The world’s largest corporations now rival most governments – not only in terms of revenue and assets, but also in their ability to shape political outcomes. Their power is reinforced by the immense personal fortunes of billionaires, which enable them to wield disproportionate influence over <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/big-beautiful-bills">public policies, laws, and regulations</a>.
Crucially, extreme concentrations of wealth and power could not have developed without the active support of policymakers, whether tacit or explicit. Consequently, being an oligarch is inherently precarious.
Crony capitalism may grant enormous advantages, but it also carries built-in risks. Chief among them is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/slapping-democracy">political change</a>: new leadership, whether elected or imposed, may not extend the same protections or privileges to elites favored by the previous government.
That danger is especially acute in authoritarian or personality-driven regimes, where leaders’ whims often override institutional checks. The <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/business/timeline-elon-musk-trump-x-dg">on-again, off-again bromance</a> between US President Donald Trump and Elon Musk is an obvious example.
As <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitical tensions</a> escalate, however, oligarchs are no longer contending solely with domestic challenges. Increasingly caught in global power struggles, they have become convenient targets for hostile foreign powers seeking to pressure or undermine the leaders they support.
The <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/4/12/us-and-uk-announce-new-sanctions-targeting-russian-ultra-wealthy">sanctions</a> imposed by the United States and the European Union on oligarchs linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine are a case in point. While these measures have done little to change the course of the war, they have profoundly disrupted the lives and businesses of those affected.
Indian billionaires Gautam Adani and Mukesh Ambani have also found themselves in America’s crosshairs. Both have profited enormously from their ties to Prime Minister Narendra Modi – a fellow Gujarati – with their fortunes growing in tandem with his political ascent. This has made them useful bargaining chips in the ongoing trade negotiations between the US and India.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-and-the-us-india-tariff-tiff">Nepal and the US-India tariff tiff</a>, Sudiksha Tuladhar
To be sure, Ambani’s Reliance Group had already mastered the art of leveraging political influence to advance its business interests well before Modi rose to power. But Ambani’s alliance with Modi has pushed Reliance’s dominance to new heights. Adani’s rise, by contrast, is <a href="https://thewire.in/political-economy/why-gautam-adani-is-a-factor-in-india-us-ties">inextricably tied to Modi</a>, dating back to the latter’s tenure as chief minister of Gujarat.
Both oligarchs, particularly Adani, have relied on their proximity to Modi to expand their business empires, benefiting from regulatory reforms tailored to their interests and <a href="https://www.cnbctv18.com/aviation/adani-winning-bids-for-six-airports-former-head-of-privatisation-panel-explains-key-policy-changes-15898141.htm">acquiring state assets</a> through lucrative privatization deals, often without a public tender. They have also moved into new sectors by <a href="https://www.freepressjournal.in/business/full-timeline-of-how-gvk-and-adanis-changing-fortunes-sealed-mumbai-airports-fate">purchasing successful firms</a> targeted by Modi’s administration, effectively neutralizing potential competitors.
Moreover, Ambani and Adani have enjoyed privileged access to publicly owned banks, receiving favourable loan terms that allowed them to <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/companies-bought-over-by-the-adani-group-got-haircut-of-96-to-42-on-loans-from-public-sector-banks-congress/article68606029.ece">restructure</a> their debts with minimal scrutiny. Their political connections, evidenced by frequent appearances alongside Modi during his international trips, have helped them secure <a href="https://www.newsclick.in/%E2%80%98Beneficiaries%E2%80%99-Modi%E2%80%99s-Globetrotting-Adani-Ambani">major contracts abroad</a>.
These political alliances have translated into lenient regulatory treatment. In Adani’s case, allegations that he has engaged in stock manipulation through opaque shell companies in offshore tax havens – exposed by US-based <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/adani-vs-hindenburg-research-what-you-need-know-2024-01-03/">short-seller Hindenburg Research</a> – were met with a muted response. Regulatory bodies like the Securities and Exchange Board of India declined to pursue a serious investigation.
Officially, Ambani has come under scrutiny for profiting from the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/09/business/india-russian-oil-ambani.html">resale of Russian oil</a>, effectively circumventing US sanctions, while Adani is being investigated for <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c748y8e4093o">alleged bribery</a>. But Trump’s actions appear to be a calculated attempt to pressure Modi through his inner circle. Adding insult to injury, they come from a US president whom Modi has long described as a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/31/world/asia/modi-trump-india-tariffs.html">true friend</a>”.
Modi has claimed that his sole concern is protecting Indian farmers – a statement that would surely come as a surprise to the farmer protest movement, which his government has long vilified and suppressed.
Trump, for his part, insists that his priority is securing a better deal for American producers and workers. In reality, many of his key demands are aimed at advancing the interests of US-based multinationals and those of <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/property-/-cstruction/trump-calls-indias-economy-dead-but-trump-towers-earn-thousands-of-crores-from-gurgaon-mumbai-pune-and-other-cities/articleshow/123164276.cms">his own companies</a>.
But given Trump’s track record, it’s hard to imagine that personal grievances did not play a role. Relations between the two leaders have noticeably cooled since Modi <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/narendra-modi-trump-phone-call-pm-modi-makes-it-clear-to-trump-us-played-no-role-in-india-pakistan-ceasefire-no-talks-on-india-us-trade-deal/articleshow/121922239.cms">refused to endorse</a> Trump’s dubious claim that he helped broker the recent India-Pakistan cease-fire – a narrative Trump had hoped would strengthen his bid for a Nobel Peace Prize. Modi’s refusal to play along effectively derailed that effort.
