a more complex model, involving ‘a three-sided constellation of conflict among proponents of marketisation, adherents of social protection and partisans of emancipation’, would make it possible to connect ‘politics, society and economy’. He does not consider in any detail alternative approaches to the ‘political economy’ of social change and development in Nepal (eg the ‘neo-liberal’ and the Marxist) although he sees the ten-year <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/blogs/thebrief/2015/02/16/making-war-on-the-day-of-love/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Maoist insurgency</a> (1996-2006) as part of a broader movement for social justice, rights and citizenship that he argues has been developing ‘since the 1950s’. The book has four main chapters, each considering an axis of change. Chapter 2 ‘From Subjects to Citizens’ considers Nepal’s political ‘transition’ focuses particularly on the period since the 1950s. The first half of the chapter charts the uneven process the transition from subjects to citizens at the national level, the second half examines local perceptions of the dynamics of social change with particular reference to changes in caste, gender and local power relations and to the role of the Maoist insurgency in bringing about these changes. This section draws on Sharma’s own fieldwork in western Nepal. Chapter 3 ‘Peasantry, Mobility and the Changing Face of Rural Nepal’ looks briefly at the economic and social history of the peasantry in Nepal and ‘changing rural society’, exploring the diversification of rural livelihoods, the weakening of ‘caste-based feudal relations’ and the commodification of labour. This leads on to a consideration of <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/nepali-migration-in-the-2020s/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">migration</a>, which he rightly sees as having a long history from the mid-18th century onwards. Somewhat controversially, Sharma identifies three to five ‘waves’ of migration, the last of which became more widespread after the 1990s and ‘has come to shape the nature of the remittance-based national economy of Nepal’ – leaving many Nepalis in low-paid, highly exploitative and precarious employment. I would have preferred to see migration as characterised by different ‘forms’ or ‘regimes’, often contemporaneous rather than sequential. And despite the undoubted importance of remittances in contemporary Nepal would contest the notion that Nepal’s economy is ‘remittance-based’. There are many different strands in Nepal’s complex integration in the wider regional and global economy, including not only the export of labour, but also of other resources as commodities, and the importation of commodities from other countries, foreign direct investment, loans and ‘<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19592#.YXet2E1BzOQ" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">foreign aid</a>’. It is also debatable, as the climate crisis deepens in this most vulnerable of countries, whether paid employment away from home is necessarily more precarious than livelihoods based on <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/aid-rarely-aids-agriculture-in-nepal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">agriculture</a> and embedded in a local economy and society often characterised by hierarchy and inequality.   Chapter 4 ‘Mobility and Educational and Occupational Futures’ focuses on the experiences of young men from rural Nepal as they struggle to overcome the challenges of mobility and find secure, and salaried employment. It draws heavily on Sharma’s fieldwork in Palpa and explores ‘social meanings and patterns of mobility’, looking at the links between education and employment in particular, but also considering the significance of caste and ethnic identities in determining outcomes. This chapter is particularly rich in ethnographic terms, and complements Sharma’s earlier work on ‘youth, migration and masculinities in Nepal’. It would be good if some anthropologist were to undertake a similar investigation into the education and subsequent livelihoods of girls and women. Chapter 5 ‘Development and Patronage Politics’, while referring to programs undertaken during the early 20th century ‘that would fall under what is broadly regarded as development’, Sharma sees 1950 as ‘a critical moment in Nepal’s development history’. He examines briefly what he calls the ‘initial rush for development’ in the 1950s and then the program of ‘nation-building through Bikas’ under the Panchayat System dominated by King Mahendra. This is followed by a review of the period after the first Jana Andolan from 1990 to 1996 (‘democratisation for development’) and of the Maoist insurgency (‘conflict and development’) from 1996-2006. Sharma considers the Maoists’ theory, strategy and practical contribution to