Political intimidation, ownership pressures, the rise of AI, and economic constraints are calling into question the future of press freedom – nowhere more conspicuously than in the United States, where these forces have combined to fuel growing anxiety about the fate of an institution that has been fundamental to democracies everywhere. At this year’s International Press Institute World Congress, Project Syndicate Deputy Managing Editor Rachel Danna sat down with Martin Baron, former executive editor of the Washington Post, to discuss the state – and fate – of journalism today. Project Syndicate: You’ve said that journalism’s core mission is to hold powerful institutions to account. In today’s climate, in which media owners, particularly in the US, fear political retaliation, how can editorial independence be maintained? Martin Baron: Journalists must insist on their editorial independence. That’s the first thing: not to concede anything, and to make it clear that their job is to report on what’s happening – what their government is up to, and what the most powerful institutions and individuals in their countries are doing, for good and for ill. The core of our mission is to hold the powerful to account and listen to people who would otherwise go unheard. The alternative is to become either stenographers or propagandists. James Madison, the principal author of the US Constitution, talked about the importance of freely examining public figures and government measures. I always focus on the word “examining,” because it means to investigate, inspect, and assess – the opposite of stenography and propaganda. America’s founders wanted a check on government. They wanted somebody to guard against corruption and abuse of power, and we should live up to those assignments. But ownership remains a point of vulnerability for media outlets. There’s no perfect form of ownership – they all come with pressures, especially when owners have other commercial interests. These pressures have only grown since Donald Trump returned to the White House this year, willing and eager to target those interests. Owners who yield do a disservice to the journalists who work for them and to democracy itself. Their primary goal should be to defend the rights that allowed their media businesses to exist in the first place. You said that you don’t think there’s a “perfect form of ownership,” and considering your experience following Amazon founder Jeff Bezos’s purchase of the Washington Post, you may know this firsthand. But are there other models? Should the media be profit-driven, or should it aspire to be more like a public utility? Are there different models we should be exploring that might work in the US or elsewhere? I haven’t seen anything that’s very promising. Joseph Stiglitz sort of advocated government funding during his talk at the IPI’s World Congress, but I think that’s a major trap. Public broadcasters in the US received government funding, and Trump used it as a way to clobber them. Trump and state officials aligned with him would use government funding as a cudgel to pressure media outlets, when what we need to do is eliminate sources of – or potential sources of – pressure so we can operate with independence. That requires finding a way to be self-sustaining, whether as a nonprofit or as a commercially oriented enterprise. Many independent media organisations around the world, operating in very challenging environments, have been the recipients of American assistance through USAID. Now that USAID has been shut down, they are not getting that money, creating a huge crisis for them. Other outlets have been financed by philanthropic organisations, and they are finding that funding has dried up as well. That is particularly true of news organisations operating in exile or in countries like El Salvador, Venezuela, and Myanmar. Suppose US media organisations relied on government funding. In such a case, Trump would insist that they adhere to the standards he has set, just as he is doing with other recipients of public funding, like universities and school districts. And his standard for the media is to serve as his propaganda outlet. He does not want a free and independent press. The only press he considers legitimate is the kind that repeats what he says word for word. Given this context, and drawing on your experience leading the Washington Post during Trump’s first term, what do you think the media got right – and what did it miss – in covering a president openly hostile to the press? What do you think of the coverage of the second Trump presidency so far? For the most part, the press has done a really good job, both during the first term and now in the second. We know a lot about what happened during the first Trump presidency. We knew much of it at the time, and we know even more now. The same is true today: every day, there is another revelatory report about what’s happening in this administration. Many front-line journalists, and the editors who work directly with them, are committed to holding the government to account – to finding out what this administration is really up to, who’s influencing it, and how its policies are affecting people. I deeply admire them for it. The real failure regarding Trump’s first term actually came before he became a candidate. We didn’t do a good enough job of understanding how we could end up with a president like Trump. We didn’t understand America well enough. We didn’t spend enough time traveling around the country, listening to people’s grievances, and explaining them to others. We still don’t do enough of that. The press needs to serve as a bridge between communities, helping people better understand one another and what they’re going through. That requires reporting without a trace of contempt or condescension, grounded in real empathy. It’s also important to remember that most people don’t spend their days thinking about politics or democracy. They’re focused on making a living, ensuring their kids get a good education, and maintaining access to health care. We need to understand why people feel these things are under threat, why they believe they’re worse off than before, why their kids have fewer opportunities, and why the social problems in their communities are not being addressed. So, how should journalists approach the coverage of populist leaders who actively seek to delegitimize the press? How do you present both sides, or adhere to the cherished principle of impartiality, when one side is clearly lying? You’ve talked about the idea of “objective reality” in journalism. How should journalism today reflect this idea? I have long been an advocate for what’s been known as objectivity in journalism. I know that word can make a lot of people uneasy, but I think it’s been grossly mischaracterised. What I mean by “objectivity” is that reporters should start their work knowing they don’t know everything. That’s the whole reason for reporting. Reporting means finding out about things you don’t know about, or don’t know enough about. So, we should do our jobs without thinking we have all the answers. Instead, we should be focused on asking the right questions. Objectivity – approaching every story with humility, acknowledging what we don’t know, and being willing to learn – is how we preserve our independence. But objectivity is not “both-sidesism.” It doesn’t mean pretending every issue is split 50-50. If the evidence points in one direction, we should say so, rather than pretending otherwise. Only after we’ve done rigorous reporting can we tell people that what we’ve found is true. “Truth” is a big word, so I’m reluctant to use it. The goal is simply to get as close as possible to reality and understand the facts. And to do that, in any field – whether you’re a judge, a scientist, or a journalist – you have to begin with a hypothesis but keep an open mind, knowing it could be wrong. People used to describe journalism as the “first rough draft of history,” and that remains true: it is a draft, always incomplete and constantly evolving. I often think we’re looking at the world through a keyhole; we don’t see everything, yet sometimes we can push the door open a little and get a clearer view of what’s really going on. If we’re skilled and lucky, we can swing that door wide open and see the whole picture. That doesn’t happen every time, but with each discovery, the draft becomes more refined and our confidence in it grows.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251215141240_653d1ccac6b20b3d0d51e587477d90edc641f7ab4d11a8db54269e0645bb4547.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251215141240_653d1ccac6b20b3d0d51e587477d90edc641f7ab4d11a8db54269e0645bb4547" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="Martin Baron"><figcaption>Martin Baron</figcaption></figure>  It seems that many people today are eager to tell others what they know – or think they know – despite having no background or formal training in journalism. Influencers and “content creators” have built huge followings on Substack and social media. What does this mean for the future of the profession? I’m not attached to the traditional ways of doing things. Technology has fundamentally changed how people consume information, and that naturally changes how we convey what we know, or think we know. This shift has created an entire ecosystem of influencers, Substackers, YouTubers, and podcasters. The core principle everyone should follow is verification. Is the information you’re communicating authentic and accurate? Alternatively, is it misinformation, or even disinformation? Upholding that standard is critical. Everyone in this business has a duty to share only what they know to be true. Passing along information you haven’t verified is simply irresponsible. Share it only if it’s been checked and comes from trustworthy sources. But how do you do that? That’s the hard part. You need to rely on sources that have proven to be reliable over time. As much as people criticise traditional news organisations, when there’s a natural disaster, guess where they go for information? Whether it’s a hurricane, an earthquake, fires, floods, or war, people turn to the traditional news organisations. That suggests that they believe the information they find there will be accurate. What opportunities and risks does generative AI present? Is this, in your view, a turning point for news media and for journalists? People always sound wiser when they say everything is terrible. Doomsayers tend to sound more profound, and people are more inclined to believe them than the optimists. AI, of course, is a powerful tool capable of many great things. But like every technology, it comes with risks as well as benefits. Social media is a good example: it connected us in unprecedented ways while also deepening polarization. The same is true of AI. It’s an extraordinarily powerful reporting tool that can make journalists more efficient by allowing them to sift through vast amounts of data. Reporters have already used it to analyse bomb strikes, identify the weapons used, and piece together what actually happened. At the same time, the risks are enormous. AI makes it easy to fabricate images, video, and audio. You can hear a recording that perfectly imitates someone’s voice – tone, cadence, and speech patterns. It’s fake, but people may still believe it. Or they may conclude that distinguishing truth from falsehood is impossible and not even worth trying. That’s a precarious position. It threatens not just the press but democracy itself in ways we have yet to grapple with. When we can’t even agree on a basic set of facts, progress becomes impossible. That uncertainty enables people to exploit the situation for personal, commercial, and political gain. This is already happening in US politics. An unflattering image appears, and a public figure says, “That wasn’t me. That was AI.” You hear their voice on a recording, and they say the same thing. Some denials may even be true. But as fake images and audio spread, even authentic ones will be dismissed. People will claim that anything that contradicts their narrative or casts them in a bad light was fabricated. Without a shared sense of what’s real, we lose any firm foundation for public debate. You’ve warned that democracy cannot survive without a free press, which underpins many other freedoms. What reforms or protections do you think are most urgently needed to safeguard press freedom around the world? First, it’s important to make clear that free-speech rights are not reserved solely for the press. They belong to everyone. In many countries today, including the US, even business executives are afraid to speak openly for fear of government reprisal. What we need is a broad coalition of people who understand that free expression is essential to a functioning society. Clearly, there have been many encroachments on free-speech rights in the US recently, and I worry about where they may lead. But we still have judges who recognise the importance of those rights, and many who continue to stand up for the rule of law. That’s the model other countries should aspire to: constitutional protections for free speech, judicial systems that enforce those protections, and governments that respect them. What lessons can emerging democracies draw from US efforts to protect press freedom and uphold institutional resilience at a time of democratic backsliding? You can’t just declare yourself a democracy and sit back. The greatest defender of US democracy has always been its institutions, and Trump is systematically trying to destroy them, with far too much success. Yet they still exist, and they continue, in their own way, to push back against these assaults. That is the key lesson for emerging democracies: you must defend your institutions and protect their independence while recognising how easily they can be subverted. People around the world are horrified by what’s happening in the US precisely because they saw it as a bastion of free expression and the rule of law. Emerging democracies should remember how fragile these pillars really are and resist the temptation to take them for granted. In the US, we’ve done that for too long, which is why so many people once asked, “How much damage can Trump really do?” We took the press freedom for granted. But many more people now understand that the press is often the only institution willing to listen to them, investigate wrongdoing, and hold the powerful to account. And they know that if the press isn’t there, none of that work gets done. And yet the press is increasingly demonised and blamed for various crises around the world. There is a notion that the news media finds itself in its current predicament because it has somehow failed. Do you think this criticism is fair? Has the media done a different – or lesser – job in recent years? It seems to me that many of these criticisms come from people who claim the press is irrelevant and then insist that, had we covered something differently, the outcome somehow would have been different. I don’t know how to reconcile those two ideas. If we’re irrelevant, why would our coverage make a difference? Often, the people who criticise the press haven’t actually looked into what we reported. In many cases, we did cover those issues – people simply weren’t paying attention because they didn’t see them as urgent at the time. When something doesn’t feel urgent, it’s easy to ignore. Some people seem to think the media runs the world. In the US, for example, there’s a notion that the press somehow got Trump elected in 2016. That’s complete nonsense. There was extensive reporting on Trump. At the Post, we published an entire series on his personal and professional history. We wrote so much that it eventually became a book: Marc Fisher and Michael Kranish’s Trump Revealed. If you read that book now, it’s striking how prescient it was. Yet people say, “You didn’t write about this,” or “Why didn’t you tell us that before he got elected?” Many of these criticisms just aren’t borne out by the facts. More often than not, the issues people say we ignore were, in fact, covered – and covered thoroughly. Or else we simply didn’t know then what we know now. Over time, new information emerges, documents surface, and more people come forward. So how can news organisations get people to pay attention, especially younger audiences? You’ve said that without younger readers, journalism has no future. What strategies do you believe are most effective in reaching them without compromising journalistic rigor? I’m not sure we’re communicating in the ways people actually want to receive information. People read less nowadays. They’re more passive consumers; they don’t want to go searching for information. We live in a digital age in which more people get their news visually or through audio rather than text. If I had my choice, it would be different, but that’s the way it is. We should study what works for audiences and apply those lessons ourselves, even if it makes traditional journalists uncomfortable. A journalist recently asked me, “What should I be focusing on? What should I be learning?” I told him, “Short-form video.” You’re a long-form writer? Great, you should still learn how to do short-form video. You may not want to, but you need to provide a tasting menu that makes people want the full course. Most people are not going to read a 10,000-word story or a ten-part series. They don’t have the time or patience. That said, merely adapting isn’t enough. We have to embrace these new formats with enthusiasm, because they’re teaching us how to reach people in a world where communication habits have changed dramatically. We could sit around blaming audiences for the current state of journalism, but that would be a waste of time. © <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">Project Syndicate</a> Martin Baron is a former executive editor of the Washington Post.

