<figure><img width="640" height="426" src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111016118/636d14089c7e80680e0a9958jpeg.jpg" alt=""/><figcaption>Photo: Jan Møller Hansen</figcaption></figure>Nearly an entire generation of Nepali youth has grown up following the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) that was signed on 21 November 2006, and which brought the Maoist insurgency to an end.
The accord marked the entry of the Maoists into democratic politics, effectively ending the war. But thousands of families of those killed, maimed or disappeared still <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/12-years-later-justice-is-a-mirage/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">wait for truth and justice</a>.
Signed 15 years ago on this day, the CPA pledged to ‘Investigate human rights violations and those involved in crimes against humanity’.
But 14 prime ministers later, the whereabouts of nearly 2,000 people who went missing during the war remains unknown. <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-runs-out-of-excuses-to-address-war-crimes/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Conflict-era survivors</a> of torture, abuse, rape and families of those killed continue to wait for justice all these years later.
“State officials' reluctance to investigate and prosecute such serious crimes has exacerbated the suffering of victims, undermined the rule of law in post-conflict Nepal, and increased the risk of such violations in the future," says Meenakshi Ganguly, South Asia director at Human Rights Watch.
In 2015, the government formed the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/truth-about-truth-commission,3565" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> and the Commission to Investigate Enforced Disappearances. Both received more than 60,000 complaints but not a single investigation has been resolved, said four rights organisations in a statement released on the anniversary of the CPA agreement.
Rather, the two commissions are being used as a pretext to prevent cases from moving through the regular courts. 
The current 5-party coalition government includes former enemies in the conflict: the Nepali Congress and the Maoists. Critics have said there is an unspoken agreement between them to delay the transitional justice process since so many of their senior leaders could be considered culpable for war crimes.
It was perhaps to deflect criticism from human rights groups and international watchdogs that Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal (who was known by his nom de guerre 'Prachanda' during the conflict) issued a statement on 21 November, saying that his party was committed to meet the obligations under the CPA on justice for wartime excesses.
'Although the conflict was brought to an end, the task of investigating events that occurred during the war and to provide victims with transitional justice remains,' Dahal said <a href="https://www.himalkhabar.com/news/126682" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">in the statement</a>, which was also published in English in The Kathmandu Post on Sunday. 'We are proud of what the revolution achieved, but we will probe and bring out wartime excesses.'
Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch and TRIAL International issued a joint press release on Sunday stating that the promises made in the agreement have not yet been fulfilled 15 years later, there has been no progress in providing justice for the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/opinion/nepal-must-reboot-human-rights-rule-of-law/" target="_blank" style="letter-spacing: 0.01em;" rel="noopener noreferrer">crimes and other offenses</a> committed against international law. 
“Nepal's transitional commissions have not been able to achieve anything in the last six years. These commissions have long since lost the trust of the victims,” says Mandira Sharma, Senior International Legal Adviser to the ICJ.
The commissions also drew much criticism for a clause that recommended <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/just-not-justice/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">granting amnesty</a> to those that committed serious crimes under international law. After international pressure, the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/rights-groups-laud-nepal-supreme-court-ruling/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">issued an order</a> to annul the provision, which the government has since implemented.
The statement from the four international organisations reinforced the Supreme Court's order to amend the law, while urging for timely justice and reparations for the victims. 
<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/editorial/rocky-transition-to-justice/" target="_blank" style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" rel="noopener noreferrer">Nepal’s delayed transitional justice</a> and multiple cases of the perpetrators being set free by the court have diminished its credibility in the world community. In October 2020, the country was <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-elected-to-2nd-term-at-unhrc/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">elected to the second term at UNHRC</a> (United Nations Human Rights Council) even as it had failed in fulfilling human rights pledges at home, much to the criticism of activists.
All four organisations have called on the Nepal government to set a clear timeline for a reliable <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/14-years-after-conflict-no-closure-in-nepal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">transitional justice process</a> with the needs of the victims at the forefront, to begin meaningful consultations with them and to fulfill their legal obligations.
Adds Meenakshi Ganguly of Human Rights Watch: "If justice is continually denied in Nepal, perpetrators of these international crimes committed during the conflict will be prosecuted abroad under international jurisdiction."

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Justice delayed, justice denied

