Earlier in August, after Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India following her violent suppression of a people’s movement, in Nepal pundits asked: ‘Is Nepal Next?”&nbsp;
The national narrative here focused on similar public discontent with leaders who have overstayed, disregarding public welfare while being neck-deep in corruption. They pointed out that the present NC-UML coalition government was ‘India-aligned’, just as Sheikh Hasina was.
Nepal’s cybersphere also shared Indian mainstream media’s magnified reports of attacks on Hindu targets in Dhaka, leaving out the fact that most were attacked for being close to the Hasina and her Awami League.&nbsp;
Some Nepali media also unquestioningly reported that Nepal’s border security was on ‘heightened alert’ for a ‘mass influx’ of Hindu refugees, forgetting that Nepal and Bangladesh do not even have a contiguous border.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">Peacemongers at India-Pakistan border</a>, Beena Sarwar
Regional upheavals have a long history of impacting Nepali politics. After Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed by the military in 1979, student protests erupted in Kathmandu and quickly turned into mass rallies against the partyless Panchayat system. King Birendra finally agreed to hold a referendum on the absolute monarchy.
When street protests in Sri Lanka forced out the Rajapaksa government and the economy went into freefall in 2022, Nepali commentators again asked: ‘Is Nepal Next?’ Nepal’s macroeconomic position was in a much sounder footing, but editors needed catchy headlines.
Bangladesh’s unrest was initially triggered by students protesting the quota for government jobs, and commentators here immediately drew parallels with constitutionally-guaranteed reservations for women as well as ethnic and caste minorities – even though in Bangladesh the anger was over the increased job quota for Awami League cadre.&nbsp;
If all this was not convoluted enough, add geopolitics to the mix. India and China are now in overt competition for influence in the Subcontinent, a region New Delhi regards as being in its sphere of influence. While Sri Lanka and the Maldives are strategic because of their location astride Indian Ocean maritime routes, Nepal, Bangladesh and to a certain extent Bhutan, are important buffers.&nbsp;
India was fully backing the secular Awami League despite Sheikh Hasina’s &nbsp;growing authoritarianism and her close trade and economic ties with China.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/selfies-on-the-prime-minister-s-bed">Selfies on the prime minister’s bed</a>, Guna Raj Luitel
In July, Hasina returned to Dhaka earlier than scheduled during a state visit to Beijing after being unable to secure a $5 billion loan from China. New Delhi had also leaned on Hasina to cancel China’s involvement in the Teesta contract, and award it to India.&nbsp;
In Sri Lanka, Chinese ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is said to have contributed to its economic collapse, pushing President Ranil Wickremesinghe closer to India and the West to cultivate support for its IMF bailout in June. Defence and maritime cooperation has followed hot on the heels of these deals.&nbsp;
The China’s Exim Bank did sign a $4.2 billion debt restructuring agreement with Sri Lanka in June, showing that Wickremesinghe is deftly trying to balance geopolitical ties.
In the Maldives, relations with New Delhi soured and broke into full-scale war on cybersphere after Mohamed Muizzu won elections earlier this year. But Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s was in Malé this week to ‘rectify’ Muizzu’s pro-Beijing tilt.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/retrofitting-saarc">Retrofitting SAARC</a>, Shristi Karki
In Nepal, China has made no secret of its wish to seek unity among myriad Communist factions, while India and the West have worked behind the scenes to wreck that plan. The latest coalition switch in July was a manifestation of this geopolitical jostling.&nbsp;
India’s new Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri made a courtesy visit to Kathmandu this week where officials were careful not to raise contentious issues like Kalapani, the Eminent Person’s Group report, new air routes, or to lift restrictions on buying surplus hydroelectricity from plants with Chinese involvement. Misri was formerly India’s ambassador in Beijing.
Interestingly, the Chinese who never openly commented publicly on Nepal’s internal affairs are now much more vocal, while the Indians who used to be very outspoken have taken a hands-off approach ever since the 2015 Blockade.&nbsp;
The latest example of this new Chinese mood is Ambassador Chen Song’s X posts with crude criticism last month of a Nepali journalist’s report on the Pokhara airport loan, or using undiplomatic language about the unsuccessful search for the twin buses that fell into the Trisuli, killing 59.&nbsp;
Still, the recent regime change in Dhaka is a warning to Nepal’s leaders not to take electoral mandate for granted, and to demonstrate results from better governance in the run-up to the next elections in 2027, or risk losing out to populist parties.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-love-triangle-with-china-and-india-impacts-investment">Nepal’s China-India love-triangle impacts investment</a>, Ramesh Kumar

Shristi Karki

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The geopolitics of Nepal’s politics…

Nepal and India are both Hindu-majority countries, but there is a difference between the Hindutva nationalism playing out in India’s ongoing elections and the Hindu faith as practiced in Nepal.
Most Nepalis are too busy trying to get by in hard economic times to be too engrossed with elections across the border. Some do harbour strong views about Narendra Modi’s brand of Hindu revivalism, and the RPP in particular seems to want to imitate the BJP’s ability to set a national Hindutva narrative.
Still, a majority of Nepalis look at Narendra Modi with something between indifference and fondness. The Indian Prime Minister has visited Nepal five times since he was first elected in 2014, and many here still remember his address to Parliament which he began in Nepali during his first state visit to Kathmandu.
There is a section in Nepal that supports a non-secular Hindu state, and Nepalis have noticed that every time Modi comes to Nepal he makes it a point to visit Hindu and Buddhist sacred sites. But in contrast to his BJP’s Hindu exclusionist policies in India, Nepal has traditionally enjoyed a syncretic blend of Hindu and Buddhist traditions.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/the-south-wind-blows">The south wind blows</a>, Chandra Kishore
For most Nepalis, therefore, the affinity for BJP and Modi could be characterised as cultural rather than political. Most Nepalis still have memories of the hardships they suffered during the 6-month blockade that New Delhi imposed just after the 2015 earthquake because it did not like the contours of Nepal’s new draft Constitution.
The poor showing of the Hindu-monarchist Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) in last month’s by-elections in Ilam and Bajhang shows that at least in the mountains, Nepalis are not so impressed with the polarised electoral politics on display in India. Interestingly, Bajhang is close to the Indian state of Uttarakhand which has declared itself to be a Hindu-only ‘Devbhumi’ and with which it has close cross-border cultural ties.
Although factions of the other four main parties in Parliament, the NC, UML, Maoist-Centre and the RSP, do flirt with the Hindu-monarchy line from time to time, there is not much public support for it yet and none of the four largest parties in Parliament has officially voiced its support for such an agenda.
When (and if) Modi does win a third term in India’s elections there could inevitably be ripple effects in Nepal — especially if the BJP’s mentors in the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) adopt an even more radical agenda, abolish secularism from the Indian Constitution, or push the Greater India idea of ‘Akhanda Bharat’.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-faith-in-politics">India’s faith in politics</a>, Shrijan Pandey
Even so, rousing radical religious passions will not be as easy in Nepal, which is South Asia’s oldest nation-state and does not carry with it the historical baggage of Partition. Nepal’s Muslim minority which forms 5% of the population has for the most part lived in harmony with Hindus and Buddhists, although there are politically-instigated local flare-ups from time to time mainly along the southern border.&nbsp;
Though Nepal’s Hindu population is more than 80% (2021 census), Nepal as a whole is a country of minorities. The Hill-Brahmin and Chhetri may dominate the political and economic spheres, but they form less than 30% of the population. Nepal’s ethnic and indigenous groups have been asserting themselves, as seen in the recent Ilam by-election, where the UML’s Suhang Nembang comfortably beat the NC’s Dambar Bahadur Khadka by close to 6,000 votes. However, an independent candidate, Dakendra Singh Limbu, with no political affiliation, but who campaigned on a platform of assertive Limbu identity, made a strong showing, finishing third with 11,457 votes.
Such identity politics is more a response to ethnic exclusion and a demand for regional autonomy than pushing a religious agenda. Indeed, Nepal’s political parties have so far desisted from mixing religion with politics, even though some individual leaders in the parties sometimes seem to appear to be sorely tempted.
Nepal’s next general election is more than three years away, and India-style Hindutva politics could still be whipped up. For now, it seems more likely that it will be Nepali nationalism that will be a more potent vote-mobiliser.
This already seems to be happening, with the government minting Nepal’s new 100-rupee note that depicts the country’s ‘pointy map’ (‘chuchhe naxa’) showing a 350-sq km strip of territory in its northwestern tip which is also claimed by India.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/crimson-saffron-and-green">Crimson, saffron and green</a>, Chandra Kishore
Akhilesh Upadhyay is former Editor-in-Chief of The Kathmandu Post and a Senior Fellow at the think tank, IIDS.