Trump and Modi are both shrewd and self-interested enough to recognise each other’s true priorities. By attacking Modi’s tycoons, Trump may have found the most effective pressure point to extract significant concessions from the Indian government.
If Modi yields, it won’t just be a costly political blunder but also a tragedy with far-reaching consequences for India and the world economy. © Project Syndicate
Jayati Ghosh, Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, is a member of the Club of Rome’s Transformational Economics Commission.&nbsp;

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Trump targets Modi’s tycoons

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Trump have had a love-hate relationship. The two populist leaders have now fallen out, threatening a full scale Indo-American trade war. Many of Nepal’s exports to the United States like garments and rugs are also what India sells to the US. So, after Donald Trump announced additional tariffs on Indian exports to total 50%, Nepal could have an advantage. But this is only if the government plays its cards right and develops a long term strategy to boost export of items in which it has comparative advantage, and find new export products. The recent fallout ostensibly comes after India ignored western sanctions and continued to purchase Russian oil, and could be linked to Trump’s meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday in which he wants to use India as a bargaining chip. “Trump has not honoured any international trade agreements, making the global trade regime unstable,” says economist Posh Raj Pandey. This could mean that the US could still pull back on tariffs, just as he has given China a reprieve of another 90 days this week. Compared to other South Asian countries, including India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, Nepal faces a relatively low tariff rate of 10%. Theoretically this could put Nepali exports at an advantage for items like garments and other products like tea. But it also carries its own risks.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250814090852_1d2fe71e4f7c5f82d72240714c6a7a140d59230096eac995ca3264a5c2ed00a2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250814090852_1d2fe71e4f7c5f82d72240714c6a7a140d59230096eac995ca3264a5c2ed00a2" data-rendition-name="original" width="1266" height="860" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal-US trade graph NT"></figure>  Some 64% of Nepal’s imports are from India, and US tariffs could make those products more expensive. A stronger USD vis-a-vis the INR would also devalue the Nepali rupee and increase the cost of imports from India of raw material for its exports, for example, garments. The manufacturing sector in Nepal has never reached its true potential, its main export items to India are soya and palm oil which are actually just bulk imports of the same oils repackaged for export. Domestic production lacks capacity to keep up with demand. “Nepal’s productive capacity must be increased in order to boost exports, and the market should be diversified for Nepal to take advantage of a competitive market,” says Pandey. Indian exporters could try to reroute their finished products through the open border with Nepal, changing the tag from ‘Made in India’ to ‘Made in Nepal’ to avoid US tariffs. China did this by relocating its factories to Vietnam in the past, but such re-labelling may result in punitive measures. “It is not worth the risk, we should be careful. Besides, there is no domestic value addition in such cases,” states Kharel. Nepal has a trade deficit with the US of Rs7.64 billion, which is probably why Trump has not increased tariffs on Nepal’s exports to more than 10%. Nepal’s main exports to the US are ready-made garments, dog chews and carpets. Nepal had preferential market access to the US, but did not take much advantage of it. “Nepal’s garment export to the US stands at Rs2 billion, and we could try to increase production and export more to take advantage of relatively lower tariffs, but reaching production worth Rs10 billion is not practical and Nepal does not have the capacity either,” says Pandey. Furthermore, if Nepal increases exports to the US and creates a trade surplus, it may raise eyebrows in Washington and Nepal could be slapped with higher tariffs if Trump is still around. In a modern multilateral world, Donald Trump has pressed ahead unilaterally, using tariffs to arm-twist allies to get all kinds of concessions, even those not related to trade. Trump thinks he is doing this to protect the domestic US industry, but it is already backfiring with higher domestic consumer prices. Adds Pandey, “Trump has used the tariffs as a Swiss Army knife to cut through everything. The tariffs are used as an instrument for national security, to increase investment and even to end conflict.” Trump claimed he initiated the ceasefire between India and Pakistan over their recent conflict by threatening both countries with tariffs. New Delhi denied Trump’s claims, while Pakistan acknowledged his role, even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize. REGIONAL HEGEMON “India had wanted to establish itself as a regional hegemon by aligning itself to the West,” says Paras Kharel, executive director at South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment (SAWTEE). But the tariff tiff with India may have thrown that strategy off kilter. Most countries use diplomatic channels to resolve existing trade issues. However, Trump has chosen the path of coercive diplomacy, which was seen in his response to issues like migration and the use of veto power at the United Nations. India is the world's third largest consumer of oil, with Russia accounting for 30% of the country’s oil imports. Russia was also the largest arms supplier for India, but that has decreased in recent times, as India shifted towards the US, Israel and France. India is the largest arms importer in the world, and is making more and more purchases from American manufacturers of weapons systems. But India has already retaliated by cancelling planned imports of military equipment from the US. Uncertainty looms large as Trump’s volatile flip-flopping upends global trade. The unpredictability was underlined by Trump extending his tariff truce for China by 90 days, saying Beijing "has been dealing with it nicely". The tariff threat on Indian exports could also be similarly postponed if New Delhi appeases Trump with compromises. But Modi seems in no mood to give up India’s national interest, especially by allowing American agricultural imports. Modi is all set to visit China for the first time in seven years for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit on 31 August in Tianjin. This could signify the beginning of a major realignment in geopolitical alliances in the Asia-Pacific. Nepal is a small player, but when India and China are buffeted by global turbulence, it will rock Nepal as well. Nepal therefore needs to boost trade capacity to take advantage of new opportunities. Says Pandey, “Nepal needs to diversify its exports, find new markets and seek alternative finance sources.”

