The shock wave of the return of Donald Trump to the White House, as well as the Republican control of the Senate and possibly the House, will impact not just America but people across the world.
In South Asia, it will mainly change the way Washington views and deals with China and India, and in more unpredictable ways. The impact on Nepal will be governed by how US relations with the country’s two giant neighbours develop in the next five years.
“Compared to Harris who has been focused more on multilateralism and maintaining allies, Trump is more confrontational and unilateral,” says National Assembly member and former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Paudyel. “There is fear that Trump’s policies will push the world to become even more polarised than it is now.”
India and China will both be able to fill the gap left by Trump America’s retreat from global and regional leadership. They will be able to take advantage of Trump diluting relations with or abandoning traditional allies in Europe and Asia.
Although India is in the western camp, New Delhi has wanted to call its own shots. It is using its growing economic clout to thumb its nose at the EU and the US. For example, India has got away with importing oil from Russia despite western sanctions.
Says Akhilesh Upadhyay, Senior Fellow at the Strategic Affairs Center, IIDS: “From a traditional security perspective, Nepal is bang in the middle of China and India. China and America have a great power rivalry, and it is unclear which way Indian axis will go.”
India can also benefit if Trump follows through on threats on more tariffs on Chinese imports. Even though the Biden-Harris administration has been punishing China with tariffs and other barriers, Trump has in the past been more belligerent on Beijing.
“On the one hand, India is close to US in Quad, on the other hand, it takes part in BRICS where it works with Russia and China, and the Shanghai Cooperation. It remains to be seen how the US relationship plays out with our two big neighbours,” adds Upadhyay.
Since the enemy of an enemy is a friend, Washington has regarded India as its bulwark against increased Chinese economic and military clout. But New Delhi has not always gone along with US strategic interests, and does not really like the Americans being too involved with India’s smaller neighbours.
On the downside, A Trump administration could curb the influx of Indian IT workers in US, and the easy access Nepali students have to those jobs in the US could also be scaled back.
Some experts say which party is in the White House will not affect policy South Asia, and Nepal even less. But a Trump win could mean less development assistance to Nepal, particularly in reproductive health, human rights, and social safety.
Nischal Pandey at the Centre for South Asian Studies in Kathmandu says that the few state-level visits between the US and Nepal — from King Mahendra’s address to the joint session of US Congress during President Eisenhower tenure in 1960 to Ganesh Man Singh being received at the White House by President Bush Sr after 1990, to US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit in 2002 during George HW Bush’s term — have all been during Republican administrations.
He adds, “Historically, Republican presidents and administrations have been &nbsp;interested in Nepal than Democratic ones.”
More directly, Nepalis aspiring to migrate to the United States could find it more difficult. There are currently about 300 Nepalis waiting in Mexico for human traffickers to smuggle them into the United States, and that border is going to be tightened even more.
Earlier this year, Sao Paolo airport in Brazil had 150 Nepalis stranded after arriving to take the Darien Gap backdoor to the US. Another 200 headed out to Brazil were stuck at Addis Ababa airport, forcing Ethiopia to ban visas to Nepalis.&nbsp;
Trump has threatened a 20% tariff on Mexican imports if it does not stop migrants. He plans to deport 11 million undocumented people, he may not be able to carry it through but the threat is there for Nepalis in the US without papers.
Trump’s strong rhetoric on China could be bargaining brinkmanship, and it will be interesting to see how he balances this with Sino-Russian alignment. Biden did not roll back bans on Huawei and restrictions on TikTok, and US security concerns about China’s rise is a bipartisan issue, just as Gaza is. Harris would not have done things differently in those sectors.&nbsp;
Says MP Bimala Rai Paudyal: “Trump’s win could cause economic tensions with China, which will affect trade here as well, this is something we will need to prepare for.”
America’s moral authority to lecture countires like Nepal on transitional justice, human rights, democracy, and press freedom will be diminished during the second Trump term.&nbsp;
Reproductive rights, support for family planning projects in Nepal through the UN system may also fall like it did during his earlier presidency. Foreign aid through USAID could also be cut.
But perhaps the more indirect impact on Nepal of the Trump presidency will be his rollback on America’s commitment to curb climate change which will accelerate melting of the Himalayan icecap with major impact on water supply downstream in Asia.&nbsp;
“America’s climate commitments and goals will be impacted by Trump who doesn’t believe in climate change,” says Paudyal. “The current work on loss and damage, and carbon trading depends significantly on US funding, and the world looks to the US to be proactive.”
If Trump can bring the Ukraine war to a close by cosying up to Putin, a peace deal may improve fuel and food situation globally. There are thousands of Nepalis in the Russian Army, at least 50 have died, and they could finally come home.&nbsp;
Concludes Upadhyay: “As for Nepal, the Trump administration should see Nepal as a soverign nation on its own right rather than through the prism of great power rivalry either between US and China.”

Shristi Karki

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Trumpet Call

The current wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States has been building for years. It started in the early 2000s, when US policymakers first raised national-security concerns about Huawei.&nbsp;
China’s national technology champion, the market leader in developing new 5G telecommunications equipment, was accused of deploying digital backdoors that could enable Chinese espionage and cyber-attacks. US-led sanctions in 2019 stopped Huawei dead in its tracks.
But Huawei was just the start. The US has since spiraled into a full-blown outbreak of Sinophobia – a strong word that I don’t use lightly. Phobia is the extreme or irrational fear or dread aroused by a particular object or circumstance.
Indeed, China threats now seem to be popping up everywhere. The US government has imposed export controls to cut off China’s access to advanced semiconductors – part of its concerted effort to stymie the country’s <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/artificial-intelligence-vs-human-stupidity">artificial-intelligence</a> ambitions.&nbsp;
The Department of Justice has just indicted a state-sponsored Chinese hacking group for allegedly taking aim at critical American infrastructure. Much has also been made of the purported risks of Chinese EVs, construction and dock-loading cranes and now TikTok.&nbsp;
Nor are the fears confined to technology. Several years ago, I wrote about America’s trade-deficit disorder, whereby the US government misdiagnosed a multilateral problem – a trade deficit with more than 100 countries – as a bilateral problem and punished China with tariffs.&nbsp;
Others have warned that Washington’s exaggerated claims of the Chinese military threat have, at times, bordered on hysteria as tensions mount in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Of course, all this is only half the story. China is equally guilty of its own strain of Ameriphobia – demonising the US for its accusations of Chinese economic espionage, unfair trading practices, and human-rights violations.&nbsp;
Both phobias are related to the profusion of false narratives that I address in my most recent book, <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Accidental-Conflict-America-China-Narratives/dp/0300259646">Accidental Conflict</a>. Notwithstanding this tit-for-tat blame game, my point now is different:&nbsp;
There is good reason to worry about an increasingly virulent strain of this phobia spinning out of control in the US. Not since the red-baiting in the 1950s, has America so vilified a foreign power.&nbsp;
Back then, a two-pronged congressional approach, led by US Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin and the House Un-American Activities <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/the-destroyer-of-worlds">spearheaded an assault on alleged Communist sympathisers</a> under the guise of protecting Americans from Soviet espionage and influence.
Today, another politician from Wisconsin, Representative Mike Gallagher, has led the charge as chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party which, in an eerie parallel to the McCarthy era, has leveled a series of unsubstantiated charges against China. While Gallagher will retire from Congress in April, his legacy will live on, not just as co-sponsor of a bill that could lead to an outright <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rattled-by-criticism-nepal-bans-tiktok">ban of TikTok</a>, but also as the leader of a congressional effort that has cast a long shadow over those who support almost any form of engagement with China.
The litany of US allegations is a manifestation of unproven fears wrapped in the impenetrable cloak of national security. Yet there is no “smoking gun” in any of these cases. Instead, it is all about circumstantial evidence of an increasingly aggressive China. At work is an unmistakable bipartisan politicisation of deductive reasoning.
For example, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, a leading Democrat, <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/china-cars-national-security-threat-investigation/" target="_blank">asks us</a> to “imagine” what could happen if Chinese EVs were weaponised on American highways.&nbsp;
FBI Director Christopher Wray, a Donald Trump appointee and member of the conservative Federalist Society, warns that Chinese malware could disable critical US infrastructure “if or when China decides the time has come to strike” (emphasis added).&nbsp;
And a former US counterintelligence officer has compared sensors in Chinese-made cranes to a Trojan horse. There are many what ifs and mythical parallels, but no hard evidence on intent or verifiable action.
What is it about China that has generated this virulent US reaction? In Accidental Conflict, I stressed that the US has long been intolerant of competing ideologies and alternative systems of governance. The claim of &nbsp;American exceptionalism seemingly compels us to impose our views and values on others. That was true in the Cold War, and it is true again today.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/staying-neutral-in-a-us-china-confrontation">Staying neutral in a US-China confrontation</a>, Project Syndicate
I also argued that excessive fear of China conveniently masks many of America’s own self-inflicted problems. Bilateral trade deficits may well reflect the unfair trading practices of individual countries – China today, Japan 35 years ago – but broad multilateral trade deficits stem more from chronic US budget deficits that lead to a deficiency of domestic savings.&nbsp;
Similarly, the technology threat is not only an outgrowth of the alleged Chinese theft of US intellectual property, it also represents, as I stressed in Accidental Conflict, America’s underinvestment in research and development and shortfalls in STEM-based higher education. Rather than taking a long, hard look in the mirror, it is politically expedient for US politicians to blame China.
As Sinophobia feeds on itself, fear starts to take on the aura of fact, and the dangers of accidental conflict with China intensify. By acting on these anxieties, America risks inciting the very outcome it wants to deter. Fears over Chinese aggression &nbsp;in Taiwan are a case in point.
The US can and must do better. Rather than excusing the excesses of Sinophobia as justifiable reactions to the China threat, US leaders need to avoid the low road and think more in terms of being the adult in the room. Global leadership requires nothing less.
In his first inaugural address in 1933, US President Franklin Roosevelt underscored the ultimate risk of this dangerous pathology with the memorable line, “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”&nbsp;
Amid today’s Sinophobic frenzy, that message is well worth remembering. © <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/" target="_blank">Project Syndicate</a>&nbsp;
Stephen S Roach is a faculty member at Yale University and the author of the forthcoming Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, November 2022).&nbsp;