Southerly winds

For most Nepalis, the arrival of the emir of Qatar to Kathmandu in four jets on Tuesday was marked by just one matter of importance: the government declared it a holiday. The decision was greeted by howls of ridicule in the Nepali cybersphere with posts poking fun at a former monarchy pulling all stops to give a lavish welcome to a foreign monarch. To be sure, Qatar is economically important because there are an estimated 400,000 Nepalis working in the Gulf emirate and an important source of remittance to families back home.&nbsp; However, working conditions for Nepalis in the Gulf in general and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/rights-referees-blow-whistle-on-world-cup-fouls">Qatar in particular</a> are said to be poor with few safeguards on labour rights. Migrant worker welfare was said to be high on the agenda in meetings between Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Dahal is also said to have brought up the issue of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/hamas-releases-thais-but-where-is-bipin">Nepali student Bipin Joshi</a> believed to have been among those abducted by Hamas in its 7 October attack on southern Israel in which 10 other Nepalis were killed. It is not clear how effective this will be since Qatar’s mediation in the Israel-Hamas conflict has been deadlocked as Israel disregards international pressure to stop killing Palestinian civilians. Sheikh Hamad al-Thani arrived in Kathmandu from a visit to <a href="https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/342874/ministry-qatar-emir%E2%80%99s-visit-to-strengthen" target="_blank">Bangladesh</a>, another country with a sizeable migrant worker population in Qatar.&nbsp; In a statement prior to the Qatar emir’s visit to the two countries, the New York-based group Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged Qatar to take labour rights and welfare more seriously. ‘It is important for Qatar, Bangladesh, and Nepal to go beyond exchanging diplomatic pleasantries over their longstanding labour ties and seize this moment to publicly commit to concrete, enforceable protections that address the serious abuses that migrant workers in Qatar continue to face,’ said <a href="https://www.hrw.org/about/people/michael-page" target="_blank">Michael Page</a> of HRW.&nbsp; He added: ‘The Qatari emir should not just meet heads of state, but also visit dialysis centres filled with migrant worker returnees from Qatar and speak with the families of workers who died in Qatar to see the grave consequences of inadequate Qatari labour protections.’  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024042322044_22180746f870255db298aec402e8ec0da6bdbaeacf50649a98ffb0c4b7472aef.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="2024042322044_22180746f870255db298aec402e8ec0da6bdbaeacf50649a98ffb0c4b7472aef" data-rendition-name="original" width="1800" height="1200" loading="lazy" alt="Qatari leader in Nepal reminded of workers’ rights NT"> <figcaption>Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani arrived in Kathmandu on Tuesday on a two-day state visit. Photo RSS</figcaption> </figure>  Migrant workers from Bangladesh, Nepal and other labour-exporting countries play a vital role in Qatar’s economy and were instrumental in the construction of the 2022 World Cup.&nbsp; ‘The Qatar-to-Nepal and Bangladesh routes that the Qatari leader is taking are well-trodden, with thousands of workers making this journey daily,’ the HRW statement said. Although Nepali workers send back remittances from Qatar, many end up deeper in debt to pay back unscrupulous recruiters and employers who cheat them of promised salaries. Heat stress from global warming has also made working conditions impossible, and many Nepali workers <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/too-hot-to-work">return with kidney failures</a>. HRW says some workers also have been deported for <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/10/12/qatar/fifa-address-demands-migrant-worker-strikes" target="_blank">demanding</a> wages and benefits promised by contractors, and there have been thousands of <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/10/qatar-urgently-investigate-migrant-worker-deaths" target="_blank">unexplained deaths</a> of young, healthy migrant workers in Qatar. Nepal ends up paying compensation to the families of many migrant workers who have lost their lives, not Qatar. HRW says it has documented cases of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/world-cup-ending-without-migrant-relief">Nepali families who received no support </a>from Qatari authorities or employers after losing the worker supporting them.&nbsp; Only some Qatari companies complied with a directive making contractors provide life insurance for migrant workers, even during the construction spree for the 2022 World Cup.&nbsp; The climate crisis is increasing outmigration from Nepal at a time when it is also making Qatar too hot to work in.&nbsp; HRW said the Qatari authorities have <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms" target="_blank">introduced</a> labour reforms, but they came too late and were too little and too narrow in scope. “The labour agreement to be signed during the emir’s visit should incorporate concrete provisions to <a href="https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Protecting%20Asian%20Migrants%27%20Rights.pdf" target="_blank">address</a> these issues,' the HRW statement read, adding that the best way for the emir to mark his trip would be to guarantee migrant worker welfare. Meanwhile, an <a href="https://thediplomat.com/2022/11/nepalis-feel-the-human-toll-of-qatars-world-cup/">investigative story by Nepali journalists Samik Kharel and Roshan Sedhai</a> on widows of Nepali workers who died during the construction of facilities for the 2022 World Cup was runner-up for best story in the civil rights category of the Fetisov Awards given in Istanbul on Tuesday.

Qatari leader in Nepal reminded of workers’ rights

Nepalis play Russian roulette in distant war

Across the world, borders are being increasingly fenced. The US-Mexico border wall is being elongated to 1,200km to keep migrants out. Israel has walled itself from Palestine. The floodlit India-Pakistan iron curtain can be seen from space at night. Bangladesh is almost completely fenced off from India.&nbsp;
Now, India’s Home Minister Amit Shah has announced that a barbed wire fence is going up along India’s 1,643km border with Burma. The announcement has raised fears that it will disrupt age-old cultural and family ties that predate British rule.
Ethnic violence in Manipur, as well as anti-government insurgencies on both sides have made the border a flashpoint. Even so, the barbed wire proposal has spread despair among residents of the Indian states of Arunachal, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram that border Burma.&nbsp;
Most of the India-Burma border is dense mountain forest, and the scene of epic battles between the Japanese and British forces in which many Nepali soldiers died. A barbed wire fence is not just difficult to build in this terrain, it will be hard and expensive to maintain.&nbsp;
New Delhi has security concerns, but here in the Burmese borderlands there is worry that families and communities will be torn apart. This boundary is similar to the Nepal-India border, where there are marriage ties, families own property on both sides.&nbsp;
There is some debate about the need for a border fence in India, but in Burma’s controlled society there is not even a murmur. A fence will likely block supply lines for rebels fighting the repression of the Burmese military junta.&nbsp;
Hard borders separate the territories of nation states, and in doing so they also divide people that were once one. Over time, borders tend to slowly erase these historical bonds and a collective cultural lived experience.
A national boundary is already an artificial construct, barbed wire makes it even more artificial. Politicians fanning populist nationalism are obsessed with border security, and want to build walls to barricade historical people-to-people ties.
Nations and their rulers, even if they are world powers, are ultra possessive about territory and take umbrage at maps that do not accurately represent their claim. There is something almost primordial about this mindset, like wild animals marking and defending the perimeters of their domain.&nbsp;
Ever since I <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/caste-vote">started writing this column from Birganj</a> in Nepali Times last year, I have been trying to find a Nepali word that describes the cultural, social, economic, ecological ties that bind the peoples of the borderlands.&nbsp;
The best word I have come up with is सीमांचल (Simanchal) which by coincidence is almost an exact translation of this column series: Borderlines. The word has the connotation of a political demarcation, it denotes citizenship, but it does not allude to any barbed wire fence, it means being able to crisscross a national boundary without any fear or hindrance.&nbsp;
Such a borderless world now exists between Schengen member countries, but then Fortress Europe is now building a dozen new ‘berlin Walls’ to keep outsiders out, while giving its own citizens complete, but one-sided, freedom of movement in and out.&nbsp;
There may be an international border running between them, but Nepalis and Indians of &nbsp;the सीमांचल speak the same language, observe the same festivals, and marry each other. Border people have an identity different from the centre. A border may have been defined by a treaty (usually after war) to separate people, but people of the borderlands keep transboundary ties strong.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/nepal-india-trans-boundary-bonds">Nepal-India trans-boundary bonds</a>, Chandra Kishore
A barbed wire fence arouses fear and suspicion, but the people of Simanchal spread hope and trust. The capital sees the border as the line where its jurisdiction ends, borderland people see it as the place where sovereignty begins. The Simanchal melds political and cultural identity into one.
When the nation state is weak, and the centre cannot hold, it is the periphery that defends the border. They are the true writers of history.
In 2018, India and Burma agreed on free movement for people living up to 16km on either side. This made it convenient for Burmese border dwellers to come to India for trade, education, medical service. But there was also inflated security concern about refugees, human traffickers, weapons, and drugs coming across.&nbsp;
Former Nepal-based Indian diplomat and expert on the Northeast, John S Shilshi who is himself from Manipur, told me recently: “As long as local sentiments are not addressed, this barb wire border fence will not work. It could also go against India’s own ‘Look East’ policy.”&nbsp;
Although the Nepal-India border is seen as a model for openness, there are new challenges. The Vajpayee government stationed SSB border police along the Nepal border, and now with elections approaching, another BJP government has further tightened security. Meanwhile, extremism and religious intolerance is seeping across. &nbsp;
Bilateral nation-to-nation ties between India and Nepal are always tangled, there is a move to build local initiatives. While we wait for Kathmandu and New Delhi to sort things out border cities on both sides are getting together on their own: Biratnagar-Jogbani, Birganj-Raxaul, Nepaganj-Rupedia, Bhairawa-Sonauli.
<a href="https://twitter.com/Kishore_chandra">Chandra Kishore</a> is a Birganj-based commentator who writes this monthly column Borderlines for Nepali Times.

