India and Pakistan are twins separated at birth. Tensions between them have been at a hair trigger ever since independence and has erupted into full scale conflict at least four times in the past 80 years.
The 22 April terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 25 Indian tourists and a Nepali citizen, threatens to escalate tension between the two nuclear-armed nations. India has squarely blamed Pakistan for the attacks, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given his military “operational freedom” to respond. Pakistan has said it has credible intelligence of an Indian military strike and its officials have promised a “full spectrum” response — a code for a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/thinking-the-thinkable">nuclear retaliation</a>.
For Nepal, the killing of its national in the Pahalgam attack comes as another stark reminder that in conflicts from Afghanistan to Iraq, from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine">Ukraine</a> to Israel, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/10-nepalis-from-one-town-fighting-in-ukraine">Nepalis are getting caught in the crossfire</a>. The last time full-scale fighting broke out between <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">India and Pakistan</a> on Kargil in 1999, at least 22<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-trial-by-fire-for-soldiers-from-nepal?%27%5C%22="> Nepalis fighting for the Indian Army</a> were killed in action.
Three of Nepal’s immediate neighbours (China, India, Pakistan) have nuclear weapons, and they do not have good relations. With China supplying weapons, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/war-and-warming">missile technology</a> and other support to Pakistan, this triangular friction could set off a regional conflagration.&nbsp;
<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0" target="_blank">Research at Rutgers University</a> has calculated that even a week-long tactical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would throw up so much smoke and debris into the atmosphere that it would block out the sun for years, and lead to a collapse of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/grow-nourish-sustain-together-world-food-day">global food system</a>. This does not take into account the radioactive fallout that prevailing winds would blow up to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lives-on-the-line-in-the-himalaya">the Himalaya</a>, contaminating glaciers that are the sources of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/saving-what-is-left-of-himalayan-rivers">Asia’s main rivers</a>.
The impact of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/climate-breakdown-linked-to-thame-flood">climate breakdown </a>on High Asia was already ringing alarm bells about its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/himalayan-icecap-melting-faster-than-thought">shrinking ice cap</a> reducing the dry season flow of water downstream. Water was going to be the next strategic commodity, geopolitical experts warned, and the next wars in Asia would be over water.
That water war is already happening. India retaliated to the Kashmir attack by suspending the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/world/asia/india-pakistan-indus-waters-treaty.html" target="_blank">Indus Waters Treaty</a> of 1960 mediated by the World Bank that has withstood at least three wars between India and Pakistan. The treaty gives India control over the three eastern tributaries of the Indus (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beas_River" target="_blank">Beas</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ravi_River" target="_blank">Ravi</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sutlej" target="_blank">Sutlej</a>), while Pakistan got water from the Indus and two of its western tributaries (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_River" target="_blank">Indus</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chenab_River" target="_blank">Chenab</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jhelum_River" target="_blank">Jhelum</a>.
Pakistan was assured of 70% of the annual flow, and India could use a reasonable amount of water for<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15231"> irrigation and hydropower</a>. &nbsp;Within days of its threat, India stopped water flowing down to Pakistan from the Chenab river and is reportedly preparing to do the same on the Jhelum.
The sabre-rattling has reached a crescendo. Besides threats and counter-threats there are also symbolic drills, with the Indian Air Force practicing landing on an expressway in Uttar Pradesh by its Rafale, Su-30 and Jaguar fighter jets to demonstrate ‘operational readiness’. In response Pakistan test-fired its Abdali ballistic missile that can carry a nuclear warhead and has a range of 450km.&nbsp;
The danger is that with ultra-nationalist rhetoric and the beating the war drums by both sides, India’s government and Pakistan’s military may have to ‘do something’ to appease domestic public opinion. But any tactical strike, an artillery exchange, or territorial incursion could quickly escalate out of control.
Expecting an Indian retaliation for the Pahalgam killings, Pakistan is using<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/interfaith-collaboration-for-nuclear-disarmament"> nuclear deterrence </a>and warning of “catastrophic consequences”. The two neighbours came close to a nuclear exchange in 2019 after an attack on the Indian military in Kashmir, and prompt international intervention led by the United States cooled tensions.&nbsp;
This time, the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">Trump administration</a> is too distracted and not as engaged. Pakistan has denied it was responsible for the terrorist attack and called on Washington to stop a possible Indian retaliation. India and Pakistan have stopped overflights by each other’s airlines, and some international carriers have even stopped flying over Pakistan fearing an air war.
Washington, Beijing, the UN and the EU have all urged restraint. Iran, which has good relations with both India and Pakistan has sent its foreign minister to urge both countries not to go into a tit-for-tat war. Iran has its own nuclear flashpoint to worry about with tensions in Israel, &nbsp;Yemen and Syria.
India and Pakistan both share similar problems of joblessness, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/why-nepal-s-poverty-rate-is-stuck">poverty </a>and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/climate-change-new-threat-to-nepal-s-rhinos">environmental threats</a>. Neither side needs the threat of a senseless war, and we in the neighbourhood do not need it either.&nbsp;
Kunda Dixit
This Editorial is brought to you by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/" target="_blank">Nepali Times</a>, in collaboration with <a href="https://inpsjapan.com/en/" target="_blank">INPS Japan</a> and <a href="https://sgi-peace.org/" target="_blank">Soka Gakkai International</a>, in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

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Nukes in the neighbourhood

The armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953 has been mentioned as a possible model for how to end the fighting in Ukraine. This makes sense. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">Trump administration</a>, however, seems to opt for a quick deal like the 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam or the Minsk agreements of 2014–15, combining “ceasefires in place” with vain prospects of subsequently reaching a genuine <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/restorative-justice-for-peace-building">peace agreement</a>.
One lesson from the negotiations that led to the Korean armistice is that patient diplomacy is needed to end a stalemated war. When talks began in July 1951, the impatient Mao Zedong estimated that two weeks would be enough to conclude. The negotiations instead took two years.
The result was a long text, detailing the exact border line and establish a demilitarised zone across the peninsula under UN supervision. The stated intention was to follow up with a peace agreement. This came to nothing. The conference established for the purpose in Geneva decided instead to reach an agreement on Indochina, dividing Vietnam for the next 21 years and replacing the French with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-world-9-11-made">American military forces</a>.
The biggest difference between the Korea and Ukraine wars is that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/ukraines-lessons-for-sandwiched-nations-like-nepal">Ukrainians are fighting alone</a>, with only external military support, while the Korean War was primarily fought by American and Chinese forces on Korean soil.
Back then, the armistice agreement was concluded by the commanders of the US-dominated UN forces, the Chinese “volunteers”, and the North Korean army, against the wish of Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul. He wanted to continue the fight for national reunification. Only after being offered a defence pact with the US did he accept the negotiated outcome, yet did not sign the agreement. South Korea has never signed the armistice that has prevented new <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2664">outbreaks of war</a>.
The key similarity between the Korean and Ukrainian wars is the prominent role of the USA as a supporter of the governments in Seoul and Kyiv. In both cases a condition for ensuring that an armistice can hold is that the US take responsibility for any agreement and joins up with others in providing security guarantees.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/is-the-time-ripe-for-an-end-to-the-ukraine-war">Is the time ripe for an end to the Ukraine war?</a> &nbsp;Herbert Wulf
A key reason why war has not resumed in Korea for the last 72 years is the continued US presence in the south. American troops act as a "tripwire," ensuring that any North Korean invasion would lead to a war it would surely lose. For the same reason, the US needs to have boots on the ground in Ukraine.
Another similarity is that any attempt to conclude a genuine peace agreement is futile. A genuine peace in Korea would require that North and South agree either on national reunification or on recognising each other as independent states, just as East and West Germany did in 1973.
A peace agreement was even more unthinkable for Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung in 1953–54 than it is for Seoul and Pyongyang today. It is just as inconceivable that President Vladimir Putin will withdraw voluntarily from Donbas and Krym as it is for President Volodymyr Zelensky to conclude a definitive peace agreement that does not recognise Ukrainian sovereignty to its entire territory.
To maintain the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also crucial for Europe and the UN that Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty is not internationally recognised. Therefore, just as the two Koreas, Russia and Ukraine must settle for something less than a peace treaty, namely an armistice. This may end the fighting and could save hundreds of thousands of lives but will not establish peace.
An armistice is not a simple ceasefire, where military forces are supposed to remain where they happen to be situated when the agreement is made. For a Ukrainian armistice to be respected, the Russian and Ukrainian forces must withdraw to either side of a clearly delineated demilitarised zone. This is complicated by the fact that the front lines are so long.
The easiest compromise would be for Ukraine to let Russia retain control over Krym, while Russia withdraws from Donbas. Third parties should put pressure on Moscow and Kyiv to accept that neat solution. To soften the pill, Ukraine could guarantee a high degree of local autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk.
International monitoring with the use of satellite surveillance along the entire border would be needed. If one or both parties were to mobilise combat forces, launch drone attacks, or place rocket launchers on alert, warning signals should be triggered and international security guarantees enforced by robust multi-national forces.
A final similarity between Korea 1953 and Ukraine 2025 armistice is that both sides must abstain from any political interference at the other side of the agreed boundary. Russia and Ukraine must remain fully sovereign and independent states.
Any rapprochement between the two Korean states continues to depend on Seoul’s ability to convince Pyongyang that it does not seek regime change in the north and on the willingness of Kim Jong Un to abstain from provocative <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/thinking-the-thinkable">missile tests</a> and vocal threats.&nbsp;
Putin apparently wants an agreement to include a provision for new elections in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/ukraine-crisis-hits-nepal-economy-hard">Ukraine</a>, so he can interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs and remove Zelensky from power. This is a destructive demand that should be consistently rejected by any mediating or facilitating party to talks. The Ukrainians must decide for themselves when to lift their state of emergency and hold<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/is-democracy-too-expensive-for-nepal"> democratic elections</a>.
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">President Trump</a> has put pressure on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire and has conceded on Ukraine’s behalf that it cannot get back all its lost territory or obtain NATO membership. He should now concentrate his efforts on convincing both sides to engage in negotiations for a strongly guaranteed and highly monitored armistice rather than a quick and fragile ceasefire or a dodgy settlement allowing one side to interfere in the other.
Stein Tønnesson is Senior Research Fellow (Peace and Security in Northeast Asia) at the Toda Peace Institute and Research Professor Emeritus, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2025/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine-lessons-from-korea.html">the original</a> with their permission.