<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05b59c7e80680e0a5f21jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1451" height="852"/><figcaption>King Palden Thondup Namgyal, the last Chogyal (monarch) of Sikkim with his wife Hope Cooke.</figcaption></figure>Nearly half-a-century after the overthrow of Palden Thondup Namgyal, the 12th and last Chogyal of Sikkim and India’s formal annexation of the tiny kingdom, the ghost of Sikkim still haunts neighbouring Himalayan states.Till today, there are frequent dark references by media commentators to New Delhi’s plans for the ‘Sikkimisation’ of Nepal as well.Sikkim was the smallest of the three Himalayan kingdoms, sandwiched between Nepal and Bhutan to the west and east, and between China and India in the north and south. Its location magnified tiny Sikkim’s strategic importance.Although it was a sovereign country, after Indian independence in 1947, Sikkim (like Bhutan) had ceded to New Delhi authority over three important state affairs: defence, foreign relations and communication.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05b89c7e80680e0a5f22jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1682" height="809">After the British left India, under a treaty signed on 12 December, 1950 Jawaharlal Nehru gave Sikkim a special protectorate status, maintaining the kingdom’s independence under the Chogyal, the king.However, the Chogyal began to show an increasing desire to chart an independent course in foreign relations for his country. When Indira Gandhi became prime minister of India in 1966, she showed little patience for the Chogyal’s authority, and even less tolerance for Sikkim’s desire for increased independence.Internal political turmoil in Sikkim eventually gave India the pretext to wrest power from the Chogyal and install its own administrative head to rule the country in 1973. The Chogyal wanted to renegotiate the 1950 Treaty between Sikkim and India, and made attempts to establish independent foreign relations.<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05bb9c7e80680e0a5f23jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1263" height="705"><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Indira Gandhi was especially suspicious of the Chogyal’s American-born wife, Hope Cooke, and the influence she had on him. She was suspicious of Sikkim’s unusually large new embassy building in New Delhi’s diplomatic quarter.Then, in March 1975, the Chogyal and Queen Hope traveled to Kathmandu to attend King Birendra’s coronation, and even met Chinese and Pakistani leaders who were also attending.Moreover, while in Kathmandu, the Chogyal gave a press conference all but denouncing India as a hurdle in Sikkim’s attempts to raise its international stature. The Chogyal instantly became even more of India’s bête noire.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015114/636d05be9c7e80680e0a5f24jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1048" height="1221">The Chogyal’s desire to break out of India’s influence was audacious, but the king may not have been a smart enough statesman or politician to challenge such a powerful neighbour. At a time when he needed public support within Sikkim to stand up to India, he made no effort to end his political discrimination against the Sikkimese of ethnic Nepali origin.This political alienation of Nepali-speakers, who then made up 75% of the population, proved to be fatally costly not only for this throne, but also for his kingdom.The Chogyal had internal political problems to deal with, and there was pressure building up for greater democracy. Several political organisations, especially the Sikkim National Congress led by Kazi Lhendup Dorji and Sikkim Janata Congress, had widespread support from Sikkimese Nepalis.The two parties demanded political freedom and preferred to put emphasis on the country’s development, in contrast to the Chogyal’s desire to break out of India’s traditional role as Sikkim’s master, especially in foreign affairs. In the eyes of the Nepali-speaking Sikkimese, the Chogyal was an unpopular autocratic ruler who wanted to disenfranchise them.Three days after the Chogyal returned to Gangtok from Kathmandu, the Indian Army surrounded his palace on 9 April 1975. New Delhi then carefully stage-managed a referendum to let the Sikkimese people decide whether the country should remain independent, or to be assimilated into India. The result was a foregone conclusion.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015118/636d05c09c7e80680e0a5f25jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="550" height="788">Ironically, Sikkim’s ethnic Nepali majority voted overwhelmingly in favour of Sikkim’s assimilation with India rather than endure what they saw as the Chogyal’s ethnic discrimination. The reign of King Palden Thondup Namgyal, the Chogyal, came to an end and Sikkim became India’s 22nd state on April 26, 1975.Kazi Lhendup Dorji became the first Chief Minister of the new Indian state of Sikkim. For Nepalis in Nepal, however, India’s stage-managed annexation evoked deep-seated fears that New Delhi could plan something similar.Unlike Nepalis in Sikkim, Nepalis in Kathmandu staged street demonstrations against India, calling the referendum a charade. To this day, politicians in Nepal perceived to be close to New Delhi swiftly earn the ‘Lhendup Dorji’ label in the media.Big BrotherIndia has loomed large right through recent Nepali history: the end of Rana rule, the Panchayat period and Nepal’s own referendum on the monarchy in 1980, the Indian blockade of 1990 and the subsequent People’s Movement, on to the India-brokered 12-point agreement to end the Maoist conflict in 2006, the new constitution and another five-month blockade by India in 2015.Nepali politicians have found India-bashing to be a potent tool during elections to drum up nationalist support. And India has often obliged by behaving like Big Brother.After the first Constituent Assembly abolished Nepal’s monarchy in 2008, there were murmurs of India’s ‘grand design’. These voices grew louder when Nepal’s first Vice President Parmananda Jha, a member of the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) took his oath of office in Hindi.The MJF itself emerged as a credible political force, a power-broker and king-maker, and there was widespread belief in Kathmandu that it was New Delhi’s pawn. India was accused of using Nepal’s Madhesi population, just as it had used Nepali-speakers to foment unrest in Sikkim half-a-century earlier.The activities of successive Indian ambassadors after 2006 were minutely followed by the media, which reported on their actual and fictitious meetings with Nepali politicians. The envoys appeared to have direct access to parlours of politicians in breach of diplomatic norms, and the press had a field day covering what it saw as New Delhi’s meddling.Given Nepal’s overwhelming economic dependence on India, and the history of New Delhi’s heavy-handedness in its neighbourhood, paranoia about Indian intentions is understandable. But it is a bit of a stretch to fan fears of an imminent ‘Sikkimisation’ of Nepal.Nepal’s modern foreign policy history is starkly different from the Chogyal’s Sikkim, and the country’s geostrategic situation has much stronger stock value than Sikkim ever did. Nepal’s shares a substantially longer border with India and China’s Tibetan Autonomous Region, providing both neighbouring countries to the north and the south a strategic geopolitical buffer.The very fact that a neutral Nepal allows both China and India not to have to deploy the kind of military presence as they have amassed eyeball-to-eyeball in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh means huge savings in money, men and matériel.On the other hand, Sikkim’s much smaller size did not give it that advantage. Its location astride India’s ‘Chicken Neck’ corridor between Nepal and Bangladesh had made Sikkim too strategic for its own good because of the proximity of China’s Chumbi Valley.In Nepal, suspicion and paranoia about India takes flights of fancy – especially among those living north of the Chure-Bhavar line. To some extent, given India’s looming presence and its actions in the past, the fear is justified.But for the most part, this unfettered obsession about Nepal being swallowed up by India distracts attention from the real danger – New Delhi’s unspoken expectation of subservience from landlocked Nepal. Even though Indian politicians and diplomats may not articulate it so clearly, India’s rowdy media is obsessed about ungrateful Nepalis always on the verge of selling themselves off to China.On the other hand, the single-minded preoccupation of Nepalis that we are about to be ‘Sikkimised’ comes from our own deep-seated sense of insecurity, magnifying and perpetuating it. This is not only unlikely, but also unfortunate and misdirected.Nepal never had the quasi-sovereign status that Sikkim had. It has always vigorously sought to establish independent foreign relations with other countries, establishing foreign missions, embassies and consulates.Diplomatic relations between Nepal’s kingdoms and the Chinese empire go back to the 7th century, when they first exchanged emissaries. Nepal is the only country with a consulate in Lhasa. Modern China after Mao’s revolution annexed Tibet just as India subsumed Sikkim. But although Chinese imperial regimes sometimes sought to bring Nepal under their sphere of influence, Beijing never attempted to ‘Tibetise’ Nepal.However, this is not to say that New Delhi and Beijing have no interest in Nepal, and both will leave Kathmandu to its own devices. They have tried, and will keep trying, to exert influence in Nepal for their own national and strategic interests.China may be comfortable with the status quo as long as Nepal is not a launch pad for Tibetan nationalism, while India will try to maintain the sphere of influence that it inherited from the British. The 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty, widely seen in Nepal to be unequal, is an example of New Delhi’s attempt to maintain its dominance.The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship signed on 31 July 1950 by a newly-independent India with the Rana regime was skewed in some respects. For example, it requires Nepal to consult with India prior to importing weapons from other countries, a clause that was used to impose the blockade in 1980 when Nepal sourced anti-aircraft guns from China.The Treaty was an encroachment on Nepal’s sovereignty, and is at the root of much of the persisting anti-India sentiment in Nepal. It tends to crop up in the manifesto of just about every political party in Nepal at election time, including the Maoists’ 40-point demand before the start of the conflict in 1996.However, Nepalis have to recognise that the 1950 Treaty also gave Nepal what Sikkim never had. Article 1 explicitly provided that ‘there shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal. The two Governments agree mutually to acknowledge and respect the complete sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each other.’At least in letter and spirit, if not in action, India was bound by the Treaty to maintain peace with Nepal and not play the role of an aggressor. More importantly, India explicitly acknowledged 70 years ago that Nepal was an independent, sovereign country and that it respected its territorial integrity.Unless a Nepal government attempts to undermine India’s territorial integrity on its own, or by tilting too far towards China or Pakistan, New Delhi will have no reason to ‘Sikkimise’ Nepal. Besides, there are an estimated 60,000 Nepali nationals, apart from Indians of Nepali descent, enlisted in the Indian Army.Some Nepali analysts tend to exaggerate the parallels between Sikkim and Nepal, and this serves no purpose except to fan the paranoia. Nepal’s foreign policy may be mishandled from time to time, but it is distinctly independent. We have only ourselves to blame when it does not work, for example, with the failure of our vaccine diplomacy at the moment.Regionally, despite the signing of the 1950 Treaty with India, Nepal has strategically charted an equidistance with India and China. New Delhi diplomats tend to scoff at the word ‘equidistance’, but it has stood Nepal in good stead in keeping both giant neighbours at arm’s length.The policy is derived from King Mahendra’s attempt to establish warm relations with China. His son, King Birendra, took the policy forward with his Nepal as a Zone of Peace (ZOP) proposal, a not-so-subtle attempt to tell the world that Nepal wanted to wriggle out of India’s sphere of influence.Over 100 countries endorsed Nepal as a ZOP, with the notable exception of India. While it signaled to the world Nepal’s foreign policy aspiration, King Birendra’s proposal did not do much to keep India off Nepal’s back. By 1990, widespread street protests forced King Birendra to abolish the Panchayat system and turn himself into a constitutional monarch from an absolute one.Prior to the invasion and formal annexation of Tibet by China in 1950, India considered Tibet, not Nepal, as its strategic buffer with China. When the Chinese invaded Tibet, India needed Nepal not only as an ally but also to serve as the next buffer line against China.The Treaty of 1950 was a clear and distinct move by India to transform Nepal into a 900-km long frontier wall with China to protect its densely-populated Gangetic Plains of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal.This means that if India annexes Nepal, it will have to be on the frontlines with an economically and militarily ascendant China across the mountains. Why would India want to do that?Naturally, New Delhi would prefer to preserve and extend its influence in Kathmandu. After the bruising blockade in 2015, the Indian mission is not engaged in overt influence-peddling, preferring a more low-key approach. This does not mean it has lost interest, New Delhi possibly now sees a politically stable Nepal being more in its interest than its policy of ‘controlled instability’.It is now up to the Nepali people and their political leaders to be careful not to provide a motivation to rouse the Indian tiger with needless provocation to be an aggressive, expansionist force. Nepal must realise that its sovereignty is strengthened by domestic stability.The kind of perpetual infighting and disunity that has characterised Nepali politics especially in the past two years, only undermines our independent status. Even the Chinese, who usually left Nepal’s political parties to sort out their own problems, had to step in when infighting within the NCP last year ultimately split the party.Learning from the 2015 Madhes Movement and blockade, Nepal’s politicians should not allow Tarai politics to be a pretext for future Indian meddling. For this, Nepal must be a much more inclusive state, mindful of devolving political decision-making to neglected and marginalised groups. This ensures long-term stability, and cannot be seen as something that ‘disturbs communal harmony’.Externally, Nepal should show restraint when ultra-nationalist pressure groups bring up the reclamation of Nepal’s historical territory ceded to British India in 1816. However strong our claim to Limpiyadhura, it is too sensitive an issue for Nepal’s political factions to use as nationalist ammunition against each other.As long as Nepal seeks mutually respectful bilateral relations with India and China that builds on its own internal stability, it can play a positive role at a time of global polarisation and increased regional tension.Nepal must live its policy of peaceful coexistence, be a peace-keeper in areas of conflict, and move forward as a confident nation, once and for all shedding its fear of Sikkim’s ghost.Ajay Pradhan is an expatriate Nepali living in Vancouver who works for the Government of Canada as senior policy advisor for treaty negotiations and reconciliation on comprehensive land claims. <img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/2022111015118/636d05c39c7e80680e0a5f26jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="79" height="109">