economic, social and political change. While recognising that ‘development was at the core of Maoist ideology and strategy’ and acknowledging their positive influence in certain areas – notably addressing inequality and social discrimination – he seems largely unimpressed by their actual achievements and has a number of negative things to say about their practice. Somewhat surprisingly, he does not refer in any detail to their theoretical and political analysis of development and underdevelopment, despite several of the Maoist leadership publishing them widely. He notes, however, that the Maoist insurgency prompted various development agencies to reconsider their own strategy for addressing ‘<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/end-of-war-is-not-peace/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">structural violence</a> and discrimination’ – resulting in the establishment of a new consensus on the priority on gender, caste and ethnicity through the lens of  inclusion and empowerment. This effectively downgraded the concerns of economic (class) inequality, and poverty, which had hitherto been a main concern of both the World Bank and the UK Department for International Development (DfID). He also remarks that the conflict itself had the effect of accelerating the process of migration, both temporary and permanent, from the rural areas to the towns and abroad, thereby contributing to the transformation of both rural and urban economy and society. ‘The Maoist insurgency coincided with a major economic change in Nepal, that is, the commodification of land and labour as never before, with the deepening of the market in the citizens’ everyday lives,’ he writes. This process continued in the next period, following <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/revisiting-maoist-demands,2860" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Jana Andolan II</a> and the <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=12806#.YXetRU1BzOR" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Comprehensive Peace Agreement</a> (CPA) of 2006, as the Maoists re-entered the mainstream of Nepali politics and contributed to the peace process and state re-structuring. This led to the establishment of an interim government, the abolition of the monarchy, and the election of a Constituent Assembly charged with the task of drawing up a new constitution, for a secular, federal republic. The excitement of the early years of this period (2006-2008) was followed by seven years of political wrangling and lack of direction until, eventually, shortly after the April-May 2015 earthquake, a new Constitution was finally promulgated in September. This was marked by controversy, and <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/few-jobs-created-by-nepal-employment-drive/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">failed to advance</a> any of the promising elements of the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/justice-in-transition/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">CPA</a>, including Article 3.13. which envisaged ‘a policy of massive increase in employment and income generation opportunities by increasing investment in industries, trade and export promotion’. Sharma argues that ‘sluggish economic growth and <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/missing-the-plot-in-nepals-job-scheme/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">lack of jobs</a> have created economic precarity’, and that while demands for greater rights for various social minorities have tended to take centre stage, there has been little or no appetite on the part of government or opposition, development agencies or civil society, for economic justice.  Sharma argues that ‘beyond the immediate impact on the economy and lives and livelihoods, the earthquake had a seismic impact on Nepal’s long political transition’.  I would disagree. Although it resulted in the ‘fast-tracking of the Constitution-writing process’, the earthquake failed to promote a new sense of common endeavour or urgency, even as regards physical reconstruction after the earthquake. The interventions of the foreign agencies in its aftermath were un-coordinated and subject to widespread criticism. Controversies over aspects of the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepals-contentious-constitution-day/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Constitution</a> and the very different responses to it from China and India, provided fuel for a ‘new Nepali nationalism’, as Sharma suggests – even if this nationalism proved divisive rather than integrative. This period was marked on the one hand by a national debate over the precise form the promised new ‘federal’ structure would take, and efforts to delineate the contours of a new, more decentralised polity, while on the other hand, political