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Defending press freedom in the age of Trump

Traditional donors have sharply scaled back their aid commitments to developing countries over the past year. Some, like the United States, have virtually eliminated their aid programs. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), official development assistance (ODA) from member countries <a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/about/news/press-releases/2025/04/official-development-assistance-2024-figures.html" target="_blank">declined by 7.1%</a> in 2024, its first annual drop in six years. This trend was not limited to a few major donors. Of the 33 members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 22 slashed their aid budgets, and only four countries met the United Nations’ target of allocating 0.7% of gross national income to ODA. The outlook for the coming year offers little hope for improvement, as major DAC donors have announced additional cuts. Most notably, US President Donald Trump’s administration has suspended most foreign aid and dismantled the Agency for International Development (USAID), which dispersed most US government aid dollars. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom plans to <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/clyrkkv4gd7o" target="_blank">reduce aid spending</a> from 0.5% of GNI to 0.3% by 2027. Similar retrenchment across Europe and North America is reshaping international assistance, disrupting humanitarian and climate-related programs, and creating financing gaps in critical sectors such as health, education, and clean energy. In our 2017 book <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/going-beyond-aid/B48F59C6D8D2790D403A1A0C44B37612" target="_blank">Going Beyond Aid</a>, we urged developing-country governments to reduce their dependence on foreign aid, not only because it was becoming an unreliable source of funding, but also because other, better ways of financing development were becoming more available. That message is more urgent than ever. As reliance on aid becomes untenable, the international community must mobilise a broader array of financing sources to advance green and sustainable growth. This includes national development banks, industrial investment funds, sovereign wealth funds, and institutional investment in public markets, as well as innovative mechanisms such as debt swaps and public-private partnerships (PPPs). These tools can unlock domestic resources, attract long-term investors, and create synergies between public goals and private capital. Equity investment offers a promising avenue for engaging non-traditional development partners while reducing developing countries’ dependence on debt. Government investment funds, public and private financial institutions, and other private actors can participate by taking equity stakes in public enterprises, financing infrastructure projects, or joining PPPs. Such participation not only alleviates debt burdens but also improves the performance and management of public assets. As government-funded, mission-driven institutions, public development banks (PDBs) have the potential to provide patient capital for green and sustainable investment in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). Building on the <a href="http://www.dfidatabase.pku.edu.cn/index.htm" target="_blank">pioneering database</a> of public development and financial institutions created by the Institute of New Structural Economics at Peking University, future research can identify effective ways to harness these institutions to fuel low-carbon growth. Responding to growing demand from the economies of the Global South, development partners have increasingly adopted an “entire value chain” approach to the green transition in recent years. This strategy facilitates transfers of low-carbon technologies, diffusion of digital innovations (including trade in services), and industrial modernisation, enabling countries included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to accelerate their shift toward sustainable development. Empirical research supports this approach. An analysis covering 139 countries <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-first-evidence-of-a-take-off-in-solar-in-africa/" target="_blank">finds</a> that, following policy directives to incorporate green and low-carbon principles into the BRI, carbon intensity (CO₂ emissions per unit of GDP) among participating countries declined significantly between 2013 and 2022. These findings are consistent with another <a href="https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-first-evidence-of-a-take-off-in-solar-in-africa/" target="_blank">recent study</a> showing how China’s solar-energy expansion has helped transform Africa’s power sector. Investment in infrastructure and industrial development can also generate positive spillover effects. Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jors.70023" target="_blank">shows</a> that the presence of at least one Chinese-financed infrastructure project in a second-order administrative region (comparable to a municipality) is associated with a 5% increase in nighttime luminosity – a widely used proxy for economic activity. Neighbouring regions experienced a 10-15% rise in luminosity, indicating that the benefits of such projects extend well beyond the immediate investment site.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251104131124_1a11d248a89b0785bc7d7f1d9f721e7e7a2563cbd579c3c672a0900220c19171.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20251104131124_1a11d248a89b0785bc7d7f1d9f721e7e7a2563cbd579c3c672a0900220c19171" data-rendition-name="original" width="720" height="405" loading="lazy" alt="development aid and China"></figure>  These outcomes underscore the critical role of infrastructure investment, particularly in energy and transportation projects. By improving electricity access, affordability, and connectivity, they reduce energy poverty, bolster public services, and stimulate economic activity in underserved areas. To meet the evolving challenges of development finance, both traditional and non-traditional donors and creditors should move beyond aid and adopt multidimensional strategies that combine trade, investment, infrastructure, green technology, and digital connectivity, including fintech solutions, to support EMDEs. Importantly, such collaborations should be viewed as a mutual learning process in which partners assume complementary roles and shared responsibilities. To be sure, there have been missteps along the way. China’s financing of coal-fired power plants before 2021, for example, had slowed reduction in CO₂ emissions. But these outcomes, once recognised as policy errors, can help strengthen accountability and foster self-correcting mechanisms within the international development ecosystem. Through ongoing learning and adaptation, global partners can build a more resilient, inclusive, and sustainable framework for development finance. © <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">Project Syndicate</a> Justin Yifu Lin, a former World Bank chief economist and Senior VP, is the honorary dean of the National School of Development and director of the Institute of New Structural Economics at Peking University. Yan Wang is Senior Academic Researcher at Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center.

Development finance must shift away from aid

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Trump have had a love-hate relationship. The two populist leaders have now fallen out, threatening a full scale Indo-American trade war. Many of Nepal’s exports to the United States like garments and rugs are also what India sells to the US. So, after Donald Trump announced additional tariffs on Indian exports to total 50%, Nepal could have an advantage. But this is only if the government plays its cards right and develops a long term strategy to boost export of items in which it has comparative advantage, and find new export products. The recent fallout ostensibly comes after India ignored western sanctions and continued to purchase Russian oil, and could be linked to Trump’s meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday in which he wants to use India as a bargaining chip. “Trump has not honoured any international trade agreements, making the global trade regime unstable,” says economist Posh Raj Pandey. This could mean that the US could still pull back on tariffs, just as he has given China a reprieve of another 90 days this week. Compared to other South Asian countries, including India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, Nepal faces a relatively low tariff rate of 10%. Theoretically this could put Nepali exports at an advantage for items like garments and other products like tea. But it also carries its own risks.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250814090852_1d2fe71e4f7c5f82d72240714c6a7a140d59230096eac995ca3264a5c2ed00a2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250814090852_1d2fe71e4f7c5f82d72240714c6a7a140d59230096eac995ca3264a5c2ed00a2" data-rendition-name="original" width="1266" height="860" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal-US trade graph NT"></figure>  Some 64% of Nepal’s imports are from India, and US tariffs could make those products more expensive. A stronger USD vis-a-vis the INR would also devalue the Nepali rupee and increase the cost of imports from India of raw material for its exports, for example, garments. The manufacturing sector in Nepal has never reached its true potential, its main export items to India are soya and palm oil which are actually just bulk imports of the same oils repackaged for export. Domestic production lacks capacity to keep up with demand. “Nepal’s productive capacity must be increased in order to boost exports, and the market should be diversified for Nepal to take advantage of a competitive market,” says Pandey. Indian exporters could try to reroute their finished products through the open border with Nepal, changing the tag from ‘Made in India’ to ‘Made in Nepal’ to avoid US tariffs. China did this by relocating its factories to Vietnam in the past, but such re-labelling may result in punitive measures. “It is not worth the risk, we should be careful. Besides, there is no domestic value addition in such cases,” states Kharel. Nepal has a trade deficit with the US of Rs7.64 billion, which is probably why Trump has not increased tariffs on Nepal’s exports to more than 10%. Nepal’s main exports to the US are ready-made garments, dog chews and carpets. Nepal had preferential market access to the US, but did not take much advantage of it. “Nepal’s garment export to the US stands at Rs2 billion, and we could try to increase production and export more to take advantage of relatively lower tariffs, but reaching production worth Rs10 billion is not practical and Nepal does not have the capacity either,” says Pandey. Furthermore, if Nepal increases exports to the US and creates a trade surplus, it may raise eyebrows in Washington and Nepal could be slapped with higher tariffs if Trump is still around. In a modern multilateral world, Donald Trump has pressed ahead unilaterally, using tariffs to arm-twist allies to get all kinds of concessions, even those not related to trade. Trump thinks he is doing this to protect the domestic US industry, but it is already backfiring with higher domestic consumer prices. Adds Pandey, “Trump has used the tariffs as a Swiss Army knife to cut through everything. The tariffs are used as an instrument for national security, to increase investment and even to end conflict.” Trump claimed he initiated the ceasefire between India and Pakistan over their recent conflict by threatening both countries with tariffs. New Delhi denied Trump’s claims, while Pakistan acknowledged his role, even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. REGIONAL HEGEMON “India had wanted to establish itself as a regional hegemon by aligning itself to the West,” says Paras Kharel, executive director at South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment (SAWTEE). But the tariff tiff with India may have thrown that strategy off kilter. Most countries use diplomatic channels to resolve existing trade issues. However, Trump has chosen the path of coercive diplomacy, which was seen in his response to issues like migration and the use of veto power at the United Nations. India is the world's third largest consumer of oil, with Russia accounting for 30% of the country’s oil imports. Russia was also the largest arms supplier for India, but that has decreased in recent times, as India shifted towards the US, Israel and France. India is the largest arms importer in the world, and is making more and more purchases from American manufacturers of weapons systems. But India has already retaliated by cancelling planned imports of military equipment from the US. Uncertainty looms large as Trump’s volatile flip-flopping upends global trade. The unpredictability was underlined by Trump extending his tariff truce for China by 90 days, saying Beijing "has been dealing with it nicely". The tariff threat on Indian exports could also be similarly postponed if New Delhi appeases Trump with compromises. But Modi seems in no mood to give up India’s national interest, especially by allowing American agricultural imports. Modi is all set to visit China for the first time in seven years for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit on 31 August in Tianjin. This could signify the beginning of a major realignment in geopolitical alliances in the Asia-Pacific. Nepal is a small player, but when India and China are buffeted by global turbulence, it will rock Nepal as well. Nepal therefore needs to boost trade capacity to take advantage of new opportunities. Says Pandey, “Nepal needs to diversify its exports, find new markets and seek alternative finance sources.”