Chandra Kishore

Barbwire borders

The new left-led coalition in Kathmandu could pave the way for progress on finally addressing conflict atrocities, but first the government’s proposed bill in Parliament needs some important changes to ensure justice for victims. Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal has held several meetings with opposition leader K P Oli of the UML over the past few months because he knew that the bill could not be passed without UML support. Dahal was under pressure from the international community, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres during his visit to Nepal in October to conclude the transitional justice process. On Tuesday, <a href="http://www.hrw.org/asia/nepal">Human Rights Watch (HRW)</a> and the group Advocacy Forum-Nepal released a report that said although the <a href="https://www.hrw.org/asia/nepal">Nepal</a> government’s proposed bill on transitional justice contains positive provisions, but needs ‘significant amendments’. ‘It is widely recognised that a lack of accountability for conflict-era violations has led to a crisis of impunity in Nepal, with police and politicians rarely held accountable for rights violations and corruption,’ the two organisations said in a statement.&nbsp; But they added that the current moment presents the opportunity to amend the draft so that the demands of victims and survivors of the 1996-2006 conflict are met. More than 17,000 Nepalis, mostly civilians, were killed and some 3,288 are still listed as missing. HRW said that the work of rights activists had ensured built public pressure to improve the draft bill, but it still allowed those responsible for serious war crimes and crimes against humanity to not be answerable.&nbsp; The HRW Advocacy Forum report, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/node/387537">Breaking Barriers to Justice: Nepal’s Long Struggle for Accountability, Truth and Reparations</a> analyses the proposed law and reviews some cases where there were obstructions to justice by the Nepali state, which is made up of the former enemies in the conflict.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240306110324_81106a42b6e16cc935bacb7d2315487adc45b250b4b032276a0819db1918818c.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20240306110324_81106a42b6e16cc935bacb7d2315487adc45b250b4b032276a0819db1918818c" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="TJ Bill"> </figure>  Survivors of war rape and relatives of victims filed complaints in 62 extrajudicial killings, and the organisations say that the draft does not meet international legal standards, rulings by Nepal’s &nbsp;<a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/01/nepal-supreme-courts-decision-reaffirms-need-amend-transitional-justice-law">Supreme Court</a> and demands of victims’ families. “To deliver a durable and rights-respecting process without further delay, Nepal’s leaders should agree to amendments called for by victims and recommended by legal experts, then ask parliament to pass the bill into law,” said <a href="https://www.hrw.org/about/people/meenakshi-ganguly">Meenakshi Ganguly</a>, HRW’s deputy Asia director. "This is a moment of opportunity to deliver the truth, justice, and reparations long sought by victims and help protect the rights of all Nepalis in the future." The conflict ended 18 years ago with the signing of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement under which mandated setting up a <a href="http://www.trc.gov.np/">Truth and Reconciliation Commission</a> (TRC) and a Commission on the Investigation of Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP). During Secretary-General Guterres’ visit Prime Minister Dahal from the Maoist Centre party promised ‘speedy advancement’ of the peace process. The current bill provides for reparations and interim relief for some victims, including victims of torture and rape, who were left out of earlier relief packages. It guarantees the right of the families of victims of enforced disappearance to their relatives’ property.&nbsp; The TRC and (CIEDP) would investigate war crimes and those classified as ‘serious violations of human rights’ could be referred to and prosecuted in a special court. This includes rape, enforced disappearance, and cruel or inhuman torture, and a yet to be finalised definition of unlawful killing.&nbsp; However, HRW says the bill excludes numerous serious crimes under international law, including some acts of torture and other unlawful killings. It says excluding certain categories of crime risks providing general amnesty to perpetrators, as well as deprive some victims and their families from reparations.&nbsp; “If the transitional justice bill is passed without appropriate amendments, it risks hindering the search for justice,” said Bikash Basnet of Advocacy Forum. “If it is appropriately amended, it can be the basis for a meaningful, nationally-owned process that upholds the rights of victims and benefits all Nepalis by strengthening institutions and the rule of law.” Click here for full report, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/node/387537">Struggle for Accountability, Truth and Reparations</a>

