Thirty years after it abruptly pulled out of the Arun III project, the World Bank appears to have developed cold feet about an even larger project on the river in eastern Nepal. After opposition by civil society in Nepal, Japan and Europe, the Bank’s new president James Wolfensohn <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/20-years-ago-this-week/arun-iii">exited from Arun III</a>. The project’s generation capacity has been doubled to 900MW and it is being development by India’s state-owned SJVN Limited.&nbsp; Whereas in 1995, the opposition to Arun III was mainly from activists, this time it is said to be India’s displeasure with the Bank’s involvement in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/world-bank-flip-flop-on-upper-arun">1,061MW Upper Arun</a>. Delhi is so sensitive to the issue that sources said it even leaned on Indian-born American President of the World Bank, Ajaya Banga to cancel his trip to Kathmandu for the IDA21 Replenishment Meeting in June. When it gets the green light, Upper Arun will be the most expensive hydroelectric project in Nepal so far with a price tag of $1.6 billion. The semi-storage scheme is located on the transboundary Arun River 15km from the Chinese border after it cuts through the Himalaya between Mt Everest and Kangchenjunga. Beijing is said to have no objections to the project, but India’s silence is said to stem <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">from its strategic interest</a> in not allowing anyone else to build large storage projects on the tributaries of the Ganga in Nepal. India’s SJVN is also currently constructing three large projects downstream, including Arun III and Lower Arun with a total generation capacity of nearly 2,000MW.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16" data-rendition-name="original" width="850" height="771" loading="lazy" alt="Upper Arun Map NT"> </figure>  Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) set up Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited (UAHEL) as a subsidiary and in May signed up the French firm Tractebel for detailed design of the scheme. Experts say the design will have to take into account future climate-induced glacial lake outbursts like the one that swept away the 1,600MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">Chungthang Teesta</a> III in Sikkim last year built at a cost of $1.7 billion.&nbsp; Upper Arun’s financing will be 70% loans and 30% equity. The World Bank had already earmarked $750 million with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with Japan’s JICA also joining. But UAHEL Managing Director Fanendra Raj Joshi said there was no word either way from the World Bank, which meant there was no financial closure yet. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/right-climate-for-nepal-s-energy-transition">Right climate for Nepal’s energy transition</a>, Ramesh Kumar All this is in stark contrast to the optimism last year after Finance Minister Prakash Mahat returned from an IMF meeting in Morrocco and announced that the World Bank would be the main lender in Upper Arun.&nbsp; In November 2024, Mahat even took a helicopter with World Bank Managing Director Anna Bjerde and ADB Director Ramesh Subramaniam to the Upper Arun site and it looked like the loans were in the bag. It would also be the first large project in Nepal in which both big multilateral lenders would be involved.&nbsp; In April this year, an ‘agreement in principle’ was even reached between Mahat’s successor Barsaman Pun and World Bank Vice President for South Asia Martin Raiser to develop Upper Arun. But the loan meeting planned for June was cancelled. &nbsp; A Finance Ministry official told Nepali Times: “The World Bank told us categorically in November in Washington DC that India was opposed to its involvement in Upper Arun.” &nbsp; When Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal visited Delhi in June, Indian officials reportedly said they were interested in developing Upper Arun and evacuate its power through an extension of the 400kV transmission line it is building. Although Beijing had given the go ahead to the World Bank and ADB involvement in Upper Arun, it may not be as happy about an Indian company so close to its border. As a semi-reservoir project, Upper Arun can generate electricity at full capacity for up to six hours a day even in winter, unlike the schemes downstream which are run-of-the river in which generation depends on water flow.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/rivers-be-dammed">Rivers be dammed</a>, Pinki Siris Rana&nbsp; India is involved in projects in Nepal’s rivers that will generate a total of 8,000MW when complete. SJVN Limited is also taking over from the Chinese the 769MW Tamor project in the Arun Basin. &nbsp; Says Fanendra Raj Joshi of Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited: “Nepal can find alternative sources of funding and we will go ahead with this project even if the World Bank decides not to provide the loan.”&nbsp; Joshi and the NEA’s Kulman Ghising (pictured, below) attended a hearing with indigenous communities at the project site in Sankhuwasabha this week. Ghising told the gathering that if the World Bank pulled out Nepal would carry on with Upper Arun through “domestic and diaspora investment with the same financial package as Upper Tama Kosi”. The 546MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/when-it-rains-it-pours-ksqprbu3">Upper Tama Kosi was knocked</a> by a massive landslide in September and will not be fully operation at least for a year. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="600" loading="lazy" alt="Kulman Ghising"> </figure>  “This is a project that can transform the local economy and Nepal’s economy as well,” Ghising added. “We will go ahead with blended financing from all levels of government.” Despite the lack of financial closure, construction of the project is expected to get underway in 2026 for completion in six years. Construction of a 21km access road from the power house to the dam site along the Kosi Corridor highway is in full swing through difficult terrain.