Nepal and the US-India tariff tiff

Will President Donald Trump give his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping a gift? While Trump prizes unpredictability, Xi aims to position China as a force for global stability. Thus, there is a widespread assumption that China will rush to fill the vacuum left by an increasingly nationalist and isolationist United States.
The Chinese leadership has no interest in filling America’s shoes. Attempting to do so could cost China dearly just when it is undertaking a broader economic reorientation at home. The world may be tired of US interventionism – and, now, of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">Trumpian aggression</a> – but that does not mean it is ready to welcome an abstemious superpower.&nbsp;
China has studiously avoided becoming involved in major crises beyond its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trans-himalayan-handshake">immediate neighbourhood</a>. Though it has proposed global initiatives on ‘development’, ‘security’, and ‘civilisation’, and articulated a vision of multipolarity in which all countries are treated equally, its efforts to realise these goals have not gone beyond economic statecraft.
While foreign commentators debate what <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-xi-jinping-s-big-surprise">China’s vision </a>entails – with some describing it as a potentially benevolent hegemon, and others as a malevolent one – Chinese authorities and intellectuals are more immediately concerned with weathering the storm that Trump has unleashed.
Viewed from outside, China’s core <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/staying-neutral-in-a-us-china-confrontation-8qni2ij1">national interests</a> seems straightforward: to replace the US as global leader. But pursuing that role may contradict other core interests, such as maintaining regime legitimacy and security, orchestrating a continuous rise in living standards, and reunifying Taiwan with the mainland.&nbsp;
These goals might best be served by maintaining a cold peace with the US, rather than embracing conflict with it.
Having watched the US, China knows all too well that being a <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4815">global superpower </a>would inevitably draw it into regional conflagrations that it would prefer to avoid. But China also knows that it has benefited massively from the relatively stable world economy that the US and its allies helped bring about.
China needs to retain enormous amounts of resources and manpower domestically to tackle its biggest challenges. Chinese leaders must <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-bubble-economy">manage an economy</a> that is no longer driven primarily by property development and exports, while preparing for the possibility that one of its largest trading partners could descend into total isolation.
Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs and escalatory duties in response to Chinese countermeasures were a wake-up call. Whatever happens in the trade war, China urgently needs to rebalance its economy by stimulating greater domestic demand.
While Chinese leaders have long acknowledged the need for such a rebalancing, they have been slow to follow through with the necessary policies. Public messaging notwithstanding, they have continued to prioritise industrial output over living standards, and capital investment over consumer spending. But the prospect of losing one of its biggest export markets should change this calculation.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/turning-point-in-us-india-relations">Turning point in US-India relations</a>, Shashi Tharoor
Similarly, China has an interest in building resilient supply chains for critical technologies in order to circumvent US chokepoints. A significant share of national resources has already been redirected toward promoting domestic innovation.&nbsp;
With the Sino-American rivalry intensifying over the past decade, Chinese leaders have come to regard domestic innovation as a strategic necessity.
Beyond boosting domestic innovation, China is eager to seize opportunities to set the global governance agenda for emerging technologies.&nbsp;
Its recent successes in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-needs-to-be-more-intelligent-about-ai">AI</a> – most notably <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/artificial-censorship">DeepSeek</a>’s release of low-cost models that rival those from top US developers – have created a strong impetus for China to amplify its voice. China’s message – that a handful of rich countries should not be able to monopolise the technologies that will determine everyone’s economic future – undoubtedly resonates with many around the world.
During the post-Liberation Day staring contest with the US, China convened an impromptu gathering of the all-powerful Politburo and Chinese ambassadors stationed abroad. The purpose was to assess China’s relations with its neighbours, and the stature of those in attendance spoke to the sense of crisis that had swept through the country’s top leadership.&nbsp;
More to the point, the meeting confirmed that China’s strategic orientation remains focused on its own region – not the global context.
Beijing remains fully committed to maintaining strong ties with the Kremlin, viewing Russo-Chinese alignment as a geographical and strategic necessity. The two countries’ 4,209km land border gives China more than enough reason to work with Russia.&nbsp;
China’s ultimate focus is not Russia but its long-term rivalry with the US. An axis with President Vladimir Putin’s regime might well offer a workable (if imperfect) solution to the containment strategy that America has been pursuing against China.
Likewise, China has been de-escalating tensions with India, another large, nuclear-armed neighbour. Both know that the structural and historical strains on their relationship – characterised by an obvious power imbalance and mutual mistrust – will not be easily eliminated. But both also know that predictable, stable ties will yield big benefits over time, especially in a new multipolar order.
PAX SINICA
Beyond managing relations with its immediate neighbours, China has sought to mobilise the Global South behind reforms to multilateral institutions.&nbsp;
When Chinese leaders and diplomats speak of ushering in an ‘orderly multipolarity’, they mean an international order in which the non-Western world has much more clout. Hence, China is a strong advocate of the recent BRICS expansion, and of proposals to redistribute voting shares within Western-dominated international financial institutions.
China has also sought to shape the agenda at United Nations-affiliated institutions where the US historically has had less influence, such as at UN Trade and Development and the South Centre. It can assume a limited leadership role without directly confronting the US and the rest of the G7.&nbsp;
China does have a foreign-policy interest in subtly countering US influence in the developing world, which is why it builds large-scale infrastructure and addresses long-ignored development needs there without making any demands about democracy, human rights, and accountability.&nbsp;
Instead of offering security guarantees, China offers roads and bridges. In exchange, it can secure access to critical raw materials and open new markets for its state-owned enterprises and private companies at a time when the US and Europe are closing their doors.
China did broker a modest rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and its Global Security Initiative <a href="https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2024/10/the-global-security-initiative-chinas-international-policing-activities/" target="_blank">aims to</a> foster international cooperation in counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, biosecurity, and emerging technologies.
But in the case of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine?%2F=">Russia-Ukraine </a>and<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/mortality-in-the-gaza-israel-war"> Israel-Hamas</a> wars, it has avoided taking direct responsibility, let alone providing any security guarantees. Of course, China’s self-proclaimed neutrality on the war in Ukraine has not gone unchallenged.&nbsp;
In Gaza, China has criticised the US for supporting Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s agenda of continuing the war. But unlike Iran – which China relies on for oil – these other flashpoints have been kept at arm’s length.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/world-wars">World wars</a>
China would face three big challenges in pursuing even partial or limited global leadership. First, given America’s accelerated withdrawal from international affairs, China might struggle to sustain its commercial engagement with many parts of the world. After all, the US wants to impose drastic costs on those who do business with China, and it may well get its way.
Second, China cannot avoid engagement in dangerous security situations forever. Sooner or later, it will have to develop a truly global foreign policy. In fact, simply putting its own Global Security Initiative into practice would require it to do much more heavy lifting, not only in setting the agenda but also in terms of deploying security personnel and resources. America may be retreating, but that does not mean it will sit idly by and watch China try to increase its own influence.
Third, China still needs to orchestrate a domestic economic rebalancing – a process that will have enormous global consequences. Shifting from export-led growth to greater domestic consumption will take years, and the push to rebalance may run up against China’s ambition to remain a global manufacturing powerhouse.&nbsp;
The latter objective is already causing tensions with Europe and some developing countries whose domestic manufacturers are struggling to compete with Chinese national champions (such as the electric-vehicle maker BYD).
Even as its economy continues to grow, China will remain a largely self-centered and reluctant superpower. Unlike the US, its domestic political economy calls for a more restrained foreign policy, focused primarily on its immediate neighbours and commercial opportunities in the Global South.
As the world grapples with the decline of US power and the shift toward multipolarity, China will increasingly become the centre of gravity in the global economy. The rivalry between a political and military superpower and an economic one will be dangerous for everyone. Both must tread carefully to prevent economic warfare from escalating into a conflict that all would regret.
&nbsp;©Project Syndicate&nbsp;
Yu Jie is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House.

