They say you can choose your enemies, but not your neighbours. This rings true especially for small nation states bordering much larger ones.
And that is also what Mao Zedong told King Mahendra in Beijing in 1967, and it is the message successive Chinese leaders have given to Nepal’s rulers ever since: be clever, don’t rock the boat, learn to live with India.&nbsp;
In Beijing in 1988, Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv Gandhi demarcated each other's &nbsp;spheres of influence: south of the Himalaya India calls the shots, and north of it (including Tibet) China does.&nbsp;
Lila Nyaichyai, who did her PhD on Chinese Public Diplomacy in Nepal from Yunnan University, says China’s main concern in Nepal is stability.
“As a country grows to become a global power, its aspirations do too,” she says. “But China hasn’t cared much about whether Nepal is a monarchy, a democracy, or a federal republic as long as it is politically stable for development.”
Nepal’s royal rulers navigated the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States successfully, getting both to contribute to the country’s development. But the dramatic rise of India and China as global powers, and the fact that they are rivals in Nepal’s immediate neighbourhood has made the need for balance much more critical now.&nbsp;
A template could be the way Finland survived the Cold War between next door Soviet Union and the West. It did not join the Warsaw Pact, but its reference group was the other Nordics. The country decided to keep Moscow at arms length by appeasing it — a strategy that came to be called ‘Finlandisation’.
“Finlandisation was this attitude of yielding to pressure from a big brother,” Finnish journalist and author Katri Merikallio explained to me during a recent visit to Helsinki. “Finland remained independent, but its sovereignty was narrowed. There was a price to pay. We must acknowledge the risks that such a balancing involves, both for the sovereignty of a nation but also for internal politics.”
It was a survival tactic that saved Finland from being arm-twisted by the Soviet Union, like Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But today with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ‘Finlandisation’ is not in vogue anymore and Finland has joined NATO.
Nepal’s strategy of ‘equidistance’ between New Delhi and Beijing is somewhat similar to how Finland survived the Cold War. But it is a little more complicated than that. Indian strategists do not like the term ‘neutrality’ to characterise Nepal’s dealings with its regional rivals China and Pakistan.&nbsp;
South Asia is now in America’s blindspot with Trump’s turbulent second term, and without Washington’s countervailing presence geopolitics has become much more slippery than Prithvi Narayan Shah’s yam analogy.&nbsp;
Back in Kathmandu, former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Paudyal of the UML contends that despite their differences, bigger countries do come to an understanding, often at the expense of smaller neighbours. An example of this is China’s refusal to get involved in Nepal's Limiyadhura dispute with India.
“It will not be easy, but we must maintain our policy of equidistance in dealing with India and China,” Rai Paudyal told us. “We must assure both that we are not a security threat, and that Nepal’s prosperity and stability is in their national interest as well.”
Nepal is the oldest nation state in South Asia, and has survived invasions, expansionist empires, and neighbours who do not see eye to eye with each other thanks to master strategists like Jang Bahadur Rana, Chandra Shumsher and King Mahendra.
Today, Nepal is one of the few remaining open societies in Asia with a free press, and a fragile yet rambunctious democracy. Yet feckless governments with leaders unskilled to steer a safe course in a volatile region means Nepal has never been as vulnerable to outside interference as it is today (page 1).
Here in Helsinki, NATO membership has finally finished off Finlandisation. It is a lesson for Nepal about how quickly the geopolitical terrain can shift and upend a nation’s established foreign policy doctrine. &nbsp;
Nepal needs to be supple and agile, pragmatic and self-confident. This will require monumental political reform marked by greater accountability, transparency, and good governance at home.&nbsp;
In other words, secure relations with our two giant neighbours needs sturdier domestic politics.
Sonia Awale in Helsinki

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Love thy neighbours

Throughout its 260-year history, Nepal has tried to keep an equilibrium between its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/political-geography-of-india-nepal-china-ties">two giant neighbours</a>. Past rulers have tried to ensure friendly relations with India and China even if the two are not exactly friendly <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/chindia?%2F">with each other</a>.&nbsp;
But just how delicate this balancing act can be was thrown into sharp relief last week in two events.&nbsp;
A Nepali was among 25 killed in an attack in Kashmir <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/nukes-in-the-neighbourhood">last month</a>, and at a seminar on regional terrorism this week in Kathmandu foreign policy wonks felt Nepal needlessly irritated India by not being more forthcoming in its condemnation of Pakistan.
Then, at the annual Kathmandu International Mountain Film Festival (<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/festival-of-mountain-films">Kimff</a>) Chinese documentaries on Tibet were screened under a China-funded ‘Xizang Panorama’ showcase.
There was an immediate backlash against Kimff for accepting Chinese sponsorship and the use of ‘Xizang’, the Chinese name for Tibet. The films were said to be 'colonial propaganda', and Beijing’s attempt to erase Tibetan identity, independence, and self-determination.&nbsp;
'The term "Xizang" is not merely a geographic designation—it represents China's calculated campaign to replace "Tibet" in international discourse, seeking to erase a distinct and vibrant artistic, literary and spiritual identity,' a collective &nbsp;of Tibetan filmmakers and writers wrote to Nepali Times last week as Kimff was ongoing.&nbsp;
The Nepal government in its diplomatic language has started using ‘Xizang’ to refer to Tibet, and there was speculation that the Chinese lobbied with the government to pressure Kimff to show the films on Tibet. Kimff did not respond to our request for comment.&nbsp;
“While we can advocate for the rights and identity of the Tibetan community in activism and media, the reference to Tibet in our diplomacy will remain in line with our foreign policy with regards to China,” says international relations specialist Indra Adhikari.
The terrorism seminar and the film festival controversy were just the latest examples of how Nepal’s government and civil society are being increasingly squeezed by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/no-man-s-land">rival neighbours</a>.&nbsp;
The rollback of Pax Americana <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">under Trump </a>means that emerging powers China and India are filling the gap. The result: a politically-weakened Nepali state is now more subservient than ever before.&nbsp;
Nepal’s strategy of equidistance is fraying at the edges as Kathmandu is buffeted by countervailing pressure from north and south.
“<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">Nepal’s political leadership</a> in recent times has changed the definition of ‘national interest’ to suit its own circumstance,” explains former SAARC General-Secretary Arjun Bahadur Thapa. “This means our <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/at-home-and-abroad">foreign policy</a> tilts towards one neighbour or the other depending on which party is in power.”&nbsp;
To be sure, Nepal has asserted itself from time to time, eliciting Indian ire over the Limpiyadhura dispute, and Kathmandu’s refusal to directly condemn Pakistan on the Pahalgam attack even when one of its nationals was killed.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/balochistan-to-kashmir">Balochistan to Kashmir</a>, Shyam Tekwani
New Delhi has never liked the term ‘equidistance’, and there are also some in Nepal who want it redefined, taking into account proximity, &nbsp;cultural affinity, trade and economic <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/how-to-reboot-nepal-india-relations">relations with India</a>.&nbsp;
“Perhaps it is time that we move beyond equidistance to a more pragmatic approach,” says Adhikari. “<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-love-triangle-with-china-and-india-impacts-investment">Nepal’s relations with India and China</a> are different in nature, and our policy could reflect that difference.”
Meanwhile, Thapa is not so sure that growing American and Western disinterest in the region is making India and China more assertive towards smaller nations. &nbsp;
He says: “It is true there is declining Western interest in this region, but the US and Europe never really had more influence in Nepal than India and China.”
Speculation is also rife about how Nepal’s two neighbours regard the clamour on the streets and cyberspace for a restoration of a Hindu monarchy. The pro-monarchy RPP and RPP-N joined forces, but amidst shrinking turnout at their rallies decided to ‘decentralise’ protests to other parts of the country.
The Indian media has given wall-to-wall coverage to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/republicans-and-royalists-on-nepal-s-streets">the royal rallies in Kathmandu</a>, almost at the level of its reporting on the cricket IPL. China has not said much, and seems more interested in trying to unite Nepal’s disparate Communist parties.
India’s ruling BJP and China’s CCP have their preferences for how and who governs Nepal, but that may not mean they are working at cross purposes. Both New Delhi and Beijing would prefer the buffer state between them to be politically stable.
Indra Adhikari says that sections of the BJP could want Nepal to become a Hindu state.&nbsp;
She adds: “Some in the BJP even want the reestablishment of a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/nepal-party-reincarnating-hindu-monarchy">Hindu monarchy</a>. But China wants a stable and amenable government, preferably led by a leftist alliance.”