How to agree an armistice in Ukraine

Last month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the first official <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/reaction-to-wang-yi-s-nepal-visit-in-chinese-media">foreign visit </a>of the commission in her second term would be to India. On the same day, Marco Rubio held his first bilateral meeting as US Secretary of State with India’s minister of external affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Washington last month confirmed his country’s rising international profile. The visit ended with the promise of what Modi called a US-India “mega partnership.” He has committed to double trade with the US by 2030, increase <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/half-full/A-carbon-neutral-Nepal-is-possible-clean-Nepal,1064">oil and gas imports</a>, and expand US military sales to India.
India is now the fastest-growing major <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/how-nepal-can-avert-an-economic-crunch">economy</a>, with the IMF forecasting a 6.5% increase in GDP this year. India is expected to overtake Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/india-s-election-and-its-economic-future">India’s election and its economic future</a>, Raghuram G Rajan
Despite its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/missing-out-on-nepal-s-tourism-potential">vast potential</a>, India has long been overlooked by the West, both <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/ukraine-crisis-hits-nepal-economy-hard">economically</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitically</a>. But a fundamental global realignment is now underway. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ has given way to an era of great-power competition that, unlike during the Cold War, features demands by emerging and developing economies for a more <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/making-nepal-accessible-to-all">inclusive </a>and representative multilateral system.&nbsp;
In this multipolar age, both the US and Europe see India, a neutral <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/no-binary-foreign-policy?fb_comment_id=3583384368393672_3586424038089705">foreign-policy </a>actor and dynamic<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18861"> emerging economy</a>, as vital to the future of their strategic priorities.&nbsp;
A founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, India has plenty of experience navigating precarious moments in <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4896">world affairs</a>. During the Cold War, it skillfully balanced its policies toward <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/america-nepal-and-the-royal-coup-qedzifz9">the US and the Soviet Union</a>.&nbsp;
When it engaged with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/so-far-so-good/the-vagaries-of-fate">the Soviet Union</a>, from which it received considerable <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/civil-military-synergy-in-disaster-management">military assistance</a>, it calibrated its approach to offset US support of Pakistan, without taking sides in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-rich-get-richer-and-more-powerful">great-power competition</a>.&nbsp;
India has since maintained this pragmatic balancing act, adapting its foreign policy to a shifting geopolitical landscape. Today, that means recognising its potential to shape global affairs, including by playing a leading role in building an efficient, realistic, and inclusive multilateralism.&nbsp;
This is reflected in Modi’s pursuit of a more assertive, internationalist foreign policy. Beyond building new partnerships and strengthening old ones, Modi has sought to increase <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-s-hindutva-politics-influencing-nepal">India’s influence </a>in traditional and emerging multilateral fora. In 2023 alone, India held the presidency of both the G20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a Chinese creation, comprising nine Middle Eastern and Asian countries).&nbsp;
India plays a leading role in the BRICS, and is characteristically nuanced: whereas Russia and, to a significant extent, China see themselves as disruptors of the existing order, India views itself as a reformer. This enables it to maintain strategic flexibility as it advances its interests.&nbsp;
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-china-rail-race">India’s relationship with China</a> is complicated by other factors. While the countries work together in some fora, they are also locked in protracted<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-bangladesh-border-talks-have-lessons-for-nepal"> territorial disputes</a> and a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-race-for-shital-nibas">competition for leadership</a> in the so-called Global South.&nbsp;
India’s growing global clout, including its appeal to Western powers, stems in large part from its ability to act as a counterweight to China. It is indispensable to the Quad alliance with Australia, Japan, and the US, a grouping that is officially focused on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-quad-maritime-security-and-climate-change">maritime security</a> and economic cooperation, though its members clearly seek to provide a buffer against China in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/between-two-oceans">Indo-Pacific region</a>. It is thanks to India that the Quad is not viewed as just another Western vehicle.&nbsp;
Modi has sought to bolster India’s Southern credentials, including by highlighting its status as the “mother of democracy”. By framing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/is-democracy-too-expensive-for-nepal">democracy</a> as intrinsic to Indian civilisation, rather than a colonial legacy, he aligned India with ‘middle powers’ seeking to redefine global governance on their own terms.&nbsp;
To be sure, Modi has moved India away from the secular and pluralistic values that had flourished after <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-goal-is-empowerment-and-independence-of-women">independence</a>, in favour of assertive <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/unconventional-convention">Hindu nationalism</a>. So many international indices have downgraded India’s democratic status that he is now seeking to create his own.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/demodification-of-india">Demodification of India</a>, Chandrakishore&nbsp;
Modi is the second leader of independent India (after Jawaharlal Nehru) to be elected to three consecutive terms, and remains a dominant force in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-faith-in-politics">Indian politics</a>.&nbsp;
And at a time of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-water-and-electricity">rapid geopolitical change</a>, he is committed to leveraging his position, and India’s profound strengths, to turn it into a global player. India has long had the potential to be an active shaper of international affairs. It has now arrived. &nbsp;&nbsp;© Project Syndicate
Ana Palacio, a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group, is a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University.

India has arrived

Till about 200 years ago <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-china-rail-race">China and India</a> were the world’s largest economies, and that helped Kathmandu prosper as an entrepôt between the two. We have now come full circle. China and India are ascendant once more, and the two giant neighbours can be the locomotives to pull Nepal along if we play our cards right. That is the message in former Kantipur editor <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/two-takes-on-the-nepal-india-nexus">Sudheer Sharma</a>’s omnibus edition of two books that explore the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/so-far-so-good/nepals-history-through-art">historical</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitical dimensions of Nepal</a>’s relations with China.&nbsp; The two Nepali language books, भिक्षु, व्यापार र बिद्रोह (Monks, Trade and Rebellion) and हिमालपारिको हुरी (Trans-Himalayan Hurricane) follow Sharma’s previous work प्रयोगशाला (Laboratory) which looked mainly at Nepal-India relations and was translated into English as The Nepal Nexus. The first book is predominantly about Kathmandu’s historical links with Lhasa, and by extension <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/beijing-30-zak6iu1w">Beijing</a>. Vajrayana Buddhism played a significant role in bringing the two sides of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lives-on-the-line-in-the-himalaya">the Himalaya</a> together, allowing social and trade relations to thrive.&nbsp; Princess Bhrikuti, King Narendra Dev and Arniko were prominent historical figures, but thousands of lesser known <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/monks-and-nuns-help-in-rescue-and-relief,2320">monks</a>, traders, and travellers also played their part in cementing Kathmandu-Lhasa ties. These connections were so strong that they endured three wars that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/beginning-of-the-end-of-the-gorkha-empire">Gorkha Kingdom</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/gift-a-goat-to-tibet-nomads-in-nepal">Tibet</a> fought against each other in which <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/neither-side-lost-both-sides-won">Chinese emperors</a> sent military help to fight off the Nepalis. Although<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-assam-connection-revived"> Nepal’s historic connections</a> with Tibet waned after the Chinese annexation of the plateau in the 1950s, it is on that foundation that present day <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-china-agreements-are-stuck">Nepal-China relations</a> are built.&nbsp; Till today, Nepal is the only country with a consulate in Lhasa, and the only <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/kathmandu-airport-to-cut-flight-hours">international flights</a> from Lhasa are to Kathmandu. But as Sharma notes, even back then, Nepal’s proximity with northern India figured importantly in its<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/home-is-where-the-heart-is-yqkvf5vx"> socio-economic </a>and cultural connections with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/there-are-muslims-in-tibet-too">Tibet</a>. Nepal was the corridor for the exchange of trade and faith between the Ganga plains and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/it-is-getting-hotter-on-the-roof-of-the-world">the Tibetan plateau</a>. The road between Patna and Potala, Banaras and Beijing passed through <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/bringing-silicon-valley-to-kathmandu-valley">Kathmandu Valley</a>. Sharma traces this socio-political landscape to explain how it went on to shape the country’s modern day relations with the neighbours.&nbsp; There were 2,000 Buddhist monks in Nepal during the reign of Lichhavi king Amshuverma, and Arniko established himself in the court of Kubulai Khan and took eight years to build the massive White Dagoba in Beijing. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-life-and-times-of-arniko">The life and times of Arniko</a>, Sewa Bhattarai While Mahayana Buddhism spread from India, through Nepal to China and beyond, it was <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/crony-communism">Communism</a> that later came from China to Nepal. King Mahendra had great geopolitical savvy and navigated the complicated geopolitics of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/land-reform-in-cold-war-nepal">Cold War</a> to cultivate relations with both Nehru and Mao, while keeping both at arms length. Mahendra wrested aid to build infrastructure like the Kodari and Prithvi Highways from China, but also from India, the Soviet Union and the United States. In fact Nepal was only the eighth non-Communist country to receive foreign aid during Mao’s China.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/the-new-equaliser">The new equaliser</a> But when <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/14-years-after-conflict-no-closure-in-nepal">Nepal’s Maoists</a> launched an armed struggle against <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/if-birendra-was-alive-nepal-could-still-be-a-monarchy">the monarchy</a>, China’s official media never called them ‘Maoists’. As far as Beijing was concerned, Mao was dead in his mausoleum. It was only later under <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-xi-jinping-s-big-surprise">Xi Jinping </a>that China warmed up to Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s ‘Maoist’ label.&nbsp; The first book takes us to the point when the Constituent Assembly <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/Ftnp-abolishing,624">abolished Nepal’s monarchy</a> in 2008, and the second book, as the name suggests, looks at how the whirlwind rise of China has buffeted Nepal.&nbsp; Sharma encourages readers to abandon <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/guest-editorial/Prithvi-Narayan-Shah-a-visionary-leader,1102">Prithvi Narayan Shah</a>’s famous metaphor of Nepal being ‘yam between two boulders’ to it being more like a ‘narrow canyon’ between two big <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/why-we-climb-mountains">mountains</a>, emphasising the challenges of maintaining sovereignty amid geopolitical pressures not just between India and China, but increasingly, with the United States. We have to see how the new Sino-US Cold War will evolve under <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trump-s-second-coming">the second Donald Trump presidency</a>. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-great-game-2nd-half">suspension of the MCC</a> this week will be an opening for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/crony-communism">China to push its own BRI infrastructure projects</a> in Nepal. It is not very helpful to see Nepal as being ‘squeezed’ between its giant neighbours, but leverage the country’s geostrategic location by being a connector between India and China. Both neighbours, naturally, have their own interests in Nepal as a buffer state, but both want stability. Kathmandu’s strategy should be to take advantage of the economic growth of its neighbours. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/poor-cash-rich-nepal">Poor cash-rich Nepal</a>, Sonia Awale &nbsp; Both books look at the arrival of Tibetan refugees into Nepal from the late 1950s, and how this resulted in geopolitical push and pull. Although American support for Khampa guerrillas was cut off after Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in 1971, US and western support for Tibetans in exile resumed after that.&nbsp; Nepal allowed the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mindfulness-about-bhutan-s-refugees"> refugees</a> to stay and work here, but under Chinese pressure Kathmandu adopted stricter measures — including <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2754">deporting Tibetans entering Nepal</a>. The Tibetan exile community remains one of Beijing’s biggest concerns in Nepal. Successive Kathmandu governments have been pressured to curb ‘anti-Chinese activities’ like celebrating the Dalai Lama’s birthday and other anniversaries.&nbsp; Sharma notes that so far Nepal has deftly balanced its support for refugees while keeping relations with Beijing on an even keel. It is significant that China has been surprisingly understanding of the presence of<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-start-of-the-anglo-gorkha-war"> Gorkha soldiers from Nepal</a> in the Indian Army along the disputed border where India and China fought a war in 1962, and after which there have been frequent skirmishes.&nbsp; The two books should be read chronologically so as to track the trajectory of historical Nepal-Tibet ties right up to present-day Nepal-China relations. The most relevant concern for bilateral relations today, as Sharma points out, is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-nepal-can-avert-an-economic-crunch">Nepal’s economic independence</a>, <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15973">sovereignty</a>, and role in a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-column/nepal-in-the-new-world-order">transformed world order</a>. &nbsp;&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250224140256_38f09c2f6dc3b7c79892cf556976fa9f7b3a2f43fb53bd7a248a6c6af3ba4715.jpg" data-media-id="editor_37" data-image-id="20250224140256_38f09c2f6dc3b7c79892cf556976fa9f7b3a2f43fb53bd7a248a6c6af3ba4715" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sudheer Sharma 1"> </figure>  &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250224140256_c6eb78b8f59cfda4b3dae582212306fd3ea25b1973d554fdb7579b9d8f345969.jpg" data-media-id="editor_38" data-image-id="20250224140256_c6eb78b8f59cfda4b3dae582212306fd3ea25b1973d554fdb7579b9d8f345969" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sudheer Sharma 2"> </figure>  &nbsp;