Nepal’s chance on transitional justice

It is widely known that a significant trade and currency dispute between Nepal and Tibet that began in 1788 led to a military conflict between China and the Gorkha Kingdom. The outcome of this <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/sino-nepal-ties-in-the-post-afghan-era">Sino-Gorkha War </a>in 1791-92, particularly the question of who emerged victorious, however, remained uncertain and subject to debate. The emergence of a hitherto unknown war report of 1793 sheds not only new light on this question, but may also offer insights into contemporary global peace challenges. Scholars relying on Chinese and Tibetan sources assert that China emerged victorious, and that Nepal was required to dispatch a quinquennial mission bearing valuable goods to the imperial palace in Beijing.&nbsp; Chinese scholar Wei Yuan, in his Military History of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/losing-loose-change-in-nepal">Qing Dynasty</a> (Shèngwu Ji) wrote: ‘The request of the rebels (the Gorkhalis) for surrender was granted.’&nbsp; Similarly, an inscription from 1792, found on a stone slab beneath the Potala in Lhasa, attributed to the Chinese emperor, reads: ‘Now that the Gorkhas have submitted to me, the imperial army has been withdrawn.’ Qing paintings also depict an ostentatious victory banquet. However, this claim of Chinese victory has been occasionally contradicted by Nepali and Western scholars who both rely on scarce Nepali sources. For example, the Nepalikabhupa-Vamsavali (misleadingly known as the ‘Wright Chronicle’) states: ‘(<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/12-full-opinion/the-end-of-history">King Rana Bahadur Shah</a>) killed the Chinese army. He thus caused the Chinese Emperor to praise him.’&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301110348_f49d0e1564b05298a0771f30977f976f785b26636dd430bd19c81ed2d2235b4f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20240301110348_f49d0e1564b05298a0771f30977f976f785b26636dd430bd19c81ed2d2235b4f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1037" height="625" loading="lazy" alt="Sino-Nepal War"> <figcaption>Capture of Syaphru in present day Rasuwa District by the Chinese Army. Paintings and engravings commissioned by the Qianlong emperor of the Gorkha Campaign collaboration between Chinese and European painters. The Jesuit missionaries were involved in producing the drawings in China were Giuseppe Castiglione, Jean-Denis Attiret, Ignace Sichelbart and Jean Damascene.(Photo: ALL PHOTOS: NEPALI TIMES)</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301110348_630572b9dcd2a41c2cb499b105e6c7ac3b5610f4d6185cc63d746f070bc0ff5e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20240301110348_630572b9dcd2a41c2cb499b105e6c7ac3b5610f4d6185cc63d746f070bc0ff5e" data-rendition-name="original" width="1036" height="622" loading="lazy" alt="Sino-Nepal war"> <figcaption>The Qing celebration of consolidation of Tibet after the Gorkha Campaign in 1792.</figcaption> </figure>  Additionally, a letter attributed to Rana Bahadur Shah, addressed to officials sent for the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/from-nalapani-to-kalapani">conquest of Kumaon Garhwal</a> and published in 1957 by Dhana Bajra Bajracharya and Jnana Mani Nepala in Aitihasik Patrasamgraha (Vol 1.56-61), supports the notion of Nepali victory. Recently, a comprehensive Nepali war report has come to light, previously only indirectly or partially known. This report (sandhi) from 1793AD has been published by the project Documents on the History of Religion and Law of Pre-modern Nepal, a collaboration between the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the National Archives in Kathmandu, established in 2016.&nbsp; The sandhi and its translation by Manik Bajracharya, Rajan Khatiwoda and Axel Michaels is publicly accessible. According to this 28-folio text, which details the course of the war from the initial clashes in Tibet in 1788 to the so-called Treaty of Betrawati in late 1792, Nepal emerged victorious in the final and decisive battle at Betrawati near Nuwakot. The sandhi recounts: ‘After realising that his troops had been defeated and had fled, the Minister (General Fuk’anggan) observed them through his binoculars and issued the following order: “Establish a strong checkpoint at the Betrawati bridge and do not allow any fleeing soldier who crosses the Betrawati river to pass. Chop off the nose of anyone who tries to cross, and also send additional troops.” The Minister himself came to this side of the bridge with 13 cannons. At that time, the Gorkha Maharaja’s troops at the checkpoint pushed back the Chinese troops to Betrawati. Since the Chinese troops were in a hurry, they were unable to complete building a new bridge.&nbsp; In their rush to cross the bridge, many Chinese soldiers drowned in the Betrawati. The remaining soldiers threw two cannons into the river out of fear of the Gorkha Maharaja’s troops, and many of them jumped into the river and died. When the Minister witnessed the defeat of his troops, he opened the way over the old bridge Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/beginning-of-the-end-of-the-gorkha-empire">Beginning of the end of the Gorkha empire</a>, Alisha Sijapati  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301110348_f8b8ef2b8e7db243dfdbcfd6190176400c991219fe9508c08d839cff4d74fe6e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20240301110348_f8b8ef2b8e7db243dfdbcfd6190176400c991219fe9508c08d839cff4d74fe6e" data-rendition-name="original" width="1012" height="612" loading="lazy" alt="Sino-Nepal war"> <figcaption>Battle of Betrawati</figcaption> </figure>  The sandhi continues with a peace offer in a quoted letter from the Chinese General to Rana Bahadur Shah: “In the midst of battle, victories and defeats are common occurrences. In such circumstances, no one should lose heart. Previously, I had communicated to the Gorkha Maharaja that we would resolve matters upon reaching Nuwakot. I had also instructed my troops to remain on this side of the bridge. Despite these precautions, we suffered losses (literally, ‘my troops died’). Let us consider this a tragic play, witnessed by myself. The populace, especially the underprivileged, must now feel extremely fearful. 'The Gorkha Maharaja and the British Resident need not fret about vacating Nuwakot, as I have decided to abandon my intention of advancing there. […] I will now draft a letter to the venerable Maharaja to appease him. I request you to also correspond with him, agreeing to the terms I will propose. If we can come to an agreement, I will withdraw my troops from your realm, report to the Chinese Emperor, persuade him, and arrange for numerous gifts (khillat) to be sent to the venerable Gorkha Maharaja and the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=656">venerable saheba [Kirkpatrick]</a>.' It appears that both sides claimed victory. How was this possible? The key lies in the differing interpretations of the gifts exchanged. The Chinese referred to them as tribute (Chinese: gòng), while the Nepalis understood them primarily as ‘gifts’ (saugat, koseli). The sandhi details the agreed-upon terms: After five years, a representative of the Gorkha Maharaja will journey with a petition and offerings (saugat) to the Chinese Emperor, pay homage, and return with news. The Gorkha Maharaja and the King of Lhasa (the Dalai Lama) shall maintain their friendship and refrain from further hostilities, while both parties retain their respective territories. It was further decided that in transactions in Tibet, the unalloyed mahindramallī of the Gorkha Maharaja would be accepted at face value, while adulterated coins would be valued accordingly. Read also:<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-and-the-taliban-s-second-coming"> Nepal and the Taliban's second coming</a>, Kanak Mani Dixit Any enemy threat to the Gorkha Maharaja’s troops should be reported to the Chinese Emperor for potential military assistance. However, the existence of a formal peace treaty, the so-called Treaty of Betrawati, remains uncertain. The exact wording of this treaty has yet to be found in Nepali, Chinese or eventually Indian archives. In 1909, Padma Jang Bahadur Rana, the third son of Prime Minister Jang Bahadur, published an English text of the treaty without presenting an original document.&nbsp; Nepali scholar Yogi Naraharinath published a summary of this ‘contract’ in his Itihasa Prakashma Sandhi Patra Sangraha (BS 2012, vol. 1, p. 121), which closely aligns with the aforementioned points. He also notes that the treaty, written in English, is currently housed in the Jaisikothā office in Kathmandu.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301120348_6918ee417cd84de38cf99946be3f7013c40cc959ab8ef0e12ab9a49f05467176.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20240301120348_6918ee417cd84de38cf99946be3f7013c40cc959ab8ef0e12ab9a49f05467176" data-rendition-name="original" width="763" height="355" loading="lazy" alt="Sino-nepal war"> </figure>  Paragraph 6 of this ‘treaty’ discusses the exchange of ‘products of their own country (aphaphna desha-ma ujjeko vastu)’ (Nepal and Tibet) to be sent to China every five years. This clause is pivotal, as it raises the question: are these products considered gifts, as most scholars understand them, or tribute payments? If interpreted as tribute, it would suggest that China emerged victorious and that Nepal acknowledged Chinese suzerainty. However, the sandhi mentions ceremonial and honorary gifts (najara) and presents (tohapha) sent to the Chinese emperor only in the preliminary peace agreement of 1789, negotiated in Kerung. All subsequent documents refer to saugat, meaning “gift” or “present”. For me, the answer to this question simultaneously resolves the conflict: both sides interpreted the terms differently, allowing each to declare victory. Sometimes, wars conclude with arrangements that enable both sides to claim success. Despite China’s evident superiority, Nepal avoided comprehensive defeat, while China failed to advance to Kathmandu, settling for an envoy (Amban) instead. Therefore, the Treaty of Betrawati offered certain advantages to both parties, albeit to varying degrees. The Rana prime ministers, grappling with issues of legitimacy, sought recognition as legitimate rulers through missions to China. Emphasising the importance of regular missions, the emperors placed Nepal on the outer periphery of their network of tributary states known as the Cefeng system, asserting their claim to universal power. The Treaty of Betrawati also highlights the divergent views on China’s suzerainty over Nepal (and Tibet). The lack of a clear victor in the war and Nepal’s relatively low significance to China contributed to this discrepancy. In addition to border reorganisation and fortification through watchtower construction, Nepal fulfilled smaller obligations such as returning looted items from the Tashi Lhunpo monastery.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301110352_8be89e440deb5d824914ec0587d3c9dc1e5dd561fad6574ed0f444d6d07003f4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_11" data-image-id="20240301110352_8be89e440deb5d824914ec0587d3c9dc1e5dd561fad6574ed0f444d6d07003f4" data-rendition-name="original" width="2000" height="1563" loading="lazy" alt="Sino-Nepal war"> <figcaption>Recent rendering of the Battle of Betrawati at the Nepal Military Museum.</figcaption> </figure>  However, the five-year missions remained Nepal’s primary commitment, despite the Gorkha government’s increasing reluctance to fulfil them, ultimately discontinuing them from 1906 onwards. Conversely, China provided no military aid to Nepal, even during the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-start-of-the-anglo-gorkha-war">Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16</a>, despite the agreements in the Treaty of Betrawati. Its impact was more pronounced in Tibet, where it led to the presence of influential Ambans like Song Yun (1752-1835) and diminished the authority of the Dalai Lama.&nbsp; The sandhi states: ‘While the Gorkha Maharaja’s Kaji and the (Dalai) Lama of Bhot (Tibet) once held political sway, they (the Tibetans) are now considered subjects/cultivators (raiyata) of China. In Bhot, Chinese directives govern all tasks.’ Thus, the Treaty of Betrawati underscores the parties’ contrasting views on China’s dominion over Nepal (and Tibet). The absence of a clear victor in the war, coupled with Nepal’s limited significance to China, contributed to this disparity.&nbsp; Despite border reorganisation and watchtower construction, Nepal’s fulfilment of smaller obligations, such as returning looted items from Tashi Lhunpo, and discontinuation of the five-year missions, China’s impact was more pronounced in Tibet, where it exerted authority through influential Ambans and curtailed the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=14733">Dalai Lama</a>’s power. There are many ways to end a war – through victory and surrender, truce, scarce resources, fatigue or attrition. Even if there are only limited lessons to be learned from history, the solution to the Sino-Gorkha war, in which both parties could see themselves as winners, may make it seem advisable to rethink today’s military conflicts.&nbsp; Axel Michaels is with the Centre for Asian and Transcultural Studies (CATS) / Südasien-Institut der Universität Heidelberg and author of Nepal — A History from the Earliest Times to the Present Oxford University Press, 2024.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240301120344_a274b878f6082a05c8852790b086a3ac23a12efbfbf8dd67732b6ecc68c5aa0d.jpg" data-media-id="editor_14" data-image-id="20240301120344_a274b878f6082a05c8852790b086a3ac23a12efbfbf8dd67732b6ecc68c5aa0d" data-rendition-name="original" width="1352" height="1567" loading="lazy" alt="Sino-Nepal war"> </figure>