Shristi Karki

National insecurity

India and Pakistan are twins separated at birth. Tensions between them have been at a hair trigger ever since independence and has erupted into full scale conflict at least four times in the past 80 years.
The 22 April terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 25 Indian tourists and a Nepali citizen, threatens to escalate tension between the two nuclear-armed nations. India has squarely blamed Pakistan for the attacks, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given his military “operational freedom” to respond. Pakistan has said it has credible intelligence of an Indian military strike and its officials have promised a “full spectrum” response — a code for a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/thinking-the-thinkable">nuclear retaliation</a>.
For Nepal, the killing of its national in the Pahalgam attack comes as another stark reminder that in conflicts from Afghanistan to Iraq, from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine">Ukraine</a> to Israel, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/10-nepalis-from-one-town-fighting-in-ukraine">Nepalis are getting caught in the crossfire</a>. The last time full-scale fighting broke out between <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">India and Pakistan</a> on Kargil in 1999, at least 22<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-trial-by-fire-for-soldiers-from-nepal?%27%5C%22="> Nepalis fighting for the Indian Army</a> were killed in action.
Three of Nepal’s immediate neighbours (China, India, Pakistan) have nuclear weapons, and they do not have good relations. With China supplying weapons, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/war-and-warming">missile technology</a> and other support to Pakistan, this triangular friction could set off a regional conflagration.&nbsp;
<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0" target="_blank">Research at Rutgers University</a> has calculated that even a week-long tactical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would throw up so much smoke and debris into the atmosphere that it would block out the sun for years, and lead to a collapse of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/grow-nourish-sustain-together-world-food-day">global food system</a>. This does not take into account the radioactive fallout that prevailing winds would blow up to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lives-on-the-line-in-the-himalaya">the Himalaya</a>, contaminating glaciers that are the sources of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/saving-what-is-left-of-himalayan-rivers">Asia’s main rivers</a>.
The impact of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/climate-breakdown-linked-to-thame-flood">climate breakdown </a>on High Asia was already ringing alarm bells about its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/himalayan-icecap-melting-faster-than-thought">shrinking ice cap</a> reducing the dry season flow of water downstream. Water was going to be the next strategic commodity, geopolitical experts warned, and the next wars in Asia would be over water.
That water war is already happening. India retaliated to the Kashmir attack by suspending the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/world/asia/india-pakistan-indus-waters-treaty.html" target="_blank">Indus Waters Treaty</a> of 1960 mediated by the World Bank that has withstood at least three wars between India and Pakistan. The treaty gives India control over the three eastern tributaries of the Indus (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beas_River" target="_blank">Beas</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ravi_River" target="_blank">Ravi</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sutlej" target="_blank">Sutlej</a>), while Pakistan got water from the Indus and two of its western tributaries (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_River" target="_blank">Indus</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chenab_River" target="_blank">Chenab</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jhelum_River" target="_blank">Jhelum</a>.
Pakistan was assured of 70% of the annual flow, and India could use a reasonable amount of water for<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15231"> irrigation and hydropower</a>. &nbsp;Within days of its threat, India stopped water flowing down to Pakistan from the Chenab river and is reportedly preparing to do the same on the Jhelum.
The sabre-rattling has reached a crescendo. Besides threats and counter-threats there are also symbolic drills, with the Indian Air Force practicing landing on an expressway in Uttar Pradesh by its Rafale, Su-30 and Jaguar fighter jets to demonstrate ‘operational readiness’. In response Pakistan test-fired its Abdali ballistic missile that can carry a nuclear warhead and has a range of 450km.&nbsp;
The danger is that with ultra-nationalist rhetoric and the beating the war drums by both sides, India’s government and Pakistan’s military may have to ‘do something’ to appease domestic public opinion. But any tactical strike, an artillery exchange, or territorial incursion could quickly escalate out of control.
Expecting an Indian retaliation for the Pahalgam killings, Pakistan is using<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/interfaith-collaboration-for-nuclear-disarmament"> nuclear deterrence </a>and warning of “catastrophic consequences”. The two neighbours came close to a nuclear exchange in 2019 after an attack on the Indian military in Kashmir, and prompt international intervention led by the United States cooled tensions.&nbsp;
This time, the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">Trump administration</a> is too distracted and not as engaged. Pakistan has denied it was responsible for the terrorist attack and called on Washington to stop a possible Indian retaliation. India and Pakistan have stopped overflights by each other’s airlines, and some international carriers have even stopped flying over Pakistan fearing an air war.
Washington, Beijing, the UN and the EU have all urged restraint. Iran, which has good relations with both India and Pakistan has sent its foreign minister to urge both countries not to go into a tit-for-tat war. Iran has its own nuclear flashpoint to worry about with tensions in Israel, &nbsp;Yemen and Syria.
India and Pakistan both share similar problems of joblessness, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/why-nepal-s-poverty-rate-is-stuck">poverty </a>and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/climate-change-new-threat-to-nepal-s-rhinos">environmental threats</a>. Neither side needs the threat of a senseless war, and we in the neighbourhood do not need it either.&nbsp;
Kunda Dixit
This Editorial is brought to you by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/" target="_blank">Nepali Times</a>, in collaboration with <a href="https://inpsjapan.com/en/" target="_blank">INPS Japan</a> and <a href="https://sgi-peace.org/" target="_blank">Soka Gakkai International</a>, in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

Nukes in the neighbourhood

The armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953 has been mentioned as a possible model for how to end the fighting in Ukraine. This makes sense. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">Trump administration</a>, however, seems to opt for a quick deal like the 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam or the Minsk agreements of 2014–15, combining “ceasefires in place” with vain prospects of subsequently reaching a genuine <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/restorative-justice-for-peace-building">peace agreement</a>.
One lesson from the negotiations that led to the Korean armistice is that patient diplomacy is needed to end a stalemated war. When talks began in July 1951, the impatient Mao Zedong estimated that two weeks would be enough to conclude. The negotiations instead took two years.
The result was a long text, detailing the exact border line and establish a demilitarised zone across the peninsula under UN supervision. The stated intention was to follow up with a peace agreement. This came to nothing. The conference established for the purpose in Geneva decided instead to reach an agreement on Indochina, dividing Vietnam for the next 21 years and replacing the French with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-world-9-11-made">American military forces</a>.
The biggest difference between the Korea and Ukraine wars is that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/ukraines-lessons-for-sandwiched-nations-like-nepal">Ukrainians are fighting alone</a>, with only external military support, while the Korean War was primarily fought by American and Chinese forces on Korean soil.
Back then, the armistice agreement was concluded by the commanders of the US-dominated UN forces, the Chinese “volunteers”, and the North Korean army, against the wish of Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul. He wanted to continue the fight for national reunification. Only after being offered a defence pact with the US did he accept the negotiated outcome, yet did not sign the agreement. South Korea has never signed the armistice that has prevented new <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2664">outbreaks of war</a>.
The key similarity between the Korean and Ukrainian wars is the prominent role of the USA as a supporter of the governments in Seoul and Kyiv. In both cases a condition for ensuring that an armistice can hold is that the US take responsibility for any agreement and joins up with others in providing security guarantees.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/is-the-time-ripe-for-an-end-to-the-ukraine-war">Is the time ripe for an end to the Ukraine war?</a> &nbsp;Herbert Wulf
A key reason why war has not resumed in Korea for the last 72 years is the continued US presence in the south. American troops act as a "tripwire," ensuring that any North Korean invasion would lead to a war it would surely lose. For the same reason, the US needs to have boots on the ground in Ukraine.
Another similarity is that any attempt to conclude a genuine peace agreement is futile. A genuine peace in Korea would require that North and South agree either on national reunification or on recognising each other as independent states, just as East and West Germany did in 1973.
A peace agreement was even more unthinkable for Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung in 1953–54 than it is for Seoul and Pyongyang today. It is just as inconceivable that President Vladimir Putin will withdraw voluntarily from Donbas and Krym as it is for President Volodymyr Zelensky to conclude a definitive peace agreement that does not recognise Ukrainian sovereignty to its entire territory.
To maintain the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also crucial for Europe and the UN that Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty is not internationally recognised. Therefore, just as the two Koreas, Russia and Ukraine must settle for something less than a peace treaty, namely an armistice. This may end the fighting and could save hundreds of thousands of lives but will not establish peace.
An armistice is not a simple ceasefire, where military forces are supposed to remain where they happen to be situated when the agreement is made. For a Ukrainian armistice to be respected, the Russian and Ukrainian forces must withdraw to either side of a clearly delineated demilitarised zone. This is complicated by the fact that the front lines are so long.
The easiest compromise would be for Ukraine to let Russia retain control over Krym, while Russia withdraws from Donbas. Third parties should put pressure on Moscow and Kyiv to accept that neat solution. To soften the pill, Ukraine could guarantee a high degree of local autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk.
International monitoring with the use of satellite surveillance along the entire border would be needed. If one or both parties were to mobilise combat forces, launch drone attacks, or place rocket launchers on alert, warning signals should be triggered and international security guarantees enforced by robust multi-national forces.
A final similarity between Korea 1953 and Ukraine 2025 armistice is that both sides must abstain from any political interference at the other side of the agreed boundary. Russia and Ukraine must remain fully sovereign and independent states.
Any rapprochement between the two Korean states continues to depend on Seoul’s ability to convince Pyongyang that it does not seek regime change in the north and on the willingness of Kim Jong Un to abstain from provocative <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/thinking-the-thinkable">missile tests</a> and vocal threats.&nbsp;
Putin apparently wants an agreement to include a provision for new elections in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/ukraine-crisis-hits-nepal-economy-hard">Ukraine</a>, so he can interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs and remove Zelensky from power. This is a destructive demand that should be consistently rejected by any mediating or facilitating party to talks. The Ukrainians must decide for themselves when to lift their state of emergency and hold<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/is-democracy-too-expensive-for-nepal"> democratic elections</a>.
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">President Trump</a> has put pressure on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire and has conceded on Ukraine’s behalf that it cannot get back all its lost territory or obtain NATO membership. He should now concentrate his efforts on convincing both sides to engage in negotiations for a strongly guaranteed and highly monitored armistice rather than a quick and fragile ceasefire or a dodgy settlement allowing one side to interfere in the other.
Stein Tønnesson is Senior Research Fellow (Peace and Security in Northeast Asia) at the Toda Peace Institute and Research Professor Emeritus, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2025/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine-lessons-from-korea.html">the original</a> with their permission.