A past foretold

Thirty years after it abruptly pulled out of the Arun III project, the World Bank appears to have developed cold feet about an even larger project on the river in eastern Nepal. After opposition by civil society in Nepal, Japan and Europe, the Bank’s new president James Wolfensohn <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/20-years-ago-this-week/arun-iii">exited from Arun III</a>. The project’s generation capacity has been doubled to 900MW and it is being development by India’s state-owned SJVN Limited.&nbsp; Whereas in 1995, the opposition to Arun III was mainly from activists, this time it is said to be India’s displeasure with the Bank’s involvement in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/world-bank-flip-flop-on-upper-arun">1,061MW Upper Arun</a>. Delhi is so sensitive to the issue that sources said it even leaned on Indian-born American President of the World Bank, Ajaya Banga to cancel his trip to Kathmandu for the IDA21 Replenishment Meeting in June. When it gets the green light, Upper Arun will be the most expensive hydroelectric project in Nepal so far with a price tag of $1.6 billion. The semi-storage scheme is located on the transboundary Arun River 15km from the Chinese border after it cuts through the Himalaya between Mt Everest and Kangchenjunga. Beijing is said to have no objections to the project, but India’s silence is said to stem <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">from its strategic interest</a> in not allowing anyone else to build large storage projects on the tributaries of the Ganga in Nepal. India’s SJVN is also currently constructing three large projects downstream, including Arun III and Lower Arun with a total generation capacity of nearly 2,000MW.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16" data-rendition-name="original" width="850" height="771" loading="lazy" alt="Upper Arun Map NT"> </figure>  Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) set up Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited (UAHEL) as a subsidiary and in May signed up the French firm Tractebel for detailed design of the scheme. Experts say the design will have to take into account future climate-induced glacial lake outbursts like the one that swept away the 1,600MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">Chungthang Teesta</a> III in Sikkim last year built at a cost of $1.7 billion.&nbsp; Upper Arun’s financing will be 70% loans and 30% equity. The World Bank had already earmarked $750 million with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with Japan’s JICA also joining. But UAHEL Managing Director Fanendra Raj Joshi said there was no word either way from the World Bank, which meant there was no financial closure yet. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/right-climate-for-nepal-s-energy-transition">Right climate for Nepal’s energy transition</a>, Ramesh Kumar All this is in stark contrast to the optimism last year after Finance Minister Prakash Mahat returned from an IMF meeting in Morrocco and announced that the World Bank would be the main lender in Upper Arun.&nbsp; In November 2024, Mahat even took a helicopter with World Bank Managing Director Anna Bjerde and ADB Director Ramesh Subramaniam to the Upper Arun site and it looked like the loans were in the bag. It would also be the first large project in Nepal in which both big multilateral lenders would be involved.&nbsp; In April this year, an ‘agreement in principle’ was even reached between Mahat’s successor Barsaman Pun and World Bank Vice President for South Asia Martin Raiser to develop Upper Arun. But the loan meeting planned for June was cancelled. &nbsp; A Finance Ministry official told Nepali Times: “The World Bank told us categorically in November in Washington DC that India was opposed to its involvement in Upper Arun.” &nbsp; When Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal visited Delhi in June, Indian officials reportedly said they were interested in developing Upper Arun and evacuate its power through an extension of the 400kV transmission line it is building. Although Beijing had given the go ahead to the World Bank and ADB involvement in Upper Arun, it may not be as happy about an Indian company so close to its border. As a semi-reservoir project, Upper Arun can generate electricity at full capacity for up to six hours a day even in winter, unlike the schemes downstream which are run-of-the river in which generation depends on water flow.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/rivers-be-dammed">Rivers be dammed</a>, Pinki Siris Rana&nbsp; India is involved in projects in Nepal’s rivers that will generate a total of 8,000MW when complete. SJVN Limited is also taking over from the Chinese the 769MW Tamor project in the Arun Basin. &nbsp; Says Fanendra Raj Joshi of Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited: “Nepal can find alternative sources of funding and we will go ahead with this project even if the World Bank decides not to provide the loan.”&nbsp; Joshi and the NEA’s Kulman Ghising (pictured, below) attended a hearing with indigenous communities at the project site in Sankhuwasabha this week. Ghising told the gathering that if the World Bank pulled out Nepal would carry on with Upper Arun through “domestic and diaspora investment with the same financial package as Upper Tama Kosi”. The 546MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/when-it-rains-it-pours-ksqprbu3">Upper Tama Kosi was knocked</a> by a massive landslide in September and will not be fully operation at least for a year. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="600" loading="lazy" alt="Kulman Ghising"> </figure>  “This is a project that can transform the local economy and Nepal’s economy as well,” Ghising added. “We will go ahead with blended financing from all levels of government.” Despite the lack of financial closure, construction of the project is expected to get underway in 2026 for completion in six years. Construction of a 21km access road from the power house to the dam site along the Kosi Corridor highway is in full swing through difficult terrain.