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Letting go of Sikkim's ghost

<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109171148/636bda899c7e80680e080274jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1438" height="1362"/>Nepal has been elected to a second term on the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) in Geneva <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/does-nepal-deserve-2nd-term-at-unhrc/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/does-nepal-deserve-2nd-term-at-unhrc/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1602730211285000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG7iQJFhPO894iZt7803_apN_Kg2A">despite opposition from activists</a> who have accused the ruling Nepal Communist Party (NCP) of dragging its feet on is out transitional justice, failure to address violence against women and Dalits and efforts to curtain freedom of expression.This time, Nepal was one of the candidates for four seats in the HRC together with Pakistan, China, Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia from the Asia-Pacific region. But Saudi Arabia was not elected.The election with 150 out of 193 votes at the UN headquarters in New York gave Nepal a new term from 2021-23. Nepal’s Permanent Mission at the United Nations tweeted: ‘It is yet another opportunity for Nepal to contribute to the protection &amp; promotion of HR globally.’Foreign Minister Pradeep Gyawali also tweeted: ‘We are grateful to the friendly nations for their support. Thanks to the Nepali Missions in New York and Geneva for hard work.’<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109171148/636bda8d9c7e80680e080275jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1222" height="420">However, many human rights group said Nepal <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/does-nepal-deserve-2nd-term-at-unhrc/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/does-nepal-deserve-2nd-term-at-unhrc/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1602730211285000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG7iQJFhPO894iZt7803_apN_Kg2A">did not deserve to be re-elected</a> because it had not fulfilled pledges it made in 2017, including implementation of the transitional justice process, make the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) more effective, and promoting rights to free expression.Not only are these promises unfulfilled, they say, but there has been a worrying rise in deaths in detention while not been enough effort has gone into investigating and prosecuting those responsible for violence against Dalits and women in Nepal.In April, Nepal’s <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-runs-out-of-excuses-to-address-war-crimes/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-runs-out-of-excuses-to-address-war-crimes/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1602730211285000&amp;usg=AFQjCNET7gWIvKE-wTBN9H6Allms8cr6rg">Supreme Court </a>rejected a government appeal of the court’s 2015 decision that ordered amendments to the Transitional Justice Act because it allowed pardon for heinous crimes during the 1996-2006 Maoist conflict.The Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and the Commission on Enforced Disappearances have languished because of the lack of political will by both former adversaries who now make up the Nepali state to address them.Although Nepal has been praised for improvements in laws, including the Supreme Court decision this year on transitional justice, critics say it has lagged behind in implementation, allowing impunity to flourish.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109171148/636bda8f9c7e80680e080276jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1220" height="518">“Nepal suffers from a chronic problem of non-implementation of human rights protections. Laws get passed but go unenforced. Transitional justice processes and institutions continue to be subordinated to short-term political interests. Government after government, including the current one, fail to respect judicial decisions and even actively seek to compromise judicial independence,” Frederick Rawski, Asia-Pacific Regional Director at the <a href="https://www.icj.org/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.icj.org/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1602730211285000&amp;usg=AFQjCNE2WYg-avFZqSeUR1mDqZx8VmLl7g">International Commission of Jurists</a> told this paper in September.Last month, Nepal had <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-again-pledges-progress-on-human-rights-if-elected-to-un-council/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/nepal-again-pledges-progress-on-human-rights-if-elected-to-un-council/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1602730211285000&amp;usg=AFQjCNH-j334FCDBdxCwgog1MyzyxSq7gw">renewed its pledge</a> to address human rights concerns and progress in transitional justice during a teleconference organised by Amnesty International and the International Society for Human Rights (ISHR).Nepal’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York Amrit Bahadur Rai had said: “I would like to assure all that there will be no blanket amnesty in cases of severe human rights violations committed during the conflict period,” he said.Nepal had been elected for the first term in 2017 to the 47-member Commission, which has 13 members from the Asia-Pacific. At that time, Nepal had secured 166 votes, which has now come down to 150. In Tuesday’s election Pakistan secured the most votes (169), Uzbekistan got 164 to become a UNHRC member for the first time, and China 139. Saudi Arabia won only 90 votes.Fifteen countries were elected, with Russia from Eastern Europe, France and Uk from Western Europe, and Cuba from Latin America and the Caribbean region.Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/does-nepal-deserve-2nd-term-at-unhrc/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/does-nepal-deserve-2nd-term-at-unhrc/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1602730211285000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG7iQJFhPO894iZt7803_apN_Kg2A">Does Nepal deserve a 2nd term at the UNHRC?</a>