Neither side lost, both sides won

<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-start-of-the-anglo-gorkha-war">Bal Bhadra Kunwar </a>commanded the Gorkhali defenders of<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/from-nalapani-to-kalapani"> Nalapani Fort</a> as they faced a month-long siege by troops of the British East India Company in 1814. Vastly outnumbered, the 600 <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/letters-from-the-western-front">Nepali soldiers</a>, women and children inside were bombarded by British cannons. Hungry and thirsty, 70 of them finally broke out, leaving the dead and dying behind.&nbsp; For his brave defence of the fort against overwhelming enemy numbers, Bal Bhadra Kunwar is regarded as Nepal’s national hero to this day. Now, his sixth-generation descendant, Viking Kunwor (pictured, right) is making a living out of crafting the famous Gorkhali knife, the khukri, wielded in battle by his ancestor. In a narrow alley behind Boudha tucked between restaurants is the <a href="https://kilatools.com/">The Heritage Knives Nepa</a>l store selling hand-crafted khukris. On display are antique curved knives, some dating back to World War I and one of them bearing the inscription of Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher Rana. After escaping from Nalapani Fort in 1814, Bal Bhadra Kunwar fled to Lahore and commanded a Gorkhali regiment under Punjab king Ranjit Singh. He was killed in action near Peshawar during the Sikh-Afghan war in 1822.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240209140228_b7c77a04bc12d171add560d8c121777967c101dd44425c3294366a5d6f6eb226.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20240209140228_b7c77a04bc12d171add560d8c121777967c101dd44425c3294366a5d6f6eb226" data-rendition-name="original" width="5662" height="3775" loading="lazy" alt="VK Kunwor"> </figure>  Viking Kunwor was born to a Swedish mother and a Nepali father, and divides his time between Sweden and Nepal, drawn by his deepening fascination with Nepal's rich history in which his ancestor played such a heroic part. In Sweden, he is involved in the hospitality industry, and to remain rooted to the country of his brave forebears, Viking set up the khukri store in Boudha in 2019. Viking has toured Garhwal and Kumaon, visiting Nalapani and other battlefields from the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/beginning-of-the-end-of-the-gorkha-empire">Anglo-Nepal War </a>two centuries ago to find out more about Capt Bal Bhadra.&nbsp; There was not much except oral history about him, but many of Viking’s forebears ended up fighting in the British and Indian Armies, except Viking’s father.&nbsp; Because of the Gorkhali connection, Viking developed a strong passion for the craftsmanship that went into forging khukris, and the history of the iconic knife that struck fear into the hearts of enemies in historic battles around the world. “I initially pursued my passion for history and heritage studies, but shifted gears and became a chef in Sweden,” Viking told us during a recent visit to Nepal.&nbsp; His fascination with khukris, particularly their roles in the two World Wars and the variations used by different regiments intrigued him. He found that khukris issued to soldiers and those privately purchased were different. A khukri scabbard has pouches for smaller knives for more delicate cutting as well as a sharpening utensil.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/beginning-of-the-end-of-the-gorkha-empire">Beginning of the end of the Gorkha Empire</a>, Alisha Sijapati  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240209140228_ba725f1316461b0b15ff3833b27705dad21225ce4cd1e5aa1be40c878d0ad96f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_7" data-image-id="20240209140228_ba725f1316461b0b15ff3833b27705dad21225ce4cd1e5aa1be40c878d0ad96f" data-rendition-name="original" width="5662" height="3775" loading="lazy" alt="VK Kunwoe"> </figure>  Examining their blades, styles and patterns, Kunwor discovered that modern knives did not match the quality of khukris made centuries ago. He wanted to find the lost process of making the perfect khukri by metalsmiths in the mountains of eastern Nepal. “Beyond their practical use, I was captivated by the cultural significance of the metalwork,” Viking said.&nbsp; He went to Dharan, renowned for its khukri makers, and tried to blend the scientific approach from his Swedish half with the traditional workmanship of his Nepali side. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/from-nalapani-to-kalapani">From Nalapani to Kalapani,</a> Alisha Sijapati  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240209140228_21b31ac725d3fd81e37dcc4e6e00a7eb3adbb64e3d719fb1e6ce7e731546564f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20240209140228_21b31ac725d3fd81e37dcc4e6e00a7eb3adbb64e3d719fb1e6ce7e731546564f" data-rendition-name="original" width="3775" height="5662" loading="lazy" alt="Viking"> </figure>  He opened his shop, but nearly lost hope during the Covid lockdown. Now his khukri business is gaining traction, and Kunwor's knives are exported to Europe and the United States. Besides khukris, he also makes kitchen knives for which there now seems to be healthy demand in Nepal itself. Kunwor has also noted a shift in people's attitudes towards heritage preservation in Nepal.&nbsp; Many Nepalis are reaching out to him to clean and seek advice on maintaining ancestral swords that have adorned their prayer rooms. He helps willingly, because it invovles cultural preservation that is an integral part of Nepal's heritage. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/letters-from-the-western-front">Letters from the Western front</a>, Alisha Sijapati

Alisha Sijapati

Viking's khukri passion

Eight years ago, at a busy Thamel restaurant, a promising new plan to set up an animal vaccine facility in Nepal was born during a meeting with a professor from the University of California-Davis. The idea was to innovate a cold chain-free viral vaccine that could be transported to rural Nepal without logistical problems and, ultimately, to increase the accessibility of vaccines for small farmers. A government agency in the Netherlands agreed to chip in almost half a million euros to the project as a matching fund. A few Dutch investors along with Nepali companies were interested in the project as well. So a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/alternative-investments-to-attract-fdi">Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) </a>company called BIOVAC Nepal was established in 2017. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/invest-in-investment">Invest in investment</a>, Nepali Times Data from the poultry sector showed that the venture made business sense and had high social impact. So we prepared to get this innovative high-tech company up and running. The Australian government also pledged money for additional research and enhanced manufacturing capacity. Everyone was excited. But very quickly, as happens often in Nepal, that excitement turned into frustration. Ahead of the Nepal Investment Summit 2024 from 28-29 April in Kathmandu, this is an account of how deep the rot has set in. Fix this before trying to attract any investors. Registration for the FDI company alone took almost a year, followed by senseless bureaucratic hurdles. We thought the Department of Livestock was the main agency for permits for an animal vaccine facility, only to find out a year later that it was the Department of Drug Administration (DDA). Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/alternative-investments-to-attract-fdi">Alternative investments to attract FDI</a>, Siddhant Raj Pandey There was no clear instruction and guidance and we were kept running around in circles trying to figure out the procedure. Finally, after six grueling years of effort, we set up a state-of-the-art animal vaccine research, development and manufacturing facility. It took another year and half to get a commercial license for our first product.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240210140220_de2e166db4c2b9385179489558c94c9e83ee248a0532d01d2a4ce14b1a44d20f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20240210140220_de2e166db4c2b9385179489558c94c9e83ee248a0532d01d2a4ce14b1a44d20f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1125" loading="lazy" alt="entrepreneuship in Nepal"> </figure>  The business culture in Nepal is so primitive that contracts are not worth the paper they are signed on. For vaccine commercialisation, we signed an agreement with a local distributor for exclusive partnership with volume commitments and a joint marketing effort. That did not go according to what was planned and agreed upon. But there was little we could do other than almost beg for help. Recovering money from issued invoices was excruciatingly difficult, if not impossible. After producing our thoroughly researched and tested vaccine, we then had to go the extra mile to prove that it actually worked. We published all our testing and validation data in internationally recognised and peer-reviewed scientific journals. Even then, we had to constantly face the doubts of Nepali farmers as we attempted to convince them that our product was as good as if not better than imported ones. But there seemed to be little faith in ‘Made in Nepal’.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/success-in-nepal-means-not-having-to-work">Success in Nepal means not having to work</a>, Anil Chitrakar Nepal’s poultry industry is inefficient in terms of production. For example, the productivity of the Cobb 500 broiler chicken in the US is almost 99%, meaning there is only a 1% loss due to mortality. The same breed of chicken in Nepal sometimes has a production efficiency of less than 70%. Disease outbreaks due to poor biosecurity and immunisation are the main reasons. BIOVAC provided a comprehensive disease prevention service, but was unable to convince farmers to sign up for measures that would guarantee better production success. There was a resistance to new ideas.&nbsp; The unpredictability in business projections meant that we had to look for additional funds. Local banks, although very approachable, are often boxed into traditional ways of lending money through real estate collaterals. Government directives are often lacking or confusing. Every investment loan is looked at from a real estate prism. Two of Nepal’s major universities produce hundreds of biotech graduates every year. A majority of them eventually emigrate. Over 16 years ago, we opened up one of Nepal’s most modern biotech companies. Since then, many of these graduates have been able to learn and work on cutting edge vaccine research and production. But instead of appreciation, we have been harassed and obstructed by government agencies every step of the way. Even ‘social impact investment’ providers who scrutinised our books told us we did not have a sound commercial plan. Some of the criticism was constructive, but they saw it as yet another ‘hydro’ project. The project was in the national interest, building not only vaccines but also the highly skilled human resources needed to go from a trading and importing nation to a country of cutting-edge innovation. The narrow definition of rate of return meant that the ‘social impact’ was lost in translation. Ever since I returned to Nepal from the US 16 years ago, I have seen a gradual breakdown of governance. The overall mood of the country is cynical and gloomy. Scientists and innovators are valued even less, which is why there is an exodus of our best and brightest. After dedicating almost seven years of my life to build something that we believed the country needed, my entrepreneurial urge is dampened. The odds are stacked against innovation and invention, this has become a land of rent-seekers and traders. Dibesh Karmacharya has a PhD in Conservation and Microbiome Genetics from Griffith University, Australia. He is the Founder/Chair of the Center for Molecular Dynamics Nepal, Intrepid Nepal and BIOVAC Nepal.