Upper Arun question mark

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh must be based on a win-win policy, rooted in mutual respect, non-hegemony, and the pursuit of shared prosperity and deeper understanding. 
For India, there have always been only two neighbours: China and Pakistan. The rest of us smaller South Asian countries are geographic entities to be praised, cajoled, reprimanded and even punished as the situation calls for.
Sheikh Hasina's last tenure in power (2009-2024) appears to have been a ‘praise’ period. However, after the student-led people's uprising toppled her regime in August, a powerful section of the Indian media has shifted into the ‘reprimand’ mode, with some even suggesting ‘punishment’. Much of the social media discourse seems to support this.
Oppression of minorities anywhere in the world, including in my own country, must be condemned and speedily resolved. It should never recur. Communal conflict has been an age-old phenomenon in South Asia following the British colonial policy of divide and rule. 
It is a regrettable fact that, after 77 years of the departure of the British, we have still not been able to solve it.
After the regime change in Bangladesh, the Indian media's coverage of events can, in my view, be categorised as follows: 
<ol><li>The events that toppled Sheikh Hasina was the work of Pakistan's ISI, the Islamists in Bangladesh, or pro-Chinese elements all aimed to replace the ‘India-friendly’ government with an ‘unfriendly’ one. There is no mention of the role of common people or of the students, of the killing of ordinary people. What is the source of all these assertions? </li><li>The new government in Dhaka is bent on persecuting Hindus and even committing ‘genocide’. Many of these stories were debunked by fact-checkers, including the BBC. But that did not stop or even slow down the tirade of stories demonising Bangladesh.</li><li>The US involvement was also referred to and linked with the events in Pakistan in toppling Imran Khan. So, the US toppled Sheikh Hasina.</li></ol>
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Sheikh Hasina government even resorted to firing on demonstrators using helicopters.
In a prompt action, the interim government fast-tracked the issuance of visas for journalists. However, Indian journalists who visited Bangladesh focused solely on the attacks on Hindus, ignoring the broader human rights abuses by the Hasina government. 
The Indian media’s coverage of the July-August uprising in Bangladesh was also striking in its one-sidedness.
The Indian media largely ignored the massive student-led people's movement, which saw millions take to the streets of cities across the country. Their focus remained almost exclusively on the sporadic violence against Hindus during the power vacuum in the first week of the transition.
The firing on unarmed demonstrators, resulting in at least 700 deaths by 5 August, was barely covered. This was one of the most barbaric crackdowns in the recent history of South Asia, yet the Indian media gave it little attention. 
In the <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEoyTkOZ8xE&amp;t=588s">six interviews I gave</a> to <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bDJgVVBDLg">mainstream Indian outlets</a>, there was almost <a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/world/sheikh-hasina-had-turned-very-dictatorial-mahfuz-anam-on-bangladesh-regime-change/cid/2038904">no mention</a> of the scale of <a href="http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2024/08/07/the-daily-star-journalist-mahfuz-anam-interview-bangladesh-protests-political-crisis.html">the uprising</a> or the civilian deaths, only the vandalism of symbols like Bangabandhu's statue or the burning of government properties.
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Indian media's coverage appears to be driven by the isolated attacks against Hindus of Bangladesh, rather than the people of Bangladesh. India should not see the recent events through the lens of Sheikh Hasina but through the lens of democracy.
In a recent video broadcast by the Indian news portal ThePrint, Meenakshi Lekhi, a BJP leader and lawyer, said, ‘The chief adviser… is seeking to rename the nation [Bangladesh] to be [the] Islamic republic of East Pakistan.’ 
Where did she get that from? Her column was filled with distortions and misinformation. When recounting Sheikh Hasina's rule, she omitted critical facts like the rigging of the 2014, 2018 and 2024 general elections, which were at the core of voters' outrage with her regime.
At The Daily Star, we studied 56 news items appearing in the Indian media between 9 July-20 November. Except for a handful, most could be categorised as ‘views reports’ and not ‘news reports’. They had headlines like: ‘To avoid election Yunus is using the excuse of reforms’, ‘Politics of revenge – 13 including ministers on trial’, ‘Will democracy at all return to Bangladesh?’, ‘China, ISI behind escalation of student-led protests in Bangladesh’, ‘ISI conspiracy to topple Sk. Hasina and established anti-India govt’, among others. 
Some TV news even called it an ‘Islamist takeover’. There were hardly any attempts to take a serious look at the events in Bangladesh.
If we analyse the sourcing of the news, the presentation, the headlines, and the language used in reporting, it becomes clear that it was directed at creating an impression that Hindus were not safe in Bangladesh to generate deep hatred in the Indian population.
The mindset of the Indian media and also that of a section of political leadership is dominated by a fundamental disrespect for our intellectual ability, and Islamophobia.
Indian media coverage clearly implies that we, as a people, are incapable of determining our future. It is the Pakistanis, Chinese or the Americans (not to name the Indians, which they do not of course mention) that must tell us what to do. 
This mindset is insulting to a nation that has fought against Pakistani cultural, economic and military oppression, and that has defeated them in an armed struggle with Indian help. 
It is insulting to a people who have dismantled dictatorships and who have now toppled what appeared to be an invincible regime of Sheikh Hasina. This mindset shows the disdain of the Indian media towards Bangladeshis. One political leader even compared us with termites.
The Indian media has a total misunderstanding of the deep roots of Islam in Muslim Bangladeshi psyche. People going to mosques, wearing Islamic headgear, keeping beards, using Islamic salutations, or referring to the Quran as a part of daily life are portrayed as extremists and terrorists.
If the revival and strengthening of Hindu religious practices, building more temples, enshrining Hindu cultural traits, and becoming more practising Hindus are part of the present-day Indian ethos, then why should we, the Bangladeshis, becoming more Muslim make us extremists? 
If mass-based groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS can propagate the Hindu religion, and if a political party like the BJP, whose aim is to establish Hindutva in India, can get elected three times, then why does the reappearance of Islamic groups make us a ‘fundamentalist’ country?
The Indian media and leadership must dig deep into the cultural and religious heritage of Muslim Bengal, and try to embrace us as we are, rather than define us as they would like us to be. 
We must accept what the Indian people decide is the India they want. Just as India must accept what the people of Bangladesh decide we are. 
That is the only way a durable Bangladesh-India relationship can be built. The lesson for India is that regime-based relationships must be replaced by people-based relationships. 
For that to happen, we must understand each other better, with sincerity and respect.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star. Reprinted with permission.

How the media shapes Bangladesh-India ties

This year, Sri Lanka entered a power purchase deal with Adani Green Energy Ltd. In terms of the agreement, the country will purchase electricity from the company over 20 years. The Adani Green Energy project received cabinet clearance from the previous government to produce 484MW of wind power in two facilities the company would build in Mannar and Pooneryn and invest more than US$442 million in its projected life span of 20 years.
Adani Green Energy would be paid $0.0826 per kWh of power produced. The deal was relentlessly pushed, defended and ultimately signed by the previous Sri Lankan government. The mandatory tender process was not followed indicating inbuilt and rampant corruption and vested interests at the time.
The project is now under litigation in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka over the violation of fundamental rights. The main issues raised by the petitioners deal with environmental concerns surrounding the project and the woeful lack of transparency in the awarding process that led to the granting of the deal to Adani.
The petitioners also argue that the agreed upon per unit cost is a significant loss to the country and ideally this rate should be set at $0.005 kWh. The deal, its approval and the final granting process were mired in controversy even before litigation. 
In 2022, the then Chairman of the Ceylon Electricity Board, M M C Ferdinando told the parliamentary panel, the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE), that the deal was offered based on a request from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to then Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. 
Ferdinando later retracted his statement and resigned from his post under pressure from the then government. In May 2023, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Sabry observed flippantly in an interview with The Hindu that Adani projects in Sri Lanka were a ‘government-to-government kind of a project’. He noted that it was the Indian government that selected the Adani group for infrastructure development projects including the Sri Lankan wind power project. 
Reading between the lines, Sabry’s public observations indicated a clear backdoor and informal Indian state involvement in the project. Despite the notoriety that Adani companies had already acquired across the world, Sabry had the nerve to say that his government was “very very confident” that the Adani Group’s companies had considerable capital.
Adani actually saw a the $140 billion drop in share values after the publication of a negative report by US research company Hindenburg accusing the company’s top leader Gautam Adani of getting away with the ‘largest con in corporate history’. 
Another investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project also documented serious malpractices by Adani companies. All this is in addition to The Guardian and Financial Times also reporting on Adani family’s surreptitious investments in the company’s shares.
It is against this background that the flamboyant and utterly inexperienced former Sri Lankan Minister of Energy attempted to convert the agreement with Adani Green Energy Limited in August 2023 into a formal government-to-government deal. 
In reality no such formal state to state level agreement existed between India and Sri Lanka. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Adani power deal has ended up in litigation in the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. The new Sri Lankan government needs to carefully and comprehensively revisit the power deal.
Malpractices evident in the local awarding process needs to be considered as well as the role of local power brokers who made it happen and evident corruption that enveloped the entire project needs to be investigated. 
The project also needs to be evaluated in light of the global evidence against the Adani Group. In October, the Kenyan High Court suspended a $736 million agreement between the state-owned Kenya Electrical Transmission Company and Adani Energy Solutions to build and operate power facilities, including transmission lines.
In a lawsuit, the Law Society of Kenya argued that the deal was ‘a constitutional sham and tainted with secrecy’. It also argued that the Kenyan state entity and Adani Energy Solutions did not carry out mandatory public participation focused on the project properly, which is a requirement under Kenya’s Public Private Partnerships Act. These conditions sound alarmingly similar to the Sri Lankan case.
In 2023, accusations were made in India’s Gujarat State against Adani Power Mundra Limited that it had charged an excess of INR 39,000,000,000 over a period of five years under two power purchase agreements. An opposition politician in the state noted the case was a “textbook case of corruption, money laundering, loot of public money and above all, the classic case of cronyism that the Prime Minister and his government represent.” 
The issue here was that the rate at which coal for power production that was purchased by Adani Power Mundra was significantly higher than market rates at which coal was being traded in Indonesia, the source of the purchase. This meant that the state-owned Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, a Gujarati state entity in the energy sector had to pay much more for the overall electricity supply. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited has now written to Adani Power Mundra Limited asking that the excess amount charged be repaid. 
As a presidential candidate, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake assured that if he won, the National People’s Power would cancel the Adani energy project because it posed a threat to Sri Lanka’s energy sector sovereignty. 
The controls placed by Adani Power on its power supply to Bangladesh is a classic example of Bangladesh’s energy sovereignty being utterly compromised at a very crucial time in the country’s history. In real terms, Adani Power has slashed its supplies to Bangladesh by about 60% due to unpaid bills exceeding $800 million. Sri Lanka could also find itself in a similar situation if it compromises its power supply and energy sovereignty by going ahead with the Adani project.
In October President Dissanayake informed the Supreme Court that it would reconsider the approval given by the previous regime to the Adani Group projects. The government must now expect considerable pressure from vested parties, in this case both the Adani Group and the Indian government, more generally. But it is essential to be mindful that we are not dealing with a project in an Indian state.
We cannot be endlessly languishing in the depths of poverty simply because of the corruption of our own leaders of the recent and not-too-recent past, and business magnates of the region. The Adani case is a good starting point to roll back mega corruption and illegality in the country.
Sasanka Perera is the founding professor of the South Asia University's Department of Sociology. This commentary was first published <a href="https://island.lk/adanis-power-in-sri-lanka/">The Island Online</a>.