US afflicted with full-blown Sinophobia

Nowhere is Nepal’s delicate balancing act between its giant neighbours India and China as evident as it is in this tourism capital.&nbsp; The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/pokhara-s-china-connection">Chinese have cultivated a special relationship with Pokhara</a> ever since they built the 200km Prithvi Highway connecting it to Kathmandu in 1974, right up to the inauguration of Pokhara International Airport last year. India has not been far behind: it financed the 181km Siddhartha Highway connecting Pokhara to Bhairawa in 1971, and a dam that raised the level of Phewa Lake. There are strategic reasons for India and China to eye Pokhara. Most <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/recruitment-of-nepalis-into-indian-army-paused">Gorkha soldiers in the Indian Army are sourced from these mountains</a>, and there is an Indian military pension centre here.&nbsp; For China, it is important to keep an eye on refugee centres here with thousands who fled Tibet after the Chinese annexation. Both India and China have an interest in who governs Nepal, and have followed (often meddled) with political developments in Kathmandu. A Nepali Congress-Maoist coalition that was seen by many to be India-leaning was <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/catapulting-to-singha-darbar">suddenly replaced on Monday with a Communist-led coalition</a> more amicable to China.&nbsp; However, it is Pokhara that is on the main geostrategic fault line between India and China, where the rivalry is openly played out. Pokhara’s mayor Dhana Raj Acharya is from the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Socialist and has earned the moniker ‘Chinese mayor’ for pushing direct flights to Pokhara from Chinese cities, and activities like the Dragon Boat Festival on Phewa Lake, the China International Crosscountry Championship, and a full-scale celebration of Chinese New Year last month.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240309010324_1a033dbd507869e172cfe184d622391defeaf39a1af0a4a4e1c6b60bd5d1a675.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20240309010324_1a033dbd507869e172cfe184d622391defeaf39a1af0a4a4e1c6b60bd5d1a675" data-rendition-name="original" width="3500" height="2333" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal"> <figcaption>Pokhara Mayor Dhana Raj Acharya with Chinese Ambassador Chen Song. Photo: DHANA RAJ ACHARYA/FACEBOOK</figcaption> </figure>  The Indians have been looking at this flurry of Chinese activity with some concern, and have organised their own events.&nbsp; The first international flight at Pokhara's new airport was a Sichuan Airlines jet from Chengdu in June flying in the Dragon Boat Festival crew. India has been dragging its feet on allowing direct flights between Pokhara and Indian cities because the airport was built by the Chinese. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/pokhara-s-desperation-and-hope">Pokhara's desperation and hope</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit To make its point, the Indian Embassy organised a Yoga Day function on the same day as the inaugural Chinese flight. It was not a coincidence that both the Chinese and Indian ambassadors to Nepal were in Pokhara on the same day.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240309010324_d07a2bdaa9fdff8dd3d9e585673b83f642e3bbf03dfc45d5b7bbec0d6cfbd55d.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20240309010324_d07a2bdaa9fdff8dd3d9e585673b83f642e3bbf03dfc45d5b7bbec0d6cfbd55d" data-rendition-name="original" width="1840" height="1292" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal"> <figcaption>A Sichuan Airlines Airbus 319 was the first international flight to the new Chinese-built Pokhara airport in June last year. Photo: XINHUA. It landed on the same day that the Indian Embassy organised Yoga Day at the nearby Pokhara Stadium (below).</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240309010328_ac491e7363d9a7ee6ff46ff926bcb29b0cc08aba0687d9c6d3d4bb5afa09318e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20240309010328_ac491e7363d9a7ee6ff46ff926bcb29b0cc08aba0687d9c6d3d4bb5afa09318e" data-rendition-name="original" width="2250" height="1501" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry in Nepal"> <figcaption>Photo: DHANA RAJ ACHARYA/FACEBOOK</figcaption> </figure>  &nbsp;On another recent visit to Pokhara, Indian Ambassador Naveen Srivastava made a pointed reference to the fact that Pokhara was connected to the Indian border (by the Indian built road in 1971) before it was linked to Kathmandu (by the Chinese-built road in 1974). He added that although Indian visitors liked to drive to Pokhara, they were facing difficulties because of the poor state of the Prithvi Highway.&nbsp; “I don’t know who is repairing that highway,” Ambassador Srivastava continued, referring obliquely to Chinese contractors, “but India has set a record in highway construction. Next time, also remember Indian companies.” Srivastava made no mention of India’s reluctance to allow flights to Pokhara, adding that most Indian visitors came by road anyway. Chinese Ambassador Chen Song also appeared concerned about the slow progress on the expansion of the Prithvi Highway, and drove along a part of it during a recent visit, posting drone footage of the upgrading work on social media. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/begnas-going-the-way-of-phewa">Begnas going the way of Phewa</a>, Durga Rana Magar While in Pokhara, Ambassador Song also publicly criticised the Indian policy of not importing electricity from Nepali hydropower plants built by the Chinese. And to drive that point home, two Chinese Air Force Y-20 transport aircraft landed at Pokhara airport in November with 50 tonnes of relief for Jajarkot earthquake survivors.&nbsp; New Delhi insisted that the India-Nepal Bilateral Consultative Group on Security Issues be held in Pokhara in October.&nbsp; “The great game between India and China is being played out in Nepal, and Pokhara is where it is most visible,” explains geopolitics expert Indra Adhikari.&nbsp; She adds, “India is concerned about an increase in Chinese activity around Pokhara, and competition between Nepal’s neighbours is heating up.”&nbsp; India’s main sensitivity appears to be over the fact that Kaski and neighbouring districts of central Nepal are major recruitment centres for the Gorkha regiments of the Indian Army. The Gorkha Pension Camp was opened as far back as 1955 in Pokhara, and in 1987 it established a school for the children of Gorkha soldiers in its military.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024031106034_a5c5037ae3a76c0443eca037a02d822494de1f60649e6f42466936fb3e632ddd.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="2024031106034_a5c5037ae3a76c0443eca037a02d822494de1f60649e6f42466936fb3e632ddd" data-rendition-name="original" width="900" height="551" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara geopolitics"> <figcaption>Indian Ambassador Navin Srivastav with mayor Acharya.</figcaption> </figure>  Similarly, China’s touchiness concerns the presence of British Gurkha veterans and their families living in Hong Kong, and Tibetans in four refugee camps in and around Pokhara.&nbsp; Pokhara was also the staging post for American and Indian military support for Khampa guerrillas who were fighting the Chinese Army in Tibet till they were disarmed or driven out in 1976. Explains analyst Ananda Raj Mulmi: “Beijing does not want Pokhara to once more become a base for anti-Chinese activities.” After opening the China-Nepal border at Korala in Mustang, the Chinese are keen to make Pokhara a trading hub in central Nepal.&nbsp; “The Chinese had a long term time horizon to link the Prithvi Highway to Korala, and wanted to extend the road from Pokhara to Jomsom but King Mahendra did not approve, so they just built it up to Baglung,” adds Mulmi.&nbsp; Pokhara’s sister city relations with eight Chinese cities is a source of soft power, and means there are frequent cultural exchanges. Pokhara is a household word in China because of the popular television serial Deng Feng Lai which was filmed on location here, and the main characters took a paragliding flight. <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/chinese-tourist-influx-to-nepal-in-2020-nqr538k3">Chinese visitors used to be the mainstay of Pokhara’s tourism till Covid</a>.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024031106034_ff7c3ce0f0e3b2e83849bcdf35942892b9fb7e4f110ce6032920fd3e4ccd8094.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="2024031106034_ff7c3ce0f0e3b2e83849bcdf35942892b9fb7e4f110ce6032920fd3e4ccd8094" data-rendition-name="original" width="976" height="665" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara geopolitics"> </figure>  More than a year after the inauguration of Pokhara Airport, there are no regular international flights. India may be preventing flights to its cities, but it is Nepal’s failure that it has not been able to attract airlines to connect Pokhara to Chinese destinations.&nbsp; “This is because we went ahead and built an expensive airport without factoring in geopolitical sensitivities,” says foreign policy expert Krishna KC. “We have to convince the Indians that it is also in their interest to allow flights.”&nbsp; Chinese Ambassador Song announced at Pokhara Airport’s inauguration that it was a BRI project even though it predated the concept, and this ticked India off even more. Nepal’s unclear flip-flopping over the issue aggravated both sides, diplomatic sources say.&nbsp; Even so, most people here blame India for being petty-minded about not allowing new air routes making Pokhara operations feasible, as well as permitting connections to Indian cities.&nbsp; Professor of geostrategic studies Bhim Nath Baral says it is natural for both powerful countries to be concerned that Pokhara will be used against its national interest.&nbsp; “But it is up to Nepal to deploy diplomatic skills to understand and reassure both sides,” he adds. “That can only come with a mature and self-confident foreign policy.”

Pokhara epicentre of Sino-Indian rivalry

China’s sharp economic slowdown has raised alarm bells around the world. But it has also thrown into relief the rise of another demographic powerhouse next door.&nbsp; The Indian economy grew at an impressive <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-economic-growth-set-accelerate-its-fastest-year-2023-08-31/">7.8% annual rate</a> in the second quarter of 2023, and the country recently reached an important milestone by becoming the first to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/23/science/chandrayaan-3-india-moon-landing.html">land a spacecraft</a> on the Moon’s potentially water-rich south pole. India’s ascent, unlike China’s, has not been accompanied by an increasingly assertive foreign policy. As India’s geopolitical, economic, and cultural clout grows, so does its global footprint. China’s ‘<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/29/opinion/china-economy-decline.html">decline</a>’, as some have begun to call the conclusion of the country’s four-decade-long economic boom, opens new opportunities for the Indian economy and other developing and emerging countries. Earlier this year, India reached another milestone when its population officially <a href="https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/publication/un-desa-policy-brief-no-153-india-overtakes-china-as-the-worlds-most-populous-country/">surpassed that of China</a>, which had been the world’s most populous country for <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/19/world/asia/india-china-population.html">more than 300 years</a>. While China’s shrinking, <a href="https://www.scmp.com/economy/economic-indicators/article/3207047/china-population-2022-marks-first-population-decline-60-years">rapidly aging</a> population is likely to impede economic growth and may curtail its geopolitical ambitions, India – one of the world’s <a href="https://indbiz.gov.in/one-of-the-youngest-populations-in-the-world-indias-most-valuable-asset/">youngest</a> countries, with a <a href="https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/india-population/#:~:text=The%20population%20density%20in%20India,1%2C202%20people%20per%20mi2).&amp;text=The%20median%20age%20in%20India%20is%2028.4%20years.">median age of 28.2</a> – is poised to reap a huge demographic dividend. But the driving force behind India’s emergence as a major global power is its rapid economic growth. While India’s GDP is still smaller than China’s, the country is currently the world’s <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2023/07/10/world-economic-outlook-update-july-2023">fastest-growing</a> major economy and is projected to account for <a href="https://t.co/SMFH21oTa0">12.9% of global growth</a> over the next five years, surpassing the United States’ 11.3% share.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231029081036_781e265ec0c9f72b3c2596697419554293b721f2c4e8c93b963d66e35f4aa3c1.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20231029081036_781e265ec0c9f72b3c2596697419554293b721f2c4e8c93b963d66e35f4aa3c1" data-rendition-name="original" width="696" height="477" loading="lazy" alt="India China graph NT"> </figure>  In addition to fueling a consumption boom, India’s youthful population is also driving innovation, as evidenced by the country’s world-class information economy and its recent moon landing, which the country managed to achieve despite a national space budget equivalent to <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/india-races-russia-to-be-first-to-land-on-moons-south-pole-ad5d9d05">roughly 6%</a> of what the US spends on space missions. Having already surpassed the United Kingdom, its former colonial ruler, India’s GDP is poised to <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/01/india-to-leapfrog-to-third-largest-economy-by-2030.html">overtake</a> that of Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030, behind the US and China. Given its increasingly unstable neighborhood, it should come as no surprise that India has the world’s <a href="https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2022/world-military-expenditure-passes-2-trillion-first-time">third-largest</a> defense budget. The deepening <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Pakistan-China-and-terrorism">strategic alliance</a> between China and Pakistan underscores India’s precarious position as the only country bordering two nuclear-armed <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/pakistan-becoming-chinese-client-state-by-brahma-chellaney-2016-05?">revisionist states</a> with expansionist ambitions. Moreover, for the past three years, India has been locked in a tense <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-cannot-win-india-himalayan-border-dispute-by-brahma-chellaney-2023-04">military standoff</a> with China along its Himalayan border. Bilateral relations, marked by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/12/india-china-arunachal-border/">intermittent clashes</a> in the disputed Tibet-Ladakh border region, are at their lowest point in decades. By confronting China despite the risk of a full-scale war, India has challenged Chinese power in a way no other country has done in this century. But despite leaning toward forging closer ties with the West, India remains hesitant to enter into formal military alliances with Western countries. Western powers are partly to blame. US President <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s reluctance to comment on the Sino-Indian military standoff, let alone openly support India, has sent a clear signal that India is responsible for its own defense. Given that the country’s future growth hinges on its ability to defend itself against external threats, India will likely step up its efforts to modernize its conventional armed forces and enhance its nuclear deterrence. The escalating geopolitical rivalry between China and India could also impede efforts to unite the Global South and transform the BRICS group into a credible alternative to the G20 and G7. The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) recently agreed to expand the group by adding <a href="https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/xv-brics-summit-johannesburg-ii-declaration-24-august-2023">six new members</a>: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, Argentina, and Iran. Given the 11 members’ divergent interests, BRICS+ will likely find it even harder to reach consensus on any major issue.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231029081040_43ee34df0da045fc9466deb8642e67e778412c7494d5aa1275da28fc08e002e9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_20" data-image-id="20231029081040_43ee34df0da045fc9466deb8642e67e778412c7494d5aa1275da28fc08e002e9" data-rendition-name="original" width="599" height="402" loading="lazy" alt="India China NT 2"> </figure>  Meanwhile, China’s economic slump could prompt President Xi Jinping to double down on his expansionist agenda. Biden recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/11/us/politics/biden-china-criticism-economy.html">characterized</a> the stagnating Chinese economy as a “ticking time bomb,” warning that, “When bad folks have problems, they do bad things.” China’s controversial <a href="https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1696104724691570945">new national map</a>, which depicts vast areas of India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Bhutan (and even a bit of Russia) as Chinese territory, underscores the threat posed by China’s increasingly aggressive behavior. In addition to these external threats, India’s future will be shaped by its response to domestic economic challenges. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/world/asia/in-india-government-tracks-its-own.html">great strides</a> in modernizing the notoriously outdated Indian bureaucracy and promoting e-government to reduce red tape and attract foreign direct investment. His government has invested heavily in upgrading and expanding the country’s infrastructure, implemented regulatory reforms, and sought to boost domestic manufacturing through Modi’s <a href="https://mea.gov.in/Images/attach/Make_in_India_Initiative.pdf">“Make in India” initiative</a>. But to transform itself into a global manufacturing hub, India must invest in human capital, particularly in <a href="https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp012202">education and training</a>. Moreover, India’s size and diversity also pose enormous challenges. India may be the first developing economy that, from the beginning, has pursued modernization and prosperity through a democratic system. But as one of the world’s most culturally diverse countries, its seemingly never-ending election cycle has often fueled division and polarization. But, despite its <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/divided-families-and-tense-silences-us-style-polarization-arrives-in-india/2019/05/18/734bfdc6-5bb3-11e9-98d4-844088d135f2_story.html">US-style polarized politics</a>, India’s democratic framework has served as a pillar of stability. By fostering open expression and dialogue, the Indian political system has empowered grassroots communities and individuals, enabling members of historically marginalized classes and castes to rise to the highest levels of policymaking. Whether India can maintain its current upward trajectory will depend on its ability to maintain political stability, rapid economic growth, domestic and external security, and a forward-looking foreign policy. Success would enhance India’s <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/india-us-china-balance-of-power-without-formal-alliance-by-joseph-s-nye-2023-06">global standing</a> and help advance <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/can-india-emerge-as-a-rival-to-china-manufacturing-population-it-investment-trade-youth-regulatory-reform-11673895652?mod=opinion_featst_pos2">US interests</a> in the Indo-Pacific, the world’s new geopolitical fulcrum and home to its fastest-growing economies.&nbsp; © Project Syndicate Brahma Chellaney is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Policy Research, New Delhi and Fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin. His book <a href="https://press.georgetown.edu/Book/Water">Water: Asia’s New Battleground</a> (Georgetown University Press, 2011) for which he won the 2012 <a href="https://asiasociety.org/media/press-releases/brahma-chellaney%E2%80%99s-water-asia%E2%80%99s-new-battleground-wins-2012-asia-society-bernard">Asia Society Bernard Schwartz Book Award</a>.