Killing investment in Nepal in 10 easy steps

One hundred years after Nepal’s Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher Rana signed a historic treaty with British envoy in Nepal W F T O’Connor, the ceremony has been remembered in the same palace chamber in Kathmandu. The ‘Treaty of Friendship between Great Britain and Nepal’ was signed on 21 December 1923 at the Belayati Baithak at Singha Darbar in Kathmandu. On the same day 100 years later, Nepal’s Foreign Minister N P Saud and British Ambassador Rob Fenn sat almost at the exit spot to reenact the event. The treaty is considered by historians as being the single most important accord in which the world’s sole colonial superpower at the time recognised and guaranteed Nepal’s sovereignty, and proof that the British considered Nepal an independent nation and different from Indian princely states.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231224021248_093d05a99c42d769b6b63eb21b1e9a59bda0b01eefe329b9ec5a62e5761e7f90.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20231224021248_093d05a99c42d769b6b63eb21b1e9a59bda0b01eefe329b9ec5a62e5761e7f90" data-rendition-name="original" width="1024" height="768" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty NT "></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231224021248_5418b1c49013296154f9ebb4a2b55fbeb7b21c1303bdbbe15533b5991d7a9f2e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20231224021248_5418b1c49013296154f9ebb4a2b55fbeb7b21c1303bdbbe15533b5991d7a9f2e" data-rendition-name="original" width="1024" height="768" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty NT "></figure>  “Nepal was never colonised and was always a sovereign nation,” said Fenn at the centenary ceremony on Thursday. Saud, for his part, described the 1923 treaty as a “powerful document” which allowed Nepal to find common ground with a global power at a time when many Asian and African countries were under colonialism.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231224021248_093d05a99c42d769b6b63eb21b1e9a59bda0b01eefe329b9ec5a62e5761e7f90.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20231224021248_093d05a99c42d769b6b63eb21b1e9a59bda0b01eefe329b9ec5a62e5761e7f90" data-rendition-name="original" width="1024" height="768" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty NT "></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231224021248_3d64314ed46c2f319e8794ca15cd9fd4cd2d3f20a5083c535646ec3ae8680f3e.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20231224021248_3d64314ed46c2f319e8794ca15cd9fd4cd2d3f20a5083c535646ec3ae8680f3e" data-rendition-name="original" width="768" height="613" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty NT "></figure>  Nepal’s newly appointed Foreign Secretary Sewa Lamsal lauded Britain’s cooperation in Nepal’s development efforts in the past 100 years. She added: “Britain upgraded its residency in Kathmandu to an embassy, and Nepal’s relations with the international community began to expand after the treaty.” The Belayati Baithak state hall was used for ceremonial occasions at Singha Darbar, the grand palace that Chandra Shumsher built in 1908. It is inside the western facade of the Singha Darbar which is now the central secretariat of the Nepal government.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231224021248_cbecb8fa8b2fceb63274c1c867617932cf235b63c0ed47b5a3245f0994136079.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20231224021248_cbecb8fa8b2fceb63274c1c867617932cf235b63c0ed47b5a3245f0994136079" data-rendition-name="original" width="1024" height="768" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty NT "></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20231224021248_c1afa322a868baf0ccb26626ba821f636cf9478b859e3adb44d15e1623c5e7d9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20231224021248_c1afa322a868baf0ccb26626ba821f636cf9478b859e3adb44d15e1623c5e7d9" data-rendition-name="original" width="768" height="1024" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty NT "></figure>  It was saved during the devastating fire that destroyed most of Singha Darbar in 1972, and was badly damaged in the 2015 earthquake. Experts advised that it be demolished and be replaced with a modern building. However, heritage conservationists lobbied the National Reconstruction Authority to repair and retrofit the facade, and restore both the interior and the exterior to its original splendour. The neo-classical hall is 50m long and 10m wide and decorated with ornate mirrors, paintings and even a fountain which have all been reinstalled. The room opens out into a wide balcony that overlooks the front garden, the palace gate and the city beyond.

Nepal, Britain mark centenary of 1923 treaty

The daily 10-hour curfew at Tribhuvan International Airport from 8 November that will last five months has affected tourism during Nepal’s peak season, with some hotels and trekking agencies here reporting cancellations into spring next year. The reduced hours at Nepal’s main aviation gateway till 31 March means that a third of all flights have been cut. This has also caused ticket prices to surge by up to eight times of normal fares. For example a Kathmandu-Delhi ticket that used to cost Rs12,000 is now listed at Rs50,000, and even then seats are not available.&nbsp; “Especially if they are here to trek, change in flight dates can cause tourists to miss their connections,” says Jagan Timilsina, who runs a trail running and outdoor education business. &nbsp; Pokhara is feeling the brunt as hotels report last-minute cancellations for November because of flight disorders. Some hoteliers also say although there have been some cancelled trips, most itineraries have been rescheduled.&nbsp; Hari Prasad Sharma Gaire of the local chapter of the Hotel Association of Nepal says the Kathmandu airport closure should have been timed for the off-season. He told us: “Starting construction during the peak tourist season was a mistake and will cause the tourism industry to lose a lot of business. The upgrade could have been spread out over a longer time but closed for fewer hours at night so that disruption was minimal.”&nbsp; Nearly a third of the 1.2 million tourists who visit Nepal annually come to Pokhara, which is also the gateway to Mustang, the Annapurna treks and pilgrimage tourism to Muktinath. Located by scenic lakes with a range of adventure sports like hot air ballooning, paragliding, canyoning, bungee and ziplines, Pokhara is also popular among diaspora Nepalis. “Besides its own attractions, Pokhara is really the hub for central Nepal, and we have been trying to get visitors to extend their stay here,” says Timilsina, who started out as a trekking porter and rose up the ranks to be an expedition guide and entrepreneur. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111603114_0e071ce63ea9b0a9a7ee76f8c3cea0ff08c6767c41dd09f6bc4413d2db067a60.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024111603114_0e071ce63ea9b0a9a7ee76f8c3cea0ff08c6767c41dd09f6bc4413d2db067a60" data-rendition-name="original" width="3500" height="2333" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara's tourism woes NT"> <figcaption>Tourist arrivals in Pokhara have slumped since the disruptions at Kathmandu airport due to upgrading work. Photo: KRISHNA MANI BARAL/NEPALI TIMES ARCHIVE</figcaption> </figure>  Even without the Kathmandu airport closure affecting tourist arrivals, Pokhara was already suffering from a decline due to many factors like the poor state of the Prithvi Highway, the shortage of luxury accommodation for high-end tourists, and the reluctance of international airlines to start direct flights to Pokhara despite an expensive new airport that was inaugurated two years ago.&nbsp; “There was a lot of initial excitement on the construction of the international airport,” says Timilsina, “but it hasn’t delivered as expected due to politics. People have invested in nearby businesses, and have faced losses.” India has blocked direct flights from its cities to Pokhara because the facility was built by a Chinese company. Although tourists and pilgrims from India hit record levels this year, the poor state of the highways and the Indian bus accident on the highway to Kathmandu in July that killed 27 pilgrims from Maharashtra state dampened arrival figures. Gaire says, “While tourist arrivals to Pokhara are now approaching pre-Covid levels, we haven’t seen the improvement we were expecting. We need a better marketing strategy. What are our embassies abroad doing?”&nbsp; Indeed, Pokhara used to be a favourite destination for Chinese tourists. There was a boom in arrivals from China before Covid, especially after a popular Chinese tv serial was shot on location here. But arrivals from China have not really recovered since the pandemic because of the economic slowdown there. Promoting Pokhara airport to handle direct flights from Chengdu or Kunming could revive Chinese arrivals.&nbsp; Nepal’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAAN) has used the Kathmandu airport closure as an excuse to arm-twist international airlines to start flying to Bhairawa, which has barely been in operation for two years since it was inaugurated. So far, Fly Dubai, Thai AirAsia, Jazeera and Qatar are flying to Bhairawa, but most use it as a hop before flying on to Kathmandu, which does not reduce congestion at Kathmandu.&nbsp; An ideal situation could have been to get Pokhara to run to full capacity while Kathmandu is partially out of action. Pokhara entrepreneurs are puzzled why the CAAN and the national government have not taken more interest in promoting Pokhara as an alternative to reduce the congestion in Kathmandu. Nepal’s football team that was flying to Dushanbe this week couldn’t get tickets via Delhi, and took a domestic flight to Bhadrapur, crossed over to Bagdogra and flew on to Delhi to catch their flight to Tajikistan.