Adani in Sri Lanka

In June 2020, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-row-dont-read-too-much-into-chinas-statements/articleshow/76056332.cms">incursions</a> by Chinese Army into the fraught borderlands of India’s Ladakh region triggered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-was-india-china-military-clash-2020-about-2024-10-25/">bloody clashes</a> that killed 20 Indian soldiers, plunged bilateral relations to their lowest point in decades, and led to a prolonged military standoff. 
In November, China and India have reached a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3284373/how-china-and-india-can-build-border-truce-normalise-ties">truce</a>, though many in India would prefer to hold their applause. Since the 2020 violence, bilateral relations have remained frozen, and India wants China to take steps to restore the status quo ante at the border. China’s unprovoked encroachments across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh are to blame for disturbing the peace in the first place.
To show it meant business, India <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-10-23/china-and-india-bury-the-hatchet-for-now">slowed down</a> approvals of Chinese investments; tightened visa approvals for Chinese nationals, and canceled direct flights between the two countries. India toughened its stance on Chinese territorial claims in the Pacific, and made pointed political gestures that were bound to displease China, like <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/india/china-lodges-protest-with-india-over-pm-modis-response-to-taiwan-president-lais-greetings-on-his-poll-victory/articleshow/110765182.cms">responding</a> warmly to the Taiwanese president’s congratulatory message after Modi’s re-election. (There was also talk of Taiwan allowing Indian workers.)
While the recent truce suggests that China has finally gotten the message, it is difficult to shake the impression that India was the more anxious of the two parties to reach an agreement. In fact, India’s economic establishment appears largely convinced that, far from pursuing a strategy of decoupling, or at least ‘de-risking’, vis-à-vis China, India should be using Chinese capital to fill its own investment gaps.
Given that bilateral trade has <a href="https://www.ptinews.com/story/business/China-largest-trading-partner-of-India-in-FY24-with-USD-118-4-bn%3B-US-second-with-USD-118-3-bn/1497275">reached</a> its highest-ever levels despite the political tensions, it comes as no surprise that India’s business community has reportedly been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-10-24/how-india-ceos-convinced-modi-to-push-for-better-china-ties-at-brics">pressing</a> the government to conclude an agreement that would facilitate economic engagement. In July, the government’s chief economic adviser <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-not-rethinking-issue-allowing-chinese-investment-trade-minister-says-2024-07-30/">openly advocated</a> a strategy that would increase Chinese investments in India and deepen Indian integration into Chinese supply chains.
There were indications over the last few months that an agreement to end the Ladakh standoff was forthcoming. And a deal did soon emerge, allowing both China and India to resume patrols along the frontier.
But significant areas of concern remain. As the political commentator Brahma Chellaney observed, when Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met at the BRICS Summit in Kazan after the truce was announced, their respective ministries produced very different statements. Whereas India described the accord as a step toward a ‘multipolar Asia and a multipolar world’, China referred only to a ‘multipolar world’. The implication was subtle but clear: Asia belongs to China.
More broadly, China’s actions along the LAC have signaled a clear desire to keep India off balance by taking steps to shift the border in ways more favourable to its own interests. This mirrors China’s assertive approach to advancing its territorial ambitions elsewhere along its shared border with India, and in the South China Sea.
It is worth remembering how the last standoff between India and China, focused on the Doklam plateau in Bhutan, ended. India does not claim Doklam, but it does support Bhutan’s claim, which China disputes. Moreover, a major Indian highway runs below the plateau, connecting India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. So, when China deployed troops to build a Chinese highway in Doklam, India sent troops to stop the project.
In that case, the two sides took just a few months to reach an agreement, which looked much like the recent Ladakh deal. Since then, however, the Chinese outflanked India by building a road elsewhere on the Doklam plateau to achieve the same result. The PLA now overlooks a vital Indian highway.
China’s conduct follows a clear pattern: create new facts on the ground, deploy forces to positions from which they can intimidate (and, potentially, attack) India, and wear India down with protracted diplomacy. In the meantime, encourage India to increase its dependence on Chinese imports and dangle the investment carrot before Indian business leaders.
Yet the promised economic benefits of the two sides’ recent rapprochement are unlikely to materialise. The Chinese have not lifted a finger to address India’s huge bilateral trade deficit which soared to $101 billion in 2022, from $70 billion in 2021 – or to lower the barriers Indian companies face when trying to access the Chinese market.
Moreover, all indications point to Chinese investment in low-value-added industries, rather than sectors involving technology transfer, even as Chinese companies pursue acquisitions in sensitive sectors in India. There are also massive opportunity costs: greater economic integration with China would surely make India less attractive to global companies seeking to reduce their exposure to the People’s Republic.
Add to that China’s long track record of exporting its way out of economic trouble and weaponising other countries’ economic vulnerabilities, and it seems clear that India should proceed with caution. Until China credibly demonstrates its good intentions, the truce in Ladakh warrants little celebration. © <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org">Project Syndicate</a>

CHINDIA

Project Syndicate: Being especially vulnerable to climate change, the Global South is open to receiving financial, technical, and other forms of support from wherever they can get it. Are America and its allies squandering an opportunity here?
Ian Bremmer: At this point, developing economies are open to climate finance support from any quarter. With simultaneous major geopolitical conflicts, inflationary pressures, and pivotal elections happening this year, America and its allies view climate partnerships with emerging markets as a lower priority. The EU’s top priority is Ukraine, and the US has been consumed with the Gaza conflict.
The Global South will therefore strengthen ties with China and Middle Eastern countries, as we’ve seen happening since the last United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28). Diversifying partnerships makes sense for these governments, since wealthy countries have made it clear they won’t significantly ramp up support anytime soon. Although <a href="https://cop29.az/en/news/letter-to-parties-and-constituencies#:~:text=The%20COP29%20Presidency's%20top%20negotiating,priorities%20of%20developing%20country%20Parties." target="_blank">climate finance</a> will be a major topic at COP29 in Azerbaijan, the $1 trillion target will go unmet, leading to frustration and even more collaboration with non-traditional partners.
The donor pool is becoming a contentious topic in UN climate negotiations, because countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and China are not currently classified as ‘<a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf" target="_blank">developed economies</a>’. The United States and some EU governments are pushing to expand this list to achieve more ambitious goals, but it won’t happen. Many emerging markets support the current list because they don’t want to antagonise China, which firmly opposes being a donor and criticises developed markets for not delivering on climate finance.
Do strategic and ‘national-security’ considerations surrounding climate policy and green technologies ensure a zero-sum dynamic?
This collaboration has historically set global policy expectations, laying the groundwork for milestones like the Paris climate agreement, COP26 in Glasgow and COP28 in Dubai. The outcome of the US election will be crucial, but under a Democratic administration, robust climate cooperation could continue, particularly with the right climate envoys.
During the first three years of <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s presidency, US Climate Envoy <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/john-kerry">John Kerry</a> and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, demonstrated that meaningful <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-00692-7" target="_blank">progress</a> can still be made despite broader tensions. After the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/08/05/1115878668/china-taiwan-pelosi-climate-military#:~:text=BEIJING%20%E2%80%94%20China%20declared%20Friday%20it,Nancy%20Pelosi's%20visit%20to%20Taiwan." target="_blank">suspension</a> of climate talks following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, Kerry and Xie’s teams were among the first to resume discussions in 2023.
Even then, separating climate issues from US-China tensions will pose a challenge. Chinese officials have stressed that climate collaboration requires “overall stable relations”.
What about under a second Trump presidency? How much damage could he do to the net-zero transition, both in the US and globally?
Donald Trump is obviously no fan of climate policies, but he supports US industry. His administration would cut Inflation Reducation Act spending, and could do so significantly with full Republican support. These cuts would then ripple through the economy. But the US would still pursue aggressive industrial policies, challenging economic trade partners. A Trump administration would favour oil and gas, but its impact would be limited.&nbsp;
On the international front, you could expect a US withdrawal from UN climate talks altogether, which could derail progress at COP30 and significantly reduce funding for developing economies. This could weaken new climate commitments from all governments by 2025, eventually pushing global temperatures higher than currently projected.
And following the strong performance by far-right parties in the European Parliament elections, should we expect Europe’s ambitions under the 2020 EU Green Deal to be scaled back?&nbsp;
The EU has temporarily peaked in its adoption of environmental policies. Looking ahead, the bloc will largely focus on implementing existing regulations. Key among these is the <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en" target="_blank">Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive</a>, which will require companies to ramp up disclosures starting next year, with France already <a href="https://www.novata.com/resources/blog/csrd-unpacked-enforcement-compliance-and-penalties/#:~:text=France%20is%20the%20only%20country,not%20publishing%20the%20sustainability%20report." target="_blank">imposing</a> strict penalties for noncompliance. 
&nbsp;
Similarly, the <a href="https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/deforestation-regulation-implementation_en#:~:text=It%20will%20start%20to%20apply,Deforestation%20Free%20Products%20(EUDR)." target="_blank">EU Deforestation Regulation</a> will take effect this December, and countries around the world are already preparing for it. Seven key commodities will be barred from the EU market if their sourcing involves any kind of deforestation, legal or illegal.
Meanwhile, the recently adopted <a href="https://www.esginvestor.net/eu-approves-nature-restoration-law/#:~:text=EU%20member%20states%20have%20approved,targets%20in%20the%20bloc's%20history." target="_blank">Nature Restoration Law</a> – the EU’s flagship biodiversity legislation – requires that member states create action plans and set targets to increase their conservation and restoration efforts. The enforcement of these policies will lead to “<a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Nature_Positive_Guidelines_for_the_Transition_in_Cities_2024.pdf" target="_blank">transition risks</a>.” Multinational corporations and governments that fail to comply with sustainability-related regulations will face legal action.
Another elephant in the room is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set highly ambitious decarbonisation targets reaching <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59125143" target="_blank">net-zero by 2070</a>, but India has also been hoovering up Russian hydrocarbons at a discount and <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Indias-Coal-Consumption-and-Emissions-Hit-Record-Highs-in-Q1.html" target="_blank">increasing</a> its consumption of coal.&nbsp;
Actually, India’s net-zero target by 2070 is perceived by many as <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-net-zero-emissions-target-by-2070-little-too-long-term-hardeep-singh-puri/article67398684.ece" target="_blank">insufficiently ambitious</a>. But India faces a tough balancing act between long-term decarbonisation and immediate economic priorities. It still relies on coal for domestic security and is being cautious about phasing it out until renewable-energy capacity and alternative revenue sources for coal-producing regions are well established.
Energy-storage limitations, fluctuating LNG prices, and other challenges have prompted a shift toward a combination of LNG and green hydrogen for industry, and a mix of solar and nuclear power for residential areas.
Owing to capital shortages, grid instability, minimal storage solutions, and reliance on emerging technologies, India <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/india-may-miss-2030-renewable-energy-targets-as-up-punjab-haryana-lag-say-experts/articleshow/90964081.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank">will not meet</a> its 2030 targets of 500 gigawatts of non-fossil fuel power capacity and a 45% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels. It is, however, expected to build its clean-energy supply chains by 2030 (leveraging a second-mover advantage), and this should help to accelerate its energy transition.
EVs are one bright spot. India has implemented <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/india-says-high-tariffs-evs-protect-chinese-imports-2024-06-14/" target="_blank">tariffs</a> to protect its budding domestic EV sector, and earlier this year it introduced a new <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2014858#:~:text=The%20Union%20Government%20has%20approved,by%20reputed%20global%20EV%20manufacturers." target="_blank">policy</a> to encourage EV manufacturing. This could attract investments worth billions of dollars from companies like Tesla or various Japanese firms.
In the past, you’ve proposed new bodies such as a World Carbon Organisation. Where does your thinking stand today in a world increasingly dominated by zero-sum strategic considerations?
Multilateral institutions will continue to face challenges, but they remain essential in an increasingly fragmented world. Their value lies in reaching global consensus and driving coordinated action, as seen with the Paris agreement’s impact on countries, companies, and communities. In that case, there was a clear ‘before and after’.
Yes, progress has been too slow, but to be fair, expectations for these negotiations are often too high, setting them up for failure. International fora should be seen as what they are: annual stocktaking exercises that help the world assess its current position and decide on necessary course corrections.
Unilateral initiatives, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Deforestation Regulation, face just as much, if not more, pushback. This highlights the need to improve multilateral systems – by creating new structures or overhauling existing ones – rather than abandoning them. Doing so is ultimately in everyone’s interest. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">© Project Syndicate</a>
Ian Bremmer is a political scientist and founder of Eurasia Group, a geopolitical risk advisory firm, and GZERO Media.