India’s quiet rise

Following the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/nepals-maoist-leader-visits-china">visit of Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal to China</a> earlier this month, there was talk that export of buffalo meat to China was on the agenda. If so, not enough homework was done before Nepal raised the possibility.&nbsp;
Some traders in Kathmandu claim there is a growing demand for buffalo meat in China, and there have been reports of slaughterhouses in the eastern Tarai where buffalo meat is processed specifically for the purpose of smuggling it to China through various routes.
Chinese media do report the seizure of undocumented buffalo meat inbound to China from Vietnam, there is no evidence that the contraband is originally from Nepal.
Finding out if there is indeed a growing demand for water buffalo meat in China is not easy. The annual Chinese customs import data categorise buffalo meat (not visceral organs like liver, intestine, tongue, etc.) together with other cattle raised for meat under the category 'meat of bovine animal'.
Furthermore, an average Chinese person does not distinguish between buff and beef as separate products. For the average Chinese, beef/牛肉 (shuǐ niú ròu) is interchangeable with buffalo meat. Shuǐ/水 means water in Mandarin.
With the growth of China's economy and rising living standards, the demand for bovine meat is indeed shooting up. Due to the limited arable land and the local bovine population, ever larger quantities of beef/buff need to be imported every year.
China was already importing $2.52 billion worth of beef in 2016, and this grew to $17.76 billion in 2022. The top five source countries were Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, New Zealand and Australia.&nbsp;
The export of beef from Nepal is prohibited, but water buffalo meat export to China could be economically viable. But a great deal more homework needs to be done on the legal or technical infrastructure aspects.
The General Administration of Customs of China (GACC) has strict rules for imports of 18 food items, including meat products. These not only relate to how the meats are produced or manufactured, but also ensure that the food safety management system of the exporter country is equivalent to Chinese standards.
Which means that even a state-of-the-art Nepali slaughterhouse following safety and hygiene practices in frozen meat production has little to no chance of exporting to China unless the GACC has certified it.&nbsp;
Furthermore, there are exhaustive GACC standards in the evaluation and confirmation process, which include confirming legal provisions, animal and plant diseases, competence of food safety supervisory, overall safety and hygiene control in food production, processing, transportation and storage, competence in export food safety, food protection, traceability and recall system, emergency response preparedness, technical support capabilities, so on and so forth.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/are-you-sick-of-chicken">Are you sick of chicken?</a>, Sonia Awale
While there are provisions in Nepal for food safety and animal and plant epidemics, there is a wide implementation gap for safety and hygiene control in food production, transportation and supplies. For example, the Slaughterhouse and Meat Examination Act 1999 makes the licensing of slaughterhouses and examination of the meat mandatory, but looking at meat shops even in Kathmandu, it is clear how lax enforcement is.
The most recent epidemic of the lumpy-skin disease in cattle and the shortage of vaccines is indicative of Nepal's lack of preparedness in responding to the animal and plant epidemics, and the country needs to do a lot more to qualify as an exporter country for food products including bovine meats.
However, assuming that Nepal is planning to export water buffalo meat to China, it must quickly request an evaluation by the GACC -- even if such an exercise will likely result in the Nepalese food security management system not meeting the standards.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/nepal-sets-ambitious-target-for-food-sufficiency">Nepal sets ambitious target for food self-sufficiency</a>, Ramesh Kumar
Doing so would have practical benefits in having recommendations from the GACC as rectification instructions would also indicate the gaps, addressing which could strengthen technical cooperation between Nepal and China, at least in animal husbandry, and have benefits for Nepal’s own domestic meat industry.
Once Nepal moves toward standards-based food production, transportation, storage and security, it could then apply to be registered as an exporter in the GACC registration system.
Should Nepal pass the GACC evaluation and confirmation assessment, it can expect Chinese investors to be willing to set up meat and other food production and processing facilities here. According to a 2021 FAO estimate, Nepal has 2.32 million hectares of land underutilised which could potentially be developed as pasture.
Increased investment in food production and processing industries in turn can have trickle-down benefits to farming populations, especially in the hinterland where youth are migrating away from the land due to the lack of opportunities.
What is needed is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/polluted-politics">political will</a>, integrity and a determination to follow through. Things will eventually fall in place once we realise the gap and work to fill them. Or we can continue on being the country with the most bilateral MOUs with no practical significance except junkets for bureaucrats and politicians.
Nirab Gyawali is a Nepali lawyer working to be the first Mandarin-speaking transaction lawyer in Kathmandu.

Not easy for Nepal to sell buffalo meat to China

Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s visit to China comes as the season here in Beijing begins to shift from the summer to autumn.&nbsp;
As the Prime Minister alights from his aircraft at the Beijing Capital International Airport being greeted by still balmy conditions, he may very well wonder why his flight could not have touched down at the other (newer) colossal international airport in Beijing, Daxing International, designed by the award winning British architectural firm Zaha Hadid Architects.
That facility is not just a piece of art but is the world’s largest single-building airport occupying more than 7.5 million sq feet of ground space. Although by land-area, Daxing International is still significantly smaller than King Fahd International or even Denver International or Washington Dulles, the way in which the airport evokes, in combination, a sense of power, networks and a futuristic vision is inescapable.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/fixing-the-broken-parts-in-nepal-china-ties">Fixing the broken parts in Nepal-China ties</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit
This is not surprising at all because the People’s Republic of China is probably at this juncture of history the example par excellence of a Eurasian power vigorously straddling the super continent in almost every sense of the word: political, economic, cultural and certainly in respect to hard infrastructure systems.&nbsp;
It is also no surprise that it is exactly due to this position China currently occupies as a preeminent Eurasian power that it is bumping up with such great and increasing friction against not just the United States but <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/political-geography-of-india-nepal-china-ties">other leading powers in the system such as India</a> and so on.&nbsp;
The state of progressively intense upheavals that is consequently being generated within the international system is something that smaller powers such as Nepal will find almost impossible to circumvent let alone easily maneuver around.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-now-has-to-balance-not-just-india-and-china-but-also-the-west">Nepal now has to balance not just India nad China, but also the West</a>, Bhairaja Panday
It is within this broad lay of the land that Dahal's September sojourn to China must be viewed and analysed. Sino-Nepal relations do not exist in a vacuum, they are part of larger (and ever shifting) structural, geopolitical forces at play that can potentially pull Nepal against gravitational force into spaces not easily comprehensible, much less simple to navigate.&nbsp;
This comes back to the question as to what is the natural direction of Nepal’s foreign policy, where does the gravity of Nepal’s foreign policy lie, because it is against this question too that better inferences and assessments of the prime minister’s China visit can be brought to bear.&nbsp;
At any given point in history, the state of Sino-Nepal relations will be dictated as well by the overall <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/40-years-after-the-sino-us-thaw">nature and tenor of Sino-US</a>, Sino-Indian as well as Sino-Russian relations and different combinations of those bilateral relationships.&nbsp;
Nepal’s relationship with India and then the United States exerts a profound impact on its foreign policy towards China, and this is exponentially the case in contemporary times as larger and larger diaspora communities in those countries become more entrenched and organised, giving rise to push and pull factors that reverberate back into the corridors of power in Kathmandu.&nbsp;
It must not be forgotten as well that the Maoist party Prime Minister Dahal's visit to China takes place at a time in Nepal's history when its governmental and administrative apparatus is perhaps the most fragile and fungible they have ever been, and therefore prone to being malleable in general or definitely within certain distinct pockets.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/geopolitical-tectonics">Geopolitical tectonics</a>, Editorial
There are certain strong domestic lobbies in favour of China within Nepal’s political ecosystem, but it is hard to establish the extent to which these have the ability to triumph in forging real diplomatic success in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/sino-nepal-ties-in-the-post-afghan-era">Sino-Nepal relations</a>.&nbsp;
Surely in terms of big-ticket items in the bilateral relationship such as expansion of BRI and an elevated position for China in harvesting the green energy market in Nepal, it appears that Nepal’s position is currently circumscribed to a large extent by structural factors and that Kathmandu would need to approach cooperation with China with greater creativity encompassing an international approach.&nbsp;
For example, harnessing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">Nepal’s substantial hydropower potential</a> is a key objective of policy makers in the country but due to the divergent and fragmented geopolitical environment Nepal faces externally, it becomes challenging for any one of the great powers alone to plan and actually execute large scale infrastructure projects without inciting adverse pushback.&nbsp;
So would it be feasible for Kathmandu to think along the lines of gradually proposing and nurturing international consortia (by including within a single basket China, India and the United States, for instance) to address the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/balance-of-power">development of hydropower in Nepal</a> or other large scale infrastructure initiatives?&nbsp;
It is unlikely that such an approach can be made to happen, but it is certainly worth the effort by the prime minister to explore during his high-level engagements with leaders in China. Sticking to a strictly bilateral approach on this visit to China will be a safe bet for the Prime Minister Dahal and will not ruffle any feathers.
But if one can think out of the box as a means to inject more momentum from Nepal towards much needed regional economic growth, then why not at least try?
Bhaskar Koirala is an independent analyst with Peking University. Views here are the author's own.