original

674x448

610x380

500x500

400x266

400x240

400x203

301x200

1250x600

1084x550

thumbnail

viewImage

Upper Arun question mark

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh must be based on a win-win policy, rooted in mutual respect, non-hegemony, and the pursuit of shared prosperity and deeper understanding. 
For India, there have always been only two neighbours: China and Pakistan. The rest of us smaller South Asian countries are geographic entities to be praised, cajoled, reprimanded and even punished as the situation calls for.
Sheikh Hasina's last tenure in power (2009-2024) appears to have been a ‘praise’ period. However, after the student-led people's uprising toppled her regime in August, a powerful section of the Indian media has shifted into the ‘reprimand’ mode, with some even suggesting ‘punishment’. Much of the social media discourse seems to support this.
Oppression of minorities anywhere in the world, including in my own country, must be condemned and speedily resolved. It should never recur. Communal conflict has been an age-old phenomenon in South Asia following the British colonial policy of divide and rule. 
It is a regrettable fact that, after 77 years of the departure of the British, we have still not been able to solve it.
After the regime change in Bangladesh, the Indian media's coverage of events can, in my view, be categorised as follows: 
<ol><li>The events that toppled Sheikh Hasina was the work of Pakistan's ISI, the Islamists in Bangladesh, or pro-Chinese elements all aimed to replace the ‘India-friendly’ government with an ‘unfriendly’ one. There is no mention of the role of common people or of the students, of the killing of ordinary people. What is the source of all these assertions? </li><li>The new government in Dhaka is bent on persecuting Hindus and even committing ‘genocide’. Many of these stories were debunked by fact-checkers, including the BBC. But that did not stop or even slow down the tirade of stories demonising Bangladesh.</li><li>The US involvement was also referred to and linked with the events in Pakistan in toppling Imran Khan. So, the US toppled Sheikh Hasina.</li></ol>
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Sheikh Hasina government even resorted to firing on demonstrators using helicopters.
In a prompt action, the interim government fast-tracked the issuance of visas for journalists. However, Indian journalists who visited Bangladesh focused solely on the attacks on Hindus, ignoring the broader human rights abuses by the Hasina government. 
The Indian media’s coverage of the July-August uprising in Bangladesh was also striking in its one-sidedness.
The Indian media largely ignored the massive student-led people's movement, which saw millions take to the streets of cities across the country. Their focus remained almost exclusively on the sporadic violence against Hindus during the power vacuum in the first week of the transition.
The firing on unarmed demonstrators, resulting in at least 700 deaths by 5 August, was barely covered. This was one of the most barbaric crackdowns in the recent history of South Asia, yet the Indian media gave it little attention. 
In the <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEoyTkOZ8xE&amp;t=588s">six interviews I gave</a> to <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bDJgVVBDLg">mainstream Indian outlets</a>, there was almost <a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/world/sheikh-hasina-had-turned-very-dictatorial-mahfuz-anam-on-bangladesh-regime-change/cid/2038904">no mention</a> of the scale of <a href="http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2024/08/07/the-daily-star-journalist-mahfuz-anam-interview-bangladesh-protests-political-crisis.html">the uprising</a> or the civilian deaths, only the vandalism of symbols like Bangabandhu's statue or the burning of government properties.
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Indian media's coverage appears to be driven by the isolated attacks against Hindus of Bangladesh, rather than the people of Bangladesh. India should not see the recent events through the lens of Sheikh Hasina but through the lens of democracy.
In a recent video broadcast by the Indian news portal ThePrint, Meenakshi Lekhi, a BJP leader and lawyer, said, ‘The chief adviser… is seeking to rename the nation [Bangladesh] to be [the] Islamic republic of East Pakistan.’ 
Where did she get that from? Her column was filled with distortions and misinformation. When recounting Sheikh Hasina's rule, she omitted critical facts like the rigging of the 2014, 2018 and 2024 general elections, which were at the core of voters' outrage with her regime.
At The Daily Star, we studied 56 news items appearing in the Indian media between 9 July-20 November. Except for a handful, most could be categorised as ‘views reports’ and not ‘news reports’. They had headlines like: ‘To avoid election Yunus is using the excuse of reforms’, ‘Politics of revenge – 13 including ministers on trial’, ‘Will democracy at all return to Bangladesh?’, ‘China, ISI behind escalation of student-led protests in Bangladesh’, ‘ISI conspiracy to topple Sk. Hasina and established anti-India govt’, among others. 
Some TV news even called it an ‘Islamist takeover’. There were hardly any attempts to take a serious look at the events in Bangladesh.
If we analyse the sourcing of the news, the presentation, the headlines, and the language used in reporting, it becomes clear that it was directed at creating an impression that Hindus were not safe in Bangladesh to generate deep hatred in the Indian population.
The mindset of the Indian media and also that of a section of political leadership is dominated by a fundamental disrespect for our intellectual ability, and Islamophobia.
Indian media coverage clearly implies that we, as a people, are incapable of determining our future. It is the Pakistanis, Chinese or the Americans (not to name the Indians, which they do not of course mention) that must tell us what to do. 
This mindset is insulting to a nation that has fought against Pakistani cultural, economic and military oppression, and that has defeated them in an armed struggle with Indian help. 
It is insulting to a people who have dismantled dictatorships and who have now toppled what appeared to be an invincible regime of Sheikh Hasina. This mindset shows the disdain of the Indian media towards Bangladeshis. One political leader even compared us with termites.
The Indian media has a total misunderstanding of the deep roots of Islam in Muslim Bangladeshi psyche. People going to mosques, wearing Islamic headgear, keeping beards, using Islamic salutations, or referring to the Quran as a part of daily life are portrayed as extremists and terrorists.
If the revival and strengthening of Hindu religious practices, building more temples, enshrining Hindu cultural traits, and becoming more practising Hindus are part of the present-day Indian ethos, then why should we, the Bangladeshis, becoming more Muslim make us extremists? 
If mass-based groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS can propagate the Hindu religion, and if a political party like the BJP, whose aim is to establish Hindutva in India, can get elected three times, then why does the reappearance of Islamic groups make us a ‘fundamentalist’ country?
The Indian media and leadership must dig deep into the cultural and religious heritage of Muslim Bengal, and try to embrace us as we are, rather than define us as they would like us to be. 
We must accept what the Indian people decide is the India they want. Just as India must accept what the people of Bangladesh decide we are. 
That is the only way a durable Bangladesh-India relationship can be built. The lesson for India is that regime-based relationships must be replaced by people-based relationships. 
For that to happen, we must understand each other better, with sincerity and respect.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star. Reprinted with permission.