How to agree an armistice in Ukraine

Last month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the first official <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/reaction-to-wang-yi-s-nepal-visit-in-chinese-media">foreign visit </a>of the commission in her second term would be to India. On the same day, Marco Rubio held his first bilateral meeting as US Secretary of State with India’s minister of external affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Washington last month confirmed his country’s rising international profile. The visit ended with the promise of what Modi called a US-India “mega partnership.” He has committed to double trade with the US by 2030, increase <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/half-full/A-carbon-neutral-Nepal-is-possible-clean-Nepal,1064">oil and gas imports</a>, and expand US military sales to India.
India is now the fastest-growing major <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/how-nepal-can-avert-an-economic-crunch">economy</a>, with the IMF forecasting a 6.5% increase in GDP this year. India is expected to overtake Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/india-s-election-and-its-economic-future">India’s election and its economic future</a>, Raghuram G Rajan
Despite its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/missing-out-on-nepal-s-tourism-potential">vast potential</a>, India has long been overlooked by the West, both <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/ukraine-crisis-hits-nepal-economy-hard">economically</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitically</a>. But a fundamental global realignment is now underway. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ has given way to an era of great-power competition that, unlike during the Cold War, features demands by emerging and developing economies for a more <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/making-nepal-accessible-to-all">inclusive </a>and representative multilateral system.&nbsp;
In this multipolar age, both the US and Europe see India, a neutral <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/no-binary-foreign-policy?fb_comment_id=3583384368393672_3586424038089705">foreign-policy </a>actor and dynamic<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18861"> emerging economy</a>, as vital to the future of their strategic priorities.&nbsp;
A founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, India has plenty of experience navigating precarious moments in <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4896">world affairs</a>. During the Cold War, it skillfully balanced its policies toward <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/america-nepal-and-the-royal-coup-qedzifz9">the US and the Soviet Union</a>.&nbsp;
When it engaged with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/so-far-so-good/the-vagaries-of-fate">the Soviet Union</a>, from which it received considerable <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/civil-military-synergy-in-disaster-management">military assistance</a>, it calibrated its approach to offset US support of Pakistan, without taking sides in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-rich-get-richer-and-more-powerful">great-power competition</a>.&nbsp;
India has since maintained this pragmatic balancing act, adapting its foreign policy to a shifting geopolitical landscape. Today, that means recognising its potential to shape global affairs, including by playing a leading role in building an efficient, realistic, and inclusive multilateralism.&nbsp;
This is reflected in Modi’s pursuit of a more assertive, internationalist foreign policy. Beyond building new partnerships and strengthening old ones, Modi has sought to increase <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-s-hindutva-politics-influencing-nepal">India’s influence </a>in traditional and emerging multilateral fora. In 2023 alone, India held the presidency of both the G20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a Chinese creation, comprising nine Middle Eastern and Asian countries).&nbsp;
India plays a leading role in the BRICS, and is characteristically nuanced: whereas Russia and, to a significant extent, China see themselves as disruptors of the existing order, India views itself as a reformer. This enables it to maintain strategic flexibility as it advances its interests.&nbsp;
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-china-rail-race">India’s relationship with China</a> is complicated by other factors. While the countries work together in some fora, they are also locked in protracted<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-bangladesh-border-talks-have-lessons-for-nepal"> territorial disputes</a> and a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-race-for-shital-nibas">competition for leadership</a> in the so-called Global South.&nbsp;
India’s growing global clout, including its appeal to Western powers, stems in large part from its ability to act as a counterweight to China. It is indispensable to the Quad alliance with Australia, Japan, and the US, a grouping that is officially focused on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-quad-maritime-security-and-climate-change">maritime security</a> and economic cooperation, though its members clearly seek to provide a buffer against China in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/between-two-oceans">Indo-Pacific region</a>. It is thanks to India that the Quad is not viewed as just another Western vehicle.&nbsp;
Modi has sought to bolster India’s Southern credentials, including by highlighting its status as the “mother of democracy”. By framing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/is-democracy-too-expensive-for-nepal">democracy</a> as intrinsic to Indian civilisation, rather than a colonial legacy, he aligned India with ‘middle powers’ seeking to redefine global governance on their own terms.&nbsp;
To be sure, Modi has moved India away from the secular and pluralistic values that had flourished after <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-goal-is-empowerment-and-independence-of-women">independence</a>, in favour of assertive <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/unconventional-convention">Hindu nationalism</a>. So many international indices have downgraded India’s democratic status that he is now seeking to create his own.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/demodification-of-india">Demodification of India</a>, Chandrakishore&nbsp;
Modi is the second leader of independent India (after Jawaharlal Nehru) to be elected to three consecutive terms, and remains a dominant force in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-faith-in-politics">Indian politics</a>.&nbsp;
And at a time of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-water-and-electricity">rapid geopolitical change</a>, he is committed to leveraging his position, and India’s profound strengths, to turn it into a global player. India has long had the potential to be an active shaper of international affairs. It has now arrived. &nbsp;&nbsp;© Project Syndicate
Ana Palacio, a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group, is a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University.