Pokhara’s tourism woes

An excerpt of a conversation between an anthropologist and linguist Mark Turin, PhD and Lava Deo Awasthi, PhD, the first Chairperson of the Language Commission of Nepal. Nepali Times: What is the role of Nepal’s Language Commission and when was it formed? Lava Deo Awasthi: The Constitution of Nepal (2015) created a Language Commission (LC) with the following four core mandates: (a) to develop eligibility criteria for gaining status as an official language and offer recommendations to the Government of Nepal about the official language(s) in each province; (b) to offer recommendations to the Government about measures to be taken for the conservation, promotion, and development of languages; (c) to suggest possible ways of using mother tongues in education by assessing their stage of development; and, (d) to conduct studies, carry out research and perform monitoring functions about the response to the constitutional provisions for the federalisation of languages in Nepal. The Commission was founded in 2016 and I was appointed as the Chairperson of the Commission in September of the same year by the Cabinet of Ministers. What in your own professional and educational background helped to prepare you for the role? I have worked with the Government of Nepal for about 30 years, alongside holding teaching appointments at universities in Nepal. Prior to assuming the role of the Chairperson of the Commission, I served as permanent Secretary to the Government of Nepal and worked as the Chief Administrator of the Central Development Region. I was appointed as Director General of the Department of Education and completed my assignments as Joint Secretary at the Planning, Monitoring and Educational Administration Divisions of the Ministry of Education.&nbsp; In addition, I have taught courses as a visiting professor at Tribhuvan University and Kathmandu University for more than three decades. Later, I also started supervising MPhil and PhD students at the Far Western University in Mahendranagar, Kanchanpur. My PhD project from the Danish University of Education was dedicated to making sense of Nepal’s social construct and commitment to multilingualism, exploring the persistence of monolingual school practices in the face of constitutional promises and state commitments to multilingualism. I conducted a survey of Nepal’s languages and carried out a qualitative study of the Tharu language in the district of Bardia. I analysed language policy statements and explored classroom pedagogies in schools. I documented how teachers showed a tendency to resist change and maintain the status quo because they were not consulted when new educational language policies were introduced. Teachers also exhibited a deeply-held adherence to the Gurukul education system which appears to have been harnessed as a way to resist newer pedagogical ideologies imported from the West. Recognising how engrained these rich traditions of knowledge transmission are, I wanted to know how students’ engagement in the learning process appeared to have dwindled, creating a gap between children’s home languages and the language(s) of the school. Whilst statutory provisions for education in the mother tongue were oriented towards promotion, classroom pedagogies remained resolutely monolingual and exclusionary. The result was that multilingual education policies that had been introduced in Nepal did not result in meaningful changes in classroom practices. My research was also a reflection of childhood traumas I had experienced at the earliest stage of formal education. My home language, Baitadeli, has a strong oral tradition and no written literature. English is my fifth language in terms of exposure and competence, and my home district of Baitadi is well-known for its loyalty to the local language. I had to drop out of school after completing my sixth grade. Staying at home, I received much attention from my family and had much greater exposure to my native language, culture and environment. My overall impression is that dropping out of school had a surprisingly positive impact on my life. The opportunity offered a surprising dividend for me as I gained mastery in my mother tongue and received extensive exposure to folk literature and Indigenous knowledge and survival skills, cultivating my interest in language, culture, literature and local cosmologies.&nbsp; Now that I reflect on it, I appreciate how language has always played a key role in my life. I grew up in a multilingual environment: brought up with Baitadeli, Hindi, Sanskrit, Nepali and English. Language played a major part in my decision to leave school and my later success is closely linked to my competence in several languages. It was rewarding to be at home with my family as I deepened my understanding of native language and culture, which in turn helped me to harness and refine my art of living. Languages matter so much to me because they are both software and hardware. Later, when I was in secondary school, I realised that my command of my home language contributed significantly to enhancing my Nepali and English. I used my mother tongue as a form of linguistic capital to strengthen my competence in both English and Nepali.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111811110_5400ba54792bf9e4854e1c1effde8bf09804e99647f23513700b450cc49adc4a.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024111811110_5400ba54792bf9e4854e1c1effde8bf09804e99647f23513700b450cc49adc4a" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="Dr Lava Deo Awasthi"> </figure>  In your term as the Commission’s first Chairperson, what were your strategic goals and objectives? My first strategic goal was to create an environment conducive to implementing the provisions of the Constitution of Nepal in relation to language. My priority was to prepare a detailed action plan for my six-year tenure in consultation with language stakeholders, including language experts, professionals, activists, Indigenous community members and representatives of relevant national and local-level institutions. The Commission formed a body of high-level advisors to ensure that the Chairperson’s work was well-informed and credible. The advisors to the committee had highly visible professional and social reputations in Nepal and had much experience in the field of language conservation, promotion, research and development. Another strategy we adopted was to establish close institutional linkages with federal, provincial, and local level governments for collecting opinions and disseminating information widely.&nbsp; What critical issues did you have to consider while discharging your duty? When Nepal’s new Constitution was drafted, a number of concerns could not be adequately addressed. These related to the conservation of languages, the recognition of official languages at the provincial level, and the use of mother tongues at federal, provincial, and local levels. These unresolved issues and matters pertaining to the federalizsation of Nepal’s languages were passed on to the Language Commission to address and resolve.&nbsp; Regarding the recommendations for official languages, a five-year timeline had been set by the Constitution. With great effort, we succeeded in having all provinces agree to recognise their official languages as per the recommendations of the Commission.&nbsp; What were your greatest achievements during your term? One of the greatest achievements was that we succeeded in setting a language agenda at all levels. Nepal’s language communities and other stakeholders expressed the view that this was the first time their languages were recognised and their voices heard by the state. People participated in debates and discussed issues relating to language that in all likelihood had never before happened in their lifetimes, at least not in ways that were supported by the state. We encouraged people to speak in their own language(s) and provided translators during plenary sessions and group discussions. Another major achievement was developing criteria for the status planning of languages at federal, provincial, and local levels, and to recommend 11 province-level official languages, in addition to the Nepali language. Similarly, a notable achievement was recognising Indigenous languages spoken by smaller communities, all of whom faced ongoing marginalisation and high levels of endangerment. The Commission identified 9 new languages that had not been reported in the 2011 census, and provided a framework for recognising official languages within a municipality. The commission emphasised the need for documentation and digitisation of languages for developing corpora and archives at national and sub-national levels.&nbsp; Languages of historical importance as well as classical languages were given recognition for their protection, growth, and development. Recommendations were made for the conservation, promotion and development of Nepal’s marginalised languages that are threatened by majority languages and for those languages that hold particular power at local and global levels. Recommendations were also made for how best to safeguard Nepal’s languages from the ever-growing spread of English and other powerful, globalising languages.&nbsp; A further important aspect of the Commission’s work was to emphasise mother tongue medium instruction in schools across the nation. Recognising the role of language in children’s cognitive, socio-emotional and academic development, the Commission suggested strategies for linking schools with ward-level language clusters for use in the classroom. The importance of nurturing and respecting a child’s first language was reiterated in the Commission’s recommendations for children’s learning and all-round development. By the end of my term, a remarkable change could be observed in terms of building trust within and across Nepal’s diverse language communities. A network of language groups and stakeholders across the country proved to be a powerful way of bringing all language communities under one roof for a collective review of and response to the process of federalising language policy. The many language stakeholders across Nepal appreciated the opportunity to work within a coordinated framework, and—feeling empowered by this—seemed genuinely enthusiastic about the initiatives taken by the Commission.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024111811114_b45297fdd2fedf17bdb6313e495a1062c0d87f1a19fa5349f871f220b75f93ab.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2024111811114_b45297fdd2fedf17bdb6313e495a1062c0d87f1a19fa5349f871f220b75f93ab" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Dr Lava Deo Awasthi NT"> </figure>  What were the most significant challenges for you as Chairperson? One of the major challenges was winning people’s trust in advocating for the mission of the Language Commission. I faced considerable resistance as I sought to emphasise the use of native languages in families and communities. While the Commission advocated for multilingualism and promoted linguistic diversity, the prevailing policy circles and central level institutions had been deeply influenced by a one-language discourse and ideology of Nepali only. The spread of English also poses a huge threat to Nepal’s languages. However, people in power do not seem to see this as a problem. They tend to abandon their own languages in preference for English. The way that Nepal’s municipalities are increasingly introducing English as a medium of instruction at the earliest stage of a child’s school-based education has proven to be detrimental to their cognitive development, socio-emotional wellbeing and academic success. Most of Nepal’s elites have been heavily influenced by the spread of English and remain unaware about its impact on their home languages as well as on the inter-generational transmission of Indigenous languages in the country. I wish that we could have produced more compelling evidence to show the consequences of making poor policy choices for our children’s education. Demystification calls for a collective response. To make change happen across this entire, complex and federalising country was daunting work and left like a race against time. I feel that I could have done more to offer concrete examples in favour of using the mother tongue as a medium of children’s education at the earliest stages of a child’s education. What do you see the Language Commission achieving in the next 5-10 years? The Language Commission will have to ensure that all of its key recommendations are implemented at all levels of government. In 10 years’ time, all seven of Nepal’s provinces will have their official languages in place. These languages will also be recognised as languages of federal business, alongside Nepali. I anticipate that all official languages in the federal and provincial systems will have a national portal for inter-language corpora using machine translation to fulfil their federal, provincial and local level language functions, and that all languages spoken in Nepal will be represented through a digital database in the national archive. The Office of Statistics will monitor the status of Nepal’s languages over time. By the end of the next decade, each municipality in the country will have recognised one or two official languages at the local level, based on speech populations. Other local languages will have received community-level legal recognition and official status to fulfil their functional roles. Languages that are highly endangered or at risk will be entitled to receive state grants for enhancing local level capabilities to encourage families and young learners to speak the language. Incentive schemes will be introduced in municipalities that promote language within the family and at home. Inter-generational transmission of languages will have received welcome and timely attention across Nepal. It is my hope that all schools—public and private—will have introduced mother tongue medium instruction at the earliest stage of school education, at least up to class five. Nepali, English and other national as well as classical and foreign languages will be taught as subjects. The existing policy of English medium education at the early stage of education will be abolished. The Government of Nepal will be held accountable if the number of speakers of any language decreases or if local communities face language loss and greater endangerment. Under the aegis of the Language Commission, a Centre for Language Research and Innovation will be created with world-class facilities for language documentation and archiving in collaboration with Tribhuvan University’s Central Department of Linguistics and other relevant institutions. Harnessing the vastness of Nepal’s linguistic diversity, the Language Commission will morph into a centre of excellence for national and international communities to engage in collaborative language research, to share experiences and document best practices at in service of global linguistic diversity and Nepal’s many Indigenous languages.