Nepal and the US-India tariff tiff

<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">US President Donald Trump</a>’s announcement of hefty trade tariffs last week has reverberated worldwide, causing turmoil in <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/live/ce3qnyr7y94t">international trade and stock markets</a>.
The Trump administration announced a baseline 10% tariff on all goods from every country entering the US market, including products from Nepal. But other countries got <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/apr/03/trumps-tariffs-the-full-list">slapped with even higher tariffs</a>: 20% for goods from the European Union, 26% on Indian exports to the US, and a massive 54% on China.&nbsp;
Many countries have imposed additional reciprocal tariffs on US goods, and there are fears of a global recession. It has been compared to dropping a nuclear bomb on the global trading system.
The tariffs will increase customs duty on foreign goods entering the US, ultimately increasing their prices for end consumers. This may reduce the competitiveness of imports, as a result of which there could be a decline in exports from China, Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and other countries that export manufactured goods to the US.
The US is Nepal's second-largest export market, with goods worth Rs17.31 billion exported during the last fiscal year. These include <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Churpi-gaining-popularity-outside-Nepal,1048">chhurpi dog chew</a>, woolen carpets, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/passionate-about-pashmina">pashmina</a>, ready-made garments, and handicrafts.&nbsp;
Dog chews and woolen carpets account for more than half of Nepal's total exports to the US. Nepal exported nearly 1,000 tonnes of dog chews to the United States.&nbsp;
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/11-56-25-april-2015-wkc9q2an">Following the 2015 earthquake</a>, the US granted Nepal duty-free treatment for 77 items under its <a href="https://np.usembassy.gov/nepal-trade-preference-program/">Nepal Trade Preference Program</a> (NTPP). The period for these non-reciprocal preferential trade benefits will end on 31 December 2025.
It is not clear if the 10% tariff will apply to those items during the course of this year, and the ultimate fate of the NTPP.&nbsp;
“The NTTP was passed as law by the US Congress a decade ago, so we can assume that the current administration will not revoke it through an executive order,” says Ravi Shankar Sainju, also the former joint secretary of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies.
But he adds that the US is unlikely to extend the trade benefit to Nepal after December, as the Nepal government has not taken the necessary steps to renegotiate the NTTP.&nbsp;
Kiran Saakha, president of the Nepal-USA Chamber of Commerce and Industry, also doubts that the NTTP will end immediately, adding: “The US Embassy was unable to provide us with a clear answer when we asked about the program. But as far as we understand, the benefits Nepal has received under the NTPP remain in place for now.”
Nepal has not been able to increase exports of the 77 specified products and reap full benefits of the zero tax facility. However, even with recent developments, economists say that a 10% duty on Nepali exports will not affect Nepal much and may even benefit the country,
<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/products-made-in-nepal,3345">Exports from Nepal </a>would still be cheaper in the US market than goods from countries in the region which have had much higher tariffs placed on them, like India (26%), Pakistan (29%) Bangladesh (37%), and Sri Lanka (44%).
“The countries in the region export goods to the US that Nepal can produce,” says economist Poshraj Pandey. “With the US having imposed a relatively lower tariff on Nepal, there is a potential to actually increase exports to the American market.”
Saakha of the Nepal-USA Chamber of Commerce and Industry, agrees that the demand for Nepali goods could increase, but adds that the country must be more competitive.
Nepal had a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/a-post-mortem-of-nepal-s-garment-boom">booming ready-made garment industry</a> leading up to the early 2000s with 500 industries employing 85,000 workers, and accounted for a quarter of the country’s total exports. But the termination of the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) in December 2004 ended quotas that countries like Nepal had benefitted from. Currently, cotton and polyester garments from Nepal are subject to 18% and 20% customs duty respectively in the US market.&nbsp;
“Nepal has the opportunity to increase the export of ready-made garments once again,” says Bhim Kumar Giri of the Garment Association Nepal (GAN). “It is time to dust off our old machines and bring them back into production. Since garment exporting countries like India, Bangladesh, and Vietnam have been slapped with high tariffs, Nepal’s products will become competitive once again.”
But to take advantage of the tariff differential, Nepal has to be much more investment-friendly and transparent than it is now. While analysts discuss hypotheticals, there are doubts as to the US government’s commitment to its new tariff announcement.&nbsp;
“We cannot be certain about Trump’s trade policies, he may reverse it just as suddenly,” says economist Pandey.
“There is cautious optimism about Nepal being less affected by Trump’s tariffs, but Nepal should not count its chicken before they hatch,” says trade expert Ravi Shankar Sainju. “Because daily expenses for the average American have risen, there may be less demand for Nepal’s exports.” &nbsp;
In the past, high production and transportation costs and low productivity have hurt the competitiveness of Nepal’s products in the international market. Raw materials required to produce goods in Nepal have to be imported, and the country’s landlocked location increases cost of production.
Former GAN president Chandi Prasad Aryal says the fact that Nepali exports have lower tax rates will be meaningless unless the Nepal government removes existing hurdles to production and export, ensures domestic production of raw materials, and promotes productivity.&nbsp;
“These new trade dynamics will be a wasted opportunity unless we can facilitate competitive production within Nepal,” he adds.
Nepal can benefit from the new US trade policy, but experts warn that Nepal must not misuse it. With high customs imposed on goods from neighbouring nations, there is a risk of those goods entering Nepal markets to be re-exported as <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/from-heads-to-toes">Made in Nepal products</a>. &nbsp;
Says Kiran Saakha: “Government and entrepreneurs must be vigilant in preventing crimes that could lead to Nepal losing its credibility in the international market. Otherwise, the US might just as easily take away the small concessions it has currently granted to us.”