What China wants

US President <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trump-s-second-coming">Donald Trump</a>’s decision to<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal"> dissolve USAID and effectively cut American assistance</a> to countries across the world, including Nepal, has forced many aid-supported programmes and projects to shut down, directly impacting Nepalis across the country who benefit from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/aid-rarely-aids-agriculture-in-nepal">aid-funded services</a>.
USAID-funded projects have provided direct budgetary support to projects in key sectors including health, education, agriculture, infrastructure, economic growth, humanitarian aid and women and children empowerment.&nbsp;
The aid cuts have meant that people directly or indirectly employed in USAID-funded projects have found themselves without jobs, while its impact has reverberated across those that have indirectly benefitted from spillovers of American aid, such as the hospitality business operators,<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/kathmandu-s-unreal-real-estate-prices"> real estate</a> owners, transport providers, and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-airlines-privatisation-still-stuck">airlines</a>.&nbsp;
The abrupt shutdown of the largest bilateral aid agency in the world has significant impact and far-reaching consequences.
Historically,<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/Connecting-dots/aid-back-basics,929"> foreign aid </a>has been the focus of intensive public debate both globally and in Nepal. Critics in donor countries—particularly those from the political right—view it as antithetical to their <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/national-interest-or-nationalism">national interests</a> and a waste of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/the-taxman-looteth">taxpayer resources</a>.&nbsp;
Meanwhile, those in the ideological left in recipient countries view it as help that comes with strings attached, a tool of neo-colonialism. Many are of the opinion that such assistance enriches people associated with the aid system rather than intended beneficiaries. So much so that Nepalis cynically refer to the aid-NGO complex as ‘डलरको खेती’ ( dollar farming).
Nepal’s leadership across the political spectrum have not pulled any punches in their criticism of aid institutions— <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/14-years-after-conflict-no-closure-in-nepal">the Maoists</a> have called them ‘agencies of imperialism’, while nationalist discourses from the political right draw connections between foreign aid and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-britain-mark-centenary-of-1923-treaty">Nepal’s sovereignty</a>.&nbsp;
Aid is, of course, essentially political—not just in terms of how it has been instrumentalised by donors, but also how it has been appropriated and used by the beneficiaries— governments, employees, consultants, NGOs, the private sector, and communities. However, viewing aid solely from its imputed political intentions is as naïve as it is counterproductive.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/missing-links-in-nepal-s-mcc-debate">Missing links in Nepal’s MCC debate</a>
While there is no denying that foreign aid is an instrument of soft power that comes with conditions, it has facilitated access to public services, generated direct and indirect<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/foreign-employment-revival"> employment </a>and livelihood opportunities and empowered <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-marginalised-on-the-margins">marginalised communities</a> that have fallen through the cracks of the establishment.
Indeed, foreign aid has contributed significantly to the Nepal’s rapid socio-economic change over the last seven decades, such that the country has arguably become accustomed to and dependent on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/e75-million-eu-aid-to-nepal-for-covid-19-ckmyfbkq">international funding</a>. USAID was by no means the only source of grants and loans that provided Nepal with resources for numerous government and non-government programmes, projects and personnel.
But while the volume of aid has varied historically, Nepal had so far been immune to such ‘aid-shocks’ that compelled the government and people to imagine and work in a context with little or no international assistance. &nbsp;
And it is not just the US that is pulling up stakes, other donor countries are similarly reconsidering their positions on bilateral aid. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has announced a reduction in foreign aid from 0.5% of its GDP to 0.3%—primarily to accommodate an increase in the country’s defence spending.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-great-game-2nd-half">The Great Game, 2nd Half</a>, Sonia Awale
More donor countries will follow suit as their taxpayers—particularly those on the populist right—demand their government increasing spending on their own domestic public services, the military, and the private sector. The shrinking pot will directly impact multilateral agencies that rely heavily on funding provided by western donors to support their programmes across the world.
Some see the western world’s retreat from foreign assistance as an opportunity for emerging powers like China to fill the vacuum and expand their sphere of influence regionally and beyond. Nepal has been receiving aid and development assistance from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/stemming-asia-s-democratic-decay">Asian regional and global powers</a> like India, China and Japan over the past decades.&nbsp;
However, the nature, priorities, and the modality of aid from Asian powers has been notably different to that of western donors. It is therefore unlikely that China or India will offer aid to Nepal using western liberal frameworks, or be able to displace Western donors completely.
If nations in the region are successful in completely replacing western donors in Nepal, this will denigrate possibilities for the country to either bargain better and ‘forum-shop’ for aid that aligns with its national interests, or diversify sources of aid.&nbsp;
As such, it might be time for Nepal to reevaluate its reliance on foreign aid, not just from the US, but from global and regional powers. So, the ‘end of aid’— if it comes to that— need not be end of development in Nepal.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">Trump shock wave hits Nepal</a>, Sudiksha Tuladhar
Data from the government of Nepal shows that foreign aid’s relative share in the national budget has been declining over the decades. In comparison, Nepal earns overs $30 million in remittances a day. Much of Nepal’s development is directly supported by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/the-new-equaliser">migrant remittances</a>, which remains under-acknowledged.&nbsp;
Decreasing its reliance on foreign aid could mean that Nepal’s leadership is obligated to rethink its development priorities. &nbsp;The government could increase its fiscal capacity to fund development programmes that are critical to its development objectives, demonstrably cost-effective and meet the real needs of communities.&nbsp;
Additionally, there could be increased efforts to raise revenue from wealth and income taxes, attract foreign direct investment, and cut back on ‘white elephant’ projects—symbolic gestures designed to feed the egos of political leadership but serving little purpose or public good.&nbsp;
All of this would ultimately be to the benefit of the Nepali people, reducing waste and corruption, encouraging a more responsible approach to government expenditure, and promoting a more careful husbandry of the country's own resources.&nbsp;
To be sure, this change will not happen immediately. &nbsp;It will be a slow and deliberative process, one that is likely to reset the development contract between Nepali state and citizens.&nbsp;
Some have likened the flow of aid to the rush of heroin— something that provides a high and a momentary sense of extraordinary well-being but it is addictive and damaging. And like any debilitating dependency— being made to quit its reliance on foreign funding cold turkey will be challenging for Nepal.&nbsp;
As things stand, it remains to be seen if as a result of President Trump’s cost-cutting rampage, Nepal might emerge as a leaner but fitter state after recovering from a painful period of withdrawal from its reliance on foreign aid.&nbsp;
Jeevan R Sharma is a Professor of South Asia and International Development at the University of Edinburgh, and has authored publications on migration, development and social change in Nepal. David Seddon is Director of Critical Faculty, and is author and co-author of various publications on Nepal.&nbsp;

The end of aid

Of all the geopolitical stunts <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trump-s-second-coming">Donald Trump</a> has pulled since returning to the White House, the United States’ votes at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 4 March stand out as the most revealing. The US opposed a seemingly innocuous resolution establishing an International Day of Peaceful Coexistence and reaffirming the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/how-will-nepal-develop-in-the-next-decade"> UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development</a>. Despite its symbolic nature, the US voted against the resolution, with representative Edward Heartney <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-the-un-meeting-entitled-58th-plenary-meeting-of-the-general-assembly/" target="_blank">explaining</a> that the US ‘rejects and denounces the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals, and it will no longer reaffirm them as a matter of course’.&nbsp; Despite US opposition, the resolution ultimately passed with 162 countries voting in favour, two abstaining, and only three, the US, Israel and Argentina, voting against. Then the US was the sole vote against a resolution reaffirming ‘the right of everyone to education … including equal opportunities for young women' likely because it conflicted with a pillar of the Trump administration’s domestic agenda: dismantling diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250311100316_36e63634a5e29d69a64b4245e40401c4f731ee12a6918545f64e04023762bf09.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20250311100316_36e63634a5e29d69a64b4245e40401c4f731ee12a6918545f64e04023762bf09" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="533" loading="lazy" alt="UNGA 1"> <figcaption>The General Assembly also voted on a draft resolution titled Education for democracy with only the United States voting against it.</figcaption> </figure>  These moves may well foreshadow America’s withdrawal from the UN, something Elon Musk and other Trump supporters have <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/nypost.com/2025/03/02/us-news/elon-musk-appears-to-back-us-withdrawing-from-nato-the-un/" target="_blank">urged</a>. Trump has <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/theconversation.com/trump-pulls-out-of-who-and-paris-how-did-international-bodies-get-through-deglobalisation-last-time-around-247919" target="_blank">already pulled</a> the US out of the WHO, and abandoned the Paris climate agreement.&nbsp; His administration has also <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and-reviewing-united-states-support-to-all-international-organizations/" target="_blank">withdrawn</a> the US from several UN bodies, including the Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and is now reassessing its involvement in the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).&nbsp; This week, the non-profit group Civicusannounced the inclusion of the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/09/watchlist-decline-civic-freedoms-civicus">US on its 2026 Watchlist</a>, alongside the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Italy, Pakistan and Serbia. <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">The Trump administration </a>is not merely unhappy with certain international institutions, it is fundamentally opposed to any multilateral framework that even suggests equality among countries. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">Trump shock wave hits Nepal</a>, Sudiksha Tuladhar Some analysts <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/theglobalobservatory.org/2024/11/what-might-be-in-store-for-the-united-nations-under-a-second-trump-presidency/" target="_blank">argue</a> that a complete US withdrawal from the UN is unlikely, given the disproportionate influence America wields through its Security Council veto. But given Trump’s law-of-the-jungle approach to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitics </a>even that advantage may no longer seem essential. Should the US leave the UN, the financial consequences could be immediate and severe. As the UN’s largest financial backer, the US <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/financingun.report/un-financing/un-funding/funding-entity" target="_blank">contributed a record $18.1 billion</a> in 2022, accounting for roughly 20% of the organization’s total funding. Notably, more than <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/financingun.report/un-financing/un-funding/funding-entity" target="_blank">70%</a> of US contributions went to just four UN entities: 40% to the World Food Programme (WFP), 12% to the High Commissioner for Refugees, 10% to UNICEF, and another 10% to the Department of Peace Operations. And since much of this funding was <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/UN%20Orgs%20Graphic%20051823.pdf" target="_blank">channeled through USAID</a> which Trump has shut down, it may have already vanished. Given the current geopolitical climate, it would take nothing short of a miracle for other governments to step in immediately to fill the gap. As a result, many critical and life-saving UN programs are now at risk.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-great-game-2nd-half">The Great Game, 2nd Half</a>, Sonia Awale The paradigm shift in US foreign policy does not necessarily signal the impending decline or outright collapse of multilateralism and the UN system despite the Trump administration bullying individual countries rather than work through international institutions.&nbsp; As the world’s leading superpower turns its back on global cooperation, the system of multilateral governance that the US helped establish nearly eight decades ago could begin to unravel. Paradoxically, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-diminishing-power-and-rising-rage">Trump’s actions</a> could also serve as a catalyst for greater <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal">international cooperation</a>, impelling other countries to work together more closely. The reason is simple: no matter how vehemently the White House denies it, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/living-with-climate-anxiety">humanity’s most pressing challenges</a> are global in nature. They will not go away simply because Trump refuses to acknowledge them. <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/nepal-needs-to-get-its-climate-act-together">Climate change</a>, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/environmental-destruction-is-a-medical-emergency">environmental degradation</a>, extreme <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/institutionalised-inequality">inequality</a>, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/is-free-health-care-possible-in-nepal">emerging health threats</a>, the rise of disruptive <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/tech-and-transition-in-nepal">new technologies</a>, and the erosion of stable employment all transcend national borders.&nbsp; Global solidarity is thus not just a moral imperative but an existential one. Many political leaders seem to understand this and <a href="https://archive.ph/o/8f1Hp/https:/geopolitique.eu/en/2025/03/06/lula-ramaphosa-sanchez-joining-forces-to-overcome-global-challenges/" target="_blank">remain committed to multilateralism</a>. International negotiations on taxation, climate action, and development financing are moving forward, even without US participation. In fact, the absence of the US, which has all too often acted as a spoiler anyway even under previous administrations, could pave the way for more ambitious and effective global agreements. In this sense, the current climate of uncertainty and upheaval could represent a unique opportunity to build a truly international movement for progressive change.©Project Syndicate&nbsp; Jayati Ghosh, Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, is a member of the Club of Rome’s Transformational Economics Commission.