discourse and practice continued to be characterised by the dominance of elite politics at all levels, national, regional and local, and by the pervasive and malign phenomenon of corruption and patronage. Sharma ends this chapter by remarking that ‘the politics of the distribution of development has been realised in practice by distributional coalitions’. In other words, development in Nepal is not the broad-based, inclusive form of positive economic, social and political transformation that the term often implies, but rather a narrowly conceived and implemented, and fragmented, ‘sharing of the spoils’. The book ends with a consideration of ‘Precarity and Paradox in Once-Remote Locations’, on the contradictions of globalisation for a social formation on the periphery of the global political economy that retains many of the characteristics of pre-capitalism. It also looks into the nature of life on the periphery – which involves integration in the global political economy but creates ‘precarious livelihoods’. Sharma is concerned that Nepal’s integration into the wider world has so far failed to generate the appropriate ‘counter-movement’ to safeguard and protect the lives and livelihoods of the majority of ordinary Nepalis, even if it has <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/nepals-great-income-divide/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">apparently reduced poverty</a>, allowed the emergence of a middle class, and enabled <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepals-richest-man-in-the-pandora-papers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">a minority to accumulate considerable wealth</a>. Nepal’s continuing and arguably increasing reliance on foreign labour migration is both a cause and a consequence of the failure to generate decent, reasonably secure employment and economic opportunities within the country. It is a failure of both the public and the private sector, but it is also a consequence of the lack of an enduring movement for economic, social and political reform (or revolution) to bring about a ‘great transformation’ in Nepal. David Seddon is a former Professor of Development Studies at the University of East Anglia and now independent researcher and writer.Political Economy of Social Change and Development in NepalJeevan R. SharmaBloomsbury Academic India, 2021215 pp.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221110161132/636d19989c7e80680e0ac829jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="180" height="291">

Nepal’s elusive ‘Great Transformation’

Nepali Congress (NC) President Gagan Thapa's candidacy in Sarlahi-4 has thrust this Madhes constituency into rare national focus. If Thapa wins and the NC emerges as the largest party, Sarlahi-4 will send Nepal's next prime minister to Parliament. But if he does not, Nepal’s grand old party will face the next years in the opposition to fight another day. There is a troubling paradox in Sarlahi-4 where the district bordering the Indian state of Bihar has been a battleground for national politicians with fierce electoral competition, all while remaining one of the region's most underserved and underdeveloped constituencies.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260305140344_069cbbc11e971a851b444866dee57f760c0cc611ed40bdf96c627e343e3c0485.png" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20260305140344_069cbbc11e971a851b444866dee57f760c0cc611ed40bdf96c627e343e3c0485" data-rendition-name="original" width="1802" height="1276" loading="lazy" alt="Sarlahi-4 voting"> <figcaption>Photo: MADHES PAHARA MEDIA</figcaption> </figure>  Ever since Mahant Thakur split from NC in 2008 to form the Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party, the district has seen rotating political alliances and fragmented votes. Yet, despite 18 years of candidates promising change irrigation schemes remain incomplete, market access for farmers has not improved, unemployment is high.&nbsp; On election day, voters here marked their ballots with fingers stained by dye from the Holi festival the day before. The road leading to Barathawa Bazar was deserted for the most part, except for some youth riding in motorcycles. This is where the high-profile contest between Gagan Thapa and RSP nominee Amresh Singh is being staged. Among the other aspirants is 27-year-old UML candidate Amnish Yadav, the son of former MP Shiv Pujan Yadav. The Yadavs are a political family with considerable caste influence in the constituency. In 2022 Yadav’s daughter Madhumala Yadav received over 14,000 votes here, ranking third overall. Yadav was voted MP from the Maoist party, but defected to the UML this time. His other son is the chair of Sarlahi’s Ramnagar Rural Municipality. Sarhali-4 has 121,012 voters, and the Yadav is banking on the 27,000-strong Yadav vote bank. Sarlahi-4 voter Avishek Sah told us he wanted his vote to go to a young nominee and not someone who has been MP thrice already, like Amresh Singh. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260305140344_527c5c2f9aa6a6c7e3bbdfbfe79fdafb0a0b56a62427e9ced86b924c6c563b10.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20260305140344_527c5c2f9aa6a6c7e3bbdfbfe79fdafb0a0b56a62427e9ced86b924c6c563b10" data-rendition-name="original" width="1200" height="1600" loading="lazy" alt="Sarlahi-4 voting"> <figcaption>Photo: AYUSHA CHALISE</figcaption> </figure>  To make local loyalties even more complicated, Amnish Yadav’s uncle, Harinder Yadav is an active NC member and walked side by side with Gagan Thapa during his door-to-door campaigns.&nbsp; The NC is betting on Thapa getting over 60% of the total votes. Amresh Singh’s tally could be limited to 10,000 votes — that too because of the nationwide RSP wave, and the popularity of its prime ministerial hopeful Balendra (Balen) Shah. “Amresh Singh lost his appeal when he played victim after he was denied a ticket by the NC in 2022,” Harinder Yadav says. Voters we spoke to here agreed with this assessment that Singh did not do much for the district once he got elected in the past, and being a part of the RSP seems to be his biggest asset. “The only reason I voted for Amresh Singh is because Balen is in RSP,” local voter Mahendra Gupta from Barathawa. &nbsp;“This is his last chance to return the people’s trust.”&nbsp; Gupta is aware of the institutional presence of the NC here. The party received the most votes in 2022 local elections, adding that the candidacy of someone as high-profile as Thapa is a positive sign for Sarlahi-4.&nbsp; Other voters like Ruby Gupta are rooting for both the NC and the RSP. “I will vote for Gagan and for Balen,” she says, adding that her FPTP vote will go to Thapa while her PR ballot would be for the RSP. RSP supporters are confident that their candidate will win big because even though many voters may not have openly voiced their support they still voted for the party and candidate. The Balen Wave was not limited to RSP voters, but also to UML candidate Yadav, who said in a gathering that he will be “the voters Balen” if they elect him. He touted his party’s track record in government, and largely campaigned on administrative efficiency, infrastructural expansion, and local service delivery. Amresh Singh ran on the RSP’s anti-establishment brand, promising to fight corruption, challenge traditional party politics, improve basic services such as education, health, jobs, and infrastructure, while pushing for stronger representation and development for Madhes.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260305140344_982df01801fa7d3532ca0555ecb8a0756e3223be3d93650e08ca82a312dc2ebd.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20260305140344_982df01801fa7d3532ca0555ecb8a0756e3223be3d93650e08ca82a312dc2ebd" data-rendition-name="original" width="1600" height="1200" loading="lazy" alt="Sarlahi-4 voting"> <figcaption>Photo:AYUSHA CHALISE</figcaption> </figure>  Singh’s rivalry with his NC competitor goes beyond the ballot— he allegedly blames Thapa for being denied the NC ticket in 2022, which led him to win the election from Sarlahi-4 as an independent. &nbsp; For his part, Gagan Thapa focused on a more pragmatic development agenda that includes upgrading roads and irrigation, improving schools and hospitals, supporting farmers, and creating employment opportunities with improved governance at the centre. He also promised to build an engineering college in the constituency.&nbsp; Thapa also promoted his own anti-establishment image within the NC, repeatedly reminding voters on the campaign trail that he represents the aspirations of the youth.&nbsp; On Thursday, as voting progressed, there were violent disruptions in two centres where voting was briefly halted. But Sarlahi district police spokesperson Saroj Rai told Nepali Times that there were no major problems. Police in collaboration with the Nepal Army sent the ballot papers to the district’s counting stations, where the votes are expected to be tallied through the night and the winner announced Friday morning.

Sarlahi-4 nervously watches ballot count

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<div class="embed-block"><iframe src="https://election-geo-dashboard.pages.dev/" width="100%" height="700" frameborder="0"> </iframe></div>

Nepal election live results

As this report is uploaded, the latest results in Nepal’s election show that the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) is headed for an even bigger sweep than most had predicted.
The RSP was leading by large margins in 49 of 165 constituencies, &nbsp;with the UML, NC and NCP trailing far behind. Prominent political figures from the old parties like K P Oli, Minwndra Prasad Rijal, Ishwar Pokhrel, Bishnu Prasad Poudel, Bimalendra Nidhi all seem headed for defeat.