Trump tariff to benefit Nepal

It was 30 years ago this month that investment into ‘Baby Arun’, the 201MW first phase of the run-of-river Arun III project, was brought to a screeching halt when the World Bank officially withdrew its support. This brought about profound and fundamental changes in the way Nepal’s power sector subsequently developed. Nepalis suffered debilitating power outages between 2008-2016 due to shortages attributable to the cancellation. At the same time, the gap left by Baby Arun was filled by private sector investment in ways that were not obvious in 1995. It took 30 years, but in many ways Nepal’s power sector is more healthy today than it has ever been, and likely better than if the project was built as planned. At a projected budget of $1.08 billion, Baby Arun would have cost the equivalent of Nepal’s entire annual government expenditure in 1995. It was to be funded by concessional grants and loans from multilateral and bilateral funders, including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), KfW, and investment by the government itself. At the time, Nepal’s total electricity generation capacity was only 230MW, and the trajectory of the power sector changed dramatically following the cancellation. In the past 30 years, $5.4 billion has been invested in the power sector led by private investors, and much of it from domestic banks and pension funds (table, right).  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250829150840_c13d6f9f34d7163832b3089eabdad6f20d2d5cef3a53039e0432add2be6c32f0" data-rendition-name="original" width="984" height="521" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Nearly 70% of the new megawatts generated were by private independent power producers (IPP) in the past 30 years, while the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and its subsidiary companies added 30% of new capacity. Almost 80% of total debt financing came from domestic banks and employee retirement funds. International assistance for power generation dropped dramatically over this time, accounting for only about 15% of investment. Before 1995 new power projects used to be entirely dependent on foreign aid. Since 1995, 63% of new generation came from 171 small hydropower projects with an average capacity of 12MW, while 4% was from 21 solar photovoltaic and biomass projects developed by local IPPs.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250829150844_5bc299fc78be90b95ce4727b0b3bdaa4542e17e126718cc8725d136630ffc097" data-rendition-name="original" width="988" height="503" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  Over three decades, investment in Nepal’s power supply came primarily from new actors that had never before been involved in this sector. The rate of electrification rose from 10% to close to 100% -- sufficient to meet domestic needs during most of the year, and in 2024 made Nepal a net exporter of power to India for the first time in its history. As practically all the new investment in this period went into run-of-river hydro and solar projects, rather than into hydropower reservoirs with seasonal storage, Nepal continues to rely on imports from India during the dry winter months. Surplus electricity generation for export during the monsoon is slated to grow rapidly as another 200 solar and hydro projects are nearing completion of construction, with over 5,000MW of power capacity. Private Power The cancellation of Baby Arun inadvertently accelerated the entry of the private sector into Nepal’s power generation. The government enacted the Electricity Act in 1992 to attract private IPPs and diversify away from total dependence from international aid, but had been struggling for several years to conclude the first agreement with the 60MW Khimti Project. There remained a large gap between the tariff that the government thought was reasonable versus what was demanded by the Norwegian investor Statkraft, and the private sector arms of the World Bank and ADB that were financing the project. The shock of World Bank withdrawal from Baby Arun put tremendous pressure on the government, then led by the UML as it is now. The Bank’s decision to terminate its involvement was ostensibly, at least partially, taken in response to a letter critiquing the project sent by the UML while it was in the opposition.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250829150848_7fb3641d776fe86a09ad60a758f7e16660a409fdb15e541644f13646b0894347" data-rendition-name="original" width="949" height="446" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>BAD NEWS: Newspaper clippings from the early 90s on tender announcement ahead of loan approval (left) and secrecy surrounding environmental assessment (centre) of Arun III before its eventual cancellation in August 1995.</figcaption> </figure>  The government was forced to soften its position and agree to the investors’ terms following the cancellation of Baby Arun. It directed NEA to sign a power purchase agreement (PPA) with Khimti. It was concluded in January 1996, and this was followed by a second PPA in July 1996 with Panda Energy, the American developer of the 45MW Upper Bhotekosi project. The expensive USD-denominated agreements to buy power from two international private producers, with price escalation clauses tied to the New York Consumer Price Index, sent alarm bells ringing. There was worry that the country was heading towards unaffordable tariff rates for the consumer and potential bankruptcy for NEA as a result of inevitable future weakening of the Nepali Rupee. The government had strong-armed NEA into signing these agreements, and realised that concessionary financing terms that Nepal was used to receiving for public sector projects such as Baby Arun and Kali Gandaki A, that included below-market interest rates and 40 years repayment period with a 10 year grace period before starting repayment, were not the norm for private sector investors. Nepal’s status as a less than attractive destination for foreign investment meant that the country had few options but to accept expensive dollar PPAs from international developers with the high commercial interest rates and short repayment periods imposed by their banks because of high investment risks. In the end, the government ended up having to additionally provide a sovereign guarantee in order to close the deal at the insistence of the lenders – committing it to repayment in case NEA defaulted on paying the IPPs. It is reasonable to assume that the extraordinarily high political cost of agreeing to the PPA terms would have meant that no government would have willingly agreed to them in 1995 had it not suffered the trauma of the loss of concessionary-financed public sector projects as large as the Baby Arun. It has taken NEA 25 years to consider offering dollar-denominated PPAs again: to cover the foreign exchange portion of the investment in the 216MW Upper Trisuli-1 and 120MW Rasuwa-Bhotekosi Hydropower projects. It seemed unlikely at the time, but it turned out that the dire situation Nepal found itself in 1995 planted the seed to mobilise investment for affordable power from within the country. Double Whammy After the dual shock of first losing investment in Baby Arun and having to sign expensive power purchase agreements with international IPPs, the first proposal for an alternative strategy to mitigate the risk of foreign currency investment into hydropower projects came from a group of engineers within the Arun III team at NEA. Led by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4900">Deputy Director Damber Bahadur Nepali,</a> engineers convinced the leadership that NEA needed to invest in a subsidiary company to build a series of locally-designed and domestically-financed projects that would have lower cost with rupee-denominated PPAs. They registered the Chilime Hydropower Company Limited (CHCL) in October 1995 with 51% shares from NEA, 25% from its employees, and 24% available for the general public, 10% of which was prioritised for local residents at the project site. The 22.1MW project is in Rasuwa on a tributary of the Trisuli, and mobilised debt financing from the Employee Provident Fund, which manages retirement savings for employees of the government, public enterprises, and private sector institutions. CHCL’s experience showed that NEA employees themselves believed that individual hydropower projects with operational independence from NEA could be developed profitably in Nepal by its own engineers -- and they were willing to put their own money on the line. Chilime also demonstrated that there was money in the country, particularly with retirement funds, looking for opportunities for long-term investments. Following completion of Chilime in 2003, CHCL led the formation of three other NEA subsidiary companies that completed construction in 2023 and 2024, producing 168.3MW using fully rupee-tied investment. NEA’s largest subsidiary, the Upper Tamakosi Hydropower Limited, completed construction of its 456MW plant in 2021.