Climate security and geopolitics

The five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) reign supreme, each wielding a veto over whatever the other 192 members might want. That is why Israel, owing to US support, can <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/israel-ignores-un-cease-fire-resolution-to-keep-pummeling-gaza">blithely ignore countless UN resolutions</a>, and why Syria, owing to Russian and Chinese support,<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/04/555292"> handily escaped sanctions</a> for its use of chemical weapons. Owing to the disproportionate power they wield, the Permanent Five share an old, decidedly British sense of empire. The authors of two recent books on empire, Lawrence James and Nandini Das, offer no thoughts on how the UN might, or indeed should, be reformed, would agree. In The Lion and the Dragon, James, a prolific historian of the UK’s role in world affairs, follows Britain’s relations with China from the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/20/hk.history.01/">nineteenth-century Opium War </a>until the return of Hong Kong and today’s tensions over Taiwan. And in Courting India, Das, a professor at the University of Oxford, concentrates on the very beginnings of the British Empire and its covetous reach into what was then the Mughal Empire in India. What this history shows is that empire is still very much with us. Though Americans, proud of throwing off the rule of King George III, tend to bristle at the idea, their own military, technological, and commercial power is as imperial and pervasive as Britain’s territorial dominance ever was. As James notes, we can thank the post-World War II Pax Americana for the mostly stable international relations that prevailed during the aptly named Cold War with the Soviets and their own empire. Read more: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/two-new-books-on-conflict-and-conservation">Two new books on conflict and conservation</a>, Kunda Dixit A perennial question, especially during periods of geopolitical upheaval, is not just how empires emerge, but how they fade. Though Britain and France still indulge their memories of empire, they have long since accepted being ‘middle powers’ at best. Ever since the Suez crisis of 1956, when the threat of US sanctions forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt’s Suez Canal, Britain has supinely followed America’s lead in international relations. (UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to send troops to Vietnam in the 1960s is the exception that proves the rule.) At the same time, France has sought comfort in the collective embrace of what became the European Union. Vladimir Putin’s Russia is on a hopeless <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/what-does-defending-europe-mean">quest to reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union</a> and recreate the empire of Peter the Great. And China already sees itself, with some justification, as wielding global influence to rival that of the American empire. China’s pursuit of superpower status is born of not just current economic and political realities, but also its deep-seated resentment over the ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1949) that it suffered at the hands of European (and Japanese) imperial powers. Of course, similar sentiments also animate Putin’s revanchism, as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dismissiveness of diplomatic overtures from post-Brexit Britain. In William Faulkner’s oft-quoted words, ‘The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.’ <h2>Passage To India</h2> The trite answer to the question of why empires fall is that they become victims of their own success, growing too large, too corrupt, too exhausted to fend off energetic newcomers. As the Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun argued in the 14th century, empires are like living organisms: they grow, mature, and die. As Das’s wonderfully researched book shows, the Mughal Empire was almost mature when the British arrived in the 1600s. Its Muslim rulers, with their roots in Central Asia, are fascinating figures. Emperor Jahangir, a generous patron of the arts, was addicted to opium and wine, whereas his wife, Nur Jahan, wielded significant political influence. The emperor’s son, Shah Jahan, was a ‘king of the world’, whose love for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, is permanently commemorated in the Taj Mahal. Mughal India was both a place of immense wealth and a bastion of religious tolerance (unlike Europe, with its centuries-long Inquisition against Muslims, Jews, and heretics). Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-smallpox-virus-in-british-india">The smallpox virus in British India</a>, Tom Robertson By contrast, the British Empire was barely in its infancy when its clash with Mughal India began. In Courting India, Das paints a vivid picture of the experiences – mostly endured, rather than enjoyed – of King James’s ambassador, Thomas Roe, at the Mughal court. But more than that, she also offers a rich description of Jacobean England as it was emerging from the first Elizabethan age and jostling for power with Portugal, Spain, France, and Holland. Roe’s own journals are a major primary source, but so, too, are the cultural interpreters of the period, from William Shakespeare to the poet John Donne (a friend of Roe). Theirs was an England full of energy, seeking its fortune in the Americas and the Indies. However, it was nowhere close to as sophisticated as courtiers like Roe seemed to believe. Indeed, Roe was almost a caricature of the Englishman abroad. He refused to learn any language that might have helped his mission (be it Farsi or Turkish), and he insisted that he and his staff wear English wool and silk, even through the Indian summer. While he eventually came to admire the pragmatic tolerance of Mughal society, he remained convinced of England and Protestant Christianity’s superiority. Never would he have allowed himself to ‘go native’. Roe was answerable not only to King James but also to his financial backer, the East India Company, which had been granted its charter by Elizabeth I in 1600. This meant he was constantly tussling with the miserly company for money (its traders were always jealous), as well as struggling to quell, or at least make excuses for, the riotous behavior of English sailors. Read also:<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/buried-in-history"> Buried in history</a>, Lisa Choegyal <h2>Century of Humiliation </h2> Two centuries later, the East India Company, as it appears in James’s book, would still be clinging to the same assumptions that Roe had held. The superiority and integrity of Christian Britain went unquestioned, and still stood in stark contrast to “Asian greed and despotism.” The biggest change, in the meantime, had been the collapse of the Mughal Empire. Mughal India, the wealthiest place in the world at the end of the 17th century, was steadily enfeebled by internal dissent and Persian and Afghan invasions. In 1857, the East India Company formally dissolved the empire, setting the stage for <a href="https://www.royal.uk/encyclopedia/victoria-r-1837-1901">Queen Victoria</a> to establish the “British Raj” and direct rule over the Indian subcontinent the following year.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2" data-rendition-name="original" width="842" height="596" loading="lazy" alt="The Mughal Empire's Treaty of Allahabad by Benjamin West NT"><figcaption>A painting by Benjamin West of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II conveying the Treaty of Allahabad to Robert Clive in August 1765 after the Battle of Buxar that gave the Company the right to collect taxes -- marking the beginning of British India rule.</figcaption></figure>  To paraphrase Ibn Khaldun, 19th Britain was no longer an infant with imperial ambitions; it was now an adult with all the energy and ruthlessness needed to extend its reach around the world. As such, the British lion had no misgivings about disgracing the Chinese dragon. Looking back on this period, it is easy to see why Chinese President Xi Jinping is so determined to expunge the century of humiliation from the national memory. That century began in 1839 with the First Opium War. When China tried to block imports of East India Company opium from Bengal, Britain responded with all its (industrialised) military might. By 1842, British warships and soldiers had crushed all opposition and compelled China’s Qing emperor to sign the Nanjing Treaty. That opened China to international trade and ensured that British citizens in ‘treaty ports’ would be subject to British, not Chinese, law. Another consequence of the war was that Britain took possession of Hong Kong, which it would hold until 1997. Whereas Das describes India principally through Roe’s eyes, James is keen to present a balance between British actions and Chinese reactions. In doing so, he stresses that China was not reacting only to British imperialism. After all, this was a time when ‘a spirit of predatory imperialism … pervaded the foreign ministries of Russia, France, Germany and China’s near-neighbour, the newly industrialized Japan’. Seized by their own commercial ambitions, all four ‘regarded China as a land mass to be partitioned and shared out in the same way as contemporary Africa’. But these other imperial projects hardly give Britain a pass. In arguing that ‘Britain was reluctantly sucked into the complex geopolitics of great-power empire building in the Far East’, James simply is not convincing. Britain, the world’s leading naval power and the home of the Industrial Revolution, was already adept at the game of geopolitics and quite prepared to protect its interests in China, not least because that would also protect its interests in India. By the 18th century, the Qing Dynasty had expanded from its Manchu roots and established an empire extending from Mongolia and Tibet to the Pacific. But by the 19th century, it was too exhausted to withstand the pressure not only from the other imperial powers but also from its own people. The century of humiliation always refers to foreign interventions, but equally important were domestic embarrassments such as the 1850-64 Taiping Rebellion – in which some 30 million people died – and the 1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion. The dynasty’s ‘Mandate of Heaven’ was clearly slipping from its grasp. It finally came to an end in 1912, when the Western-educated Sun Yat-sen, following a brief revolution, established the ‘Republic of China’. <h2>Remember Thucydides</h2> Today, that title applies only to the island of Taiwan, whereas Xi presides over the ‘People’s Republic of China’, which was established in 1949 with the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist Party over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces. Since the 1970s, most countries – including both rival Chinas – have embraced the fiction that the ROC and the PRC refer to a single country. But there is a constant fear that Taiwan could formally declare its independence and destroy the fiction, thus provoking an invasion from the mainland. If President Joe Biden is to be believed, the US would then come to Taiwan’s rescue and the South China Sea would witness a Sino-American war with far-reaching regional and global consequences. Given his focus on Britain and China, James understandably devotes only a handful of his final paragraphs to US analysts’ ‘bleak’ prognosis of a future war over Taiwan. Moreover, throughout the preceding chapters, he deals deftly with other instances when conflict erupted between rival regional powers. These include the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, which led to Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, Japan’s bloody expansionism in the 1930s, and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought America into World War II. The big risk today is that China and America could end up at war as much by accident as by design. Graham Allison of Harvard University has famously warned of the ‘Thucydides trap’, an allusion to the Peloponnesian War, in which Sparta, the incumbent hegemon, was ‘destined for war’ with the rising power, Athens. It is tempting to dismiss Allison’s argument as alarmism. But over the past 500 years, there have been 16 instances of an incumbent power facing off with a rising power, and war was avoided in only four of them, the most famous being America’s rise to replace Britain as the leading world power in the early twentieth century. Notably, James recalls that China was ‘stunned’ by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887">Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union</a>. The message pushed by Chinese state-controlled media was that the UK had surrendered to ‘a losing mindset’. Clearly, the current Chinese leadership has no intention of showing weakness. The good news is that political and military leaders on both sides of the Pacific are aware of the risks. As Xi said in 2015, on his first state visit to America, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” The bad news, however, is that all countries are prone to ‘miscalculation’. <h2>Tick-Tock</h2> Almost a half-century ago, John Bagot Glubb, a British general who commanded the Jordanian army from 1939 until 1956, published a book entitled The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. His thesis was essentially the same as Ibn Khaldun’s, only with the added claim that almost all empires rise and fall over a period of roughly 250 years. Putting aside the obvious flaws in Glubb’s arithmetic (the Ottoman Empire certainly did not ‘end’ in 1570), the core idea should not be dismissed. After all, historians now give the Qing Dynasty a lifespan of 267 years, and the Mughal Empire of Das’s book began to lose territory after only two centuries. A pessimist might say today’s China began with Communist victory in 1949, and that America’s quasi-imperial power began 201 years ago with the Monroe Doctrine. Time may not be on the side of those who place their trust in America to protect democracy and ‘liberal Western values’. John Andrews, a former editor and foreign correspondent for The Economist, is the author of The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Troublespots. © Project Syndicate  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36.jpg" data-media-id="editor_11" data-image-id="20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>