India has arrived

Till about 200 years ago <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-china-rail-race">China and India</a> were the world’s largest economies, and that helped Kathmandu prosper as an entrepôt between the two. We have now come full circle. China and India are ascendant once more, and the two giant neighbours can be the locomotives to pull Nepal along if we play our cards right. That is the message in former Kantipur editor <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/two-takes-on-the-nepal-india-nexus">Sudheer Sharma</a>’s omnibus edition of two books that explore the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/so-far-so-good/nepals-history-through-art">historical</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitical dimensions of Nepal</a>’s relations with China.&nbsp; The two Nepali language books, भिक्षु, व्यापार र बिद्रोह (Monks, Trade and Rebellion) and हिमालपारिको हुरी (Trans-Himalayan Hurricane) follow Sharma’s previous work प्रयोगशाला (Laboratory) which looked mainly at Nepal-India relations and was translated into English as The Nepal Nexus. The first book is predominantly about Kathmandu’s historical links with Lhasa, and by extension <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/beijing-30-zak6iu1w">Beijing</a>. Vajrayana Buddhism played a significant role in bringing the two sides of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lives-on-the-line-in-the-himalaya">the Himalaya</a> together, allowing social and trade relations to thrive.&nbsp; Princess Bhrikuti, King Narendra Dev and Arniko were prominent historical figures, but thousands of lesser known <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/monks-and-nuns-help-in-rescue-and-relief,2320">monks</a>, traders, and travellers also played their part in cementing Kathmandu-Lhasa ties. These connections were so strong that they endured three wars that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/beginning-of-the-end-of-the-gorkha-empire">Gorkha Kingdom</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/gift-a-goat-to-tibet-nomads-in-nepal">Tibet</a> fought against each other in which <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/neither-side-lost-both-sides-won">Chinese emperors</a> sent military help to fight off the Nepalis. Although<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-assam-connection-revived"> Nepal’s historic connections</a> with Tibet waned after the Chinese annexation of the plateau in the 1950s, it is on that foundation that present day <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-china-agreements-are-stuck">Nepal-China relations</a> are built.&nbsp; Till today, Nepal is the only country with a consulate in Lhasa, and the only <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/kathmandu-airport-to-cut-flight-hours">international flights</a> from Lhasa are to Kathmandu. But as Sharma notes, even back then, Nepal’s proximity with northern India figured importantly in its<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/home-is-where-the-heart-is-yqkvf5vx"> socio-economic </a>and cultural connections with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/there-are-muslims-in-tibet-too">Tibet</a>. Nepal was the corridor for the exchange of trade and faith between the Ganga plains and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/it-is-getting-hotter-on-the-roof-of-the-world">the Tibetan plateau</a>. The road between Patna and Potala, Banaras and Beijing passed through <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/bringing-silicon-valley-to-kathmandu-valley">Kathmandu Valley</a>. Sharma traces this socio-political landscape to explain how it went on to shape the country’s modern day relations with the neighbours.&nbsp; There were 2,000 Buddhist monks in Nepal during the reign of Lichhavi king Amshuverma, and Arniko established himself in the court of Kubulai Khan and took eight years to build the massive White Dagoba in Beijing. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-life-and-times-of-arniko">The life and times of Arniko</a>, Sewa Bhattarai While Mahayana Buddhism spread from India, through Nepal to China and beyond, it was <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/crony-communism">Communism</a> that later came from China to Nepal. King Mahendra had great geopolitical savvy and navigated the complicated geopolitics of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/land-reform-in-cold-war-nepal">Cold War</a> to cultivate relations with both Nehru and Mao, while keeping both at arms length. Mahendra wrested aid to build infrastructure like the Kodari and Prithvi Highways from China, but also from India, the Soviet Union and the United States. In fact Nepal was only the eighth non-Communist country to receive foreign aid during Mao’s China.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/the-new-equaliser">The new equaliser</a> But when <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/14-years-after-conflict-no-closure-in-nepal">Nepal’s Maoists</a> launched an armed struggle against <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/if-birendra-was-alive-nepal-could-still-be-a-monarchy">the monarchy</a>, China’s official media never called them ‘Maoists’. As far as Beijing was concerned, Mao was dead in his mausoleum. It was only later under <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-xi-jinping-s-big-surprise">Xi Jinping </a>that China warmed up to Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s ‘Maoist’ label.&nbsp; The first book takes us to the point when the Constituent Assembly <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/Ftnp-abolishing,624">abolished Nepal’s monarchy</a> in 2008, and the second book, as the name suggests, looks at how the whirlwind rise of China has buffeted Nepal.&nbsp; Sharma encourages readers to abandon <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/guest-editorial/Prithvi-Narayan-Shah-a-visionary-leader,1102">Prithvi Narayan Shah</a>’s famous metaphor of Nepal being ‘yam between two boulders’ to it being more like a ‘narrow canyon’ between two big <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/why-we-climb-mountains">mountains</a>, emphasising the challenges of maintaining sovereignty amid geopolitical pressures not just between India and China, but increasingly, with the United States. We have to see how the new Sino-US Cold War will evolve under <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trump-s-second-coming">the second Donald Trump presidency</a>. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-great-game-2nd-half">suspension of the MCC</a> this week will be an opening for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/crony-communism">China to push its own BRI infrastructure projects</a> in Nepal. It is not very helpful to see Nepal as being ‘squeezed’ between its giant neighbours, but leverage the country’s geostrategic location by being a connector between India and China. Both neighbours, naturally, have their own interests in Nepal as a buffer state, but both want stability. Kathmandu’s strategy should be to take advantage of the economic growth of its neighbours. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/poor-cash-rich-nepal">Poor cash-rich Nepal</a>, Sonia Awale &nbsp; Both books look at the arrival of Tibetan refugees into Nepal from the late 1950s, and how this resulted in geopolitical push and pull. Although American support for Khampa guerrillas was cut off after Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in 1971, US and western support for Tibetans in exile resumed after that.&nbsp; Nepal allowed the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mindfulness-about-bhutan-s-refugees"> refugees</a> to stay and work here, but under Chinese pressure Kathmandu adopted stricter measures — including <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2754">deporting Tibetans entering Nepal</a>. The Tibetan exile community remains one of Beijing’s biggest concerns in Nepal. Successive Kathmandu governments have been pressured to curb ‘anti-Chinese activities’ like celebrating the Dalai Lama’s birthday and other anniversaries.&nbsp; Sharma notes that so far Nepal has deftly balanced its support for refugees while keeping relations with Beijing on an even keel. It is significant that China has been surprisingly understanding of the presence of<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-start-of-the-anglo-gorkha-war"> Gorkha soldiers from Nepal</a> in the Indian Army along the disputed border where India and China fought a war in 1962, and after which there have been frequent skirmishes.&nbsp; The two books should be read chronologically so as to track the trajectory of historical Nepal-Tibet ties right up to present-day Nepal-China relations. The most relevant concern for bilateral relations today, as Sharma points out, is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-nepal-can-avert-an-economic-crunch">Nepal’s economic independence</a>, <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15973">sovereignty</a>, and role in a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-column/nepal-in-the-new-world-order">transformed world order</a>. &nbsp;&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250224140256_38f09c2f6dc3b7c79892cf556976fa9f7b3a2f43fb53bd7a248a6c6af3ba4715.jpg" data-media-id="editor_37" data-image-id="20250224140256_38f09c2f6dc3b7c79892cf556976fa9f7b3a2f43fb53bd7a248a6c6af3ba4715" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sudheer Sharma 1"> </figure>  &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250224140256_c6eb78b8f59cfda4b3dae582212306fd3ea25b1973d554fdb7579b9d8f345969.jpg" data-media-id="editor_38" data-image-id="20250224140256_c6eb78b8f59cfda4b3dae582212306fd3ea25b1973d554fdb7579b9d8f345969" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sudheer Sharma 2"> </figure>  &nbsp;

A past foretold

Thirty years after it abruptly pulled out of the Arun III project, the World Bank appears to have developed cold feet about an even larger project on the river in eastern Nepal. After opposition by civil society in Nepal, Japan and Europe, the Bank’s new president James Wolfensohn <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/20-years-ago-this-week/arun-iii">exited from Arun III</a>. The project’s generation capacity has been doubled to 900MW and it is being development by India’s state-owned SJVN Limited.&nbsp; Whereas in 1995, the opposition to Arun III was mainly from activists, this time it is said to be India’s displeasure with the Bank’s involvement in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/world-bank-flip-flop-on-upper-arun">1,061MW Upper Arun</a>. Delhi is so sensitive to the issue that sources said it even leaned on Indian-born American President of the World Bank, Ajaya Banga to cancel his trip to Kathmandu for the IDA21 Replenishment Meeting in June. When it gets the green light, Upper Arun will be the most expensive hydroelectric project in Nepal so far with a price tag of $1.6 billion. The semi-storage scheme is located on the transboundary Arun River 15km from the Chinese border after it cuts through the Himalaya between Mt Everest and Kangchenjunga. Beijing is said to have no objections to the project, but India’s silence is said to stem <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">from its strategic interest</a> in not allowing anyone else to build large storage projects on the tributaries of the Ganga in Nepal. India’s SJVN is also currently constructing three large projects downstream, including Arun III and Lower Arun with a total generation capacity of nearly 2,000MW.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16" data-rendition-name="original" width="850" height="771" loading="lazy" alt="Upper Arun Map NT"> </figure>  Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) set up Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited (UAHEL) as a subsidiary and in May signed up the French firm Tractebel for detailed design of the scheme. Experts say the design will have to take into account future climate-induced glacial lake outbursts like the one that swept away the 1,600MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">Chungthang Teesta</a> III in Sikkim last year built at a cost of $1.7 billion.&nbsp; Upper Arun’s financing will be 70% loans and 30% equity. The World Bank had already earmarked $750 million with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with Japan’s JICA also joining. But UAHEL Managing Director Fanendra Raj Joshi said there was no word either way from the World Bank, which meant there was no financial closure yet. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/right-climate-for-nepal-s-energy-transition">Right climate for Nepal’s energy transition</a>, Ramesh Kumar All this is in stark contrast to the optimism last year after Finance Minister Prakash Mahat returned from an IMF meeting in Morrocco and announced that the World Bank would be the main lender in Upper Arun.&nbsp; In November 2024, Mahat even took a helicopter with World Bank Managing Director Anna Bjerde and ADB Director Ramesh Subramaniam to the Upper Arun site and it looked like the loans were in the bag. It would also be the first large project in Nepal in which both big multilateral lenders would be involved.&nbsp; In April this year, an ‘agreement in principle’ was even reached between Mahat’s successor Barsaman Pun and World Bank Vice President for South Asia Martin Raiser to develop Upper Arun. But the loan meeting planned for June was cancelled. &nbsp; A Finance Ministry official told Nepali Times: “The World Bank told us categorically in November in Washington DC that India was opposed to its involvement in Upper Arun.” &nbsp; When Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal visited Delhi in June, Indian officials reportedly said they were interested in developing Upper Arun and evacuate its power through an extension of the 400kV transmission line it is building. Although Beijing had given the go ahead to the World Bank and ADB involvement in Upper Arun, it may not be as happy about an Indian company so close to its border. As a semi-reservoir project, Upper Arun can generate electricity at full capacity for up to six hours a day even in winter, unlike the schemes downstream which are run-of-the river in which generation depends on water flow.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/rivers-be-dammed">Rivers be dammed</a>, Pinki Siris Rana&nbsp; India is involved in projects in Nepal’s rivers that will generate a total of 8,000MW when complete. SJVN Limited is also taking over from the Chinese the 769MW Tamor project in the Arun Basin. &nbsp; Says Fanendra Raj Joshi of Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited: “Nepal can find alternative sources of funding and we will go ahead with this project even if the World Bank decides not to provide the loan.”&nbsp; Joshi and the NEA’s Kulman Ghising (pictured, below) attended a hearing with indigenous communities at the project site in Sankhuwasabha this week. Ghising told the gathering that if the World Bank pulled out Nepal would carry on with Upper Arun through “domestic and diaspora investment with the same financial package as Upper Tama Kosi”. The 546MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/when-it-rains-it-pours-ksqprbu3">Upper Tama Kosi was knocked</a> by a massive landslide in September and will not be fully operation at least for a year. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="600" loading="lazy" alt="Kulman Ghising"> </figure>  “This is a project that can transform the local economy and Nepal’s economy as well,” Ghising added. “We will go ahead with blended financing from all levels of government.” Despite the lack of financial closure, construction of the project is expected to get underway in 2026 for completion in six years. Construction of a 21km access road from the power house to the dam site along the Kosi Corridor highway is in full swing through difficult terrain.