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250829160812_ce9ab8b49c598970db3f5bf0a079061ef52f153b28d9f4ead2bb1b26bfd7c2f3" data-rendition-name="original" width="3000" height="1571" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> <figcaption>DAMNED: The $700 million 456MW Upper Tamakosi built entirely with domestic funds before it was destroyed by the September floods last year. </figcaption> </figure>  There were some delays and cost overruns on this run-of-river project, the largest in the country with a final cost of over $700 million -- all of it sourced domestically. The five subsidiary companies launched by NEA have produced almost two times as much new power as NEA has over the past 30 years. Seven other NEA subsidiaries are currently constructing projects to add another 474MW to the national grid. But even more important than NEA subsidiaries have been local IPPs: Nepali companies which have over the past three decades enthusiastically entered the hydropower sector. From a regulatory perspective, the credit for mobilising domestic private investment to engage in power generation goes to Minister of Water Resources Shailaja Acharya, who in 1998 offered a flat feed-in-tariff of Rs4/kWh for hydropower projects under 10MW. This upfront offer removed a major barrier that early developers had faced of having to spend money to carry out a detailed feasibility study before they could even start tariff negotiations with NEA. She had laid the foundation stone of the Chilime project, and proved to be the champion of opening up the sector for domestic IPPs. The guarantee of a PPA with a fixed tariff, irrespective of project specifications, gave small power developers the confidence to apply for survey licenses and invest in feasibility studies so they could directly approach commercial banks and make a case for their project producing required revenue to repay loans. Domestic IPPs started adding power to the national grid in 2002. Their contribution was initially modest, and first projects were small and commercial lenders who took time to be confident about providing debt financing to a sector which had previously not been considered suitable for private sector investment. While the first 10 years were slow, with less than 10MW being added to the grid each year, this increased twenty fold over the following ten years, resulting in the equivalent of a Baby Arun being added by Nepali IPPs to the grid each year. A total of 84 IPPs added 232MW, 328 MW, 454MW, and 400MW of new generation to the grid in 2021-2024 (graph). There was explosive, exponential growth as domestic developers have surged ahead to account for 76% of the new megawatts added to the grid since 2020, compared to 24% by NEA and its subsidiary companies. The megawatts that IPPs are adding have followed the classic ‘hockey stick curve’ with the ‘breakout point’, signaling the rapid growth phase in 2020. Private producers are expected to accelerate new generation in the coming years with 300 solar and hydropower projects adding 11,000MW. Another 166 hydropower and 96 solar projects are currently in the survey stage, and are in line to add another 11,000MW to the construction pipeline. One major challenge is finding financing required for the projects. Domestic investment will no longer be sufficient to finance this ambitious pipeline of renewable energy projects. Project developers as well as NEA and the Electricity Regulatory Commission will have to leverage their substantial experience accumulated through the construction of over 200 projects to attract regional and international investment and hedge the risks of dollar-denominated PPAs. Following the cancellation of Baby Arun, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Nepal developed a highly distributed power sector</a>. The national electricity grid is currently supplied with power from a remarkably decentralised array of hundreds of hydropower and solar photovoltaic projects spread across 43 districts and all seven provinces.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250829150848_0c3aa66b34bfb08380a624f397bf3ebb4126f4d6b41a26115848b496876f501b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1228" height="867" loading="lazy" alt="30 years after Baby Arun"> </figure>  This presents a sharp contrast to the pathway of a few large public sector hydropower projects with a sprinkling of private sector projects that was envisioned as part of NEA’s investment planning when Baby Arun was being considered the front runner for investment. The strategy then was to allow public sector investment in a few large hydropower projects with thermal plants to fill the gap. Knowing what we know now about acceleration of climate change impacts and increased extreme weather events, following this path would have made Nepal’s power sector highly vulnerable. Decentralised generation greatly improves the resilience of Nepal’s power supply as damage to power plants in one part of the country need not affect other areas that have their own generation. Following the investment plan where over two thirds of the country’s power supply would have come from power plants on the Arun River, would have greatly imperiled Nepal’s energy security. All rivers in Nepal are susceptible to flooding from cloudbursts made more frequent by climate change. The Arun River which is fed by glaciers in Tibet is also at risk to glacial lake outburst floods. Bikash Pandey is Director of Clean Energy and Circular Economy at Winrock International. People Power is his regular column in Nepali Times on global energy issues relevant to Nepal. <h2>Decentralised and Diversified</h2> In the 30 years since the cancellation of ‘Baby Arun’: Hydropower projects constructed cover capacities ranging from less than 1MW to 456MW and developed by IPPs from across the country with strong local involvement in purchasing equity shares. Renewable energy sources contributed to the generation mix through solar IPPs that further contribute to climate resilience, and cover shortfalls during low rainfall. The government is committed to solar contributing 10% of the power on the grid. Increasing solar beyond this target and providing incentives to project developers to invest in utility-scale battery storage would further improve resilience. BIG ARUN: The 900MW Arun III project under construction since 2018 at Num in Sankhuwasabha (pictured, below) is a separate initiative by a different project developer using a different financing modality. The ‘Baby Arun’ version of Arun III was cancelled in 1995.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20250829150852_df534df5166eb5a9bb4cbe101627bdec7ac1df2a405a9d3988d1c86fcc8ecdeb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1750" height="1312" loading="lazy" alt="30 Years after Baby Arun"> </figure>

30 years after Baby Arun

It cannot be a coincidence that after pushing bills to constrict freedom of expression and allow greater <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/security-or-espionage">surveillance of citizens</a>, Nepal’s government is now tightening controls on civil society.