Nepal elected to 2nd term at UNHRC

<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636baced9c7e80680e077f60jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1500" height="1125"/><figcaption>A milieu-matching restaurant on Freak Street from Desmond Doig’s book My Kind of Kathmandu.</figcaption></figure>Perhaps it’s the reflective, introspective mood brought on by the lockdown, or the re-examination of history as we seek to define Nepal’s border limits, but the media has recently seen considerable nostalgic chatter about the distant days when <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-gangster-of-love/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-gangster-of-love/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1594612316531000&amp;usg=AFQjCNHRPD2GXfM-mgsEKKzI-MEOmlNgvw">Kathmandu was a hippie haven.</a>The freedom of the well-worn Hippie Trail of the early 1970s, overland from Istanbul to Kathmandu, seems unimaginable in today’s world of COVID-19 travel restrictions – during this pandemic we can only dream of the joys of the open road.From the mid-1960s, hordes of hippies in search of Shangri-La bussed or hitchhiked through Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India before culminating in our Valley paradise, the end of the road. They came in tens of thousands pursuing enlightenment, preaching peace, finding themselves, escaping conformity, defying convention or fleeing the Draft, packed into gaudily-painted combis, busses and trucks resonating with Bob Dylan and Van Morrison.<a style="font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-grass-is-greener-in-nepal/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Grass is greener in Nepal</a>, Sonia Awale<a style="font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/clothed-in-cannabis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Clothed in cannabis</a>, Pema SherpaConstrained by centuries of insecurity and conflict, the turbulent regimes along their overland route learned little from their legacy, persisting in more war than peace, more hate than love. Coinciding with the Haight-Ashbury movement, the respite in hostilities presented a brief window of opportunity. Seldom has this section of the Silk Road been safe for travellers to transit since Marco Polo passed this way, protected by the Mongol Khan’s engraved tablet laissez passez.<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636bacf19c7e80680e077f61jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="640" height="480"><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Back in London, the ebullient <a href="https://www.facebook.com/tony.jones.77312477" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.facebook.com/tony.jones.77312477&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1594612316532000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEIPvciE8HtjuhYtJN5Oig4vOX_dw">Tony Jones</a> was one of the first to capitalise on the trend, organising truckloads of punters to drive to Kathmandu in his specially converted Encounter Overland vehicles. Keen to know more, one spring morning over a decade ago, I sat on a yellow cushioned cane chair in the garden of a dilapidated homestead just outside Nuwakot. The neat rows of vegetables and ranks of blossoming fruit trees in the orchard reflected Tony’s British army background.Long since settled in Pokhara, Tony was in the process of rebuilding what became the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/buzz-drive-through-nepal-dasain,746" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/buzz-drive-through-nepal-dasain,746&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1594612316532000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG3I2HbjDFnVysMk6Nm211g_wEg_g">Famous Farm</a>, twinned with his game-changing Old Inn which he had cleverly and carefully restored in the centre of Bandipur, the original inspiration of the tourist rehabilitation of that by-passed Newar trading town. Tony and his team pioneered rural heritage accommodation in historic village houses.<a style="font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://nepalitimes.atavist.com/feeling-groovy" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Feeling groovy</a>, Lucia de Vries<a style="font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/So-far-so-good/the-hippie-era-in-kathmandu,837" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">The unsuccessful hippie</a>, Lisa Choegyal“There’s a good chap, do get a move on, chito chito!” Tony Jones was hanging off a carved balcony of the rambling Newar farmhouse, waving his hammer and yelling at Laxman who laboured up the narrow staircase under a pile of wooden planks. Grinning, Laxman dumped them noisily on the exposed beams at Tony’s feet. Together, they laid and nailed them into place. Puffing with exertion, Tony continued to mutter in Nepali interspersed with English cockney expletives.<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636bacf39c7e80680e077f62jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1082" height="754">[caption id="attachment_50470" align="alignnone" width="1082"]<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636bacf59c7e80680e077f63jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1082" height="796"> The Famous Farm was conceived and restored by Tony Jones in an old homestead outside Nuwakot. Photos: THE FAMOUS FARMDistracted by the hammering but enjoying the banter, his wife and I shared a companionable pot of tea. I wanted to know more about managing the logistics of those unique overland operations, plus Rinchen was planning a big drive from UK to Mongolia in a beat-up old car.“Two pieces of advice for your son driving to Ulaanbaatar. First is be careful not to cross the Thames too many times as you leave London – most of my drivers got lost on their way to Folkstone before even reaching the English Channel!” Tony has a deep deprecating laugh, his eyes glazing as he remembered those far off days despatching truckloads of eager overlanders.“And never be the last in a convoy of vehicles! Fatal.” Which is exactly what happened to Rinchen when his engine flooded going through a river on the edge of the Gobi Desert and he sat powerless and increasingly desperate whilst his mates disappeared over the sandy horizon – but that’s another story.<a style="font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/hippinis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Hippinis</a>, Lucia de Vries<a style="font-size: 15px; letter-spacing: 0.01em;" href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/freak-me-out/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Freak me out!</a>, Marty LoganThe Hippie Trail’s terminus was <a href="https://nepalitimes.atavist.com/feeling-groovy" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://nepalitimes.atavist.com/feeling-groovy&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1594612316532000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEYph3yiqQWjLMwxU3SYVMDZpMP7w">Jhochen, Freak Street</a> and I arrived there from the opposite direction towards the end of their era in March 1974. Have travelled from Bali by train through Malaysia and Thailand, my first glimpse of the then-emerald Valley was through the grimy windows of a United Burma Airways plane from Yangon. As we circled over the rice terraces, the afternoon sun glinted off the golden spires of <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/circumambulating-with-swayambhu-billy,2193" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/circumambulating-with-swayambhu-billy,2193&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1594612316532000&amp;usg=AFQjCNGpXV9XSuoiwl5CWeXAEWRisLK0vw">Swayambhu</a> and the white dome of Bodnath flashed beneath us.The long-haired, beaded, colourfully-clad, chillum-toting hippies thronging the medieval streets of Basantapur when I first arrived in Kathmandu were no doubt free spirits, dropping out and hanging loose. Joints were rolled openly on table tops, <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-grass-is-greener-in-nepal/" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-grass-is-greener-in-nepal/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1594612316532000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEfvZdZiu-dZXiGinxGPp1pxaq0VA">ganja was legal</a> and hashish-laced cookies featured on menus in the cafes, restaurants and pie shops blaring western music that had flourished to cater to their alternative needs.More interested in getting high and higher trekking than tripping, I soon grew impatient with the smoke-blurred far-out cross-legged posturing, checked out of my six-rupee a night City Lodge, and headed for the hills.But it is simplistic and misleading to say hippies came to Nepal only for the dope. They were also tuned in to the chilled Himalayan hospitality, timeless culture, spiritual vibes, temple bells, chanting monks and exotic mountain mystery that the remote Kingdom offered in spades. They perched picturesque on the pyramid steps to witness Newar festivals and religious ceremonies, admired rooftop sunsets on the pink peaks, and pottered the streets amidst the ancient rituals of daily worship.<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636bacf79c7e80680e077f64jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1498" height="1006"><figcaption> </figcaption></figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636bacfa9c7e80680e077f65jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="886" height="761">Between the cycle rickshaws, tiger taxis, lounging bulls and grazing goats, their dusty decorated vans parked on palace cobbles or unmade bazaar lanes – the few other vehicles of the 1970s were UN-emblazoned SUVs, black palace limos with tinted windows, and the occasional vintage car carried in for the Ranas.The demise of Kathmandu’s hippie scene was not only precipitated by <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CJ-ER0GdJd8" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">President Nixon’s global crusade against drugs</a> that leveraged Nepal’s leaders to ban cannabis, marijuana and the harder stuff, but more that King Birendra wanted the Valley tidied up prior to the arrival of royal guests and world dignitaries for his lavish state coronation. By the time he and the Queen swayed down a spotless Durbar Marg on their jewel-encrusted elephant on the auspicious date of 4 February 1975, their death knell had sounded, visitor visas had evaporated and the hippies had departed.<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221109141136/636bacfd9c7e80680e077f66jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="706" height="1064"><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>When I came back in late 1975, only the hard-core were still to be found in Nepal – explorers, entrepreneurs, art dealers, dreamers, poets and devout students of Hindu and Buddhist philosophy. Many returned later in life with respectable friends and families to holiday in the ultimate destination of their errant youth. Thus the hippie subculture usefully kick-started Nepal’s nascent tourism with both American dollars and an enduring flower-power image.And some are still here to this day, including Tony Jones and myself, although neither of us would consider ourselves successful hippies. We just happened to be around at the time.