Nepal's Maoist leader visits China

In 1960, during his second official visit to Nepal, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai sat on a boat on Pokhara’s Phewa Lake with Prime Minister B P Koirala for one and a half hours and was spellbound by the reflection of Mt Machapuchre on the water.&nbsp; King Mahendra’s chief adviser Gunja Man Singh and Chinese ambassador Yuan Zhongxian had signed the agreement to establish diplomatic relations between Nepal and China on 1 August 1955, only a year after Zhou became Premier.&nbsp; In the nearly 70 years since, China has financed and supported infrastructure projects across Nepal — but especially those with links to Pokhara, like the Prithvi Highway that first linked Kathmandu to Pokhara by road. Anand Raj Mulmi, former president of the Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI), notes that China initially wanted Pokhara to be its focal point in Nepal.&nbsp; “The Prithvi Highway was built to project China’s soft power, and advance its geopolitical interest to link Nepal to China through Korola in Mustang,” Multi explains.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023091313094_0e0bd60f12dc8ce1ea07bb38116ae1d8da359d06808774e980ae840766d435f6.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2023091313094_0e0bd60f12dc8ce1ea07bb38116ae1d8da359d06808774e980ae840766d435f6" data-rendition-name="original" width="4608" height="3072" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara China connection"> </figure>  Indeed, China worked on road, irrigation, highway and hydropower projects in Pokhara. After the Prithvi Highway, it financed the construction of the Pokhara-Baglung road in 1988. The strategy was connectivity, long before the Belt and Road Initiative was even thought of. By 1980, China was also helping Pokhara’s irrigation sector, providing financial and technical assistance for a hydropower and irrigation project on the Seti River. All this&nbsp; Chinese activity made India suspicious, and Mulmi says things did not turn out like Beijing wanted.&nbsp; Even so, China’s love affair with Pokhara did not wane. The popular Chinese tv serial Deng Feng Lai (Up in the Wind) was filmed on location in Pokhara in which the two protagonists took <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19255#.XgmF09Iza70" target="_blank">a paragliding flight</a>. Since then, many young Chinese have started booking holidays in Pokhara.&nbsp; This dovetailed well with Rs 22 billion Chinese ExIm Bank loan for Pokhara International Airport which was inaugurated on 1 January 2023. The international flight to land there was a Sichuan Airlines Airbus 319 from Chengdu last month.&nbsp; The chartered flight on 23 June brought 130 Chinese passengers to Pokhara for the first Nepal-China Dragon Boat Race Festival organised by the Nepal Tourism Board, Pokhara Metropolitan City.&nbsp; “Events like the Dragon Boat Race Festival will bolster Pokhara’s economy, and enhance the socio-cultural relations between our two countries and its people,” said Chinese Ambassador Chen Song during the opening ceremony of the event.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023091313094_3e8d98945946e3368b5b5a360f9dad23253f680eee3d5e63049a47dd1d8a2861.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2023091313094_3e8d98945946e3368b5b5a360f9dad23253f680eee3d5e63049a47dd1d8a2861" data-rendition-name="original" width="1800" height="896" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara China connection"> <figcaption>A Chinese team participating in Nepal-China Dragon Boat race earlier this year.</figcaption> </figure>  Although the pandemic killed tourism prospects in Pokhara, Chinese tourists are flocking back. Lakeside restaurants in Pokhara once more have Mandarin menus and the city is still hoping that Chinese airlines will start direct flights to the new airport. Pom Narayan Shrestha, chairman of the Pokhara Tourism Council, says that Pokhara’s local as well as Gandaki Province government should push promotional activities.&nbsp; Pokhara first established sister-city relations with the city of Linzhi in the Tibet Autonomous Region in 2008. Since then, similar sister-city links have been established between Nepali cities and Kunming, Guangzhou, Yibin, Chiuchow, Haikou, Nanning and Yanji to promote bilateral cooperation in various sectors, including business.&nbsp; However, entrepreneurs in the region say that there have been no benefits to their business from such agreements.&nbsp; Experts also note that Pokhara has not been able to take advantage of the agreements, and the bilateral relationship has been limited to mayors and deputy mayors of Pokhara and the Chinese cities attending events in each other’s countries.&nbsp; “Pokhara’s sister-city agreements with various Chinese cities will only be relevant if Pokhara is promoted as a tourist destination there, and entrepreneurs from Pokhara can participate in and benefit from trade fairs in those cities,” says Mulmi. “Similarly, people from China also need to be invited to events in Pokhara, that is how all of the cities involved will benefit economically. Events like the Dragon Boat festival, and other Chinese cultural affairs represent a new beginning.”&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20230913130920_a2059268ee3f3ff7fbb916cb47806e0710fbfb02e25595771c49a5f1ac26640b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20230913130920_a2059268ee3f3ff7fbb916cb47806e0710fbfb02e25595771c49a5f1ac26640b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1080" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara China connection"> <figcaption>Pokhara Mayor Dhanraj Acharya with Chinese Ambassador to Nepal Chan Song.</figcaption> </figure>  Kiran Prasad Koirala of Pokhara Metropolitan City, admits that the town has not been very aggressive in promoting &nbsp;sister-city relationships, but adds that Chinese cities have supported Pokhara, having provided financial, ambulance, and other aid during the pandemic. &nbsp; Bishwa Shankar Palikhe, president of the Nepal-China Friendship Association, has been actively involved in expanding exchanges between Pokhara and its sister cities in Kunming, Guangzhou and Linzhi. However, he admits a lot more needs to be done.&nbsp; Palikhe adds: “We must study the development and experiences of our sister cities and incorporate them into Pokhara’s development plans. Additionally, the entire world at present is trying to draw tourists from China, we must take advantage of our proximity.”&nbsp;