The Evolution of Empire

Fenerbahçe Beko won the Turkish Airlines EuroLeague finals in Abu Dhabi, held 23-25 May, defeating Monaco 81-70 in the final. Olympiacos, who defeated Panathinaikos 97-93, finished the series in third place. The Most Valuable Player (MVP) of the final match, Nigel Hayes-Davis from Fenerbahçe Beko, received a prize of 1,000,000 Miles&amp;Smiles from Turkish Airlines’ Chief Commercial Officer Ahmet Olmuştur. The carrier has been the title sponsor of the Turkish Airlines EuroLeague, a top tier tournament, since 2010.

Turkish Basketball

In the black and white photograph, General Wangdu smiles broadly in front of the dusty cactus garden in Kathmandu’s Annapurna Hotel. With an ill-fitting jacket and shaggy hair he looks benign enough, but this was the last leader of the Tibetan freedom fighters who led the resistance against the Chinese from their remote mountain hideouts in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/comings-and-goings-in-mustang">Mustang</a>. Five months later, Wangdu was dead. Snapped in March 1974, I had only recently arrived in Nepal. How did I meet this legendary fighter? Possibly with his devoted camp follower, Lynne Klapecki, and probably in the Om Restaurant near Freak Street which was the preferred <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/hippie-trail-nostalgia-in-kathmandu">hippie hang-out</a>. Om Lobsang and his brother Yeshe were <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/page/earthquake-brings-back-memories-of-camps-for-tibetan-refugees">refugees from East Tibet </a>whose cafe offered a friendly welcome and<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/momo-loco"> the best momos</a> - they became my in-laws after I married their eldest brother Tenzin, but that was a decade later.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_4573b34282b0f5395c007243d6bef12c7ba76bfd520419e994cdcea048d795a1.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="2025052403054_4573b34282b0f5395c007243d6bef12c7ba76bfd520419e994cdcea048d795a1" data-rendition-name="original" width="1000" height="1583" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>Photo: LISA CHOEGYAL</figcaption> </figure>  Wangdu’s English was enthusiastically rudimentary, but even riding around town with him on the back of an aging <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/kathmandu-s-new-motorbike-museum">motorbike</a>, he was a commanding presence. Always flanked by armed outriders, impressive scars marked his forearms and a pistol hung from the cord around his neck. A charismatic guerrilla leader, Wangdu was celebrated by his followers for his tough commitment and respected for his measured pragmatism. He seemed so young to have shouldered such a responsibility of command, leading hundreds of hardened <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/50-years-after-the%20raid-into-Tibet,1012#google_vignette">Khampa combatants </a>through what had been a particularly <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/heavy-snowfall-over-nepal-himalaya">brutal winter in Mustang</a>, the last bastion to hold out against the Chinese invasion of their Tibetan homeland.&nbsp; The freedom fighters of Tibet, known as the Chushi-Gangdruk, had emerged to resist the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/territorialism">Chinese takeover</a> of Tibet during the 1950s. Estimated to be 80,000-strong at the time of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-or-who-after-the-dalai-lama">the Dalai Lama</a>’s final escape to India in 1959, the sheer number of Chinese deployed into Tibet eventually forced the Chushi-Gangdruk to retreat to Mustang, From this high Himalayan stronghold, they continued cross-border raids on the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) throughout the 1960s.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_8a4a935ba25ae79dc3a63bb5c14626927020e5ec098093c45ccb9a5982e009fd.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="2025052403054_8a4a935ba25ae79dc3a63bb5c14626927020e5ec098093c45ccb9a5982e009fd" data-rendition-name="original" width="1114" height="676" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>Guerrillas known as the Chushi-Gangdruk emerged to resist the Chinese annexation of Tibet during the 1950s. Photo courtesy: MIKEL DUNHAM</figcaption> </figure>  Their Kathmandu base was a small discreet lodge in a back lane near Rani Pokhari. Sipping sweet tea from a blue mug with a chipped lid, I sat bemused in a corner of the Mustang Hotel room whilst Wangdu and his cohorts received a battered brown suitcase from their CIA connection, a tousle-haired American in a leather jacket. Heaved onto the dingy bedspread that covered the thin mattress, it was clicked open to reveal piles of neatly stacked dollar bills.&nbsp; I cannot think why Wangdu allowed me to witness this handover but I was clearly no threat, a newly arrived world traveller with no understanding of the stakes nor any Nepali or <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/tibetan-music-in-nepals-sacred-valley">Tibetan language</a>. Despite armed guards in the corridor,Wangdu radiated confidence and bravado, and there was a practiced familiarity to the tense transaction. This deadly dance for many years had been funded by the Americans, tolerated by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-kingdom-within-a-republic">Mustang’s residents</a>, and permitted by King Mahendra and the Nepali authorities who it suited to turn a blind eye.&nbsp; But Mahendra died in 1972, and times were changing. Richard Nixon’s ping-pong diplomacy thawed the cold war and signalled a fresh entente with China. Nepal’s yet-to-be-crowned <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/if-birendra-was-alive-nepal-could-still-be-a-monarchy">King Birendra </a>was under pressure to curb the irritating incursions against the PLA launched from the Nepali territory of Mustang. Keen to appease his northern neighbour, on several occasions the King summoned Wangdu for peace talks but, despite increasingly overwhelming odds, Wangdu refused to surrender.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_a8efd5cfb92cd997bd7cb74296a936fef46e2f7428f9cd642b03f1ac4ea11ecb.jpg" data-media-id="editor_14" data-image-id="2025052403054_a8efd5cfb92cd997bd7cb74296a936fef46e2f7428f9cd642b03f1ac4ea11ecb" data-rendition-name="original" width="1055" height="885" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>General Wangdu flanked by two Tibetan resistance fighters in Mustang in the 1970s. Photo courtesy: MIKEL DUNHAM</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_75969125a745847a2ef82b6fe8b9106c0b21a116d85b8efdf5d2ee89a347bb31.jpg" data-media-id="editor_15" data-image-id="2025052403054_75969125a745847a2ef82b6fe8b9106c0b21a116d85b8efdf5d2ee89a347bb31" data-rendition-name="original" width="1044" height="792" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>King Birendra with General Wangdu (right in dark glasses) taken in 1974 possibly in Mustang after one of their few attempts at negotiation. Photo courtesy: RAJRNDRA KUNWAR</figcaption> </figure>  While I naively rode pillion around Kathmandu in the spring sunshine, Wangdu was in the midst of what turned out to be his final round of negotiations with the Nepal government. Refusing to cease hostilities with the Chinese, Wangdu must have suspected the cost of his decision, making his cheerful smile in the photograph all the more poignant and brave. It was only much later that I appreciated the significance of the moment. Wangdu had been sent to replace the first resistance leader in Mustang, Baba Gen Yeshe, a much derided corrupt character who stole money meant for his troops and exploited fleeing refugees by seizing their treasures. Baba Gen Yeshe never forgave Wangdu,and sought revenge in May 1974 by betraying him and his commanders to the Nepal authorities. Renewed Chinese incursions from the north, active PLA collusion with the Nepali forces under the new King, and treachery from within the Chushi-Gangdrukranks combined to seal their fate.