Lisa Choegyal

Hippie Trail nostalgia in Kathmandu

<img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221107171144/636936819c7e80680e03fde4jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="640" height="427"/>It is now <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/Double-centennial,1011" target="_blank" rel="noopener">more than 200 years</a> that men from Nepal have joined the British Army to fight, if needs be, in support of Britain’s overseas interests. And it is <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/lest-we-forget/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">100 years since the end of the First World War</a>, in which 200,000 Nepali men went to France, North Africa, Palestine and Mesopotamia to fight against the Germans and their allies. That is a very long historical relationship.So, it is a good time to question the future of the <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/a-military-migrant-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">British Gurkhas</a> and of the relationship between Britain and Nepal in this regard. Some may feel that the whole tradition of <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Gurkhas-dying-for-others,2938" target="_blank" rel="noopener">providing soldiers for a foreign army</a> is an imperialist phenomenon which should be terminated. Others see it as a matter of pride, to be continued and even reinforced.Read also: <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/lest-we-forget/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Least we forget</a>, David SeddonSuccessive cuts in the budget of the British Ministry of Defence (MoD) over the last few decades have significantly reduced the overall size of the armed forces, and particularly the British Army. The Brigade of Gurkhas now comprises fewer than 4,000 men.One might have thought, in the light of this, that the British government would have felt that time had come to call a halt to further recruitment from Nepal and to phase out this anomalous element of the British Army.But even if the size of the British Army is declining, there is a serious shortage of recruits from Britain itself – the number of new recruits was down last year by 24%. It was therefore decided in November to allow members of the British Commonwealth, even if not resident in the UK, to apply for positions in the British Army.There remains keen competition among young Nepalis to <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=5423#.XAZEg9szaUk" target="_blank" rel="noopener">join the Brigade of Gurkhas</a>, even if the number of recruits each year has been reduced to only a few hundred. What more natural, then, than to increase the quota of recruits from Nepal? This would please those who believe that Nepal would benefit from such an expansion, but would upset those who argue that recruitment to the British Gurkhas is a relic of an imperial past, not to be continued let alone expanded.Furthermore, there might be scope for women as well as men to take advantage of this apparent willingness of the MoD to recruit from abroad, including from Nepal, to the Gurkhas. In what to many was a surprise move, in July this year, it was decided to allow women to apply to join this hitherto all-male outfit.Is this just a nod to ‘equal opportunities’? Or the beginning of the re-definition of the role of ‘<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/page/the-gurkhas-an-interactive-timeline" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the Gurkhas</a>’ -- widely caricatured as ‘fearless and ferocious’ -- in favour of a softer image?  In fact, the British Army already includes some 30,000 women in a wide range of roles, but in another surprise move in October women were allowed to apply for and to take up combat roles.All of this assumes a continuation of an essentially military role for ‘New Lahures’. But what if the Britain and Nepal were to agree, under the special conditions of their bilateral relationship, that in future there would be an expanded recruitment of young Nepalis -- not to a military outfit serving mainly overseas, but to a jointly managed ‘Peace Corps’. Organised by the Brigade of Gurkhas, such a force would be committed to peace-keeping and community development in Nepal and elsewhere in the developing world.This would be a gradual transfer of responsibility, and of funding, over a period of years for this new ‘Gurkha Peace Corps’ from the MoD to the Department for International Development (DfID) in collaboration with an appropriate government department in Nepal.Eventually, however, it would become a fully joint British-Nepal responsibility, able to provide young Nepalis with suitable training and experience, and to deploy them in various roles (including peace keeping and security, but also in community development) across the world, including Nepal.The Gurkha Peace Corps would also be open to recruits from Britain, encouraging young people from Nepal and Britain to train and work together in Nepal and elsewhere. This would make it possible to sustain and renew the <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=8078#.XAZFw9szaUl" target="_blank" rel="noopener">long historical relationship between Britain and Nepal through the Gurkhas</a>, but recast it as one between equals, involving young men and women from both countries in a common endeavour: for peace and development.Dr David Seddon is Director of Critical Faculty, author/co-author of many publications on Nepal, and currently writing a three-part book on ‘Nepal and the Great War’.  Read also:<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Gurkhas-dying-for-others,2938" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dying for others</a>, Om Astha Rai<a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/a-military-migrant-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">A military-migrant economy</a>, Amanda Chisholm<a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/editorial/Double-centennial,1011" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Double centennial</a>, Editorial

The time has come for a Gurkha Peace Corps

Nepal has shut down dozens of social media platforms in a move that is widely seen as an effort to tax the revenue they generate in the country, and to control content critical of government. The sites were blocked as of midnight on Thursday, 4 September and affects all Meta products including WhatsApp and Messenger, Threads, and others. Although YouTube, Google and X are also on the government’s list, they were still working as of Friday midday.&nbsp; The government says it took the action after repeated warnings to the platforms to open offices in Nepal, a Cabinet decision last month setting a deadline, as well as a 17 August Supreme Court ruling also requiring them to register and pay requisite taxes. However, the Bill cited in the ban, ‘The Operation, Use, and Regulation of Social Media in Nepal’ has not yet been passed by Parliament. Some social media platforms which were already paying taxes in Nepal even though they are not officially registered, have also been blocked. The move is the latest in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/big-beautiful-bills" target="_blank">a slew of draft legislations</a> designed to undermine Nepal’s open society. A Bill amending the Print and Publications Act would allow district bureaucrats to shut down media. Another draft Bill would allow political appointees to head a new Media Council with the power to revoke the licenses of journalists.&nbsp; A counter-intelligence Bill would let just about anyone in government to arbitrarily tap phones, read emails and trail citizens. On Wednesday the government announced new immigration requirements that would allow it to track the movement of all foreigners in the country. Yet another draft Bill has been set to Parliament to dissolve the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=10675" target="_blank">Social Welfare Council (SWC)</a> and move registration and monitoring of non-governmental organisations, nonprofits and charities to the Ministry of Social Welfare. Seen in this light, the blockage of social media platforms this week is seen as the latest government attempt to constrict freedom of press. Nepal is one of the few remaining open societies in Asia, and now appears to be drifting towards authoritarianism. The government’s sudden shutdown of social media has been greeted with howls of protest on platforms that still remain open, like Viber and TikTok, as well as in Nepal’s mainstream press. Even senior members of the ruling UML-NC coalition have sharply criticised the move, asking if the government is trying to “turn Nepal into North Korea”.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025090508098_a2ab330e403e8418a7006cd5e915607382628dd6984524332bf7b99c74743656.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2025090508098_a2ab330e403e8418a7006cd5e915607382628dd6984524332bf7b99c74743656" data-rendition-name="original" width="4280" height="5187" loading="lazy" alt="social media ban in Nepal"> </figure>  The Regional Director of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Beh Lih Yi said in a statement: ‘Nepal’s sweeping ban on social media sets a dangerous precedent for press freedom. Blocking online news platforms vital to journalists will undermine reporting and the public’s right to information. The government must immediately rescind this order and restore access to social media platforms, which are essential tools for exercising press freedom.’ Besides undermining press freedom, blocking social media platforms will also hurt commerce and the economy since so many small and medium business trade through Instagram, Facebook and other platforms. Nepal’s vibrant social media has also been a boost or citizens to assert identity, build solidarity against injustice and play an adversarial role when the mainstream media does not do it. Social media platforms have also become the tenuous link for Nepali families scattered across the world to keep in touch with each other — its importance growing with the increasing size of the diaspora. The government wants social media platforms to register, pay taxes and remove posts on their sites that ‘undermine the national interest and Nepal’s territorial integrity, disturb social and religious harmony’.&nbsp; In response, rights activists have said while there is need for the government to regulate extreme content and hate speech, officials appear to be more intent on clamping down on free speech and trying to force platforms to share the revenue. On Friday, the government had allowed WhatsApp back online, but there were reports that it had instructed the Nepal Telecommunication Authority (NTA) to instruct mobile and internet service providers to block by Friday night all platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, WhatsApp, X (Twitter), YouTube, LinkedIn, Reddit, Threads, Snapchat, Pinterest, Signal, Clubhouse, Rumble.&nbsp; Platforms that have registered and are allowed include TikTok, Viber, Nimbuzz, Popo Live, WeTalk, Global Diary and the Nepali portal Hamro Patro. TikTok was banned last year for ‘disturbing social harmony’ and it was lifted after the platform registered its office in Nepal. But even while it was banned, many users simply switched to VPN. Telegram was also banned for ‘financial crimes’ and it has since also been allowed back. NTA officials confirmed that some Asia-Pacific regional offices of platforms, including Meta had been in touch overnight inquiring about the registration process.&nbsp; Nepal is not alone in regulating social media. China bans most Western platforms, Russia and Turkey regulate their and require platforms to locate their data servers in the country. Gulf countries allow social media but keep a tight control on dissent.&nbsp; Experts have said even the government will not dare close down YouTube since so many Nepali individuals and companies make money with posts on that platform, and closing it would also impact on Google and Gmail. Facebook had also just launched a monetisation scheme for videos and reels, and Nepalis uploading content would lose revenue.&nbsp; Blocking the platforms has already hit content creators, influencers and cut small businesses from reaching customers. A survey of social media use in Nepal by Sharecast Initiative showed that 94% of those with smart phones used YouTube, followed by Facebook (92%) while TikTok was in the 50-60% range. X and Instagram were in the single digits. A YouTube ban will also hurt the mainstream media since up to 20% of the revenue of Nepal’s main tv channels came through YouTube. Some 11.1 million Nepalis watch YouTube content every day, the survey showed. ‘For global giants like Meta or Google, Nepal is a small market, and they may not even flinch — but for millions of Nepalis, these platforms are central to daily life, livelihoods, and connections across the world,’ wrote AI consultant Naresh Newar in a LinkedIn post. Some experts said the government’s sweeping ban on social media networks was untenable and the government would be forced to rollback sooner or later. Said editor Shiva Gaunle: “The platforms had given citizens a voice and broken the monopoly of the government, legislators, the courts and journalists over public opinion. This is an effort to reassert that monopoly, but Nepal can never be turned into a North Korea.”