Pokhara’s China connection

At the annual Nepal Power Summit in Kathmandu on 18-19 April, officials called on India to allow Nepal to export power at real-time prices, not just in the day-ahead market. Also discussed was a need for more flexible guidelines on market access for Nepal’s electricity to India which currently buys power on a project-to-project basis, pointedly boycotting those built by Chinese investment or contractors. India’s interest in regulating Nepal’s rivers is not new, but with the Himalaya becoming a geopolitical and climate hotspot, its strategic interest in regulating river flow has grown.&nbsp; Climate models show that the hydrology of Himalayan rivers will change dramatically in the coming decades, with peak water in the 2030s, and low flow levels in the dry season thereafter. With 70% of the annual discharge on the Ganga flowing down from rivers in Nepal, 75% of it in the four monsoon months, storage projects in the mountains will be ever more important. Because of this, New Delhi would like pliant politicians in place in Kathmandu that will not obstruct its plans to ensure future water supply, and given current geopolitical tensions, this also means keeping the Chinese out.&nbsp; Ever since Sher Bahadur Deuba became prime minister for the fifth time in 2021, he has fast-tracked a slew of projects in which Indian companies are involved, including the West Seti reservoir project that has languished for 20 years mainly because of Indian objections to Australian and Chinese investment. Most recently, Indian National Hydroelectricity Power Corporation (NHPC) Limited is in talks to be awarded the 480MW Phukot Karnali Hydroelectric Project in Kalikot jointly with Nepal’s state-owned Vidyut Utpadan Company Limited with a share ratio of 51% to 49%. The project will likely be launched during Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s state visit to India in May. India’s NHPC has already been granted licenses for West Seti and Seti River-6 projects, and is also eyeing another 1,902MW megaproject on the Karnali.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603050_10fc6c82b0d995c39b388d8d8628365ea5e2299a1f4d474e2c2d5b7f01d37d83.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2023050603050_10fc6c82b0d995c39b388d8d8628365ea5e2299a1f4d474e2c2d5b7f01d37d83" data-rendition-name="original" width="3776" height="2424" loading="lazy" alt="West Seti"> <figcaption>Sushil Bhatta of Investment Board Nepal and Abhay Kumar Singh of India's NHPC, after signing an agreement to develop the 760MW West Seti and 460MW Seti River 6 projects in 2022.</figcaption> </figure>  In fact, across Nepal, Indian companies are building hydropower projects which will add a combined total of 4,000MW to the grid, three of which were rushed through only in the past year. Three more Indian projects are in the pipeline.&nbsp; Why the sudden renewed Indian interest in Nepal’s rivers? And what is the hurry? The answer lies in the need to plan for the decades ahead when water is going to be an even scarcer commodity in the Indo-Gangetic plains than it is now because of climate change, increased industrial, agricultural and household consumption. Energy analysts say that although India’s interest seems to be in renewable energy from hydropower to fulfil its decarbonisation commitments, exports of power from Nepal is only projected at $800 million in the next three years, which will only be a tiny percentage of the 1,600 billion kWh that India generated in the last fiscal year.&nbsp; And although power demand is expected to rise with rising incomes, industrialisation and increasingly intense summer heat waves in the plains, India’s long-term interest is in reservoir projects to store monsoon water in Nepal’s rivers to reduce monsoon flood risk and keep rivers flowing in the dry season. And New Delhi has not tried to hide its distaste for any Chinese involvement in these projects.&nbsp; Hydropower Investment and Development Company Nepal (HIDCL) in which the government is a majority shareholder informed the Investment Board Nepal in February that it was withdrawing from the export-oriented 762MW Tamor Hydropower project.&nbsp; CEO Arjun Kumar Gautam is upfront about why: “We cannot sell electricity generated with Chinese involvement in the Indian market.” Tamor was one of the two projects agreed upon during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Nepal in October 2019. Soon after, Investment Board Nepal (IBN) signed up China Construction to build the project after completing a feasibility study. The HIDCL now wants to null the agreement with the Chinese contractor and bring in a new contractor more amenable to the Indians. Meanwhile, India’s state-owned <a href="https://sjvn.nic.in/">Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam</a>, which is involved in a cascade of projects on the adjoining Arun River to generate a total of 2,000MW, is said to be aggressively lobbying top Nepali officials to also build Tamor. Besides the 900MW Arun 3, Satluj was awarded the Lower Arun by the K P Oli-led government in 2021 without competitive bidding. Then in May 2022, the Sher Bahadur Deuba-led government suddenly awarded Arun 4 to Satluj (with a 51% share) during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Lumbini.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20230506020556_4f38ffb96de37f17c662684914f0b65ab41adaaf98183a073273e88621de480b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20230506020556_4f38ffb96de37f17c662684914f0b65ab41adaaf98183a073273e88621de480b" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="666" loading="lazy" alt="Arun 4 agreement"> <figcaption>Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba look on as Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam's Nanda Lal Sharma and the NEA's Kulman Ghising exchange MoUs in May 2022 in Lumbini to build the 409MW Arun 4. Photo: RATNA SHRESTHA/RSS</figcaption> </figure>  But even though Satluj is said to be also interested in the 1,061MW Upper Arun, Kulman Ghising of the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) says it is building the project. "Upper Arun is our first priority, we are planning to start the construction of the access road," Ghising told us. Arun and Tamor are both in eastern Nepal (see map), but India is also interested in rivers in western Nepal because of the proximity of its main load centres as well as to augment the dry season flow of Nepal’s rivers that flow into the Ganga.&nbsp; There was some hue and cry last year after the Deuba-led government abruptly handed over the 750MW West Seti Dam and Seti River-6 projects to two Indian state-owned companies without competition or transparency. Experts pointed out that Nepal’s Public-Private Partnership and Investment Act 2075 states that there should be competitive bidding.&nbsp; The Seti saga is three decades long. After successive partnerships with Australian, Chinese and private Indian companies fell through, India’s state-owned NHPC finally took the lead. Since the terms of the deal are opaque, many experts question how beneficial the $1.6 billion project that involves building a high dam in the Doti district will be for Nepal.&nbsp; Indian state-owned companies appear to move faster than private Indian companies interested in river projects in Nepal. The GMR Group (Gandhi Mallikarjun Rao) obtained a permit to build the 900 MW Upper Karnali and a Project Development Agreement (PDA) was signed with the IBN in 2014 with plans to start construction in two years after securing funding. The government's latest decision to extend the deadline for the GMR by two years is being challenged in Nepal’s Supreme Court.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603054_0b5cc52ed5ece09ac54bf7fd42d663e156bd8a721203fecad4470d449722bfd9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2023050603054_0b5cc52ed5ece09ac54bf7fd42d663e156bd8a721203fecad4470d449722bfd9" data-rendition-name="original" width="1083" height="834" loading="lazy" alt="Indian investment in hydropower in Nepal"> </figure>  Geopolitical games The export-oriented 456MW Upper Tamakosi project finally started production in June 2021 after much delay. But because a part of the Upper Tamkosi was built by the Sino Hydro of China, India refused to buy power from the project during the monsoon surplus last year – even though it was built with NEA investment.&nbsp; One international lender told Nepali Times: “Obtaining an Indian nod before building any big hydropower project in Nepal has now become a must.” Indian pressure manifests itself in its refusal to buy only 364MW of electricity which was recently increased to 452MW. This is the sum total of generation capacity with no direct Chinese involvement. Nepal also cannot sell its power to China as there are no trans-Himalayan transmission lines, and exporting to Bangladesh would need an Indian approval system without giving a free and open market to Nepali electricity, while also rejecting any Chinese involvement. India’s international electricity trade procedure issued in February 2021 prohibits the import of electricity from projects invested in third countries that do not have a bilateral agreement for cooperation in the energy sector. The fact that India does not have an energy cooperation agreement with China has therefore become an excuse, not just to blacklist projects in Nepal with Chinese investment, but even Chinese contractors. India has even stopped the supply of explosives for projects like the Tanahu and Upper Trisuli-1 Schemes being built by Chinese contractors.&nbsp; "Even though there is nothing in writing, India does not want any involvement of the Chinese in any capacity in Nepal's hydropower projects, they even have details of which country is the contractor and where are the machines being used from," explains Ganesh Karki of the Independent Power Producers Association Nepal (IPPAN). India first allowed imports of electricity only from the 24 MW Trisuli and 15 MW Devighat projects, both built by the Indian in the 1960s. But after Deuba signed an agreement on energy cooperation between the two countries in 2022, NEA was allowed to 364MW.&nbsp; Even so, Nepal must renew this export provision every year, which is a bureaucratic hassle. What this essentially means is that if Indian companies do not get licenses for new plants in Nepal, they may not renew the power-selling contract either. Nepali officials have been trying to convince the Indian side that it is in their own best interest if Nepal has a surplus in the coming years. Based on projections of generation capacity, NEA has sent a proposal to New Delhi to export an additional 600MW.&nbsp; The installed capacity of hydropower projects in Nepal has reached 2,400MW and is expected to cross 3,000MW after the completion of more projects this monsoon. Projects with a combined capacity of 3,200MW are under construction and will be completed in the next three years. On the demand side, the average domestic consumption at present is about 1,600MW and is expected to increase only to 2,000MW next year.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2023050603054_1ba6d252b58558d3d1263b0f76e3abbfc1c9dd3c019f8d9d47bd8aa415651e3f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="2023050603054_1ba6d252b58558d3d1263b0f76e3abbfc1c9dd3c019f8d9d47bd8aa415651e3f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1171" height="834" loading="lazy" alt="Hydropower generation in Nepal"> </figure>  &nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><div class="flourish-embed flourish-chart" data-src="visualisation/13536204"><script src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js"></script></div></div> &nbsp; <div class="embed-block"><div class="flourish-embed flourish-chart" data-src="visualisation/13535503"><script src="https://public.flourish.studio/resources/embed.js"></script></div></div> There are critics who say Nepal should not be exporting power to India at all since it will not make a big dent in the trade deficit, and the $85.8 million it earned last year is negligible compared to the $8.33 billion Nepal earned in remittances.&nbsp; They say the priority should be on increasing electricity consumption in cooking, transportation and industry. At present, 70% of Nepal’s energy is from biomass and only 5% is from electricity.&nbsp; Since most of the electricity in Nepal is from run-of-river schemes in which generation depends on the flow of water in rivers, Nepal will have to continue to import power from India during the peak winter months for the next three years. In the monsoon, though, generation is double of demand, but the Indian quota, inadequate transmission and low domestic demand mean much of this clean electricity is wasted.&nbsp; Dinesh Kumar Ghimire at the Energy Ministry says Nepal is looking to sign a 25-year export agreement with India. "We are preparing a draft for the agreement. If both sides are on board with it, there may be an agreement during the Prime Minister's visit to India.” Edging out China While India is awarded one hydropower project after another in Nepal, China is being edged out. Both Phukot Karnali and Tamor hydropower projects were supposed to be implemented under Beijing’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) scheme.&nbsp; Last month, Sichuan Wangping Energy Science and Technology gave up its license to build the 235MW Humla Karnali-1 and 335MW Humla Karnali-2 in partnership with a Nepali company. The survey permit for these projects has now been granted to Ruru Hydropower, a Nepali company. The 1,200MW Budi Gandaki reservoir project has been caught in a geopolitical tangle between India and Nepal for the past six years. In May 2017, the Pushpa Kamal Dahal government handed over the project to China’s Gezhouba Group without competition. A few months later in October, the Deuba-led government reversed the decision and said Nepal would build it. Fast forward a year later and the Oli-led government gave Budi Gandaki back to Gezhouba, only for the Deuba-led coalition government in March 2022 to reverse the decision again. Exasperated, the then-Chinese ambassador Hou Yanqi said abandoned diplomatic niceties and said publicly that it was wrong for Nepal to change its decision every time a government changed. Says Ganesh Karki of IPPAN: “We have to conclude that because of India’s stance, it is difficult to get Chinese investment in Nepal’s hydropower. The top political leadership should lobby with India to remove this obstacle.” The hydro of hydropower&nbsp; Nepal’s former energy secretary Dwarika Nath Dhungel is convinced India considers water a strategic commodity, and its emphasis on electricity export hides its real intention to secure water supply in the coming decades.&nbsp; “We in Nepal, on the other hand, have no idea about this, and there is no clarity about our own water and energy policy. In fact, our policymakers are not working in the national interest at all,” he adds. Studies have shown that water scarcity in the Indo-Gangetic plains will increase as Himalayan glaciers dry up, and the groundwater level falls due to over-extraction. And in the monsoon, there is too much water, so the world’s most densely populated region is hit by destructive floods. &nbsp; Building storage dams in Nepal is a win-win-win for India, reducing flood risk, augmenting dry season flow of Nepali rivers that flow across the border, and generating electricity. Nepal will get some export income, but will not benefit much from irrigation since it only has a narrow strip of land in the Tarai, and large tracts of its fertile mountain valleys will be inundated by future reservoirs. “Nepal’s export of a few thousand megawatts will not mean much for India's huge power system with a capacity of around 400,000MW,” adds Dhungel. “What India is fixated on is our water. And that is why it does not want any third parties involved, especially not China.” Former secretary at the Ministry of Energy Anup Kumar Upadhyay on the other hand is all for more Indian investment in Nepal’s hydropower, and does not think there is any ulterior motive. He argues that the model in which Nepal is allowing Indian companies to build projects is beneficial to Nepal in the long term. At present, Indian companies that have received permission to build hydropower plants have agreed to provide about 22% of electricity to the Nepal government for free. And after 25 years, these projects will be fully owned by Nepal. Says Upadhyay: "Whatever projects we are giving to India now, India does not even have the benefit of regular water flow from them, so there is no reason to be suspicious that India has a grand design to control our rivers." Indeed, there are many in Nepal, even those critical of Indian behaviour, who say Nepal cannot choose its neighbours and it might as well keep India happy by ensuring that the river agreements are fair to Nepal as well.