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_e0987a7c90d76431b0d7d5e6115ebfe3dbda7ab939e5941e079c18d722e884c0.jpg" data-media-id="editor_16" data-image-id="2025052403054_e0987a7c90d76431b0d7d5e6115ebfe3dbda7ab939e5941e079c18d722e884c0" data-rendition-name="original" width="1400" height="769" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>British television journalists George Patterson and Adrian Cowell embedded themselves with Khampa guerrillas and accompanied them from Tsum Valley on a cross border raid on a Chinese Army convoy in 1964. Photo: ESSAYS ON NEPAL / SAM COWAN</figcaption> </figure>  Mikel Dunham, renowned author of Buddha’s Warriors, writes: ‘It is possible that Wangdu was waiting for some cue from the Dalai Lama’s government-in-exile in Dharamsala, India. It is equally possible – during that last, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/the-human-cost-of-nepal-s-yarsa-gold-rush?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR31-Cqw8oyIwMPzf_35e4Skr0ululJvLf3_vDkzHn-AYG2h8uPw2rqqErg_aem_tGVn5coY1-jA7fze_xqhew">desolate winter </a>– that he made the decision to go out in glory rather than admit defeat. Over the last fifteen years, Wangdu had experienced Tibet’s organized resistance being squeezed and shoved around by every conceivable outside force.&nbsp; First they had been pushed out of their own country by the PLA; then they had been refused sanction while on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/nepal-india-trans-boundary-bonds?fbclid=IwAR0PpJ5zUEbwdug3g_U3ar6FUugngRY0S8Tl2v_7wqzrsHmXWcXsKjvL4t4">Indian soil</a>; then they were abandoned by the Americans because, apparently, Nixon wanted to make friends with Wangdu’s mortal enemies, the communists; then they had been betrayed by the vampiric Baba Gen Yeshe – a Tibetan and, even worse, a fellow Khampa; and now, finally Wangdu’s army was being evicted by the Nepalis. One thing was certain: Wangdu was a warrior. To imagine Wangdu simply giving up and settling down in the pacific squalor of a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/elderly-left-in-bhutan-refugee-camp">refugee camp </a>was unthinkable.’  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_8fc1ffef4ae751628b90ae781b66e11e51e4fdde2787207c9042efbee345ce49.jpg" data-media-id="editor_20" data-image-id="2025052403054_8fc1ffef4ae751628b90ae781b66e11e51e4fdde2787207c9042efbee345ce49" data-rendition-name="original" width="500" height="746" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>The much derided Baba Gen Yeshe, the first Tibetan resistance leader in Mustang, who betrayed Wangdu for personal gain. Photo courtesy: MIKEL DUNHAM</figcaption> </figure>   <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025052403054_b1d833cdb00d3ac4416b844d8730475cd88c238caaaf8da69889a584eea229a3.jpg" data-media-id="editor_21" data-image-id="2025052403054_b1d833cdb00d3ac4416b844d8730475cd88c238caaaf8da69889a584eea229a3" data-rendition-name="original" width="500" height="656" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> <figcaption>Aditya SJB Rana of the Royal Nepal Army whose team ambushed Wangdu and his cohorts at the top of Tinker Pass in Darchula, West Nepal. Photo courtesy: GAUTAM SJB RANA</figcaption> </figure>  By August 1974 the game was up. Wangdu and six of his exhausted party were killed on their horses by <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=7270">the Royal Nepal Army</a> on the brink of escape. The officer in charge, Aditya SJB Rana, cleverly predicted their route into India after they failed to silence a police radio in Yari. A carefully laid ambush trapped them near the summit of the Tinker Pass in Darchula,at 5,000 meters the highest military operation of its time. Wangdu’s body was helicoptered to Kathmandu, and a big show made of the royal Nepal victory.&nbsp; The Tibetan armed insurgency against China had reached its end.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250524030520_3ff9c6fc85a65bc9a2c3afe9736d9f5f9413de752e790a5d9dca0981ea94f9b4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_23" data-image-id="20250524030520_3ff9c6fc85a65bc9a2c3afe9736d9f5f9413de752e790a5d9dca0981ea94f9b4" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The last days of the Khampa NT"> </figure>

The Last Days of the Khampa

Starting 17 September Turkish Airlines will fly daily to Seville, one of Spain’s major tourist draws. This is Turkish’s sixth destination in Spain after Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Malaga, and Bilbao. Seville is in the Andalusia region on Spain’s south coast with a rich Moor history. There are approximately 30,000 Nepalis living in Spain.&nbsp;

Turkish to Seville

The newly-formed Himalayan Art Council is set to launch Nepal’s National Art Protection Platform that seeks to preserve <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-history-of-heritage">Nepal’s unique cultural heritage </a>using<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/artificial-censorship"> AI-powered tools</a>. The Council seeks to safeguard <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/nepali-art-going-places">Nepali art works</a> from neglect, theft and counterfeiting as well as preserve existing artwork and celebrate living masters by giving them a cultural space to continue the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/sacred-survival">sacred art traditions</a>. "We are introducing a new digital platform designed to preserve, verify and elevate <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/nepals-new-generation-of-alternative-artists">Nepal’s art for generations to come,</a>” says a statement from the Council, adding that the digital platform will use AI told for authentication and blockchain to keep track of works of art. Artists can now be protected by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/ayo-ai?fbclid=IwAR1uwmTVq4gUB70ljfRezjzukD9ArWXPuMnUikopeQ8PoiZMjicToPSwhKE&amp;=1">AI tools</a> that detect forgeries, identify their work even when unsigned, and ensure they receive proper recognition and credit. The archives will be searchable with translated inscription and interactive guides. Says curator Meena Lama: “AI and blockchains are tools that give us the power to detect fakes and identify unsigned paintings and track every piece. With these tools we can restore trust, secure authorship and give artists the dignity they deserve.”  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250514170544_2ab58f6313c0458f75114a692b0016bd9efb3b59d5f8f07f0da72e1e37b82f53.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250514170544_2ab58f6313c0458f75114a692b0016bd9efb3b59d5f8f07f0da72e1e37b82f53" data-rendition-name="original" width="1300" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="Artwork at the Traditional Art Exhibition at Patan Museum."> <figcaption>Artwork at the Traditional Art Exhibition at Patan Museum.</figcaption> </figure>  The Council is also holding an exhibition of Nepali cultural masterpieces with 50 historical <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/Buzz-the-art,671">thangka and paubha </a>by past masters and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/between-the-sacred-and-everyday">contemporary works by current artists</a>. This curated collection is a living tribute to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/when-yaks-go-so-does-culture">Himalayan culture</a> with economic depictions of deities, mandala and sacred narratives. The exhibition at <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/a-portal-into-patan-s-past-and-present">Patan Museum</a> also provides an opportunity to meet painters and custodians of art and culture. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/golden-deities">Golden deities</a>, Sewa Bhattarai ‘The exhibition is only the first step in a long journey to ensure that Nepali art is no just seen but fully understood, <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/Narratives-of-Faith-and-Memory-Remembering-the-Lost-Sculptures-of-Kathmandu-exhibition,987">protected and remembered</a>,’ the Council says. Artist Kailash K Shrestha of Artudio has spent decades promoting thankha and paubha traditions because of their beauty and devotional meaning. But he also says artists are underpaid, exploited and ignored. He adds, “AI and blockchain are not just buzzwords, they are powerful tools that can protect Nepal’s artists from fraud, verify authenticity and build a permanent record of provenance.” Traditional Art Exhibition Till 17 May Patan Museum

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