Protest grows against Nepal’s social media ban

It was 30 years ago this month that investment into ‘Baby Arun’, the 201MW first phase of the run-of-river Arun III project, was brought to a screeching halt when the World Bank officially withdrew its support. This brought about profound and fundamental changes in the way Nepal’s power sector subsequently developed. Nepalis suffered debilitating power outages between 2008-2016 due to shortages attributable to the cancellation. At the same time, the gap left by Baby Arun was filled by private sector investment in ways that were not obvious in 1995. It took 30 years, but in many ways Nepal’s power sector is more healthy today than it has ever been, and likely better than if the project was built as planned. At a projected budget of $1.08 billion, Baby Arun would have cost the equivalent of Nepal’s entire annual government expenditure in 1995. It was to be funded by concessional grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral funders, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), KfW, and investment by the government itself. At the time, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity was only 230MW, and the trajectory of the power sector changed dramatically following the cancellation. In the past 30 years, $5.4 billion has been invested in the power sector led by private investors, and much of it from domestic banks and pension funds (table, right).  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0" data-rendition-name="original" width="984" height="521" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Nearly 70% of the new megawatts generated were by private independent power producers (IPP) in the past 30 years, while the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and its subsidiary companies added 30% of new capacity. Almost 80% of total debt financing came from domestic banks and employee retirement funds. International assistance for power generation dropped dramatically over this time, accounting for only about 15% of investment. Before 1995 new power projects used to be entirely dependent on foreign aid. Since 1995, 63% of new generation came from 171 small hydropower projects with an average capacity of 12MW, while 4% was from 21 solar photovoltaic and biomass projects developed by local IPPs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097" data-rendition-name="original" width="988" height="503" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Over three decades, investment in Nepal’s power supply came primarily from new actors that had never before been involved in this sector. The rate of electrification rose from 10% to close to 100% -- sufficient to meet domestic needs during most of the year, and in 2024 made Nepal a net exporter of power to India for the first time in its history. As practically all the new investment in this period went into run-of-river hydro and solar projects, rather than into hydropower reservoirs with seasonal storage, Nepal continues to rely on imports from India during the dry winter months. Surplus electricity generation for export during the monsoon is slated to grow rapidly as another 200 solar and hydro projects are nearing completion of construction, with over 5,000MW of power capacity. Private Power The cancellation of Baby Arun inadvertently accelerated the entry of the private sector into Nepal’s power generation. The government enacted the Electricity Act in 1992 to attract private IPPs and diversify away from total dependence from international aid, but had been struggling for several years to conclude the first agreement with the 60MW Khimti Project. There remained a large gap between the tariff that the government thought was reasonable versus what was demanded by the Norwegian investor Statkraft, and the private sector arms of the World Bank and ADB that were financing the project. The shock of World Bank withdrawal from Baby Arun put tremendous pressure on the government, then led by the UML as it is now. The Bank’s decision to terminate its involvement was ostensibly, at least partially, taken in response to a letter critiquing the project sent by the UML while it was in the opposition.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347" data-rendition-name="original" width="949" height="446" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>BAD NEWS: Newspaper clippings from the early 90s on tender announcement ahead of loan approval (left) and secrecy surrounding environmental assessment (centre) of Arun III before its eventual cancellation in August 1995.</figcaption> </figure>  The government was forced to soften its position and agree to the investors’ terms following the cancellation of Baby Arun. It directed NEA to sign a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Khimti. It was concluded in January 1996, and this was followed by a second PPA in July 1996 with Panda Energy, the American developer of the 45MW Upper Bhotekosi project. The expensive USD-denominated agreements to buy power from two international private producers, with price escalation clauses tied to the New York Consumer Price Index, sent alarm bells ringing. There was worry that the country was heading towards unaffordable tariff rates for the consumer and potential bankruptcy for NEA as a result of inevitable future weakening of the Nepali Rupee. The government had strong-armed NEA into signing these agreements, and realised that concessionary financing terms that Nepal was used to receiving for public sector projects such as Baby Arun and Kali Gandaki A, that included below-market interest rates and 40 years repayment period with a 10 year grace period before starting repayment, were not the norm for private sector investors. Nepal’s status as a less than attractive destination for foreign investment meant that the country had few options but to accept expensive dollar PPAs from international developers with the high commercial interest rates and short repayment periods imposed by their banks because of high investment risks. In the end, the government ended up having to additionally provide a sovereign guarantee in order to close the deal at the insistence of the lenders – committing it to repayment in case NEA defaulted on paying the IPPs. It is reasonable to assume that the extraordinarily high political cost of agreeing to the PPA terms would have meant that no government would have willingly agreed to them in 1995 had it not suffered the trauma of the loss of concessionary-financed public sector projects as large as the Baby Arun. It has taken NEA 25 years to consider offering dollar-denominated PPAs again: to cover the foreign exchange portion of the investment in the 216MW Upper Trisuli-1 and 120MW Rasuwa-Bhotekosi Hydropower projects. It seemed unlikely at the time, but it turned out that the dire situation Nepal found itself in 1995 planted the seed to mobilise investment for affordable power from within the country. Double Whammy After the dual shock of first losing investment in Baby Arun and having to sign expensive power purchase agreements with international IPPs, the first proposal for an alternative strategy to mitigate the risk of foreign currency investment into hydropower projects came from a group of engineers within the Arun III team at NEA. Led by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4900">Deputy Director Damber Bahadur Nepali,</a> engineers convinced the leadership that NEA needed to invest in a subsidiary company to build a series of locally-designed and domestically-financed projects that would have lower cost with rupee-denominated PPAs. They registered the Chilime Hydropower Company Limited (CHCL) in October 1995 with 51% shares from NEA, 25% from its employees, and 24% available for the general public, 10% of which was prioritised for local residents at the project site. The 22.1MW project is in Rasuwa on a tributary of the Trisuli, and mobilised debt financing from the Employee Provident Fund, which manages retirement savings for employees of the government, public enterprises, and private sector institutions. CHCL’s experience showed that NEA employees themselves believed that individual hydropower projects with operational independence from NEA could be developed profitably in Nepal by its own engineers -- and they were willing to put their own money on the line. Chilime also demonstrated that there was money in the country, particularly with retirement funds, looking for opportunities for long-term investments. Following completion of Chilime in 2003, CHCL led the formation of three other NEA subsidiary companies that completed construction in 2023 and 2024, producing 168.3MW using fully rupee-tied investment. NEA’s largest subsidiary, the Upper Tamakosi Hydropower Limited, completed construction of its 456MW plant in 2021.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3" data-rendition-name="original" width="3000" height="1571" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>DAMNED: The $700 million 456MW Upper Tamakosi built entirely with domestic funds before it was destroyed by the September floods last year. </figcaption> </figure>  There were some delays and cost overruns on this run-of-river project, the largest in the country with a final cost of over $700 million -- all of it sourced domestically. The five subsidiary companies launched by NEA have produced almost two times as much new power as NEA has over the past 30 years. Seven other NEA subsidiaries are currently constructing projects to add another 474MW to the national grid. But even more important than NEA subsidiaries have been local IPPs: Nepali companies which have over the past three decades enthusiastically entered the hydropower sector. From a regulatory perspective, the credit for mobilising domestic private investment to engage in power generation goes to Minister of Water Resources Shailaja Acharya, who in 1998 offered a flat feed-in-tariff of Rs4/kWh for hydropower projects under 10MW. This upfront offer removed a major barrier that early developers had faced of having to spend money to carry out a detailed feasibility study before they could even start tariff negotiations with NEA. She had laid the foundation stone of the Chilime project, and proved to be the champion of opening up the sector for domestic IPPs. The guarantee of a PPA with a fixed tariff, irrespective of project specifications, gave small power developers the confidence to apply for survey licenses and invest in feasibility studies so they could directly approach commercial banks and make a case for their project producing required revenue to repay loans. Domestic IPPs started adding power to the national grid in 2002. Their contribution was initially modest, and first projects were small and commercial lenders who took time to be confident about providing debt financing to a sector which had previously not been considered suitable for private sector investment. While the first 10 years were slow, with less than 10MW being added to the grid each year, this increased twenty fold over the following ten years, resulting in the equivalent of a Baby Arun being added by Nepali IPPs to the grid each year. A total of 84 IPPs added 232MW, 328 MW, 454MW, and 400MW of new generation to the grid in 2021-2024 (graph). There was explosive, exponential growth as domestic developers have surged ahead to account for 76% of the new megawatts added to the grid since 2020, compared to 24% by NEA and its subsidiary companies. The megawatts that IPPs are adding have followed the classic ‘hockey stick curve’ with the ‘breakout point’, signaling the rapid growth phase in 2020. Private producers are expected to accelerate new generation in the coming years with 300 solar and hydropower projects adding 11,000MW. Another 166 hydropower and 96 solar projects are currently in the survey stage, and are in line to add another 11,000MW to the construction pipeline. One major challenge is finding financing required for the projects. Domestic investment will no longer be sufficient to finance this ambitious pipeline of renewable energy projects. Project developers as well as NEA and the Electricity Regulatory Commission will have to leverage their substantial experience accumulated through the construction of over 200 projects to attract regional and international investment and hedge the risks of dollar-denominated PPAs. Following the cancellation of Baby Arun, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Nepal developed a highly distributed power sector</a>. The national electricity grid is currently supplied with power from a remarkably decentralised array of hundreds of hydropower and solar photovoltaic projects spread across 43 districts and all seven provinces.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1228" height="867" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  This presents a sharp contrast to the pathway of a few large public sector hydropower projects with a sprinkling of private sector projects that was envisioned as part of NEA’s investment planning when Baby Arun was being considered the front runner for investment. The strategy then was to allow public sector investment in a few large hydropower projects with thermal plants to fill the gap. Knowing what we know now about acceleration of climate change impacts and increased extreme weather events, following this path would have made Nepal’s power sector highly vulnerable. Decentralised generation greatly improves the resilience of Nepal’s power supply as damage to power plants in one part of the country need not affect other areas that have their own generation. Following the investment plan where over two thirds of the country’s power supply would have come from power plants on the Arun River, would have greatly imperiled Nepal’s energy security. All rivers in Nepal are susceptible to flooding from cloudbursts made more frequent by climate change. The Arun River which is fed by glaciers in Tibet is also at risk to glacial lake outburst floods. Bikash Pandey is Director of Clean Energy and Circular Economy at Winrock International. People Power is his regular column in Nepali Times on global energy issues relevant to Nepal. <h2>Decentralised and Diversified</h2> In the 30 years since the cancellation of ‘Baby Arun’: Hydropower projects constructed cover capacities ranging from less than 1MW to 456MW and developed by IPPs from across the country with strong local involvement in purchasing equity shares. Renewable energy sources contributed to the generation mix through solar IPPs that further contribute to climate resilience, and cover shortfalls during low rainfall. The government is committed to solar contributing 10% of the power on the grid. Increasing solar beyond this target and providing incentives to project developers to invest in utility-scale battery storage would further improve resilience. BIG ARUN: The 900MW Arun III project under construction since 2018 at Num in Sankhuwasabha (pictured, below) is a separate initiative by a different project developer using a different financing modality. The ‘Baby Arun’ version of Arun III was cancelled in 1995.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1312" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> </figure>