Geopolitics of Nepal’s rivers

<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221114111124/637217bd9c7e80680e0baa03jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1802" height="1160"/><figcaption>On 25 June 2021, China inaugurated a 435km section of the Lhasa-Nyingchi Electrified High-speed Rail. The ‘bullet train’ will have a top speed of 160 km/h and bring Chengdu closer to the Nepal border when completed in 2025. Photo: Xinhuanet</figcaption></figure>Nearly a decade since China adopted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and five years after Nepal signed it, the connectivity project is trying to rebrand itself.The $1 trillion program focused on trade, development and connectivity is financed largely by Chinese banks and SOEs.The Green Finance and Development Center of Fudan University says a total of <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004016252100740X#bib0154">$755 billion has been spent</a> on BRI projects of which more than 65% has gone into energy and transportation.In 2013, President Xi envisioned the BRI as<a href="https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n9514/pdf/book.pdf"> an aspirational world</a> of peaceful connectivity and friendship — one that is free from conflict. Yet, over the years, its success has also drawn widespread criticism questioning its sustainability.Chinese infrastructure projects in BRI include energy, transportation and real estate require construction inputs — like steel, cement and glass that remain oversupplied in China.For example, the utilisation capacity of the total production of steel and oil refining in China had gone down by <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1758-5899.12439">10% from 80 to 70</a>% between 2008 to 2015, signaling bad loans for the banks due to overproduction and negative effects on its overall economy.BRI projects allowed the Chinese government to take steps to ensure that the vast majority of the <a href="http://www.axel-dreher.de/Dreher%20et%20al._Aid_China_Growth.pdf">construction inputs will be sourced</a> from China to offset its industrial overproduction. This allows a large volume of trade to be in China’s favour while creating a huge trade imbalance between China and recipient countries.In 2021, China’s <a href="http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=250850808">trade surplus with BRI countries</a> had reached $199.2 billion. For some countries like Italy which saw a rise of exports by 63% in 2021, others like Nepal <a href="https://kathmandupost.com/money/2022/02/05/nepal-s-trade-with-china-going-through-rough-patch">had a trade deficit of Rs232.9 billion</a>, when total exports was only Rs1 billion.One thing has remained clear: while Chinese exports will continue to grow until the BRI projects are completed, countries at the receiving end must bet on export competitive projects that can reduce the trade deficit and ensure sustainability.Secondly, the Chinese <a href="https://madeinchinajournal.com/2021/12/01/builders-from-china-from-third-world-solidarity-to-globalised-state-capitalism/">consider themselves</a> ‘builders’ rather than ‘financers’ projecting their capacity to build projects under the BRI. It is no surprise that China dominates international project contracting. By 2018, <a href="https://www.enr.com/toplists/2019-Top-250-International-Contractors-1">75</a> of the world’s top 250 international contracting firms were Chinese.Most BRI projects have been funded by large state-owned banks of China and implemented by Chinese international contractors and SOEs, at times they have been subject to reproach due to poor labour relations including a lack of awareness of local rules and regulations, and especially on the hiring of Chinese labourers in large numbers instead of locals.Maria Carrai, Professor of China Studies at NYU Shanghai argues in favour of  <a href="https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/65743046/WD_1_s2.0_S0305750X20305167_main-with-cover-page-v2.pdf?Expires=1651327708&amp;Signature=OG1O4XNvHSblwIsYUfrb5blQwbiy0b~SuXiq9aKfw-STjlYGahGVTKHwgN7DXOm3WDAerWqfKY0iHspunM2n9IAGOfzYkuZCryKq8eq0PPgvLwdQG6Ufl3HoizzJTEQAHgj3x627V3359aWAyCxLSa-H6SYYTD2VxbkPQpV2vpOrNQ2YzX886Y0NK0t-s9WCt6Lf7ZlMy2evz54aewwDQJvS3Ki-P2ybBibKxQ5mNtJBd1xZYEe19UvN15ZLL3rmNXTCus2QW6mO6BflTSeGGcPbMsOiD-e-977Qh7KUg46GKxIvGJ8houVVqpvyq7-OoDY3nVJVjAgi3NPhOU0yVQ__&amp;Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA">local adaptive governance</a> because the success of BRI projects relies on effective communication of its social responsibilities to recipient countries with their local governments and making sure that working with the contractors or SOEs can enhance good governance.The Addis - Djibouti SGR railway operation and maintenance <a href="https://qz.com/africa/1634659/ethiopia-kenya-struggle-with-chinese-debt-over-sgr-railways/">were awarded to construction contractors with no actual railway operation experience</a> resulting in a lack of adequate technical capabilities to complete the project.Yet, the major challenge is still that Chinese BRI projects are heavily invested in countries that have historically demonstrated poor and weak governance, lack of transparency and are vulnerable to political shocks and instabilities.Since the start of the BRI in 2013, more than 80% of total Chinese foreign assistance <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/blog/three-key-shifts-development-cooperation-chinas-2021-white-paper">has gone to low-income countries</a>, and for some like Angola, and Montenegro the BRI loans continue to risk having an <a href="https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf">unfavorable degree of dependency</a> on China as its prime creditor.Despite this, BRI in itself has gradually undergone reform over the years. From its lofty and vague ambition in early 2016 that did not indicate its focus, we now know its priority areas.President Xi during the 2nd Belt and Road Forum in 2019 <a href="https://www.business-humanrights.org/de/blog/chinas-white-paper-and-the-bri-can-we-expect-china-to-deliver-on-the-sdgs/">called for cleaner, greener, high-quality infrastructure projects</a> that are “sustainable, affordable, inclusive and accessible”.Chinese-backed projects have previously been under heavy scrutiny due to a lack of transparency and growing debt burden. A 2021 white paper on Belt and Road highlights the need for high-quality sustainable projects and the 2022 MOFCOM’s ‘Guidelines for ecological environment protection of foreign investment cooperation’ stresses the need for Chinese investments to meet international standards of environmentally sustainable projects.In 2021 China declared to <a href="https://greenfdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/21_07_22_BRI-Investment-Report-H1-2021.pdf">not to invest in coal-power plants</a> and also to cut funding for loss-making projects. Regulatory scrutiny has forced Chinese contractors under BRI to significantly up their game, which means we will see it focusing on smaller and fewer projects of higher quality, particularly in areas of the green and sustainable energy sector.It has been five years since Nepal signed the MoU but has so far seen little in terms of the impact. The BRI projects use the <a href="http://www.edcnepal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/DAY-4-LECTURE-5-NHDP_Hydropower-Financing-Traditional-Project-Finance-EPC-and-EPC-F_2018-11-29_FINAL.pdf">Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Financing (EPC-F)</a> used in infrastructure projects and are particularly preferred in developing countries where debt markets are less mature and there may be wide variations in the availability and cost of debt financing.The EPC contractor will be responsible to finance a large portion of the project and the government has to provide a sovereign guarantee to safeguard lenders’ interests and provide payment security guarantees on behalf of off-taker, usually government-owned entities.This has generated controversy for the huge risk involved to the host country. The selection process tends to be restrictive to a particular country or set of manufacturers, in this case only to Chinese contractors.For example, only a few weeks back the government of Nepal <a href="https://myrepublica.nagariknetwork.com/news/china-miffed-with-deuba-govt-s-decision-to-deny-chinese-company-to-develop-budhi-gandaki-hydro-project/">revoked the license</a> issued to the Chinese state-owned China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) for the development of the Budi Gandaki Hydropower Project under the EPCF modality with a total cost of around <a href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepal-refuses-china-s-offer-to-fund-multi-billion-dollar-power-project/story-cfRJPHSKJkn2gqyon7anUL.html">$2.73 billion.</a>After the 2017 BRI agreement, for the first time, Nepal developed a project under the EPC financing modality of $88 million financed by China and with MoU between Nepal’s People’s Energy and China’s Chongqing Water Turbine Works Co. Ltd.The agreement was to develop a 48.8 MW Khimti-2 hydropower project on the border of the Ramechhap and Dolakha districts in Province 3. However, the project suffered a major setback: 500 Chinese workers were prevented from coming back to Nepal due to the Covid-19 outbreak. Similarly, the EPCF model requires the contractors to be present in the project while the main construction takes place.The high-interest rates associated with BRI loans with a relatively short payback period is another drawback for Nepal which prefers grants. Furthermore, in BRI projects there is a right to bid reserved exclusively for Chinese firms, but the Nepali side demands to be open to all.Back then the BRI used to run projects on an ad-hoc basis but by 2022 it has undertaken various reforms to properly guide sustainable infrastructure development.Because the BRI is enshrined into the CCP’s constitution, there is no question regarding its sustainability, but as BRI puts its focus on environmentally friendly infrastructures, countries like Nepal should prioritise projects that can yield better results and help strengthen Sino-Nepal relations.Abiral Khatri is with the NIFRA bank and is a research scholar based previously at Erasmus University Rotterdam, IIM Bangalore and Renmin University of China. Raunab Singh Khatri is the co-founder of The Araniko Project and is a Yenching Scholar in Chinese studies at Peking University.

BRI enters the tenth year

<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221114111148/63721d6b9c7e80680e0bd4e9jpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1400" height="1011"/><figcaption>Illustration: DIWAKAR CHETTRI</figcaption></figure>The war in Ukraine, which began with Russian aggression, has now turned into a battle between two powerful global forces: liberal democracy and authoritarianism. A new world order is emerging.Unlike the 20th century’s ideological clash between communism and capitalism, recent global events show complexity, volatility, unpredictability and elusive multipolarism.In this new world order, too, strategically located countries like Nepal will face intense pressure from the two mighty political forces: liberal democracy countries led by the US and allies, and alternative forces or authoritarianism led by China, Russia and the co.In such hyper-polarisation, a win-win situation can be hard to come by, particularly for less powerful countries like Nepal. Nevertheless, the new 21st century world order also offers an opportunity for countries with important geostrategic positioning to advance their interests and gain leverage among the giants.Financial integration, technological connectivity and human mobility today have turned the world into a global village, albeit with constant threats and instability.Over the last 30 years, China has become a global factory, it enjoys economic growth at home while fulfilling material demands globally. The rise and fall of demand for goods inevitably influences its stability.Around the world, many countries also face instability from dependence on global markets. The Covid-induced supply chain disruptions, particularly due to Beijing’s ‘zero-covid’ policy, have created high inflation around the world. In January 2021, the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/what-happened-supply-chains-2021">shipping cost</a> for a 40-foot container was $1,400. By September 2021, it jumped to over $20,000.Our chronic dependency on fossil fuels is the same story: from households in the foothills of the Himalaya to the suburbs of Houston, the fluctuation of oil and gas prices hits us hard, sparking protests and instability.But there is an additional factor in play: hypernationalism. Donald Trump is no longer in the White House but the supposedly liberal statesman and champion of democracy President Joe Biden continues to advance Trumpian hypernationalism.During January’s State of the Union address, Biden <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/03/01/remarks-of-president-joe-biden-state-of-the-union-address-as-delivered/">said</a>: “When we use taxpayer dollars to rebuild America – we are going to Buy American: buy American products to support American jobs.” Such insular and self-serving American nationalism resembles President Xi Jinping’s desire for “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/what-china-wants/528561/">the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”</a> and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/are-we-turning-into-a-nation-of-hyper-nationalists/article18701484.ece">increasingly intolerant</a> India.Put simply, Russia under President Vladimir Putin and its ongoing onslaught in Ukraine to assert itself in a new global power equilibrium is the kind of hypernationalistic aggression we are likely to see more of.<figure><img src="https://superdesk-pro-c.s3.amazonaws.com/sd-nepalitimes/20221114111148/63721d6e9c7e80680e0bd4eajpeg.jpg" alt="" width="1500" height="1000"><figcaption> </figcaption></figure>Extreme climate change events will further destabilise the 21st century global world order. According to a <a href="https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6wg2/pdf/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FinalDraft_FullReport.pdf">report</a> from the International Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), competition over water and food, made scarce because of climate change, will increasingly turn violent.Nepal’s <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/latest/post-monsoon-rain-ruins-nepals-crops/">"freak" rain in October</a> 2021 shows how a climate event can trigger civil strife. The downpour not only destroyed nearly $60 million of rice and killed dozens of people but also pushed peasants further into poverty and hunger, turning them desperate to seek ways to make ends meet.One such way for them has been to farm wheat. But a shortage of wheat seeds pushed frustrated peasants to launch a protest, which prompted a violent response from the police.To disperse protesters along the East-West highway, police fired teargas and rubber bullets and the protesters retaliated by hurling rocks and sticks. Both protesters and police sustained injuries.This incident demonstrates the non-linear but complex interplay between extreme climate change events and social, political and economic dimensions, and how quickly it can escalate to violence.Migration adds further complexity. An anti-refugee sentiment has given rise to anti-democratic <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/rising-far-right-declining-centre-left-future-refugees-europe/">forces</a> across Europe and North America, upending democracy. Such forces are getting traction amidst the clash between liberal democracy and authoritarianism.Migration, whether due to climate change, war, poverty, or labour, helps harden state boundaries. This, in turn, promotes intolerance and bolsters ultranationalism and xenophobia – some of the key features of the new world order.But Nepal and strategically positioned countries can take advantage of this multipolar volatile and unpredictable world order. With shrewd diplomacy and strategic planning, the countries can use their location to not only spur economic development but also strengthen cooperation promoting stability and peace. Take Laos and Bangladesh as examples.Laos, a Southeast Asian landlocked country like Nepal, is ruled by an authoritarian government and is under strong Chinese influence. As part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, it implemented a $6 billion high-speed railway project. But Laos has only a 30% stake in this joint venture. Still, the country gets a lot of benefit from it.Inaugurated in December 2021, the project advances the country’s fundamental economic interests: it not only directly connects Laos with Thailand (and eventually with all Southeast Asia) and China but also connects its internal territory, making goods transportation more efficient.According to a World Bank <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/33891/Main-Report.pdf?sequence=5&amp;isAllowed=y">report</a>, swift goods transportation will help increase Laos’ GDP up to 21%. In other words, the project’s economic benefits outweigh the risk of a Chinese ‘debt trap’.More importantly, mindful of a ‘debt trap’, Laos maintains strong <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/on-chinas-doorstep-laos-plays-a-careful-game-of-balancing/">economic ties</a> with traditional donors like Japan, Thailand, South Korea and Vietnam, including the Asian Development Bank. To avoid over-reliance on military aid from China, Laos has established military <a href="https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/02/10/china-and-russia-position-themselves-for-laos-fast-approaching-post-ldc-era/">tie</a>s with Russia.Bangladesh also has met its own interests amidst the new order and recently surpassed <a href="https://thewire.in/south-asia/bangladesh-economy-pandemic-gdp">India's per capita income</a> despite its inherent vulnerabilities to climate change. Its <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/28/bangladesh-is-everyones-economic-darling-it-might-not-last/">economic prosperity</a> combines strong remittance, a vibrant garment industry, and prudent economic governance.Most impressively, through ‘<a href="https://thewire.in/south-asia/bangladesh-economy-pandemic-gdp">balanced’ diplomacy</a>, it advances its economic interests while maintaining the two clashing mighty powers: Western liberal and authoritarian forces.In June 2021, the World Bank <a href="https://jamestown.org/program/the-belt-and-road-initiative-still-afloat-in-south-asia/">canceled</a> a $1.2 billion investment to build the Padma Multipurpose Bridge project, citing corruption. But Dhaka secured the funding to build a bridge from China as part of the BRI. Yet, when Beijing proposed the Sonadia deep-sea port project, Dhaka rejected it, instead preferring Japan’s proposed similar project at Matarbari.Most importantly, Bangladesh actively avoids Chinese projects that pose concerns, particularly to India. Like Laos, Bangladesh shrewdly focuses on economic interests while maintaining power asymmetries stemming from a new volatile multipolar global order.Laos and Bangladesh’s experiences suggest that <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/mcc-gets-green-light-in-nepal/">Nepal ratifying the US’s $500 million MCC aid</a> is strategically a positive step. Beijing’s <a href="https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/202202/t20220218_10643446.html">objection</a> should not surprise anyone or the US’s pressure.Chinese Foreign Minister <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/banner/fixing-the-broken-parts-in-nepal-china-ties/">Wang Yi’s visit</a> despite the MCC ratification <a href="https://www.nepalitimes.com/here-now/reaction-to-wang-yis-nepal-visit-in-chinese-media/">indicates that Beijing</a> wants to build closer ties with Kathmandu. Above all, Nepal should expect intense pressure from liberal democracy and authoritarian forces and prepare itself.Be it a US-led Indo-Pacific Strategy driven fund or China’s Belt and Road Initiative or the EU’s “<a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433">Global Gateway</a>”, strategically located countries do have leverage that they can use to push their financial interests while carefully handling the competing political powers.In doing so, Nepal can achieve economic prosperity and contribute to stability and peace not just at home but also regionally and globally.Dhirendra Nalbo has Ph.D. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University and is the co-founder of <a href="https://theopen.institute/">the Open Instiute</a> in Kathmandu.