Upper Arun question mark

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh must be based on a win-win policy, rooted in mutual respect, non-hegemony, and the pursuit of shared prosperity and deeper understanding. 
For India, there have always been only two neighbours: China and Pakistan. The rest of us smaller South Asian countries are geographic entities to be praised, cajoled, reprimanded and even punished as the situation calls for.
Sheikh Hasina's last tenure in power (2009-2024) appears to have been a ‘praise’ period. However, after the student-led people's uprising toppled her regime in August, a powerful section of the Indian media has shifted into the ‘reprimand’ mode, with some even suggesting ‘punishment’. Much of the social media discourse seems to support this.
Oppression of minorities anywhere in the world, including in my own country, must be condemned and speedily resolved. It should never recur. Communal conflict has been an age-old phenomenon in South Asia following the British colonial policy of divide and rule. 
It is a regrettable fact that, after 77 years of the departure of the British, we have still not been able to solve it.
After the regime change in Bangladesh, the Indian media's coverage of events can, in my view, be categorised as follows: 
<ol><li>The events that toppled Sheikh Hasina was the work of Pakistan's ISI, the Islamists in Bangladesh, or pro-Chinese elements all aimed to replace the ‘India-friendly’ government with an ‘unfriendly’ one. There is no mention of the role of common people or of the students, of the killing of ordinary people. What is the source of all these assertions? </li><li>The new government in Dhaka is bent on persecuting Hindus and even committing ‘genocide’. Many of these stories were debunked by fact-checkers, including the BBC. But that did not stop or even slow down the tirade of stories demonising Bangladesh.</li><li>The US involvement was also referred to and linked with the events in Pakistan in toppling Imran Khan. So, the US toppled Sheikh Hasina.</li></ol>
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Sheikh Hasina government even resorted to firing on demonstrators using helicopters.
In a prompt action, the interim government fast-tracked the issuance of visas for journalists. However, Indian journalists who visited Bangladesh focused solely on the attacks on Hindus, ignoring the broader human rights abuses by the Hasina government. 
The Indian media’s coverage of the July-August uprising in Bangladesh was also striking in its one-sidedness.
The Indian media largely ignored the massive student-led people's movement, which saw millions take to the streets of cities across the country. Their focus remained almost exclusively on the sporadic violence against Hindus during the power vacuum in the first week of the transition.
The firing on unarmed demonstrators, resulting in at least 700 deaths by 5 August, was barely covered. This was one of the most barbaric crackdowns in the recent history of South Asia, yet the Indian media gave it little attention. 
In the <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEoyTkOZ8xE&amp;t=588s">six interviews I gave</a> to <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bDJgVVBDLg">mainstream Indian outlets</a>, there was almost <a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/world/sheikh-hasina-had-turned-very-dictatorial-mahfuz-anam-on-bangladesh-regime-change/cid/2038904">no mention</a> of the scale of <a href="http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2024/08/07/the-daily-star-journalist-mahfuz-anam-interview-bangladesh-protests-political-crisis.html">the uprising</a> or the civilian deaths, only the vandalism of symbols like Bangabandhu's statue or the burning of government properties.
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Indian media's coverage appears to be driven by the isolated attacks against Hindus of Bangladesh, rather than the people of Bangladesh. India should not see the recent events through the lens of Sheikh Hasina but through the lens of democracy.
In a recent video broadcast by the Indian news portal ThePrint, Meenakshi Lekhi, a BJP leader and lawyer, said, ‘The chief adviser… is seeking to rename the nation [Bangladesh] to be [the] Islamic republic of East Pakistan.’ 
Where did she get that from? Her column was filled with distortions and misinformation. When recounting Sheikh Hasina's rule, she omitted critical facts like the rigging of the 2014, 2018 and 2024 general elections, which were at the core of voters' outrage with her regime.
At The Daily Star, we studied 56 news items appearing in the Indian media between 9 July-20 November. Except for a handful, most could be categorised as ‘views reports’ and not ‘news reports’. They had headlines like: ‘To avoid election Yunus is using the excuse of reforms’, ‘Politics of revenge – 13 including ministers on trial’, ‘Will democracy at all return to Bangladesh?’, ‘China, ISI behind escalation of student-led protests in Bangladesh’, ‘ISI conspiracy to topple Sk. Hasina and established anti-India govt’, among others. 
Some TV news even called it an ‘Islamist takeover’. There were hardly any attempts to take a serious look at the events in Bangladesh.
If we analyse the sourcing of the news, the presentation, the headlines, and the language used in reporting, it becomes clear that it was directed at creating an impression that Hindus were not safe in Bangladesh to generate deep hatred in the Indian population.
The mindset of the Indian media and also that of a section of political leadership is dominated by a fundamental disrespect for our intellectual ability, and Islamophobia.
Indian media coverage clearly implies that we, as a people, are incapable of determining our future. It is the Pakistanis, Chinese or the Americans (not to name the Indians, which they do not of course mention) that must tell us what to do. 
This mindset is insulting to a nation that has fought against Pakistani cultural, economic and military oppression, and that has defeated them in an armed struggle with Indian help. 
It is insulting to a people who have dismantled dictatorships and who have now toppled what appeared to be an invincible regime of Sheikh Hasina. This mindset shows the disdain of the Indian media towards Bangladeshis. One political leader even compared us with termites.
The Indian media has a total misunderstanding of the deep roots of Islam in Muslim Bangladeshi psyche. People going to mosques, wearing Islamic headgear, keeping beards, using Islamic salutations, or referring to the Quran as a part of daily life are portrayed as extremists and terrorists.
If the revival and strengthening of Hindu religious practices, building more temples, enshrining Hindu cultural traits, and becoming more practising Hindus are part of the present-day Indian ethos, then why should we, the Bangladeshis, becoming more Muslim make us extremists? 
If mass-based groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS can propagate the Hindu religion, and if a political party like the BJP, whose aim is to establish Hindutva in India, can get elected three times, then why does the reappearance of Islamic groups make us a ‘fundamentalist’ country?
The Indian media and leadership must dig deep into the cultural and religious heritage of Muslim Bengal, and try to embrace us as we are, rather than define us as they would like us to be. 
We must accept what the Indian people decide is the India they want. Just as India must accept what the people of Bangladesh decide we are. 
That is the only way a durable Bangladesh-India relationship can be built. The lesson for India is that regime-based relationships must be replaced by people-based relationships. 
For that to happen, we must understand each other better, with sincerity and respect.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star. Reprinted with permission.

How the media shapes Bangladesh-India ties

This year, Sri Lanka entered a power purchase deal with Adani Green Energy Ltd. In terms of the agreement, the country will purchase electricity from the company over 20 years. The Adani Green Energy project received cabinet clearance from the previous government to produce 484MW of wind power in two facilities the company would build in Mannar and Pooneryn and invest more than US$442 million in its projected life span of 20 years.
Adani Green Energy would be paid $0.0826 per kWh of power produced. The deal was relentlessly pushed, defended and ultimately signed by the previous Sri Lankan government. The mandatory tender process was not followed indicating inbuilt and rampant corruption and vested interests at the time.
The project is now under litigation in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka over the violation of fundamental rights. The main issues raised by the petitioners deal with environmental concerns surrounding the project and the woeful lack of transparency in the awarding process that led to the granting of the deal to Adani.
The petitioners also argue that the agreed upon per unit cost is a significant loss to the country and ideally this rate should be set at $0.005 kWh. The deal, its approval and the final granting process were mired in controversy even before litigation. 
In 2022, the then Chairman of the Ceylon Electricity Board, M M C Ferdinando told the parliamentary panel, the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE), that the deal was offered based on a request from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to then Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. 
Ferdinando later retracted his statement and resigned from his post under pressure from the then government. In May 2023, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Sabry observed flippantly in an interview with The Hindu that Adani projects in Sri Lanka were a ‘government-to-government kind of a project’. He noted that it was the Indian government that selected the Adani group for infrastructure development projects including the Sri Lankan wind power project. 
Reading between the lines, Sabry’s public observations indicated a clear backdoor and informal Indian state involvement in the project. Despite the notoriety that Adani companies had already acquired across the world, Sabry had the nerve to say that his government was “very very confident” that the Adani Group’s companies had considerable capital.
Adani actually saw a the $140 billion drop in share values after the publication of a negative report by US research company Hindenburg accusing the company’s top leader Gautam Adani of getting away with the ‘largest con in corporate history’. 
Another investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project also documented serious malpractices by Adani companies. All this is in addition to The Guardian and Financial Times also reporting on Adani family’s surreptitious investments in the company’s shares.
It is against this background that the flamboyant and utterly inexperienced former Sri Lankan Minister of Energy attempted to convert the agreement with Adani Green Energy Limited in August 2023 into a formal government-to-government deal. 
In reality no such formal state to state level agreement existed between India and Sri Lanka. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Adani power deal has ended up in litigation in the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. The new Sri Lankan government needs to carefully and comprehensively revisit the power deal.
Malpractices evident in the local awarding process needs to be considered as well as the role of local power brokers who made it happen and evident corruption that enveloped the entire project needs to be investigated. 
The project also needs to be evaluated in light of the global evidence against the Adani Group. In October, the Kenyan High Court suspended a $736 million agreement between the state-owned Kenya Electrical Transmission Company and Adani Energy Solutions to build and operate power facilities, including transmission lines.
In a lawsuit, the Law Society of Kenya argued that the deal was ‘a constitutional sham and tainted with secrecy’. It also argued that the Kenyan state entity and Adani Energy Solutions did not carry out mandatory public participation focused on the project properly, which is a requirement under Kenya’s Public Private Partnerships Act. These conditions sound alarmingly similar to the Sri Lankan case.
In 2023, accusations were made in India’s Gujarat State against Adani Power Mundra Limited that it had charged an excess of INR 39,000,000,000 over a period of five years under two power purchase agreements. An opposition politician in the state noted the case was a “textbook case of corruption, money laundering, loot of public money and above all, the classic case of cronyism that the Prime Minister and his government represent.” 
The issue here was that the rate at which coal for power production that was purchased by Adani Power Mundra was significantly higher than market rates at which coal was being traded in Indonesia, the source of the purchase. This meant that the state-owned Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, a Gujarati state entity in the energy sector had to pay much more for the overall electricity supply. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited has now written to Adani Power Mundra Limited asking that the excess amount charged be repaid. 
As a presidential candidate, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake assured that if he won, the National People’s Power would cancel the Adani energy project because it posed a threat to Sri Lanka’s energy sector sovereignty. 
The controls placed by Adani Power on its power supply to Bangladesh is a classic example of Bangladesh’s energy sovereignty being utterly compromised at a very crucial time in the country’s history. In real terms, Adani Power has slashed its supplies to Bangladesh by about 60% due to unpaid bills exceeding $800 million. Sri Lanka could also find itself in a similar situation if it compromises its power supply and energy sovereignty by going ahead with the Adani project.
In October President Dissanayake informed the Supreme Court that it would reconsider the approval given by the previous regime to the Adani Group projects. The government must now expect considerable pressure from vested parties, in this case both the Adani Group and the Indian government, more generally. But it is essential to be mindful that we are not dealing with a project in an Indian state.
We cannot be endlessly languishing in the depths of poverty simply because of the corruption of our own leaders of the recent and not-too-recent past, and business magnates of the region. The Adani case is a good starting point to roll back mega corruption and illegality in the country.
Sasanka Perera is the founding professor of the South Asia University's Department of Sociology. This commentary was first published <a href="https://island.lk/adanis-power-in-sri-lanka/">The Island Online</a>.