In a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/command-and-control">series of recent moves</a> journalists have been sued for contempt of court, imprisoned for YouTube videos, or ordered by courts to desist from investigating corrupt officials.
An amendment to the Print and Publications Act that would hand the power to shut online media to the Chief District Officer (CDO). Another draft Bill would allow a political appointee to head a new Media Council with the power to revoke a journalist’s license. The draft counter-intelligence Bill would let random officials to arbitrarily tap phones, read emails and trail citizens.
Now comes yet another draft Bill that would replace the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=10675">Social Welfare Council (SWC)</a> with direct government control over registration, regulation, and management of non-governmental organisations, nonprofits and charities. There are more than 54,000 NGOs, 200 international NGOs registered with the SWC.
The draft makes civil society organisations needlessly jump through hoops to carry out work that complements the government in the social sector. Critics say the Bill was drafted without any consultation with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/nepal-s-rights-groups-must-step-up-4r4z6ck4">civic groups</a>.
“This Bill’s content is questionable whether it intends to allow for civil society organisations in Nepal a free space to operate,” concludes Dr SP Kalaunee, Country Representative of BlinkNow Foundation and Chair of the Association of International NGOs in Nepal (AIN). “The draft seems oriented towards controling rather than facilitating the work of civil society organisations.”
The Bill will be open for feedback from the public, and integrates the National Directives Act (1961), Association Registration Act (1977), and the Social Welfare Act (1992) and proposes dissolving the SWC and replacing it with a new Social Welfare Department under the Ministry of Women, Children and Senior Citizens.
Non-government groups will now be required to get approval from the Registrar Office, the CDO or the provincial government depending on their area of operation. Those working across provinces will have to get permission from the federal government. &nbsp;
The government says the Bill is intended to vet organisations to see if they are engaged in espionage, violate national security, assist a foreign state, commit treason, cause strife between federal units, or incite communal violence.&nbsp;
CSOs working in Nepal have long called for legislation to better facilitate their work, minimise administrative and bureaucratic red tape which have posed operational challenges. But they are opposed to such drastic control.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-crow-and-the-scarecrow">The crow and the scarecrow</a>, Om Astha Rai
The NGO Federation of Nepal also issued a statement this week calling the Bill ‘retrograde and cumbersome’. It added: ‘Most of its provisions are intended to further constrain and control civil society organisations rather than facilitate and strengthen them, and reduce the role of citizen participation … it is an attack on our civil liberties, inclusivity, and transparency, and curtails our <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=5156">democratic values and constitutional rights</a>.’ &nbsp;
<a href="about:blank">Nepal’s graduation</a> from least-developed country status next year may mean less aid for Nepal, and higher interest rates on loans from multilateral creditors. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/how-usaid-cut-affects-nepal">closure of USAID </a>and reduction in bilateral grants means the work of INGOs will be even more vital – especially to meet its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/target-2030-for-maternal-and-newborn-health">SDG targets by 2030</a>.&nbsp;
“We are competing with other countries at a time when the global aid environment is shrinking, so the support we receive is directly dependent on a conducive environment for INGOs to operate and function,” says Kalaunee. “INGOs follow regulations of the nations they operate in, they will not protest or wait around for governments to change their minds or policies.”
Social safety net
Since 1977, the work of non-governmental actors in Nepal has been regulated by the Social Service National Coordination Council (SSNCC) chaired by Queen Aishwarya.
After the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/one-moment-30-years-ago-today">1990 People’s Movement</a>, King Birendra set up the Social Welfare Council (SWC) as an autonomous body in 1992 through the Social Welfare Act. But since then the SWC has been dogged by controversy and allegations of corruption and extortion.
In 2018, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) filed a Rs315 million corruption case against 14 individuals, including the Minister of Women, Children and Social Welfare and SWC chair Badri Prasad Neupane and other officials for violating public procurement laws to rent out three hectares of its property around Bhrikuti Mandap.
Civil society groups have for years called for reforms in the SWC, and a report was drawn up to restructure it before this Bill proposed its dissolution. INGOs in particular will now have to go through the Social Welfare Department and multiple ministries for permissions.