It does look like the RSP’s bell election symbol is ringing right across Nepal — from cities to the remotest districts in the mountains and plains. The party’s blue colour is sweeping the land.
The Nepali people seem to have sent a clear message that they were throughly dissatisfied with the chronic failure of the three main parties to work in the national interest to create jobs and deliver development. It was also an expression of lingering outrage over the the 8 September massacre outside Parliament. &nbsp;
It now looks almost certain that Balendra Shah will get to be Nepal’s next, and youngest, prime minister. Hopefully he will be leading a cabinet of competent and honest technocrats. It remains to seen how the power equation between Shah and the RSP’s leader, Rabi Lamichhane will play out.
Lamichhane is out of jail on bail for fraud cases which he has called political vendetta by the previous regime. Both he and Shah are charismatic and ambitious. Their working relationship will determine Nepal's political stability and whether it can avoid the political cronyism of the past.
This election was not just about casting votes. It was about standing up to principles and a value system, and respecting the hopes and aspirations of Nepal’s youth. It to push for transparent government and against impunity — including for the gunning down of young Nepalis in cold blood.
<div class="embed-block"><iframe src="https://election-geo-dashboard.pages.dev/" width="100%" height="600" frameborder="0"> </iframe>Live election results as winners of candidates are announced.</div>
CAN DO MAN
Shah got mixed reviews as mayor. He was impulsive and ad hoc, but most people inKathmandu and beyond liked his can-do attitude and unconventional style which stood in sharp contract to the legacy leaders. Over his three year mayorship he showed more maturity and planning capacity.&nbsp;
But he always ran headlong into opposition from the federal government over his urban planning and other initiatives to make Kathmandu more liveable. Coming from a civil and structural engineering background, he was involved in building low-cost housing after the 2015 earthquake.
But his public persona is more tied to his irreverent rap lyrics that stood up for the marginalised underprivileged in society, while exposing the high-handedness and apathy of the state. But this also exposed contradictions because he also used his own municipal guards to beat and chase away street vendors and squatters.
But there is no doubt that a combination of the sharp messaging in his rap videos amplified by the algorithms of social media ignited Nepal’s youth to rise up. It was more about optics and emotion than policy and strategy.
He studied Kathmandu district for five years, visiting experts in every field before announcing his independent candidacy for mayor in 2022. Many like me in his own constitunecy did not know who he was and where he came from.
He is a year younger than my architect son, and I saw in him a reflection of my own son’s commitment to serving the nation. I voted for him to be mayor despite his sometimes erratic behaviour, which could be attributed to his youth.
The best sign of his strategic planning, which unsettled septuagenarian and octogenarian politicians, is the he did not grab the first easy option of becoming prime minister in September when GenZ activists offered him the post.&nbsp;
Joining RSP was a masterstroke, as was his challenge to Oli in Jhapa to project national branding. He needed a party platform and Lamichhane needed a popular prime ministerial persona since he himself could not hold the post.
Shah has shown the capacity to take risks when he believes the value justifies the action for the country. Now, he will have to show more strategic thinking on a national scale, as well as understand the delicate geopolitics of Nepal.&nbsp;
He must rise above the kind of crude social media posts that earned him followers on X, but did nothing to erase his erratic and impulsive image.&nbsp;
Some assume that behind his trademark RayBan shades is a closet dictator, and his past remarks about Hitler are still up on social media. He has in the past shown impatience with criticism, unleashing supporters on social media to troll detractors.&nbsp;
Even so, the public seems willing to place their hope on an educated young man with integrity and a proven record for planning at the helm. By tomorrow it will be clear whether the hope Nepalis have held has been fulfilled, and the coming years will show if the RSP will lead Nepalis to a better future.