Adani in Sri Lanka

In June 2020, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-row-dont-read-too-much-into-chinas-statements/articleshow/76056332.cms">incursions</a> by Chinese Army into the fraught borderlands of India’s Ladakh region triggered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-was-india-china-military-clash-2020-about-2024-10-25/">bloody clashes</a> that killed 20 Indian soldiers, plunged bilateral relations to their lowest point in decades, and led to a prolonged military standoff. 
In November, China and India have reached a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3284373/how-china-and-india-can-build-border-truce-normalise-ties">truce</a>, though many in India would prefer to hold their applause. Since the 2020 violence, bilateral relations have remained frozen, and India wants China to take steps to restore the status quo ante at the border. China’s unprovoked encroachments across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh are to blame for disturbing the peace in the first place.
To show it meant business, India <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-10-23/china-and-india-bury-the-hatchet-for-now">slowed down</a> approvals of Chinese investments; tightened visa approvals for Chinese nationals, and canceled direct flights between the two countries. India toughened its stance on Chinese territorial claims in the Pacific, and made pointed political gestures that were bound to displease China, like <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/india/china-lodges-protest-with-india-over-pm-modis-response-to-taiwan-president-lais-greetings-on-his-poll-victory/articleshow/110765182.cms">responding</a> warmly to the Taiwanese president’s congratulatory message after Modi’s re-election. (There was also talk of Taiwan allowing Indian workers.)
While the recent truce suggests that China has finally gotten the message, it is difficult to shake the impression that India was the more anxious of the two parties to reach an agreement. In fact, India’s economic establishment appears largely convinced that, far from pursuing a strategy of decoupling, or at least ‘de-risking’, vis-à-vis China, India should be using Chinese capital to fill its own investment gaps.
Given that bilateral trade has <a href="https://www.ptinews.com/story/business/China-largest-trading-partner-of-India-in-FY24-with-USD-118-4-bn%3B-US-second-with-USD-118-3-bn/1497275">reached</a> its highest-ever levels despite the political tensions, it comes as no surprise that India’s business community has reportedly been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-10-24/how-india-ceos-convinced-modi-to-push-for-better-china-ties-at-brics">pressing</a> the government to conclude an agreement that would facilitate economic engagement. In July, the government’s chief economic adviser <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-not-rethinking-issue-allowing-chinese-investment-trade-minister-says-2024-07-30/">openly advocated</a> a strategy that would increase Chinese investments in India and deepen Indian integration into Chinese supply chains.
There were indications over the last few months that an agreement to end the Ladakh standoff was forthcoming. And a deal did soon emerge, allowing both China and India to resume patrols along the frontier.
But significant areas of concern remain. As the political commentator Brahma Chellaney observed, when Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met at the BRICS Summit in Kazan after the truce was announced, their respective ministries produced very different statements. Whereas India described the accord as a step toward a ‘multipolar Asia and a multipolar world’, China referred only to a ‘multipolar world’. The implication was subtle but clear: Asia belongs to China.
More broadly, China’s actions along the LAC have signaled a clear desire to keep India off balance by taking steps to shift the border in ways more favourable to its own interests. This mirrors China’s assertive approach to advancing its territorial ambitions elsewhere along its shared border with India, and in the South China Sea.
It is worth remembering how the last standoff between India and China, focused on the Doklam plateau in Bhutan, ended. India does not claim Doklam, but it does support Bhutan’s claim, which China disputes. Moreover, a major Indian highway runs below the plateau, connecting India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. So, when China deployed troops to build a Chinese highway in Doklam, India sent troops to stop the project.
In that case, the two sides took just a few months to reach an agreement, which looked much like the recent Ladakh deal. Since then, however, the Chinese outflanked India by building a road elsewhere on the Doklam plateau to achieve the same result. The PLA now overlooks a vital Indian highway.
China’s conduct follows a clear pattern: create new facts on the ground, deploy forces to positions from which they can intimidate (and, potentially, attack) India, and wear India down with protracted diplomacy. In the meantime, encourage India to increase its dependence on Chinese imports and dangle the investment carrot before Indian business leaders.
Yet the promised economic benefits of the two sides’ recent rapprochement are unlikely to materialise. The Chinese have not lifted a finger to address India’s huge bilateral trade deficit which soared to $101 billion in 2022, from $70 billion in 2021 – or to lower the barriers Indian companies face when trying to access the Chinese market.
Moreover, all indications point to Chinese investment in low-value-added industries, rather than sectors involving technology transfer, even as Chinese companies pursue acquisitions in sensitive sectors in India. There are also massive opportunity costs: greater economic integration with China would surely make India less attractive to global companies seeking to reduce their exposure to the People’s Republic.
Add to that China’s long track record of exporting its way out of economic trouble and weaponising other countries’ economic vulnerabilities, and it seems clear that India should proceed with caution. Until China credibly demonstrates its good intentions, the truce in Ladakh warrants little celebration. © <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org">Project Syndicate</a>

CHINDIA

Fenerbahçe Beko won the Turkish Airlines EuroLeague finals in Abu Dhabi, held 23-25 May, defeating Monaco 81-70 in the final. Olympiacos, who defeated Panathinaikos 97-93, finished the series in third place. The Most Valuable Player (MVP) of the final match, Nigel Hayes-Davis from Fenerbahçe Beko, received a prize of 1,000,000 Miles&amp;Smiles from Turkish Airlines’ Chief Commercial Officer Ahmet Olmuştur. The carrier has been the title sponsor of the Turkish Airlines EuroLeague, a top tier tournament, since 2010.