The UN vs Trump 2.0

It has been four days since Donald Trump officially re-entered the White House, and he has already signed executive orders and pardoned dozens of his storm troopers. The best thing you can say is that at least he keeps his promises.
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trumpet-call">America’s election</a> is not just about the United States. The rest of the world does not vote for American presidents, but what they do and do not do has far-reaching consequences for the planet. Quitting the climate deal in the middle of the Los Angeles wildfire calamity, and dropping out of the World Health Organization (WHO) as the world prepares for the next pandemic is not even in America’s own self-interest.
The presence at the swearing in of tech billionaires, who were seated in front of Trump’s own cabinet picks, rammed home the point that America is now an oligarchy. The tech and business world have fallen in line, with global implications. Meta’s announcement that it will stop fact-checking on Facebook and Instagram will impact Nepali society and politics .&nbsp;
Trump spoke with Chinese president Xi Jinping before his inauguration, and it seems to have been a meeting of minds between the two authoritarians: the TikTok ban was immediately halted. For all the bluster and brinkmanship, those threats against China appear to be just bargaining.&nbsp;
Trump invited President Xi for his inauguration, who sent his deputy Han Zheng. India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar was also present.&nbsp;
For Nepal, the impact of Trump’s second term will be governed by how US relations with India and China develop in the next five years. Having said that, the US Embassy in Kathmandu has always held importance beyond Nepal to serve as a Tibet listening-post. If the Trump-Xi bonhomie grows, it will affect US support for the Tibet freedom movement, and the Dalai Lama succession question.
On India, the Trump administration is expected to continue Joe Biden’s strategy of holding a slightly reluctant India in its Indo-Pacific embrace to counter China’s increasing economic and military influence in the region.&nbsp;
Trump has not followed through on his threats of tariffs on Chinese imports from “day one”. This suggests a less hostile and more pragmatic approach towards Beijing. That did not mean he held back criticism of China in his speech: notably when he blamed China for being a big polluter, and not paying more to WHO.&nbsp;
“The United States will not sabotage our own industries while China pollutes with impunity,” Trump said after announcing the withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement and revoking the Biden administration’s EV mandate.&nbsp;
It is true that China has become the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, although in per capita terms it is still much below the US. China also leads in global renewable energy efforts, it is the biggest manufacturer and exporter of EVs, and has made photovoltaics, lithium batteries and wind turbines affordable to the world.
One can dismiss territorial claims on Panama, Greenland and the ‘Gulf of America’ as deranged, but his “drill, baby, drill” and “frack away, Pennsylvania” all promise to keep America as the biggest producer of fossil fuels. &nbsp;
As a consequence, America itself will see more intense hurricanes, coastal erosion, wildfires and weather extremes. But it will be countries like Nepal at the frontlines of the climate emergency that will pay the heaviest price.&nbsp;
Last year was the warmest year on record as global temperatures exceeded 1.5°C above pre-industrial level for the first time – that target was set to be met by 2050 in Paris ten years ago. Nepal has experienced its warmest January yet this year, and the wildfire season has started early.
Another direct impact on Nepalis will be Trump’s executive order to end birthright citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants. The crackdown at the Mexican border will affect hundreds of Nepalis taking the backdoor routes to reach America. Stricter immigration will also affect tens of thousands of Nepalis who are currently in the US or are planning to go study there.&nbsp;
Budget cuts of USAID for reproductive health, human rights and social welfare, and US withdrawal from being the largest donor of WHO will mean less funding for healthcare and the social sector in Nepal.&nbsp;
Washington will further lose its moral high ground in Nepal on issues like transitional justice, human rights, democracy and press freedom. Nepal was already feeling less pressure from the West, and it is now steadily aligning itself with curbs in resurgent India and China.&nbsp;
It will be even more hypocritical for the US to espouse freedom and democracy in the rest of the world after its refusal to call Israel out on its war crimes in Gaza. Trump will take credit for the Gaza ceasefire, and will lean on Ukraine to accept peace terms with Russia.
By the looks of it, Trump is just getting started.&nbsp;
Shristi Karki

Trump’s Second Coming

The shock wave of the return of Donald Trump to the White House, as well as the Republican control of the Senate and possibly the House, will impact not just America but people across the world.
In South Asia, it will mainly change the way Washington views and deals with China and India, and in more unpredictable ways. The impact on Nepal will be governed by how US relations with the country’s two giant neighbours develop in the next five years.
“Compared to Harris who has been focused more on multilateralism and maintaining allies, Trump is more confrontational and unilateral,” says National Assembly member and former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Paudyel. “There is fear that Trump’s policies will push the world to become even more polarised than it is now.”
India and China will both be able to fill the gap left by Trump America’s retreat from global and regional leadership. They will be able to take advantage of Trump diluting relations with or abandoning traditional allies in Europe and Asia.
Although India is in the western camp, New Delhi has wanted to call its own shots. It is using its growing economic clout to thumb its nose at the EU and the US. For example, India has got away with importing oil from Russia despite western sanctions.
Says Akhilesh Upadhyay, Senior Fellow at the Strategic Affairs Center, IIDS: “From a traditional security perspective, Nepal is bang in the middle of China and India. China and America have a great power rivalry, and it is unclear which way Indian axis will go.”
India can also benefit if Trump follows through on threats on more tariffs on Chinese imports. Even though the Biden-Harris administration has been punishing China with tariffs and other barriers, Trump has in the past been more belligerent on Beijing.
“On the one hand, India is close to US in Quad, on the other hand, it takes part in BRICS where it works with Russia and China, and the Shanghai Cooperation. It remains to be seen how the US relationship plays out with our two big neighbours,” adds Upadhyay.
Since the enemy of an enemy is a friend, Washington has regarded India as its bulwark against increased Chinese economic and military clout. But New Delhi has not always gone along with US strategic interests, and does not really like the Americans being too involved with India’s smaller neighbours.
On the downside, A Trump administration could curb the influx of Indian IT workers in US, and the easy access Nepali students have to those jobs in the US could also be scaled back.
Some experts say which party is in the White House will not affect policy South Asia, and Nepal even less. But a Trump win could mean less development assistance to Nepal, particularly in reproductive health, human rights, and social safety.
Nischal Pandey at the Centre for South Asian Studies in Kathmandu says that the few state-level visits between the US and Nepal — from King Mahendra’s address to the joint session of US Congress during President Eisenhower tenure in 1960 to Ganesh Man Singh being received at the White House by President Bush Sr after 1990, to US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit in 2002 during George HW Bush’s term — have all been during Republican administrations.
He adds, “Historically, Republican presidents and administrations have been &nbsp;interested in Nepal than Democratic ones.”
More directly, Nepalis aspiring to migrate to the United States could find it more difficult. There are currently about 300 Nepalis waiting in Mexico for human traffickers to smuggle them into the United States, and that border is going to be tightened even more.
Earlier this year, Sao Paolo airport in Brazil had 150 Nepalis stranded after arriving to take the Darien Gap backdoor to the US. Another 200 headed out to Brazil were stuck at Addis Ababa airport, forcing Ethiopia to ban visas to Nepalis.&nbsp;
Trump has threatened a 20% tariff on Mexican imports if it does not stop migrants. He plans to deport 11 million undocumented people, he may not be able to carry it through but the threat is there for Nepalis in the US without papers.
Trump’s strong rhetoric on China could be bargaining brinkmanship, and it will be interesting to see how he balances this with Sino-Russian alignment. Biden did not roll back bans on Huawei and restrictions on TikTok, and US security concerns about China’s rise is a bipartisan issue, just as Gaza is. Harris would not have done things differently in those sectors.&nbsp;
Says MP Bimala Rai Paudyal: “Trump’s win could cause economic tensions with China, which will affect trade here as well, this is something we will need to prepare for.”
America’s moral authority to lecture countires like Nepal on transitional justice, human rights, democracy, and press freedom will be diminished during the second Trump term.&nbsp;
Reproductive rights, support for family planning projects in Nepal through the UN system may also fall like it did during his earlier presidency. Foreign aid through USAID could also be cut.
But perhaps the more indirect impact on Nepal of the Trump presidency will be his rollback on America’s commitment to curb climate change which will accelerate melting of the Himalayan icecap with major impact on water supply downstream in Asia.&nbsp;
“America’s climate commitments and goals will be impacted by Trump who doesn’t believe in climate change,” says Paudyal. “The current work on loss and damage, and carbon trading depends significantly on US funding, and the world looks to the US to be proactive.”
If Trump can bring the Ukraine war to a close by cosying up to Putin, a peace deal may improve fuel and food situation globally. There are thousands of Nepalis in the Russian Army, at least 50 have died, and they could finally come home.&nbsp;
Concludes Upadhyay: “As for Nepal, the Trump administration should see Nepal as a soverign nation on its own right rather than through the prism of great power rivalry either between US and China.”