Nepal in the new world order

Nepal’s only international aviation gateway, at Kathmandu airport, will cut night-time operation hours to allow construction of taxiways, and airlines have been told to curtail flights. This is expected to lead to more than normal chaos during the height of peak autumn and spring tourist seasons at an airport that is congested even at the best of times. The airport will close from 10PM to 8AM from 8 November-31 March 2025. The taxiways will now connect to the thresholds at both ends of the runway, making the airport more efficient in handling higher frequencies of landings and takeoffs. The parallel taxiway extension will allow international flights to land every 4 minutes instead of the current every 7 minutes. At present planes have to wait to land until a plane taking off backtracks along the runway.&nbsp; Kathmandu is Nepal’s only airport with international operations, and it has only one runway that is only one way in from the south over the mountains. With the taxiway improvement, the airport will be able to handle 42 aircraft landings and takeoffs per hour — double the current capacity.&nbsp; The Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) has been trying to entice international airlines to also start flying to and from the other two international airports at Pokhara and Bhairawa (Lumbini) by slashing landing and handling charges. But so far only Nepal Airlines operates a weekly flight to Bhairawa from Kuala Lumpur.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241018161016_046569e53d1d66cd445cc66c697c0ef724810aec9f54bdf827481e3cd6b80c32.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20241018161016_046569e53d1d66cd445cc66c697c0ef724810aec9f54bdf827481e3cd6b80c32" data-rendition-name="original" width="2356" height="1134" loading="lazy" alt="Kathmandu airport expansion"> <figcaption>Kathmandu Airport Expansion plan with extension of taxiways to the thresholds of runways 02 and 20 that will limit airport operations from 8 November 2024 - 31 March 2025. Areas in blue are existing structures, including the international terminal which in future will be the domestic airport, and the new international terminal near the north end of the runway,</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241018121028_6e17cc2ee87c1b02d78cb54905825b7aa15299b7a00f5eddb01a59579ab85c1a.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20241018121028_6e17cc2ee87c1b02d78cb54905825b7aa15299b7a00f5eddb01a59579ab85c1a" data-rendition-name="original" width="1353" height="1328" loading="lazy" alt="Kathmandu airport NT"> </figure>  CAAN has reportedly told international airlines to cut their flight frequency to Kathmandu citing the shorter operation hours and has told budget airlines to shift some of their flights to Pokhara or Bhairawa, or face cuts. Many airlines currently operate regular flights to and from Kathmandu between 10PM and 8AM: Air Arabia to Sharjah, Fly Dubai to Dubai, Jazeera Airways to Kuwait, Cathay Pacific to Hong Kong, Singapore Airlines, several Nepal Airlines flights, and one of four daily flights by Qatar Airways to Doha. Jazeera Airways, FlyDubai, and Thai AirAsia have applied and got permission from CAAN to begin regular flights to Bhairawa’s Gautam Buddha International Airport. Starting 9 November, FlyDubai will start making a stopover in Bhairawa before flying on to Kathmandu. Immigration, customs and security are all fully functional in Bhairawa. In Kathmandu, the next phase of the airport upgrade includes converting the current international terminal for domestic operations, the construction of a new international terminal where the domestic departure area is now, as well as moving the hangars and the Nepal Army Air Wing to the eastern side of the runway. The apron area will also double its parking space for widebody jets. This is part of a Airport Capacity Enhancement Project that was initially funded through a $80 million loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the entire masterplan is expected to cost $800 million. This project is the latest upgrade to Nepal’s only international airport since it saw its first flight in 1949. The current international and domestic terminals are too small to handle the current annual traffic volume of 8.5 million passengers a year that is growing at 20% a year.

Kathmandu airport to cut flight hours

As Kathmandu becomes more congested and polluted, and with remote online work becoming the norm, many professional Nepalis are planning to retire in Pokhara, or move there.&nbsp; With its stunning mountain panorama, balmy winters and proximity to a profusion of wilderness areas, builders are responding to this demand with new townhouses, housing development and apartments. One such block of flats is the 10-storey <a href="https://sungavaapartment.com/">Sungava Apartment</a> located at Phulbari above the Seti River, near the point where it flows into and under Pokhara. The imposing structure near Manipal Hospital is almost complete, and on a recent visit the site was strewn with huge boulders unearthed while digging the foundation.&nbsp; The Seti brought down these boulders during a gigantic flood that geologists estimate happened 800 years ago when a chunk of Annapurna IV broke off and ploughed into the glacier below. Today, Sungava (means ‘orchid’) sits safely on a high terrace, 100m above the blue-green Seti and commands a view of Dhaulagiri, Annapurna South, Machapuchre, Annapurna III and IV.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024102411104_5f8fc736c86ea3c08d7bef43bb727081d3cc1a2caa55ae2b441717e6044de7e9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2024102411104_5f8fc736c86ea3c08d7bef43bb727081d3cc1a2caa55ae2b441717e6044de7e9" data-rendition-name="original" width="2016" height="1512" loading="lazy" alt="High living below the Himalaya NT"> </figure>  The soil here is conglomerate that has solidified like concrete, and the boulders were extracted by heavy earthmovers. It is intriguing to think that these metamorphic rocks as big as cars, rounded by glacial grinding, were once a part of a much higher Annapurna IV. Even for those with little interest in geology, Sungava is an ideal place to contemplate the tectonic forces that pushed these peaks into the sky to be sculpted into delicate shapes by wind, snow, earthquake and avalanche over millions of years. The view of the Himalayan panorama from Sungava’s many balconies are breathtaking when not obscured by clouds, or the haze that drifts in from across the southern border. On most days, just watching the towering pyramid of Machapuchre (Tamu name: कतासुँ क्लिको) play hide and seek with the clouds is mesmerising. There are rocks aplenty at Phulbari, and it is probably the flowers that grew along the flat terraces e that gave the place its flowery name. The boulders will hopefully be turned into a rock garden while landscaping. An nearby restaurant complex is making the best use of the stones in its design, using flat rocks as outdoor benches and tables. Sungava was designed by the husband-wife architect team of Deepak Sherchan and Jyoti Joshi of <a href="https://thedarkmermaidamarbshrestha.blogspot.com/2013/12/creative-builders-collaborative-cbc.html">Creative Builders Collaborative (CBC)</a>, which also built Heritage Plaza, Indreni Apartment and numerous other projects in Nepal. Sadbhavana retains CBC’s trademark Newari-style masonry and here it borrows from the orange brickwork of the old town of Pokhara, integrating it with modern design elements. A few of those heritage houses are still standing in Ganesh Tole and Ram Krishna Tole in Pokhara’s old quarter.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024102411108_5eb64a4885961b6d30781cefeb1e8a313da313ac5227c7a66b60f0c7d48d6fab.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2024102411108_5eb64a4885961b6d30781cefeb1e8a313da313ac5227c7a66b60f0c7d48d6fab" data-rendition-name="original" width="1362" height="595" loading="lazy" alt="High living below the Himalaya NT"> </figure>  About 400m from the apartment past a bend on the river, and down below three tiers of terraces in the canyon is a suspension bridge. Below it, the Seti is still swollen with post-monsoon flow as it tumbles away in a hurry to head down south.&nbsp; Back at the apartment, it is quiet, far away from the hubbub of Lakeside a 15 minute drive away, and in the lap of greenery. There are 52 units at Sungava and it already has a close-knit prospective community of professionals, including doctors, publishers, engineers, and businesspeople from the renewable energy and IT sectors.&nbsp; Some residents say they opted for a second home in Pokhara to make it a ‘base camp’ to explore the Annapurnas with its many hiking trails made newly accessible with new roads. With the NRN citizenship law, overseas Nepalis can now also buy the flats. &nbsp; The floor plans include options for north and south-facing 3-bedroom apartments with verandas, and the facility has underground parking has EV charging, heated pool, sauna and gym. There are still some unsold apartments with panoramic views of the mountains and one can imagine oneself at the kitchen with its huge window, humming a ditty while preparing breakfast: “खाना पकाउँ हिमाल हेरेर...”