Turkish Basketball

Thousands of Nepali students dreaming of an American education have been forced to look elsewhere as the Trump administration’s visa restrictions make their future uncertain.
The US was long considered a top destination for higher studies, making Nepal the 10th biggest country of origin for international students in America.&nbsp;
However, that number has seen a significant decline with the total for Nepali students now at 16,482. Some 8,000 Nepali students obtained no-objection certificates to study in the US from the Ministry of Education in the past year.&nbsp;
India, Australia, Canada, South Korea, United Kingdom and Japan are the other popular destinations for Nepali students. There are no clear numbers for Nepalis going to India, but a slight decline was noted this year after the deaths of two female students.
The US State Department has issued a circular to its embassies not to issue new visas to applicants until further notice. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in the directive stated that the department planned to expand the screening of applicants' social media.&nbsp;
While new applicants are barred including those applying for visitor visas, students with scheduled interviews are allowed to proceed.
“Many of our students are affected by the new restrictions, but those who had applied for student visas earlier have got interview dates,” one Kathmandu-based college counsellor told us.
Meanwhile, even foreign students with spotless records already in the US have not been spared, as visa scrutiny intensifies under the new policy. In a move that underscores the growing sense of insecurity, many US colleges advised international students to carry their passports and documents at all times, even when traveling locally.
“Me and my friends did not go home this summer because we were not sure we would be allowed back, so we just went to Niagara Falls,” said a Nepali undergrad in Ohio, who like many interviewed for this report did not want her name used for fear of repercussion.
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Nepali students have adopted a cautious stance, with many choosing not to return home during summer vacation due to fear of visa revocations as well as travel bans. Meanwhile, over 7,000 Nepalis with Temporary Protected Status (TPS) will have to come back to Nepal by 5 August or face deportation. Thirty-seven were flown back to Kathmandu on Omni Air last week.
“The US is one of the most sought-after destinations for higher education, and the ban will definitely impact bright students,” says Narottam Aryal of the King’s College in Kathmandu.
Indeed, Nepali undergraduates admitted into Ivy League colleges for the 2025 academic year have been asked to look for alternatives. The entire Fulbright Foreign Scholarships Board resigned on Wednesday citing interference from the Trump administration on the selection of this year’s cohort. Some Nepali students already on Fulbright scholarships have noted disruptions, delays and even cancellation of stipends.&nbsp;
The student visa restrictions were initially just for foreign students admitted to Harvard University, but it was later extended to all Chinese students and now to all students. Universities like Columbia which actively recruit foreign students, face sharp enrolment declines, threatening their financial stability and diversity.
An Indian female PhD candidate at Columbia University had her visa revoked by the US State Department, and said she was targeted on the basis of her social media posts on Israeli military attacks in Gaza. Social media vetting of political activism has raised concerns about privacy and freedom of expression in a country where such rights were a given.
Many students have been informed via email that their visas have been revoked for getting speeding or parking tickets, but even others with no criminal record have been affected. The fear of deportation looms large amongst international students, including those from Nepal.&nbsp;
For most Nepalis who migrate to the US for education, the journey is a high-stakes investment. They come largely from middle-class families, often rely on a patchwork of scholarships, work-study programs, loans, or even the sale of family assets to afford fees.
Most Nepali students pursue STEM subjects which offer extended Optional Practical Training (OPT) periods that help fund their education. But with the US backsliding on education and humanitarian matters, countries like the UK and Canada are becoming more attractive despite their own recent stricter controls on student visas.&nbsp;
The UK universities saw a 63% rise in Nepali students’ admissions in 2024. Japan is another popular destination with 64,816 Nepali students enrolled as of 2024.
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Already, China, Hong Kong and Malaysia are poised to benefit from the increased scrutiny of US student visas. Several Hong Kong universities are offering unconditional admission to affected students, while Malaysian institutions are targeting previously US-bound Asian students. China and India have 330,000 and 280,000 students respectively in America, but the numbers for China have seen a sharp drop in the past year.
Elsewhere, branch campuses of American institutions such as NYU in Abu Dhabi, Georgetown in Dubai and Northwestern in Doha are getting more admission applications, and universities in the Gulf region are expanding infrastructure to accommodate those who would otherwise have gone to the US.&nbsp;
Even educational institutions in Nepal are hopeful that the US visa restrictions can be an opportunity to at least keep Nepali undergrads in Nepal, and also attract foreign students from the region.&nbsp;
“Many students might choose to complete their undergraduate degree here in Nepal and then move abroad for their Master’s degree later,” says Aryal of King’s College. “There was a need for quality higher education in Nepal anyway in terms of innovation and opportunities, so this could be the time to reduce our dependence on other countries.”
Nepal’s strategic position between India and China makes it sensitive to US policy shifts. India, a key ally, is also under US scrutiny for potential student travel restrictions. Chinese universities are already offering more scholarships to Nepali talent to capitalise on the US retreat.
American universities have challenged student visa restrictions in the courts. A federal court in Boston revoked the blanket ban on Harvard, and the State Department has ordered the resumption of processing student and exchange visitor visas.&nbsp;
Some are still hoping that President Trump will backtrack on the student visa restrictions, just like he has done with many of his more drastic executive orders.
Even so, the visa see-saw and longer-term uncertainties about living in the United States and its education system means students across the world are making alternative plans.
Says Aryal: “Policies of foreign countries change according to their needs, so excessive dependence was never a good idea. We should work to create different opportunities and choices of higher education within Nepal, so students are retained.” &nbsp;

America no longer prime destination for Nepali students

While Nepal was hosting the Sagarmatha Sambaad international climate conference in Kathmandu this month, on Mt Everest it was pretty much business as usual.&nbsp; The signs of climate breakdown are all there: a river now runs through Base Camp in summer, the Khumbu Icefall is more unstable, and there are more &nbsp;frequent avalanches. When expeditions arrived in March, the mountains were bare: it had not snowed since September, but then blizzards dumped unseasonal snow in May. And despite climate worries, such is the pull of Himalayan mountaineering that the Everest Industry showed no signs of slowdown. More than 600 international climbers and their Nepali guides had made it to the summit of the world’s highest mountain. At one point there were an estimated 2,000 people in the tent city on the Khumbu Glacier. All the ropes and ladders on the Icefall came down on Thursday, marking the official end of the spring climbing season, and just in time to avoid a monsoon cyclone approaching from the Bay of Bengal. It has been an action-packed season. One factor could be that Everest fees will go up from September: each foreign climber needs to pay a $15,000 royalty, up from the present $11,000. The cost for a Nepali climber on the South Col route will also go up: from Rs75,000 to Rs150,000.&nbsp; The fee to climb Everest in autumn is $7,500 (up from $5,500), but most climbers still prefer spring. Winter permit fee (December-February) is only $3,750 per person and the mountain is now also open for monsoon (June-August) climbs, when the fee is ever lower at $2,750. The revised rule also makes it mandatory for every two climbers on an 8,000m peak to hire one Nepali mountain guide.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025053004050_67f856fe52714e4bdcf21ae7d45c6f18c82117b9d0a5f73ed1efa04c96de1046.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2025053004050_67f856fe52714e4bdcf21ae7d45c6f18c82117b9d0a5f73ed1efa04c96de1046" data-rendition-name="original" width="931" height="732" loading="lazy" alt="The Everest Industry graph 1"> </figure>  In addition, climbers also have to pay for porters and guides, equipment, Base Camp costs, Ice Fall and fixed rope team fees, so climbing Everest does not come cheap. But such is the draw of climbing the world’s highest peak that some say the increased fees will not diminish the crowds next year. The government has tried to spread expeditions out to other seasons and other 8,000ers, but with not much success. Earlier this year, Nepal unilaterally increased the number of 8,000m peaks to 14 by adding six more sub-summits to broaden the choice for climbers. Added were: Yalung Kang (8,505m), Yalung Kang West (8,077m) &nbsp;Kangchenjunga Central (8,473m), Kangchenjunga South (8,476m), Lhotse Middle (8,410m) and Lhotse Shar (8,400m).&nbsp; The announcement could go against the accepted topographic criteria that a stand alone peak has to be at least 300m higher than an adjoining prominence, and at more than 3km isolation from it. The UIAA (Union Internationale des Associations d'Alpinisme) still recognises only 14 mountains as eight-thousanders, and only eight of those are in Nepal, or on the border with China. Nepal’s revised mountaineering regulations also increased the insurance coverage of high-altitude workers to protect porters and high altitude guides who usually take more risks on the mountains. Rescue teams and clean-up campaigners to collect trash and remove bodies of dead climbers up to Camp IV of Mt Everest do not need permits.&nbsp; The Sagarmatha Pollution Control Committee is now using drones to fly down trash in 20kg sacks. Each climber is also required to bring down at least 6kg of waste and not just their own, but this rule is erratically enforced. With five fatalities on Everest and Lhotse, Spring 2025 had a historically low death toll. Another five climbers died on Annapurna, Kangchenjunga and Makalu.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025053004050_38681de22f0fefb6faa12b01755566d09c5064d0ff84e12ccc7b5d68ea9ba38a.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2025053004050_38681de22f0fefb6faa12b01755566d09c5064d0ff84e12ccc7b5d68ea9ba38a" data-rendition-name="original" width="665" height="740" loading="lazy" alt="The Everest industry graph 2"> </figure>  Journalist Ben Ayers who ran the Everest Live social media channel from Everest Base Camp with daily updates credited the low death rate to dramatic rescues of climbers from the ‘Death Zone’ by their Nepali guides and longline helievacs — the visuals all uploaded on YouTube.&nbsp; “Ironically, this perception of safety is bringing more and more inexperienced climbers to the mountain, and they need more rescues,” Ayers said in one of his dispatches.&nbsp; American expedition chronicler and summiteer Alan Arnette suspects there is a lot of under-reporting given that the jet stream and storms were lashing Everest even till late in the season. He told us: “I heard a lot about frostbite and rescues that were not made public. It’s become practically impossible to cover the details on Everest. All the teams report nice news, and they don’t talk about bad stuff to avoid hurting businesses.” Although trash on Nepal’s mountains makes headlines, what does not receive as much attention is the climate impact of so many expeditions. The Sagarmatha Sambaad conference sidestepped this issue, which is ironic given that the impact of climate breakdown is most evident on Himalayan peaks and their glaciers.&nbsp; <h2>Need for Speed</h2> The big stories this year have been about speed-running from their home cities to the top of Everest. Ukrainian entrepreneur Andrew Ushakov flew out of JFK on 15 May at 10:15AM Nepal time, and was on the summit 3 days, 23 hours, and 7 minutes later on 19 May at 9:22AM.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250601080640_1c5cc6fc991307861768f07037ed9d30930fb20f35dbb57dc31c9a92a9e1a885.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20250601080640_1c5cc6fc991307861768f07037ed9d30930fb20f35dbb57dc31c9a92a9e1a885" data-rendition-name="original" width="1440" height="1800" loading="lazy" alt="The Everest Industry"> <figcaption>Andrew Ushakov at the summt. Photo: ELITE EXPED</figcaption> </figure>  “I could never find the time for the traditional 40-50 days of acclimatisation,” Ushakov explained matter-of-factly. His ‘Everest Sea-to-Summit’ climb was possible because he spent 400 hours in hypoxic sleep tents over the past four years in New York. However, Ushakov did use ropes already fixed, hired four Nepali guides, helicoptered to Base Camp, and used much more oxygen than an average climber. And after the climb, Ushakov was arrested at Kathmandu airport for being in possession of $20,000 of undeclared cash and spent a night in jail and fined $60,000.&nbsp; The other speedsters were Garth Miller, Alastair Cairns, Anthony Stazicker, and Kev Godlington, all former British Army commandos. They left London and summited five days later on 21 May, and flew right back. They also used hypoxic tents to simulate the thin air high on Everest.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250601080644_90c8dd5cc07b4b43f2989b1dc0c0650ab80f10ebb06680c25a6909c519957bd8.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20250601080644_90c8dd5cc07b4b43f2989b1dc0c0650ab80f10ebb06680c25a6909c519957bd8" data-rendition-name="original" width="810" height="668" loading="lazy" alt="The Everest Industry "> <figcaption>All four members of the Furtenbach team at the summit. Photo: Sandro Gromen-Hayes</figcaption> </figure>  But more controversial was their use of xenon gas therapy in a German hospital to ramp up the production of oxygen-carrying haemoglobins in their blood. Xenon is banned by the World Anti-Doping Agency for being performance enhancing in sports. Expedition leader Lukas Furtenbach said this rule does not apply to mountaineering, as it is not a regulated sport like swimming. Nepal has no rules about xenon, but the Department of Tourism said it was launching an ‘investigation’ to decide on future policy since it is difficult to ban xenon, but allow oxygen. The controversy has also divided the mountaineering community, with some climbers saying they just want to maximise their chances of survival. Spending less time on the mountain could make climbing safer by reducing avalanche risk. It would also mean less trash on the mountains, but it would reduce the income of Nepal’s expedition industry. It is also unclear how much of the success was due to xenon therapy and whether the ex-special forces were already in good physical shape.&nbsp; The need for speed hides the fact that climbing in the Himalaya is dangerous business, and climbers cannot sprint to the top just by huffing xenon. But ultra-fast climbs could be charged more, and the revenue generated can be used to establish state-of-the-art rescue operations, and increase pay and insurance for guides. Two other speed chasers this season were Swiss-Ecuadorian Karl Egloff and American Tyler Andrews, both on Everest without oxygen. Andrews choppered to Base Camp to catch a weather window, but turned back from 8,500m due to high winds. Heavy snow and wind also forced Egloff to descend from 7,000m. Slow and steady climbers like Anja Blacha from Germany did make it to the summit without oxygen, while Kami Rita Sherpa broke his own record with his 31st Everest summit as he led a 26-strong Indian Army group. There were 468 permits issued for foreign climbers from 48 expeditions to Everest this spring. Nepal’s other eight-thousanders together had only 17 expeditions. Nepal has more than 1,000 peaks above 6,000m, and has opened only 476 of them for climbing.&nbsp;