Shristi Karki

Trumpet Call

As of late October, the presidential election in the United States is on a knife’s edge. The only reasonably certain scenario in the immediate future is that the outcome on election day will be bitterly contested, and that some level of violence is highly likely if Harris is declared the winner.
I leave it to others to try to read the tea leaves about how the events of the next few months will unfold, and I will not attempt to elaborate on the formidable threats to human rights, international stability, and US democracy that will be unleashed if Trump gains the presidency. &nbsp;
These threats have been widely discussed. But there is surprisingly little discussion about the implications of a Harris presidency. To be sure, by bringing a woman – and a second person of colour – into the Oval Office, Harris’s victory would mark an historic step forward. &nbsp;
Preventing a second Trump term would, in itself, be of paramount importance. &nbsp;But what would President Harris actually be able to do? &nbsp;It might be useful to speculate about what we might realistically expect from a Harris administration.
To begin with, we should bear in mind that the implementation of President Harris’s domestic agenda will be severely constrained by a divided Congress (at least for her first two years) and by a conservative Supreme Court. This means she will not be able to pass most of the ‘big ticket’ items she has proposed in her campaign – more progressive taxation, extensive family-oriented programs, expanded access to home-ownership, etc.
She might be able to deploy her regulatory authority in some policy areas (health and environment) and – not insignificantly – she will also undoubtedly try to push ahead incrementally in areas of racial justice, gender equality, and public safety.&nbsp;
However, she will face serious pushback on many of these efforts from the Court. What she will be able to do is to defend and continue the dramatic achievements of the Biden &nbsp;administration in infrastructure and environment, achievements that have already been encoded in law.&nbsp;
The historic significance of the Biden legislative legacy has been obscured in the heat of the current campaign by the diffuse demand for ‘change’. But we should not allow unrealistic expectations about further advances to blind us to the importance of defending the major progress made during his presidency.
President Harris will have more political leeway in defining US foreign policy. &nbsp;Here, however, she will inherit daunting international crises – not only the terrible wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, but the ongoing threats to international stability caused by the rise of China, continuing threats from Russia and Iran, and challenges to international cooperation posed by climate change, cybersecurity, and global migration, among other things.&nbsp;
Again, however, we should not underestimate the enormous importance of the fact that she is not Trump. She might not be able to work miracles, but in contrast to Trump, we can count on her to place a high priority on US alliances, and international cooperation in security and the global economy – essential preconditions for managing the problems we face abroad.
The profound cultural, racial, and economic divisions that currently imperil American democracy preceded the rise of Trump and can be expected to persist beyond a Harris presidency. &nbsp;Moreover, many of the more immediate steps necessary to reduce these divisions are beyond her control.&nbsp;
We cannot move forward without bringing Trump and his associates to legal account. This will be a deeply controversial, but necessary step. But it is one that Harris should not attempt to influence. &nbsp;Beyond that, American democracy cannot fully rebound without either the re-democratisation of the Republican party or the emergence of a new conservative party that would replace it. &nbsp;
What we can realistically hope for is that President Harris will be able to build on Biden’s achievements, maintain sound economic policies, and prevent international crises from spiraling out of control. &nbsp;If she does that, she will also have played an important part in healing American democracy. &nbsp;
Robert R. Kaufman is an Emeritus Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University. He is co-author of Backsliding: Democratic Regress in the Contemporary World, Cambridge University Press, 2021.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/prospects-for-a-kamala-harris-administration.html">the original</a> with their permission.

Prospects for a Kamala Harris administration

The first, and potentially only, debate between the 45th and 46th presidents of the United States constituted a <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2024/06/28/trump-biden-debate-result-takeaways-00165701" target="_blank">clear win</a> for Donald Trump, as far more viewers focused on <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s apparent physical and mental infirmities than Donald Trump’s evasions and trafficking in partial or outright lies.&nbsp;
The question now, though, is what, if any, difference it will make in the presidential election that is now just four months away.
The debate most likely increases the odds that Trump will occupy the Oval Office come noon on 20 January, 2025. Going into Thursday night’s debate, Trump was <a href="https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/the-somewhats-election-soft-biden-disapprovers-key-for-both-candidates/" target="_blank">slightly ahead</a> in many of the national polls and, more importantly, in the half-dozen swing states that will most likely determine the election’s outcome. The debate only added to this advantage.
The context favours Trump. This year has already proven to be a tough one for incumbents seeking re-election, as outcomes in <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-election-results-bjp-disappointing-victory-good-news-for-democracy-by-shashi-tharoor-2024-06">India</a>, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/30/world/europe/france-elections.html" target="_blank">France</a> and Britain have demonstrated. Polls also show a low approval rating for the prime ministers of <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-s-Kishida-approval-rating-sinks-to-new-low-of-25-Nikkei-survey#:~:text=TOKYO%20%2D%2D%20Support%20for%20Japanese,that%20launched%20in%20October%202021." target="_blank">Japan</a> and <a href="https://nationalpost.com/news/bleak-poll-results-justin-trudeau" target="_blank">Canada</a>, which could lead to a change of leadership in those countries. Biden and the US are poised to be consistent with this trend.
Like many of his fellow incumbents, Biden has struggled to manage rising immigration and economic challenges. His failure to deal effectively with the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7227y6nqzmo" target="_blank">southern border</a> has allowed some <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/4423296-matthews-illegal-immigrants-double-under-biden-and-thats-just-the-start/" target="_blank">ten million</a> men, women, and children to enter the US illegally. Then there are the effects of inflation, something voters are reminded of every time they go to the grocery store or fill their car with gasoline. Biden can point to domestic and foreign-policy accomplishments, but they are less salient to many Americans.
Most critical is the question of his <a href="https://wfin.com/fox-health-news/doctors-express-concern-about-bidens-apparent-cognitive-issues-during-debate-troubling-indicators/" target="_blank">age</a>. Doubts are widely and deeply held that Biden is simply too old for what is arguably the world’s most demanding and important job. He is 81, turns 82 in November, and, if re-elected, would turn 86 while still in the White House. And he is an old 81.&nbsp;
As the debate demonstrated, he walks stiffly, loses his train of thought, and has a weak and raspy voice. Trump is only three years younger and makes little sense when he speaks, often taking bizarre rhetorical detours, but manages to project a more vigorous image.
Given Biden’s <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/28/biden-seeks-to-project-confidence-amid-concerns-over-debate-performance" target="_blank">better outing</a> at a campaign stop the day after the debate, some believe he can bounce back. After all, Ronald Reagan and Barack Obama recovered from poor debate performances. But that was because they were seen as great orators who simply had a bad night. Biden’s problem is that his poor showing reinforced an already-entrenched narrative that will be difficult, if not impossible, to alter. His performance could even threaten to turn him into something of a lame duck, further weakening his influence at home and abroad.
All this said, Biden will be the Democratic Party candidate chosen at the party’s convention this August unless he takes himself out of the running and frees his pledged delegates to vote for someone else. Who this someone would be – Vice President Kamala Harris, a sitting governor or senator, a member of his cabinet – is anybody’s guess.
It is obvious that Biden and his inner circle are resisting calls (<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/28/opinion/biden-election-debate-trump.html" target="_blank">including from sympathetic editors</a> at major news outlets) for him to step aside. Neither he nor his loyal lieutenants, many of whom have been close to him for decades, have given any indication that the president will bow out.
Biden’s declining political fortunes could well prove to be a drag on other Democratic candidates come autumn. It is possible that a Trump victory could help bring about a Republican takeover of the Senate at the same time Republicans hold the House of Representatives. Together with a Supreme Court that has increasingly demonstrated sympathy for positions supported by Trump and congressional Republicans, this would bring about the American equivalent of a parliamentary system, with power consolidated in the hands of a party that is better understood as radical rather than conservative.
There would be few checks on power strong enough to mitigate this imbalance; on the contrary, Trump’s plans to weaken the independence of the <a href="https://protectdemocracy.org/work/trumps-schedule-f-plan-explained/#:~:text=In%20October%202020%2C%20the%20Trump,to%20the%20president%20when%20hiring." target="_blank">civil service</a>, together with his promise to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/donald-trump-wants-control-justice-department-fbi-his-allies-have-plan-2024-05-17/" target="_blank">politicise</a> the Justice Department and regulatory agencies, would concentrate power further. Trump would be free to lower taxes, impose tariffs, further restrict access to abortion, ease already loose controls on gun ownership, enforce immigration law as he sees fit, and increase the enormous debt.
Foreign policy would also be vulnerable to significant change, because the US political system gives broad latitude to the executive. It is quite possible that Trump would reduce or even eliminate US support for Ukraine, hollow out US commitments to NATO, give Israel an even freer hand to prosecute <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/29/hezbollahs-plans-israels-threats-is-either-side-ready-for-war" target="_blank">war</a> in Gaza and Lebanon and build settlements, refuse to participate in global efforts to combat climate change, and prioritise bilateral trade issues with China over broader concerns with Beijing’s behavior abroad.
Elections have consequences, and this one more than most, given that the differences between the candidates far exceed any similarities. In the wake of a debate that appears to have tipped the scales against Biden, and with no way of knowing if someone else will be the Democratic candidate and how he or she would fare, US friends and allies should prepare themselves for potentially major changes come January.&nbsp;
© Project Syndicate
Richard Haass is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and previously served as Director of Policy Planning for the US State Department (2001-03). He is the author of <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/588988/the-bill-of-obligations-by-richard-haass/" target="_blank">The Bill of Obligations: The Ten Habits of Good Citizens</a> (Penguin Press, 2023) and the weekly Substack newsletter <a href="https://richardhaass.substack.com/" target="_blank">Home &amp; Away</a>.