The voters seem to have shown the door even to the NC despite the fact that under Gagan Thapa, the party had turned a new leaf. A strong government under Prime Minister Balendra Shah heading a carefully selected cabinet and a strong opposition of the NC, UML and other parties for check and balance may be just what we need for a stable Nepal.&nbsp;
Nepalis have collectively always shown maturity in elections. This time they have given a resounding endorsement for integrity and for good governance.

Bells ring all over Nepal

After Thursday’s election, Nepalis are in a wait-and-watch mode. The Election Commission says counting ballot papers will be expedited this time, and the results for the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) will start being declared within days. In 2022, it took three weeks for the final results to be tallied.&nbsp;
But winning an election is only half the challenge for the parties, forming a government under parliamentary politics is like a complicated mathematical equation.&nbsp;
In 2022, the Nepali Congress (NC) emerged as the biggest party, winning 89 seats. But the UML with 78 seats and the Maoists with 32 formed a minority government. In fact, Sher Bahadur Deuba did not become PM then despite leading the biggest party in Parliament.
This time, there is an unmistakeable Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) wave led by its prime ministerial candidate, Balendra Shah. Besides his own popularity, Shah represents change which most Nepalis are clamouring for after decades of corrupt and feckless coalitions that did not deliver.&nbsp;
The past months of campaigning has seen massive youth engagement on social media through memes, AI clips, and viral images. Digital content that appeals to emotion rather than policy debate between candidates shape electoral outcomes in Nepal and elsewhere. &nbsp;
Shah represents GenZ aspirations, and was their candidate for prime minister. It was only when he declined that Sushila Karki was nominated. None of the political parties in the recent past -- new, old, or revolutionary — have won enough seats to go it alone.&nbsp;
The most recent majority government was formed by the short-lived Communist Party of Nepal after the UML-Maoist merger in 2022. But that rare two-thirds majority collapsed after a power struggle between K P Oli and Pushpa Kamal Dahal. The only party to have won a majority was the NC in the 1991 and 1999 elections. But it is near impossible for it to repeat this success now, even with Gagan Thapa's rebranding of the party.&nbsp;
We have compiled these possible scenarios for election outcome in order of likelihood:
RSP gets a majority
RSP hits the magic 138 to form a government entirely on its own. Balendra Shah wins Jhapa-5, and becomes the new prime minister at 35, the youngest ever to hold the office in Nepal. But danger lurks: there could be a personality clash between Shah and Lamichhane who are both equally ambitious. History could repeat itself.&nbsp;
RSP wins but does not get a majority
RSP is likely to sweep the most votes, but what if it does not secure enough seats for a majority? It would need a coalition partner and Nepali Communist Party (NCP) under Pushpa Kamal Dahal could fit the bill, but only if it has the numbers. The RSP is not likely to team up with the UML or NC.
The NCP is relatively untainted by the 8 September events, and also has former UML defectors like Madhav Kumar Nepal and Bhim Rawal who could bag their rural vote banks. After all, there are no permanent foes in politics. If the royalist RPP and Tarai-based Janata Samajwadi have enough seats, those could be options for the RSP. &nbsp;
NC is second
The NC under the new leadership of Gagan Thapa could become the second biggest force and form a government with RSP in a power-sharing deal with Shah. This would be the most stable scenario since the RSP and NC have competent and idealistic young technocrats. Thapa himself embodies a strong combination of both old and new politics to navigate the system for more efficient government. But then Thapa and the RSP's Rabi Lamichhane do not get along.
NC and NCP form a majority
If the NC becomes the largest party but not by a big margin, it could join up with the NCP and Ujyalo. Teaming up with the UML would likely face backlash with the party and outside. If Gagan Thapa becomes prime minister he will face internal pressure from both Deuba loyalists. Same old story.
Minority coalition of NC, UML and NCP
RSP becomes the first party but does not get a majority, paving the way for the three legacy parties to cobble together a minority government. While this is possible in Nepal’s parliamentary system, such a scenario is likely to lead to more instability and dissatisfaction among young Nepalis demanding change, and even trigger street unrest. &nbsp;

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