The Everest Industry

While Nepal marked <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mt-everest-pvt-ltd">Mt Everest</a> Day on 29 May, on the other side of the planet in the US state of Colorado dozens of Nepalis who have climbed the world’s highest peak multiple times were busy working as chefs and Uber drivers. Among them is Nima Doma Sherpa, who climbed Mt Everest in 2019 after her husband Tshering Wangchu was among 16 crushed by an avalanche on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/on-thin-ice-in-the-khumbu">the Khumbu Icefall</a> five years earlier. A large serac broke off the West Shoulder of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-everest-industry">Mt Everest </a>and fell directly on a group of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/more-porters-sick-on-everest-trail">porters and guides</a> making their way up the Icefall at 5,800m. Their bodies were flown by helicopter to Khumjung where Tshering Wangchu was born. He was excited about climbing Mt Everest for the first time.&nbsp; In Khumjung, Nima Doma felt like her own life had also ended. This was the kind of news Sherpa wives, mothers and sisters dreaded every <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/peak-climbing-season-2025-s4abrxny">mountaineering season</a>. She stayed home for more than two years grieving, but ultimately gathered up all her emotional strength to take care of her 6-year-old son and 3-year-old daughter. Nima had grown up in Khumjung hearing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/stories-of-nepal-s-summiteers">tales of adventure on the mountains </a>from their father, Ang Chubi Sherpa who had climbed Everest in 1993. He used to bring her and her sisters and brother European chocolates after every expedition, and used to tell them that the chocolate bars grew on the mountains. “It was only after we got older did we realise that he told us that chocolates grew in the mountains so we would not worry about him putting himself in harm's way,” Nima Doma recalled with a faraway look at her home in Boulder this week. Nima went to the school that <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/commemorating-edmund-hillary-in-nepal,4145">Edmund Hillary</a> opened in Khumjung till Grade 8, and then dropped out to help in the kitchen and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/when-yaks-go-so-does-culture">tend yaks</a>. She was married off to Tshering Wangchu, who was also a high altitude guide. When Tshering went on expeditions, Nima also started working as a porter from Namche to Base Camp. It was perhaps her father’s tales of mountains of chocolates that had always attracted her to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/knowing-our-mountains-43v4iyvo">the peaks</a>. After her husband was killed ten years ago this month, being a widow with children was not easy for Nima Doma. But she was not alone: there were at least 200 single mothers in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/khumbu-since-1950-jaww4qn0">the Khumbu</a>, and 20 of them just in Khumjung whose husbands had been killed in <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/tragic-start-to-himalayan-spring-nepal,3695">mountaineering accidents</a>. Some were not even 20 years old, and had children growing up without fathers. But there were also women in the 50s whose husbands had been killed in the 1980s. Nima found sponsors for her children’s education, and moved to Kathmandu. In the capital, Sherpa widows used to meet to help each other. Some of them had joined the Nepal Mountaineering Association (NMA) training for rock and ice climbing. “I decided that it was no use sitting home and crying anymore, after meeting other single mothers I felt less alone,” remembers Nima, who joined the Juniper Foundation and enrolled in an NMA training camp in Manang. There she climbed Chulu East (6,584m) and met Furadiki Sherpa, whose rope-fixing husband had also been <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/on-mt-everest-s-70th-records-and-fatalities">killed on Everest</a> in 2013. They set themselves the goal of climbing Everest one day, and started a fund-raising drive.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250530090544_621be0724b9182c8e3594b2c562a71ec32ac01d985a71d0cf31646de9d51e15a.png" data-media-id="editor_12" data-image-id="20250530090544_621be0724b9182c8e3594b2c562a71ec32ac01d985a71d0cf31646de9d51e15a" data-rendition-name="original" width="2678" height="1274" loading="lazy" alt="Everest summiteers find new life in the US"> </figure>  “We decided we had to overcome society’s stigma of <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/widows-personal-happiness-comes-last-in-face-of-social-financial-hardships,1855">widowhood</a> and prove that <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/remembering-junko-tabei">women could also climb mountains</a>,” Nima said, adding that she was inspired by Nepal’s first woman Everest summiteer Pasang Lhamu Sherpa, who died during her descent in 1993. Nima Doma and Furdiki climbed the technically-difficult Ama Dablam (6,812m) and then arrived at Everest Base Camp in April 2019 as part of their Two Widows Expedition with the motto, ‘So Can We’. While climbing up the Icefall Nima passed the spot where her husband had been killed. It was a jumble of constantly-shifting ice blocks bigger than houses. She closed her eyes and said a prayer. “I remember thinking, this is so difficult and dangerous. This is what my husband had to do to support our family,” Nima Doma said. “I was determined to fulfil my husband’s dream of climbing Chomolungma, and to prove to ourselves that we two women could do it.” It was 23 May 2019 when <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/world/two-sherpa-widows-scale-everest-and-smash-stigma-idUSKCN1SU0MV/" target="_blank">Nima and Furdiki stepped on the summit</a> and looked over into Tibet, and down at Tengboche Monastery to the south.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250530090544_6b822582b5d88ba5e972db084f184690b40653c6efd9901b2dd082ffba2a263b.png" data-media-id="editor_16" data-image-id="20250530090544_6b822582b5d88ba5e972db084f184690b40653c6efd9901b2dd082ffba2a263b" data-rendition-name="original" width="2700" height="1522" loading="lazy" alt="Everest summiteers find new life in the US"> </figure>  Nima Doma hugged Furdiki, took off her mask and wept. But for the first time in five years, it was not from grief but relief — relief for being free of all the sadness and sacrifices and for fulfilling her husband’s dream. They had found <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/life-after-death">life after death</a>. “I felt this immense joy to be on top of the world, it was indescribable,” Nima Doma said, “I have wept only twice in my life. Once when my husband died, and once there on top of Everest.” The tears had frozen on Nima Doma’s cheeks, as she and Furdiki headed back down the mountain.