The world should prepare for Trump

Sha Bahadur Gurung was 30 years old when he was arrested for participating in a peaceful protest. He died aged 65 last week in Bhutan’s Chamgang Central Prison. He was among 31 prisoners of conscience in Bhutan, many of whom are serving long sentences for opposing the regime’s forcible expulsion of 100,000 of its Lhotsampa people in the early 1990s. ‘Mr Gurung died on 15 December in his prison cell under circumstances that raise serious concerns about custodial negligence and long-term abuse,” said a statement by the Global Campaign for the Release of Political Prisoners in Bhutan (GCRPPB) based in The Hague which demanded an external probe, justice and release of remaining political prisoners. Gurung was from Chirang and was arrested in 1990 while serving in the Royal Bhutan Army, and accused of having sympathies for the Lhotsampa people. He was mostly held at the notorious Rabuna Prison in Wangdi Phodrang District.&nbsp; Gurung’s relatives in the United States said he had endured prolonged physical and psychological abuse during his imprisonment, and repeatedly subjected to torture and inhumane treatment. They believe the decades of ill-treatment had damaged his health, ultimately leading to his death. Earlier this month, Gurung was transferred from Rabuna to Chamgang Central Prison. On 14 December. He had gone to bed after dinner without any visible sign of distress. He was found unconscious in his cell the next morning.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224151248_5fc8305ecd320d89b9e343c04a1a897dc1353353da55b6d277f5398034b265ea.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251224151248_5fc8305ecd320d89b9e343c04a1a897dc1353353da55b6d277f5398034b265ea" data-rendition-name="original" width="902" height="1103" loading="lazy" alt="Sha Bahadur Gurung NT"> <figcaption>Sha Bahadur Gurung, who died at age 65 in prison in Bhutan after serving 30 years for expressing political opinion.</figcaption> </figure>  He was referred to a hospital in Thimphu, suggesting that he was still alive during transfer to a local health post. But it appears that he had already died before being taken from prison. Gurung’s death occurred two days before Bhutan’s National Day on 17 December, when families, supporters, and human rights advocates worldwide had hoped for the release of political prisoners through a royal amnesty. Instead, the death of one of the longest-serving political prisoners has caused grief and anger in the Bhutanese diaspora.&nbsp; “We strongly condemn the treatment and death of Gurung, a peaceful and justice-loving Bhutanese citizen,” the V statement said. ‘This tragedy raises serious questions about the treatment of political prisoners in Bhutan and stands in stark contrast to the country’s international image under the principles of Gross National Happiness, compassion, and mindfulness.’ Earlier this year, The <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/wg-arbitrary-detention/opinions-adopted-working-group-arbitrary-detention/opinions-adopted-working-group-arbitrary-detention-its-101st-session" target="_blank">United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention</a> said the Bhutan government was detaining citizens without parole for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/detainees-in-dire-straits-in-bhutan-s-prisons" target="_blank">expressing political opinion</a>. The New York-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in 2023 that there were least 37 <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/13/bhutan-free-long-term-political-prisoners" target="_blank">political prisoners</a> in Bhutan’s jails. Of them, 32 belong to the Nepali-speaking Lhotshampa community, which has faced <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/06/18/nepal-bhutanese-refugees-rendered-stateless" target="_blank">decades of discrimination and abuse</a> and eviction. Most of them were convicted because of prohibited political activity between 1990 and 2008. One political prisoner, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/no-country-for-dissent?fbclid=IwAR07lpitMBWAYSkny_3d_smQBlmoxAOQm1OxdNtl-27h8mV0RNO9IxVY2qs" target="_blank">Madhukar Monger</a>, who was released in 2023 after serving 29 years described brutal conditions in <a href="https://www.hrw.org/asia/bhutan" target="_blank">Bhutan</a>'s jails. Political prisoners were not given enough food, and medical care, he said, urging the internaitoonal community to press for the release of prisoners of conscience.&nbsp; In March, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/about/people/meenakshi-ganguly" target="_blank">Meenakshi Ganguly</a>, Deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch, urged Bhutan’s international partners to call on the Bhutan government to release all remaining political prisoners immediately.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224161216_9d11a78ed5490091c595341900e4c26f5c0dd0328718f6930ef19c1e9b7f95a6.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20251224161216_9d11a78ed5490091c595341900e4c26f5c0dd0328718f6930ef19c1e9b7f95a6" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1422" loading="lazy" alt="Bhutan political prisoners NT"> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224161216_176855f3d3df42d24ac7e77372bbf49115695b732a6c094a66267e969111dfca.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20251224161216_176855f3d3df42d24ac7e77372bbf49115695b732a6c094a66267e969111dfca" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1420" loading="lazy" alt="Bhutan political prisoners NT"> </figure>  &nbsp;

Bhutan political prisoner dies in detention

‘Get out of my house.’ ‘All my sickness is because of you.’ ‘You’re a millstone around my neck.’ Arundhati Roy heard these admonitions from her mother over and over throughout her life.&nbsp; This must be a singular, yet universal experience. There must be very few daughters who make it through life unscathed by their mothers. And vice-versa.&nbsp; How many of our mothers look at us and see in us the potential of all of the lives they could have lived? How many resent us for it, or want us to live those lives in their stead? And how many of us look back at our mothers and imagine what they would have achieved had they not been expected and assigned to play the role of wife, daughter-in-law, mother — had we never existed in their lives? How many mothers project their experiences onto their own daughters and continue the cycle? No daughter seems to escape it — no matter how well-behaved, docile, unruly, or rebellious. Certainly not the child who would go on to become a Booker prize-winning author. Arundhati Roy’s memoir Mother Mary Comes To Me chronicles her complex relationship with her mother Mary, or Mrs Roy, as her educator mother had her two children refer to her. In December, Arundhati Roy was in Kathmandu to sign books and briefly interact with readers at two bookshops in the city. She describes a childhood overshadowed by her mother’s volatility towards her and her brother. Mary herself was raised by an abusive father to escape whom she married the first man who proposed — Arundhati’s father who in her mother’s words turned out to be an alcoholic ‘Nothing Man’.&nbsp; Mary left her husband in Assam and eventually wound up with her two children in her town of Aymanam in Kerala, encountering other family members along the way who did not treat her, or her children with respect. The trauma and cruelty her mother endured could not be contained in her body, and spilled out onto her two children, towards whom she was physically, verbally, and emotionally abusive.&nbsp; While she treated her children with disregard, she would build a school in the nearby town of Kottayam from the ground up, educate thousands of children, take up a legal fight that led to the Supreme Court granting Syrian Christian women in India equal inheritance rights, and uplift many orphaned children and women in Kerala.&nbsp; Arundhati lived with both her mother’s brutality and brilliance. And like her daughter, readers must reconcile the indefensible parts of Mary Roy’s personality — the cruelty of calling her nine-year-old daughter a bitch, or shooting the family dog that mated with a stray — with her unyielding drive to educate thousands, fight for equal rights, and challenge the way her world viewed women.&nbsp; Mrs Roy had little kindness for her own children, but plenty for the students, children, and women whose lives she shaped, and made better. And her kindness was not rooted in empathy, but in anger at the hand she had been dealt in life. Eventually, Arundhati decided to temporarily cut all contact with Mrs Roy — not because she did not love her, she writes, but so that she could continue to love her. Her desire to get away from her abusive mother, and her fascination with the ideas inspired by the architect who built her mother’s school, would lead her to the Delhi School of Architecture at age 16. In Delhi, Arundhati became roommates with Hisila Yami before she and her Maoist ideologue husband Baburam Bhattarai went underground to lead Nepal’s decade-long armed struggle. &nbsp; But architecture was not her calling. In Delhi, the heart of India’s statecraft, Arundhati came into young adulthood against a backdrop of the country’s changing socio-politics, which began to take a turn for the hyper-nationalist, Hindu supremacist community that it has now largely become. The winds of those changes have now blown into Nepal. In the city, far from her mother, Arundhati met the man who would become her partner of many years, collaborating with him on several films and screenplays before finding the language (‘I needed to hunt [language] down like prey,’ she writes) she needed to become the writer she is now.&nbsp; She went on to write her Booker prize-winning novel The God of Small Things, but the wealth and status the book brought her did not sit comfortably. So she smashed her newly-built gilded cage, as she describes it, and became more political. Contrary to norm, she published several works of non-fiction, and would only publish her second novel, The Ministry of Utmost Happiness, in 2017, 20 years after The God of Small Things. &nbsp;&nbsp; Her fierce opposition to India’s nuclear policies, to a dam that would displace millions of indigenous people and ecologically damage the Narmada Valley, her championing of Kashmiri self-determination, and her time spent with Maoist rebels in the forests of Chhattisgarh as they took up arms to defend their land and resources against corporate interests made her an enemy of the state.&nbsp; Meanwhile, being raised by a single mother had never sat well within her Syrian Christian community. ‘I wasn't Christian enough. I wasn't Hindu enough. I wasn't communist enough. I wasn't enough,’ Roy writes in her memoir. For all her love for India, the nation did not seem to reciprocate. The circumstances might be different, but it might strike a chord with readers in Nepal, many of whom marched on the streets in September hoping for a better tomorrow, but were gunned down by the very institutions meant to protect them. It might resonate with those who are not seen as citizens of this nation simply because they might not fit into an imagined idea of Nepali nationhood.&nbsp; Arundhati’s relationship with her mother, who was simultaneously proud and disdainful of her daughter’s accomplishments, continued to be tumultuous until the end of Mary Roy’s life.&nbsp; One of Mrs Roy’s last messages to her daughter before she passed was: ‘There is no one in the world whom I have loved more than you.’ Arundhati muses that her lifelong refusal to stop loving her mother must have finally breached her barriers. One wonders if that final declaration of love was solace enough, apology enough, for all the pain caused.&nbsp; But for Arundhati Roy, her love for her mother and her motherland outweighs the cruelty both have shown her. This, too, must be a singular, yet universal experience.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025122208128_32b171acb09df2184495367b74efd91fe2896b0f5ba75b276e1533276268761c.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2025122208128_32b171acb09df2184495367b74efd91fe2896b0f5ba75b276e1533276268761c" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Mother Mary Comes to Me review"> </figure>