High living below the Himalaya

When the United Nations held its Summit of the Future at its headquarters in New York in September, many world leaders, including Nepal’s Prime Minister K P Oli, highlighted the effect of climate breakdown in increasing the frequency and intensity of natural disasters. What did not get as much attention was the long term impact of the climate crisis on food production. In fact, heat stress, weather extremes and the consequences on rain-fed agriculture is already being felt worldwide, undermining the chances of the <a href="https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/">UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</a> being met by 2030.&nbsp; The SDG’s 17 targets commit countries like Nepal to reduce poverty and inequality, end malnutrition, protect the natural environment, and ensure that citizens all enjoy health, justice and prosperity without leaving anyone behind.&nbsp; However, besides the impact of climate breakdown on agricultural production, in Nepal the area under cultivation is impacted by urban expansion, falling productivity and the need for expensive inputs like fertiliser and pesticides.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241019041052_626413c5baf4dae407ac9579231b41daeb51510aa636b75aeb7489d94cca6a62.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20241019041052_626413c5baf4dae407ac9579231b41daeb51510aa636b75aeb7489d94cca6a62" data-rendition-name="original" width="999" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="urban agriculture in Kathmandu"> <figcaption>Kathmandu's urban sprawl is eating into its fertile cultivable lands. Photo: TAYLOR MASON</figcaption> </figure>  Now, a new study led by Nepali researcher Prajal Pradhan at the University of Groningen in The Netherlands looks at how urban agriculture may offer a solution to falling food production and meeting SDG targets. The researchers evaluated 1,450 publications exploring the contributions of urban agriculture with both positive and negative effects, and published their findings in the journal Cells Report Sustainability. Urban agriculture can help achieve 17 SDGs, positively influencing 81 targets. However, it could also undermine 51 goals.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-vanishing-land">The vanishing land</a>, Taylor Mason “Urban agriculture offers immense potential for sustainable development, but realising this potential depends crucially on adopting practices that minimise its adverse effects while maximising its benefits,” Pradhan explains. Urban agriculture can substantially enhance urban food security, provide employment to the urban poor, serve as ground water recharge in built-up areas, and preserve open spaces that can serve as safe havens during disasters like earthquakes. However, it also presents problems like the potential health risks from contamination and the need for expensive inputs. &nbsp; “Urban agriculture plays a definitive role in advancing the SDGs, but achieving this requires tailored, context-specific solutions that address the unique challenges of different regions,” says Yuanchao Hu of Wuhan University in China and who is a researcher at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. “But it needs equitable access and rigorous management of environmental risks.”&nbsp; Rapid urbanisation is eating into Nepal’s most fertile agricultural land, which means farming in remaining open spaces inside cities can be a viable alternative, especially as food prices rise.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241019041052_7b7c9413086226fbdc630d45acf772cfa1ced77a8970b9056ec5ec7e5226fdf8.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20241019041052_7b7c9413086226fbdc630d45acf772cfa1ced77a8970b9056ec5ec7e5226fdf8" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="999" loading="lazy" alt="urban agriculture in Kathmandu"> <figcaption>A vegetable patch in between new houses in Thimi. Photo: TAYLOR MASON</figcaption> </figure>  “The conversion of Nepal’s most fertile land into cities is a severe problem,” Pradhan told Nepali Times. “Crop cultivation, horticulture, agroforestry, beekeeping, livestock rearing, or aquaculture can all be farming activities within and around cities.”&nbsp; The study makes recommendations for sustainable practices that build on the positive aspects of urban agriculture while mitigating the downsides, thereby promoting more resilient cities in future. Research shows that urban agriculture has been helping many countries attain SDG targets by enhancing food security and biodiversity while helping education and preservation of open spaces.&nbsp; Indeed, many farmers from the hinterland who have settled in Kathmandu Valley or other urban areas of the country have been practicing urban agriculture, leasing neighbourhood patches or cultivating roof gardens both out of necessity because of inflation and falling income to grow their own food, and also as a fulfilling hobby. Saurav Dhakal, a sustainability advocate with Story Cycle and now research fellow at the Asian Institute of Technology in Thailand, says there are socio-economic and environmental benefits of urban agriculture. “It provides benefits to all urban dwellers, regardless of their income status,” says Dhakal, “families get fresh food, and there are many other benefits like water retention, heat regulation and biodiversity. These are all public goods, so special government incentives may be needed.” It is not unusual to see vegetable patches and even paddy fields within inner city Kathmandu where an older generation of farmers are using available fertile land and <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/rooftop-gardens-kathmandu,1415">roof gardens to produce fresh, nutritious food </a>to reduce their dependence on food items that have to be bought after being trucked in from large distances.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024101905100_1291ce98dbbb8caed8702ac4b1d469b3e13016d7ecaaf3bfd5f91c974d3c0c77.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="2024101905100_1291ce98dbbb8caed8702ac4b1d469b3e13016d7ecaaf3bfd5f91c974d3c0c77" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="999" loading="lazy" alt="urban agriculture in Kathmandu"> <figcaption>An older generation of farmers are using any available fertile land to continue farming but it is getting more and more difficult. Photo: TAYLOR MASON </figcaption> </figure>  Nepal’s urban population grew rapidly from only 3.6% in 1991 to 25% today. There is large outmigration from the mountains to peri-urban areas of the Tarai, to Kathmandu Valley and Pokhara, with many young men then moving abroad for work. Kathmandu Valley’s population has swelled to nearly 3 million, and is growing at 6.5% a year. Dilip Shrestha, 71, used to work for Nepal Food Corporation, so he knew firsthand about inflation, shortages and vegetables with pesticide residue. So, when he designed his new house in Kathmandu, he built a spacious roof where he grows cucumber, ginger, garlic, coriander, onions, tomatoes, chili, beans, okra, pumpkin and lettuce. His family eats healthier, and he has reduced dependence on the market.&nbsp; The co-author of the Cell Reports Sustainability journal article, Daya Raj Subedi who is a PhD candidate at Beijing Forestry University, says urban agriculture also promotes inclusion and psycho-social wellbeing.&nbsp; He says, “A crucial finding of the study is the identification of opportunities and challenges associated with urban agriculture, it can promote sustainable transformation of society.” In Banepa, 55-year-old Bijaya Manandhar in her lifetime has watched the fertile farms of her neighbourhood that used to supply vegetables to Kathmandu, now completely built up with no open space left. The pandemic lockdown prompted her to turn to the family’s <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/rooftop-agriculture-on-the-roof-of-the-world">ancestral livelihood by growing food</a> not on terrace farms, but on the roof terrace. Manandhar is now a part of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/rooftop-agriculture-on-the-roof-of-the-world%5C%5C">कौसी खेती र करेसाबारी क्रान्ती</a> (Rooftop Farming and Garden Revolution) which has an online membership of 52,000, and awards annual prizes to women who excel in urban agriculture.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241019041052_7257f5def8f823f35a799fa6f6825e153f2ffa406ac11325d4fe74049b79e96d.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20241019041052_7257f5def8f823f35a799fa6f6825e153f2ffa406ac11325d4fe74049b79e96d" data-rendition-name="original" width="1600" height="736" loading="lazy" alt="urban agriculture in Kathmandu"> <figcaption>Rooftop farming is gaining popularity as a form of urban agriculture. </figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241019041052_beff1a4494ce896dd8fd383ee1f518e5448bcf7ea8bb138255391c7bcb9769ed.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20241019041052_beff1a4494ce896dd8fd383ee1f518e5448bcf7ea8bb138255391c7bcb9769ed" data-rendition-name="original" width="4000" height="3000" loading="lazy" alt="urban agriculture in Kathmandu"> </figure>  Pradhan says the challenge now is to upscale such examples of successful urban agricultural practices so they support Neal’s efforts to meet SDG targets. He adds, “Crop cultivation around cities can be protected by land use plans and regulations. Promoting community-based agriculture, including rooftop gardens, requires community engagement and public-private partnerships across the food value chain.”&nbsp; Such support would accelerate the popularity of existing rooftop farming and community gardens in Kathmandu Valley, or kitchen garden initiatives in Pokhara, and building on traditional farming practices that are preserved and integrated into urban settings like in Bhaktapur and Banepa. In Lalitpur, the Women Entrepreneurship Facilitation Center promotes urban farming enhancing both sustainability and empowerment.&nbsp; Another co-author of the report, Yuanchao Hu from China says followup research of the team will aim to identify good practices in local urban agriculture practices. He adds, “There are examples of urban agriculture that optimise sustainability, ensuring that it remains a viable solution for cities globally while countries try to meet SDG targets.” Prajal Pradhan, Daya Raj Subedi, Kshitij Dahal, Yuanchao Hu, Prakriti Gurung, Sijal Pokharel, Sagar Kafle, Biplav Khatri, Sudeeksha Basyal, Monika Gurung, and Aruna Joshi. Urban Agriculture matters for sustainable development. Cell Reports Sustainability, 1:100217, 2024. [DOI: 10.1016/j.crsus.2024.100217] Prajal Pradhan (<a href="mailto:p.pradhan@rug.nl">p.pradhan@rug.nl</a>) This article is brought to you by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/" target="_blank">Nepali Times</a>, in collaboration with <a href="https://inpsjapan.com/en/" target="_blank">INPS Japan</a> and <a href="https://sgi-peace.org/" target="_blank">Soka Gakkai International</a>, in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240630110640_30c3782f9c09219bf1c249b51483a3cfb7a53a06d117d2aebd23ca7080d12758.jpg" data-media-id="editor_14" data-image-id="20240630110640_30c3782f9c09219bf1c249b51483a3cfb7a53a06d117d2aebd23ca7080d12758" data-rendition-name="original" width="680" height="103" loading="lazy" alt="SDG logo"> </figure>

Back to the land in the cities

The 700-year-old Lakshmi Narasingha temple in Bhaktapur houses a rare half-lion and half-human incarnation of Lord Vishnu carrying the Goddess Lakshmi. The temple was destroyed in the 1934 mega earthquake that killed 10,000 people and destroyed many monuments in Kathmandu Valley. It was rebuilt by a German project in the 1980s, but as a single-storey structure instead of its original two-tier pagoda design.&nbsp; With new findings from in-depth research, Bhaktapur municipality began re-restoring the temple in 2021, preserving its original architecture.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241017131016_2fae38cce543ad7b1f6de632feb3e212e08ed1acedd747830e949d7b8e878f18.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20241017131016_2fae38cce543ad7b1f6de632feb3e212e08ed1acedd747830e949d7b8e878f18" data-rendition-name="original" width="2048" height="1365" loading="lazy" alt="In with the old in Nepal NT"> </figure>  “Our temples and heritage sites hold deep meaning. It is disheartening to witness how often they lose their original elements, whether by design or accident,” explains Kumar Chawal of the Consumer Committee of Bhaktapur. “There is a need to preserve our architecture and protect its historical value for future generations. Otherwise, we risk losing a vital part of our identity.” The Laksmi Narsingha restoration is similar to the Bhai Dega temple in Patan Darbar Square which also collapsed in 1934, but was rebuilt with a Moghul-style dome by the Rana government at the time. Only two months before the 2015 earthquake, heritage conservationists had started to rebuild Bhai Dega as the original three-tier based on early photographs. But priorities shifted when four other temples in the square were brought down by the 7.8M earthquake on 25 April 2015.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241017131016_697ea707d9ad163be5de5f2efbf5b70d3cab771adcc22f0fae6bf937c6cb0130.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20241017131016_697ea707d9ad163be5de5f2efbf5b70d3cab771adcc22f0fae6bf937c6cb0130" data-rendition-name="original" width="2048" height="1365" loading="lazy" alt="In with the old in Nepal NT"> </figure>  This showed how damage to monuments in Kathmandu Valley spanned from one earthquake to the next. Bhai Dega restoration remains half-complete to this day because money for its restoration ran out.&nbsp; Whereas Bhai Dega restoration was done by the Kathmandu Valley Preservation Trust with grants from western embassies and international foundations, in Bhaktapur it is the municipality itself that allocated the Rs30.7 million needed to restore the Lakshmi Narasingha temple. The expected date of completion is early 2025. The municipality and local communities are focusing on two main aspects: preserving the past and promoting localisation. The restoration team has designed a blueprint for the temple by using historical photographs and insights from older generations.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241017131016_182882fdc393c99e70d1d0490319e415229563666c4934e3a582426ebf00ca30.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20241017131016_182882fdc393c99e70d1d0490319e415229563666c4934e3a582426ebf00ca30" data-rendition-name="original" width="1200" height="560" loading="lazy" alt="In with the old in Nepal NT"> </figure>  “At first, the Lakshmi Narasingha temple had only one entrance, but during the demolition process, we uncovered the foundations of four doors. Now, we are restoring all of them. This is an example of how our ancient structures have changed over time, often without our knowledge,” says Chawal. “Constructing temples is not like building houses. They carry historical and spiritual values, which is why they hold a special place in our hearts,” he adds. By replicating ancient design elements and rebuilding the temple as accurately as possible to its original form, the team has stayed true to Bhaktapur’s soul. But the restoration also revived ancient techniques that were in danger of being forgotten, generating employment for woodcarvers, masons, and contractors. The community of Bhaktapur’s Gahiti neighbourhood near the famous Nyatapola Temple has also set aside specific days for locals to volunteer in the reconstruction work. This has encouraged young people to take pride in ownership of their heritage. Families have also supported the effort by donating funds for bells, the temple pinnacle, and other structural features to the temple.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241017131016_db850ec0c084cdbe54f65bee92dad2ad8122d20fd60ec87ec086fbb9d2f72bd6.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20241017131016_db850ec0c084cdbe54f65bee92dad2ad8122d20fd60ec87ec086fbb9d2f72bd6" data-rendition-name="original" width="2048" height="1365" loading="lazy" alt="In with the old in Nepal NT"> </figure>  “I feel at peace knowing I have contributed my sweat to restoring this temple,” said one volunteer. “It is our duty to preserve our temples and heritage. The Nyatapola area will look magical once this temple is completed.” Community mobilisation is a long-standing tradition in Bhaktapur. In the past, locals have actively participated in the restoration of other temples in the city, such as Bhairav and Nyatapola fostering a strong sense of ownership. This collective engagement has not only been crucial in preserving the city's historical monuments but also in strengthening the bond between local communities and their heritage, says officials at the municipality. While securing funding is essential, and the municipality showed it values heritage conservation, the Lakshmi Narasingha restoration is proof that active involvement and sense of responsibility of the local community is as important, if not more. Local involvement also means that the monuments will be cared for into the future, When locals take ownership of these efforts, the restored monuments are not only protected in the present but are also cared for in the future.