Languages are both software and hardware

Nearly 750,000 Nepalis went abroad for employment in the past year, and more than 100,000 left on student visas. Most of them were young Nepali men and women, and the number has been increasing every year. As with other sections of society, Nepal’s security agencies also face a recruitment crisis. Nepal Police opened recruitment for 64 inspectors in September, and received 2,239 applications, compared to 2,718 candidates last year. Police also invited candidates for 256 assistant sub-inspectors this year for which it received 17,756 applications – down from 19,932 last year. It is the same story in the Nepal Army, the number of applicants for the post of Officer Cadet (Second Lieutenant) went down from 6,144 for 400 open seats in 2019 to 4,390 in 2020. Meanwhile, applicants in the paramilitary Armed Police Force went down from 857 applications for 75 posts in 2021 to 536 applicants for 99 posts last year. While the number of applicants appears higher than the demand, the data shows a significant decrease in applications for vacancies in Nepal’s law enforcement agencies. Security personnel are recruited on the basis of rank and age in Nepal, and the age cutoff for entry into Nepal’s security agencies is typically 25 years. Sociologist and migration expert Ganesh Gurung says that the demographic of young, physically fit Nepalis emigrating abroad in search of better opportunities has impacted recruitment into law enforcement and the military here at home. “The returns from working in Nepal’s police and army are minimal, whereas overseas job opportunities are more attractive,” Gurung says. “The work may be physically demanding abroad, but the pay is a lot higher.”  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241116041148_a7e477e0ee2f56acf16c2559fdb24d8f0377f7bc1f9e56138bc40108fc4fa33f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20241116041148_a7e477e0ee2f56acf16c2559fdb24d8f0377f7bc1f9e56138bc40108fc4fa33f" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="534" loading="lazy" alt="Nepal Police"><figcaption>Nepal Police</figcaption></figure>  Nepal Police spokesperson DIG Dan Bahadur Karki agrees that the physical and mental demands of a law enforcement job is incomparable to the income that security personnel earn. “A young Nepali who works in Dubai earns enough to build a home in the village within four years, while a Nepali with the same qualifications and physical ability in a security agency here barely makes enough to survive,” says Karki. “Obviously the youth prefer foreign employment.” Security agencies are now worried about the quality of inducted manpower. “There is a difference in work ethic between an applicant chosen from a competitive pool of 50 candidates versus one chosen from a pool of three candidates,” explains Gurung. “Unmotivated employees hamper the overall performance of the state apparatus.” Nepal Army spokesperson Brigadier General Gaurab Kumar KC says recruitment has not been hampered by outmigration: “We have still been getting more than three times the applicants than there are open posts, so we are not yet worried.” Even so, the passing rates of aspirants have gone down for security forces after the Public Service Commission began examinations for military recruitment in 2015. In fact, the Nepal Army complained about the Commission’s involvement in recruitment. Still, the number of vacant military posts tends to exceed the number of passing candidates. Nepal Army’s KC says that the military will not compromise on intake criteria even if there are fewer passing applicants. “Unqualified persons will not be admitted even if there are less-than-required passing candidates. We will re-advertise if that is the case.” But Nepal’s security forces now also have to worry about retention of existing personnel. About 900 Nepal Army, 600 Nepal Police, and 300 Armed police personnel resign every year before the completion of their tenure.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241116041148_b8cd62f70eea3aac7d3d3778615a5b70b1e20550c9bd76321f051f9c766fd2a9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20241116041148_b8cd62f70eea3aac7d3d3778615a5b70b1e20550c9bd76321f051f9c766fd2a9" data-rendition-name="original" width="750" height="378" loading="lazy" alt="Armed police forces"><figcaption>Armed Police Force</figcaption></figure>  In 2020, Home Minister Ram Bahadur Thapa recalled almost 1,000 police personnel who had been deployed for the security of VIPs after long-standing criticism that security forces were being misused to cater to political and bureaucratic leadership. However, security personnel have continued to be assigned to high-ranking officials as glorified housekeepers. In December 2022, Rabi Lamichhane’s Home Ministry had instructed its offices to recall unauthorised security personnel assigned to high-ranking officials, following which 500 officers from Nepal Police and Armed Police Force were withdrawn from their details. But the Nepal Army does not have to follow such rules, and the practice of army personnel serving high-ranking active-duty and retired military personnel remains. Conditions here are dire enough that many active duty officers in Nepal’s military and police forces have chosen to leave their jobs to serve in the Russian Army to fight in the Ukraine war. The hierarchical culture and chain of command of politics, bureaucracy, law enforcement and military has also meant that abuse and mistreatment of subordinates is rife in Nepal’s security forces. “Feudalism is alive and well within our security institutions,” says Gurung. “When soldiers and security forces who swore to protect and serve the nation are made to be at the beck and call of politicians and bureaucrats, it is easy to understand why they are disillusioned with their jobs and why they choose to quit and find jobs abroad.”

Job insecurity in security forces

Earlier this month, Nepal received Rs1.6 billion from the World Bank as part of its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/will-nepal-ever-be-paid-for-saving-trees">Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)</a>, rewarding the country for increasing its carbon sink capacity. Nepal is the first in South Asia to benefit from this facility, and it is specifically to recompense the country for increasing forest cover in 13 Tarai districts between 2018-2024. “We are also trying to get another Rs13 billion from the facility while also preparing for free market-based carbon trading in the international market,” says Nabaraj Pudasaini of the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries) Implementation Centre. Big emitters of greenhouse gases are under pressure to reduce their carbon emissions, and many have signed agreements to do so by investing in decarbonisation projects in developing countries. Countries that emit more than a specified amount of carbon would be able to buy emission rights from countries that emit less. Nepal is internationally known for its community forestry program which has been largely credited for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/tree-mendous">increasing tree cover to over 45%</a> in less than three decades. But this achievement had not been adequately recognised or rewarded internationally before. Forests, especially in the tropics, absorb and store large amounts of carbon while releasing oxygen in a process known as photosynthesis. <a href="https://www.fao.org/forest-resources-assessment/en/">Preventing deforestation</a> and increasing canopy cover is considered a much more achievable goal than reducing emission in the scale necessary to limit global average temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. COP11 in Montreal in 2005 first proposed reducing carbon emissions by improving forest quality by halting degradation. By 2015, a new mechanism of financial assistance was created to help less developed countries with sustainable management of forests <a href="https://www.un-redd.org/">(called REDD+)</a>. Under this new mechanism, countries receive aid based on their efforts to prevent forest degradation and increase carbon sink, and in 2021 the World Bank was entrusted with implementing it. Nepal’s FCPF receipt this month was calculated on the basis of 2.4 million tons of carbon stored at a rate of $5 per ton. In the second phase, Nepal will receive more than Rs4 billion within the next year for storing an additional 7 million tons of carbon. Eighty per cent of this amount obtained from carbon trading needs to be spent on local beneficiaries and indigenous communities.&nbsp; But carbon trading is not easy, Nepal needs to prove that protected forests will not be destroyed in future.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241121091132_c8a381c9a95aa86fec558951650d97bb87914741f01766982ba2b086af001f16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20241121091132_c8a381c9a95aa86fec558951650d97bb87914741f01766982ba2b086af001f16" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="999" loading="lazy" alt="Greenbacks for greenery NT "> <figcaption>Photo: KUNDA DIXIT</figcaption> </figure>  Explains carbon trading expert Yugan Manandhar. “Forests should be handed over to the community and shown that they are managed sustainably. Proving this will be particularly challenging; forest encroachment and degradation is rife in the Tarai.” <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/nepal-is-going-up-in-smoke">Deliberate forest fires</a> have also added to the challenge because they increase carbon emissions and reduce the sink capacity of forests. The basis for the amount that Nepal received was set five years ago by calculating the carbon reserves of forests in the 13 Tarai districts. In the meantime, sustainable forest management, tree plantation, forest destruction and erosion control were prioritised to increase carbon reserves in those forests. Nepal is signing another carbon trading agreement during the ongoing Baku climate conference. The <a href="https://www.leafcoalition.org/">Lowering Emissions by Accelerating Forest finance (LEAF Coalition) </a>proposes to sell the carbon stored in the forests of Bagmati, Gandaki and Lumbini provinces. For this, Nepal signed the letter of intent three years ago at COP26 in Glasgow. The target is to store 70 million tons of carbon in 32 million hectares of forest in the three provinces per which Nepal will receive Rs13 billion in four years at $10 per ton with provisions to increase the rate if various conditions are met. However, the agreement in itself doesn’t guarantee the amount. According to the targets set by Nepal, forest degradation should be stopped and carbon reserves increased by protecting tree cover. Preparations are also underway for clean air carbon trade because it has offset fossil fuel use by introducing 30,000 electric vehicles. Nepal has been selected for the first round to receive $40 million within one and a half years through the Clean Air System of the World Bank. Given that most of Nepal’s energy mix is from biomass, replacing them with electric stoves can significantly improve health by reducing indoor pollution as well as strengthen the country’s capacity for carbon trade. “Nepal's goal now is to sell carbon in the free market where carbon credits are bought and sold based on supply and demand in an open and transparent manner,” adds Pudasaini of the REDD Implementation Centre. “Nepal can now set its own price and bargain with interested buyer countries and organisations.” Lately, India has been discussing setting up a carbon market. Nepal has exported Rs12.72 billion worth of electricity to India so far this fiscal year, which can be traded under Nepal’s carbon market. “Carbon trading can create significant economic benefits for Nepal, which will help reinvest in development and environmental protection projects,” says Manandhar. “But we must prioritise sustainable management of forests, cutting older trees and allowing regrowth as well as promoting electric stoves and electric vehicles.”