The sins of our mothers

Nepal’s Gurkha soldiers have a well-deserved reputation worldwide for uncommon valour and loyalty. However, what happened in Hawaii in 1986 and the long struggle for fair pay and pension shows that the formidable fighters from Nepal also do not tolerate injustice. The Hong Kong-based 1st Battalion of the 7th Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Gurkha Rifles was in Hawaii for jungle warfare training exercises at the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center when they beat up their commanding officer, Major Corin Pearce. &nbsp;&nbsp; The Gurkhas said Pearce had insulted them, and 111 soldiers were dismissed. Pearce suffered broken ribs and a head injury, and was himself also discharged. The incident got worldwide publicity and enforced the belief that the Nepalis were not treated fairly in the British Army. It also led some retired soldiers to begin a decades-long struggle for compensation at par with their British peers.&nbsp; Retired British Gurkha soldier Shankar Rai in his book Triumph and Tears revisits the Hawaii incident which he witnessed, and also his experience in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas war in 1982.&nbsp; He has lots of grievances: unequal treatment and injustice from the British Army towards himself and his comrades. This is an indignant and disillusioned account of the good, the bad and the ugly of being a British Gurkha, which he says let him down despite his service and belief in it.&nbsp; The book could also be a cautionary tale of how one person on a power-trip can tarnish two centuries of the shared history of Nepal and the UK, as well as ruin the lives of those involved. It also is proof that loyalty should never be taken for granted. Four years after defeating the Argentinians in the Falklands, several companies and platoons of Gurkha rifles were stationed in Hawaii in 1986 for joint US-UK ‘Exercise Union Pacific’ military exercises. The goal was to ‘perfect the art of marine warfare in collaboration with the US Marine Force’. The rules were that a British Gurkha company commander needed to have the rank of major and pass a Nepali language test. Captain Pearce was the son-in-law of a British Brigadier on extra-regiment employment, and this rule was waived. He was appointed Acting Major. Pearce didn’t bother to learn Nepali language or culture, and from Rai’s account took every chance to belittle and embarrass the Gurkhas as poor, stupid, rude, backward, and lucky to be there. He writes: ‘After Captain Pearce reached Hawaii, he began to project himself as a master and the Gurkhas as servants, to show off to the Americans.’ The author also recounts other slights, such as only receiving a fourth of the rations they were due during hard training, being forced to train even when some of the soldiers had high fever, and claims to have ‘civilised’ the Nepalis.&nbsp; Pearce had been to eastern Nepal before the training and seen the grinding poverty. He kept telling the Gurkhas how lucky they were to be in the job, and that they were making ‘more money than Nepal’s prime minister’. During the final farewell party in Hawaii, Pearce set up tables to form a saluting platform, and asked the Gurkha pipe and drum band to march around him while playing. The enraged soldiers could not take it anymore, and after the party an inebriated group ran Captains Pearce and Chandra Kumar Pradhan out of their tents and beat them up. Both officers broke ribs, and the major needed 15 stitches on his head. ‘This sorry and unseemly episode is considered to have been entirely at odds with the Brigade of Gurkhas’ tradition of loyalty and gallant service in the British Army. It is regarded as an isolated and untypical event, which will not be permitted to detract from the high esteem in which the Brigade is held,’ reads the report of an investigation. Most of the 1/7 company soldiers were dismissed whether they had been involved in the assault or not. The author describes the shame that followed, with dismissed soldiers returning to Nepal with lost face.&nbsp; ‘I burned with humiliation, and life scared me,’ writes the author, whose father told him that he was ashamed to call him his son. ‘Many of my friends’ girlfriends left them and married other people. Rifleman Khem Gurung (21162015) of Itahari committed suicide,’ writes Rai, adding that those dismissed were blacklisted, and could not get other jobs.&nbsp; They tried to pursue legal action against the British Government, but backed down when they could not afford expensive hotshot lawyers, and would not have the money to cover the British government’s legal fees in the likely case of a loss in court. Gurkhas who had served for four years in the UK were allowed to move there, an option that many of those dismissed in the Hawaii incident took, including the author, who now lives in Oxford. Rai pours out his hurt and emotion in the book. Towards the end, he writes: ‘I depend on small jobs for livelihood. In the remaining time, I actively raise the issue of the victims of the Hawaii incident. We are burdened with insults, hatred, and contempt for a lifetime. It was harsher than a court martial, too heavy to bear.’ The is a slim book, and is a quick, engaging read of an incident 30 years ago, and Rai writes with a soldier’s precision. Even though the anger shows even after all these years, there is no over-dramatisation in the narrative.&nbsp; The first part of the book is about sailing across the South Atlantic in the QEII, which had been converted into a troop ship to take the Gurkhas to war. The soldiers from landlocked Nepal were mostly sea-sick, but were happy to get two cans of beer a day. Barclays Bank even had a branch on board. Rai’s descriptions of the friendships he developed in the Company and on the battlefield are poignant. They braved Argentinian bombs, dug trenches and fought through the rain in the Southern Hemisphere winter. There are vignettes of sharing tea with fellow Nepalis, seeing comrades fall, and finding pictures of wives and children in the pockets of dead young Argentine soldiers. Behind the prestige, honour and myths of being a Gurkha soldier, it seems this is just another job with nepotism, horrible bosses and bad pay. But such is the desperation that up to 20,000 young Nepalis still apply for 300 openings in the British Army every year. &nbsp;&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251227041256_694a253e782c83b0bf89fc1b9840b0ade3f7beca2d0b01dbc4fcd3e63c207f50.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251227041256_694a253e782c83b0bf89fc1b9840b0ade3f7beca2d0b01dbc4fcd3e63c207f50" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Triumph and tears book details NT"> </figure>

Not taking loyalty for granted

This is the 77th episode of Diaspora Diaries, a Nepali Times series in collaboration with Migration Lab providing a platform to share experiences of living, working and studying abroad. I was in Grade 3 when my father left for Saudi Arabia. Letters he sent occasionally contained photos. We had to get used to matching the person in the photos with him when he came home. Over two decades later, I left behind my son a day after he was born to go to Korea.&nbsp; He was five when I returned, and he just could not believe I was the same person he spoke on video calls. To convince him that it was indeed me, I had to call him on video from the other room.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224021240_3eead7a26ee34bab17e1b462d3e53ae8b4dc95151478e55b09f2855989364015.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20251224021240_3eead7a26ee34bab17e1b462d3e53ae8b4dc95151478e55b09f2855989364015" data-rendition-name="original" width="1080" height="960" loading="lazy" alt="Jumli coffee DD"> </figure>  Technology, it turns out, is no replacement to proximity and physical presence.&nbsp; When my father was in Saudi Arabia, my mother died. My father could not return to Nepal immediately, and my grandmother took in my two sisters and me.&nbsp; My studies took a hit. I started working in a shoe shop, and earned Rs2,100 a month. I wanted to start a shoe shop with support from my father when he returned. He did not, and neither did my other relatives. Perhaps they doubted my business sense. Or they had other priorities.&nbsp; Whatever it was, this feeling of not having someone to back me up hit me deeply but give me confidence. Without alternatives, I decided to prepare to migrate to Korea. I studied for the language exam and was among the first cohort under the G2G scheme. When I was finally matched with a Korean employer, I could not be happier.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224021248_5f681863a9aa99f31f3241158e636b32aca9fdaa7c3f5c19dd67e3de2068a3b5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20251224021248_5f681863a9aa99f31f3241158e636b32aca9fdaa7c3f5c19dd67e3de2068a3b5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1064" height="823" loading="lazy" alt="Jumli coffee DD"> </figure>  Not having received any support from those around me, the Korean offer made me feel like I had won in life. My grandmother was happy because it would increase family income. She had three additional mouths to feed, and we were quickly growing up. She worried about getting my sisters married. My first stint in Korea, however, was not what I expected. I had to change jobs multiple times, either because the company I worked for was unable to pay me, there was no work, or I had an accident. The odds just were not in my favour. The global financial crisis had taken a toll on the economy.&nbsp; Even so, I managed to help pay for my sisters' weddings and had modest savings. But there was not much to show for it compared to my peers. Never again, I thought, as I said goodbye to Korea.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224021240_f303dd30f922776a30a1871b38e5420534e73b99b7b1444b4658c4eca535d043.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20251224021240_f303dd30f922776a30a1871b38e5420534e73b99b7b1444b4658c4eca535d043" data-rendition-name="original" width="856" height="1279" loading="lazy" alt="Jumli coffee DD"> </figure>  I came home and got married. I started a mobile repair shop. But it did not work out well either, and I was soon headed back to Korea despite my misgivings. I left a day after my son was born, and this time I was determined to make it work in Korea. I was placed in a company that made golf balls. It paid well, but the job was just for money, I needed to do something more with my future that would help me stand on my own feet once I was back in Nepal. I was intrigued by the three-in-one instant coffee sachets in Korea that had coffee, milk and sugar. Back home in our village in Kaski, our cooperative grew coffee that either went to waste or fetched very low prices. My sisters and I used to pick the sweet and tasty coffee cherries.&nbsp; I saw a great business prospect in turning the beans into coffee sachets, and started exploring this. That was my mission: to make instant coffee packets widely available in Nepal. It was just a matter of understanding the process so I went to a migrant resource centre in Korea to inquire about where I could learn this.&nbsp; I was advised to take barista classes, and I found out that sachet coffee is actually not healthy and I should instead learn about fresh brewed coffee. That seemed even more exciting. How coffee beans could be ground and sold for over Rs450 in Korean cafes that people waited in line for bemused me. During my free time, I spent all my energy learning about coffee. I took training in barista, coffee sensory, machine repair and roasting. I had to rely on the generosity of Koreans who were willing to take a chance on me as I had different constraints such as lack of network, a busy work schedule at my regular job but even then, people offered to help.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224021244_86bbfcdcbe8925c46efac526225aea226b7987290f8107e991d8e764cbb01155.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20251224021244_86bbfcdcbe8925c46efac526225aea226b7987290f8107e991d8e764cbb01155" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="960" loading="lazy" alt="Jumli coffee NT"> </figure>  I was so obsessed that whenever I spent time on leisure activities during days off, I felt guilty. My golf ball job was just for income, I had to invest in my real post-Korea life. Balancing work and learning everything about coffee was not easy. Not only did I pay for some of the lessons, I even skipped overtime hours for them. But this was for my future. I must have consulted over a dozen coffee experts in Korea to share their experience and connect me to people. I could not afford to be shy about asking strangers for help. When the pandemic hit, we were granted a one-year visa extension, and I took it as an opportunity to invest in myself. I had seen great business prospects for coffee machine repair service in Pokhara because people had to rely on Kathmandu. But to learn machine repair and maintenance, I had to spend more time and weekend classes were not going to be sufficient.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224021248_18996ee0b6292070add202cf948f5b0b5a09e5b11022b9d961a68a5a886fc5f4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20251224021248_18996ee0b6292070add202cf948f5b0b5a09e5b11022b9d961a68a5a886fc5f4" data-rendition-name="original" width="1138" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Jumli coffee DD"> </figure>  I moved to a training company and worked just enough to maintain my legal status. I did not take overtime shifts. Even my roommates barely saw me because I used to come home long after our duty hours from my coffee training. I also needed actual job experience so I asked my trainer to let me shadow him at work.&nbsp; The on-the-job exposure to repair and maintenance work gave me more confidence and expertise. When I returned to Nepal, I came home with a suitcase full of coffee machine parts. I have started a coffee shop called Jumli, provide machine repair services and have also started growing my own coffee. The idea is to be a one stop shop for all players in the coffee industry, whether it is farmers or coffee shop owners who need Nepal-grown coffee or machine repair services or coffee lovers.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20251224021248_0fd28dab75d1eddbc16ab0aeda2ce7fcd4aceb07e7a381d4ce872b5184bea086.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20251224021248_0fd28dab75d1eddbc16ab0aeda2ce7fcd4aceb07e7a381d4ce872b5184bea086" data-rendition-name="original" width="1321" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Jumli coffee DD"> </figure>  It is not always easy being an entrepreneur in Nepal. Sometimes, when I am on shaky ground, I close my eyes and talk to my mother in my head for clarity. Some of these conversations are replays of the things she told me when I was growing up. I didn’t take them seriously then, but now they offer important nuggets of wisdom about life, society, and how to navigate difficult times. I have a lot of hope for the future. I am now laying the groundwork to one day export Nepal’s specialty coffee to the international market, meeting global standards of quality. Programs like the Returnee Innovators for Nepal (RIN) help in equipping you with the skills to better pitch your business and give exposure and networks. Even now, I rely on my trainer in Korea for guidance or to access spare parts that are not available in Nepal. I have come a long way from the day I cluelessly chose ‘American-O’ coffee because it was the easiest drink to pronounce in the menu. I never thought I would be making a living from coffee back home in Nepal one day.&nbsp;

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