A particularly objectionable provision in the draft stipulates that NGOs must have a Board of Director made up almost entirely of secretaries of various ministries. The NGO Federation has urged the government to take a civil society-friendly approach and not tangle its work in red tape and control. It says the government has no option but to revise the bill in its current form.
“Civil society organisations need an open space to operate, and an autonomous body to oversee them,” says Kalaunee. “Non-government organisations support in the areas prioritised by the government but by definition they cannot be a part of government.”

Big, beautiful Bills

This is the 72nd episode of Diaspora Diaries, a Nepali Times series in collaboration with Migration Lab providing a platform to share experiences of living, working and studying abroad. My father ran a store and that is where I spent all my time till Grade 6. Doing my homework. Serving customers. I then moved to my maternal grandparents’ house because I used to get along with my cousin who was a year older than me. We did everything together, and were best friends. We took turns studying: I was a night owl, and he was an early riser. Before I went to bed after studying all night, I woke him up. My mother was 44 when I was born, the same year my eldest brother got married. My sister-in-law becoming a part of our family was how my mother referenced my age. I liked making money, and was always a hustler. In Grade 7, I learnt to handle a tractor and helped my brother-in-law to plough, earning Rs10 a day. As I got better, he paid me more. By Grade 9, I was already making Rs500 per day, but had to slow down to prepare for my exams. From an early age I knew I did not want a 9-5 job. There just wasn’t enough money in it. I wanted to get into business, and compared my brother who worked in the post office and what businessmen made. It did not help that my brother was honest, and never took bribes. A friend and I made money selling cheap Chinese phones at a premium to our friends. We blasted music on the phones and pretended that we were giving them a discount. After SLC, I started teaching math and other subjects. I was soon a shareholder in the same school and in the evening I was involved in our family’s floriculture business, growing amaranth and marigold for garlands.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250831020844_1b54b999d67122a50c4c7e6204cc737bcc99bf2a68db6499a4566a7f61a880b4" data-rendition-name="original" width="955" height="1314" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  It was then that a friend suggested we learn the Korean language. We could be earning significantly higher in Korea for similar efforts. I had no plans to go abroad but he convinced me. I did not know anything about Korea, and was scolded at the language institute when I asked someone to point Korea on the map.&nbsp; It was only there that I learnt you had to pass an exam for the Korean Employment Permit System (EPS), and pay for language classes. After a week, I decided it was not for me and dropped out. But my friend convinced me to give it one more try. I did not prepare much for the exam, and it was no surprise that I failed. But it was just by one mark, and people would pity me for failing “just by one mark”. It was a brand of failure. It hurt my ego. I had to turn things around by taking the exams seriously, and locked myself up to study hard.&nbsp; Even when we had visitors, my wife told them I was not home. If I was not in my room learning Korean, I would be with a group of ten of us test-takers comparing notes and practicing late into the night. The exam was difficult, but this time I passed, the only one in my group who did.&nbsp; As someone who never liked the idea of doing a job, I still had my doubts about going to Korea. It did not help that one of my acquaintances had returned a month after he had left, and he discouraged me from migrating given that I was already making good money in Nepal.&nbsp; But my wife suggested that I give it a shot since I had worked so hard for it. And if it really turned out not to be my cup of tea, I could always return. What did I have to lose, I thought, at least I would get to visit Korea. My job there was in an electrical company that made circuit boards. I worked all day, earned good money. In the evenings, I kept myself busy with my real estate business back in Nepal. I had learnt the tricks of the trade from fellow real estate agents back home, but at the time did not have the capital to invest.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250831020848_941e961e2045058f255ad89884b51faa7d2365c68236e5cbe573d63d769ac6c5" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  In Korea, it helped that I had salary records that allowed me to get loans from financial institutions both in Korea and in Nepal. Ultimately, I started earning more from my real estate deals in Nepal than from my job in Korea. This was all thanks to my ability to take loans because of the EPS scheme. My wife has been managing the flower business while I was away. My finances grew stronger over the eight years I was in Korea. I paid off the loans that I had borrowed to buy land. But real estate did not satisfy me entirely. I wondered: what is my brand? What will I be known for? What is my contribution to society? Real estate is for wealth, but that is about it. I needed to sell one piece of land and use the revenue to start a venture. I took classes in business, and returned to Nepal six months ago and got back to my family’s ancestral roots in floriculture. In Nepal too, I am continuing the entrepreneurship training I had started in Korea with the Bridge International. Such exposure helps us reflect on our business such as our branding, vision, and proactive aspects like the importance of strong recordkeeping.&nbsp; I am now working to upgrade and expand my floriculture business. With a friend who is still in Korea I am building a cooling room to increase the shelf-life of flowers and other produce and set up a market in my village where others can sell their produce. Floriculture is our primary business, but it is seasonal and earns good money only during festivals like Tihar.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250831020848_a008ffeba13896e6918f68ff6e687c8fe11140d86a96f1ec11690547f2bcd415" data-rendition-name="original" width="1280" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Diaspora Diaries 72"> </figure>  So, I grow tomatoes to ensure year-round earnings. I also am engaged in other businesses like real estate and online shopping. I work round the clock in Nepal — a strong work ethic is something I picked up in Korea.&nbsp; My Korean bosses would work alongside us, that motivated us. I work just as hard in Nepal as I did in Korea. People here often ask me why I am pushing myself so hard. But making garlands comes easy to me, it is work my forebears were involved in. My childhood memories are about plucking flowers with my sister. I have a comparative advantage in this work. It comes naturally to me, it is easy and I enjoy it. And sometimes, if there are too many garlands to make, I can multitask while holding meetings. My fingers just fly. I am good at this job, but my wife is even better and faster.&nbsp; When there is too much load, we can also outsource the work. To be known as the flower guy would be great personal branding. The मखमली guy. Or the सयपत्री guy. I decided to come home for just this with a one-way ticket. “अब पासा: जाँदैन ल्हासा!” &nbsp;