30 years after Baby Arun

<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x2fZXyjsE28" target="_blank">Yog Narendra Malla</a> became king at age 18, and ruled Patan from 1684-1705 — his reign marked by a cultural and architectural renaissance of the city state. He put up a statue of himself in the palace square with a little bronze bird sitting on the guardian serpent above his head. It is said he told his subjects that he would look after their welfare till the day the bird flew off. During<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lessons-not-learned-from-2015-o2etq6zu"> the 2015 earthquake</a>, the pedestal collapsed and the statue was damaged. The bird was lost, only to be located in a pile of debris and reinstated when the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/piece-by-piece-patan-darbar-square-reconstruction,3782" target="_blank">statue was consecrated</a> two years later. <div class="embed-block"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/x2fZXyjsE28?si=jYfIb4p6zCLXYQ1T" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div> History remembers Yog Narendra Malla as a wise king, but like most<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/preserving-king-birendra-s-family-home"> royalty of the day</a>, he had a weakness for women. He is supposed to have consorted with 30 queens and numerous concubines. At least 33 of them self-immolated themselves on the king's funeral pyre when he died, adhering to the prevailing <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/review/Jhola,947">practice of sati</a>. When Yog Narendra Malla’s favourite queen found out that he was carrying on with yet another woman, she got the local community of the Kwelachhi neighbourhood to stage a shadow sex play to quite literally expose his unfaithfulness. Actors enacted the explicit exploits of the king and his mistress, a bright butter lamp projecting the moving shadows of their lovemaking on a thin white drape to entertain those gathered in the square below. The queen made sure that the show was designed to face the home of the king’s paramour to shame them both. She also paid for a group to chant a bhajan with lyrics that ridiculed the king’s extramarital affair. The Jhyalcha Guthi community trust that the queen set up three-and-half century ago is still active to this day, and performs the annual shadow play in the same building in Kwelachhi the day before <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-legend-behind-the-myth-of-indra-jatra">Indra Jatra </a>every year. This year’s show is on Friday evening, 5 September. The opening lines of the chants that accompany the play are the same words approved by the queen all those years ago: “Raja Yog Narendra ya aparadh…” (King Yog Narendra’s crime…) The community leader of the Kwelachhi neighbourhood, 62-year-old Baburaja Awale, explains the importance of the event: “This Jhyalcha is our<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/saving-the-intangible,3303"> intangible heritage</a> and oral history. We do not have a written format, it has been passed down from generation to generation. Every word of the bhajan is the story of King Yog Narendra Malla.”  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250904070952_249e85b32cbd99bb8515151557e0ec1a65d44a34ef1aacabaaeb469622d12664.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250904070952_249e85b32cbd99bb8515151557e0ec1a65d44a34ef1aacabaaeb469622d12664" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1167" loading="lazy" alt="Sex and the city of Patan"> <figcaption>The statue of Yog Narendra Malla being reinstated after it toppled in the 2015 earthquake. Photo: GOPEN RAI/ NEPALI TIMES ARCHIVE</figcaption> </figure>  Jhyalcha Pyankha, as the ceremony is called, starts with a puja for the Bhimsen — the god of wealth and prosperity, a popular <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-homecoming-of-nepal-s-gods">deity in Patan</a> who has a temple dedicated just to him in the palace square. This is immediately followed by a bhajan of Bhairab performed with <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/Buzz-house,670">traditional Newa musical instruments</a>. Community members serve snacks consisting of samay baji beaten rice, water buffalo chunks, soybean, green veggies, lentils, ginger, garlic and aila liquor. “In the first act of the shadow play, the man initiates the lovemaking, and in the third it is the woman,” says Laxmi Lal Awale, also a member of the trust that organises the show. The shadow action is all uncensored, but interspersed with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/between-the-sacred-and-everyday">scenes of everyday life</a>: the woman is spinning a thread, the king is going about his royal chores, and the two sit down to share sanacha fermented pickle that is popular this time of year. <div class="embed-block"><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/qZ3twuG1wNQ?si=yRfkoC3A-X9cIl8r" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></div> “Back then, there was no tv, films or YouTube, and yet we managed to stage the shadow play using our own resourcefulness,” says Baburaja Awale. “It is important to continue the tradition.” The challenge now is to ensure that the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-reign-of-the-god-of-rain"> younger generation takes over</a>, learning the lyrics of the ancient bhajan. The dafa khala group that performs all over Patan during festivals and religious events is now training teenagers to play the musical instruments and act in the shadow play. The Jhyalcha was staged even after the 2015 earthquake when the falcha where the bhajan is performed collapsed and they made-do in a tin shed. The structure was later rebuilt with a grant from the group, Photo Circle. Lalitpur Metropolitan City sets aside a budget of Rs50,000 to organise the Jhyalcha Pyankha every year, but this is not enough and is supplemented by individual donations. The performers including musicians and actors are all volunteers, and take part in it because it is their community duty. The erotic shadow play was way ahead of its time, not just in its graphic content but the use of contemporary local technology as well as improvisation and pure imagination. Says Laxmi Lal: “Whatever its origin in the legend of King Yog Narendra Malla and his queen, Jhyalcha also served as a medium of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lets-talk-about-it">sex education</a>. In the past, women were discouraged from watching the shadow play, but today everyone is welcome, we all watch it together.” Jhyalcha Pyankha Kwelachhi, Chyasal, Patan 7PM onwards Friday, 5 September

Sex and the city of Patan

This is the 72nd episode of Diaspora Diaries, a Nepali Times series in collaboration with Migration Lab providing a platform to share experiences of living, working and studying abroad. My father ran a store and that is where I spent all my time till Grade 6. Doing my homework. Serving customers. I then moved to my maternal grandparents’ house because I used to get along with my cousin who was a year older than me. We did everything together, and were best friends. We took turns studying: I was a night owl, and he was an early riser. Before I went to bed after studying all night, I woke him up. My mother was 44 when I was born, the same year my eldest brother got married. My sister-in-law becoming a part of our family was how my mother referenced my age. I liked making money, and was always a hustler. In Grade 7, I learnt to handle a tractor and helped my brother-in-law to plough, earning Rs10 a day. As I got better, he paid me more. By Grade 9, I was already making Rs500 per day, but had to slow down to prepare for my exams. From an early age I knew I did not want a 9-5 job. There just wasn’t enough money in it. I wanted to get into business, and compared my brother who worked in the post office and what businessmen made. It did not help that my brother was honest, and never took bribes. A friend and I made money selling cheap Chinese phones at a premium to our friends. We blasted music on the phones and pretended that we were giving them a discount. After SLC, I started teaching math and other subjects. I was soon a shareholder in the same school and in the evening I was involved in our family’s floriculture business, growing amaranth and marigold for garlands.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4" data-rendition-name="original" width="955" height="1314" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  It was then that a friend suggested we learn the Korean language. We could be earning significantly higher in Korea for similar efforts. I had no plans to go abroad but he convinced me. I did not know anything about Korea, and was scolded at the language institute when I asked someone to point Korea on the map.&nbsp; It was only there that I learnt you had to pass an exam for the Korean Employment Permit System (EPS), and pay for language classes. After a week, I decided it was not for me and dropped out. But my friend convinced me to give it one more try. I did not prepare much for the exam, and it was no surprise that I failed. But it was just by one mark, and people would pity me for failing “just by one mark”. It was a brand of failure. It hurt my ego. I had to turn things around by taking the exams seriously, and locked myself up to study hard.&nbsp; Even when we had visitors, my wife told them I was not home. If I was not in my room learning Korean, I would be with a group of ten of us test-takers comparing notes and practicing late into the night. The exam was difficult, but this time I passed, the only one in my group who did.&nbsp; As someone who never liked the idea of doing a job, I still had my doubts about going to Korea. It did not help that one of my acquaintances had returned a month after he had left, and he discouraged me from migrating given that I was already making good money in Nepal.&nbsp; But my wife suggested that I give it a shot since I had worked so hard for it. And if it really turned out not to be my cup of tea, I could always return. What did I have to lose, I thought, at least I would get to visit Korea. My job there was in an electrical company that made circuit boards. I worked all day, earned good money. In the evenings, I kept myself busy with my real estate business back in Nepal. I had learnt the tricks of the trade from fellow real estate agents back home, but at the time did not have the capital to invest.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  In Korea, it helped that I had salary records that allowed me to get loans from financial institutions both in Korea and in Nepal. Ultimately, I started earning more from my real estate deals in Nepal than from my job in Korea. This was all thanks to my ability to take loans because of the EPS scheme. My wife has been managing the flower business while I was away. My finances grew stronger over the eight years I was in Korea. I paid off the loans that I had borrowed to buy land. But real estate did not satisfy me entirely. I wondered: what is my brand? What will I be known for? What is my contribution to society? Real estate is for wealth, but that is about it. I needed to sell one piece of land and use the revenue to start a venture. I took classes in business, and returned to Nepal six months ago and got back to my family’s ancestral roots in floriculture. In Nepal too, I am continuing the entrepreneurship training I had started in Korea with the Bridge International. Such exposure helps us reflect on our business such as our branding, vision, and proactive aspects like the importance of strong recordkeeping.&nbsp; I am now working to upgrade and expand my floriculture business. With a friend who is still in Korea I am building a cooling room to increase the shelf-life of flowers and other produce and set up a market in my village where others can sell their produce. Floriculture is our primary business, but it is seasonal and earns good money only during festivals like Tihar.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  So, I grow tomatoes to ensure year-round earnings. I also am engaged in other businesses like real estate and online shopping. I work round the clock in Nepal — a strong work ethic is something I picked up in Korea.&nbsp; My Korean bosses would work alongside us, that motivated us. I work just as hard in Nepal as I did in Korea. People here often ask me why I am pushing myself so hard. But making garlands comes easy to me, it is work my forebears were involved in. My childhood memories are about plucking flowers with my sister. I have a comparative advantage in this work. It comes naturally to me, it is easy and I enjoy it. And sometimes, if there are too many garlands to make, I can multitask while holding meetings. My fingers just fly. I am good at this job, but my wife is even better and faster.&nbsp; When there is too much load, we can also outsource the work. To be known as the flower guy would be great personal branding. The मखमली guy. Or the सयपत्री guy. I decided to come home for just this with a one-way ticket. “अब पासा: जाँदैन ल्हासा!” &nbsp;

peace