The flower guy

An average Nepali could live 3.3 years longer if air pollution is reduced to meet the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline, according the annual <a href="https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/">Air Quality Life Index</a> 2025 published this week. The annual average concentration of tiny suspended particles in the air (PM2.5) in Nepal in 2023 was 38.3 μg/m3, nearly eight times the WHO standard, and 10% higher than 2022. Thirty years ago, air pollution in Nepal was half the current levels. WHO says particulate concentration above 5μg/m3 &nbsp;is<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-invisible-is-more-dangerous"> hazardous to health</a>.&nbsp; The most <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/why-is-the-air-in-bhaktapur-so-bad">polluted parts of Nepal</a> are along the Indian border in Rutahat, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Parsa and Bara districts in Madhes Povince where average life expectancy is reduced by as much as 5.3 years.&nbsp; People in Sarlahi, Siraha, Saptari, Morang, Sunsari, Rupandehi and Jhapa are also dying at least 4 years earlier. The Air Quality Index 2025 report which is published annually by the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago, says the figure is relatively lower for Kathmandu and Lalitpur at 2.6 and 2.4 years. After the Madhes, Kosi and Lumbini Provinces are the most polluted — especially in towns along industrial corridors and near the border. Karnali Province was by far the cleanest, followed by Sudurpaschim. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/epicentre-of-pollution">Epicentre of pollution</a>, Sonia Awale  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250828060856_136770cc84e114e8993af82e6a682c45d9458060e4ecf45f18e9f210673e1279.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20250828060856_136770cc84e114e8993af82e6a682c45d9458060e4ecf45f18e9f210673e1279" data-rendition-name="original" width="753" height="584" loading="lazy" alt="AQLI map"> <figcaption>Potential gain in life expectancy from permanently reducing PM2.5 from 2023 concentration to the WHO guideline.</figcaption> </figure>  Air pollution is now the leading external<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/cleaner-air-longer-lives-0z0okfeu"> threat to life expectancy in Nepal</a>, exceeding both tobacco and diet-related risks, which reduced average lifespans of Nepalis by 1.9 years and 1.3 years respectively. The Air Quality Management Action Plan for Kathmandu Valley introduced in 2017 had identified vehicular emissions, brick kilns, and construction as the most polluting. It adopted measures to strengthen air quality monitoring, develop emissions inventory, and conduct impact assessments. Other major sources of emissions in Nepal include <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/no-smoke-without-fire-p7vb9dcj">forest fires</a>, crop residue and garbage burning as well as transboundary pollution from India and Pakistan. The report says India is the world’s most polluted country with the particulate concentration in 2023 at 41 μg/m3, an average resident in India could live 3.5 years longer if pollution levels were brought down to meet the WHO guideline. Residents of New Delhi on average would live 8.2 years longer if they breathed clean air. South Asia has some of the world’s most polluted cities. On some winter days, Kathmandu records the worst air quality in the world. In 2023, PM2.5 concentrations in South Asia declined by 9.6% between 2021 and 2022 due to lockdowns during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. ‘After a dip in 2022, particulate pollution in South Asia increased by 2.8% in 2023 — though it remained 7% lower than in 2021,’ <a href="https://aqli.epic.uchicago.edu/report/annual-update-2025">states the report</a>. ‘In the region’s most polluted countries, particulate pollution’s impact on life expectancy is nearly twice that of childhood, and maternal malnutrition and more than five times that of unsafe water, sanitation and handwashing.’ Elsewhere, unprecedented wildfires caused particulate concentrations to rise to levels not seen since 2011 in the United States and since 1998 in Canada. China also registered a decline in air quality, an increase of 2.8% in particulate pollution in 2023 relative to 2022, the first in a decade since the start of its ‘War on Pollution’ in 2014.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250828060856_94860b929d0fb161220ad72ecb76fcd29ba8e306bd6b844485a4171dadb6bb47.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20250828060856_94860b929d0fb161220ad72ecb76fcd29ba8e306bd6b844485a4171dadb6bb47" data-rendition-name="original" width="754" height="501" loading="lazy" alt="AQLI line graph"> <figcaption>Annual average PM2.5 concentration in Nepal from 1998-2023.</figcaption> </figure>  Globally, the PM2.5 concentration in 2023 was 1.5% higher than in 2022, and nearly 5 times the WHO guideline. If global particulate pollution were permanently reduced to meet this guideline, an average person around the world would gain 1.9 years of life, adding 15.1 billion total life years to the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-future-is-older">global population</a>, the report adds. ‘Particulate pollution remained the greatest external threat to human life expectancy in 2023, with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/air-pollution-is-more-dangerous-than-smoking">its impact comparable to smoking</a> and surpassing other major health risks,’ the report says. ‘Its toll on life expectancy is more than 4 times that of alcohol use, 5 times that of transport injuries or unsafe water, sanitation, and handwashing, and more than 6 times that of HIV/AIDS.’ The report also highlights the need for open data, and says that accessible air quality information has translated into reduced particulate concentrations and gains in life expectancy in the United States, China, and Poland. Besides data, the report says, investment in monitoring and other air quality management infrastructure must be matched by political will, ambitious policies, capacity building, and sustained enforcement.