How the media shapes Bangladesh-India ties

This year, Sri Lanka entered a power purchase deal with Adani Green Energy Ltd. In terms of the agreement, the country will purchase electricity from the company over 20 years. The Adani Green Energy project received cabinet clearance from the previous government to produce 484MW of wind power in two facilities the company would build in Mannar and Pooneryn and invest more than US$442 million in its projected life span of 20 years.
Adani Green Energy would be paid $0.0826 per kWh of power produced. The deal was relentlessly pushed, defended and ultimately signed by the previous Sri Lankan government. The mandatory tender process was not followed indicating inbuilt and rampant corruption and vested interests at the time.
The project is now under litigation in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka over the violation of fundamental rights. The main issues raised by the petitioners deal with environmental concerns surrounding the project and the woeful lack of transparency in the awarding process that led to the granting of the deal to Adani.
The petitioners also argue that the agreed upon per unit cost is a significant loss to the country and ideally this rate should be set at $0.005 kWh. The deal, its approval and the final granting process were mired in controversy even before litigation. 
In 2022, the then Chairman of the Ceylon Electricity Board, M M C Ferdinando told the parliamentary panel, the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE), that the deal was offered based on a request from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to then Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. 
Ferdinando later retracted his statement and resigned from his post under pressure from the then government. In May 2023, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Sabry observed flippantly in an interview with The Hindu that Adani projects in Sri Lanka were a ‘government-to-government kind of a project’. He noted that it was the Indian government that selected the Adani group for infrastructure development projects including the Sri Lankan wind power project. 
Reading between the lines, Sabry’s public observations indicated a clear backdoor and informal Indian state involvement in the project. Despite the notoriety that Adani companies had already acquired across the world, Sabry had the nerve to say that his government was “very very confident” that the Adani Group’s companies had considerable capital.
Adani actually saw a the $140 billion drop in share values after the publication of a negative report by US research company Hindenburg accusing the company’s top leader Gautam Adani of getting away with the ‘largest con in corporate history’. 
Another investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project also documented serious malpractices by Adani companies. All this is in addition to The Guardian and Financial Times also reporting on Adani family’s surreptitious investments in the company’s shares.
It is against this background that the flamboyant and utterly inexperienced former Sri Lankan Minister of Energy attempted to convert the agreement with Adani Green Energy Limited in August 2023 into a formal government-to-government deal. 
In reality no such formal state to state level agreement existed between India and Sri Lanka. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Adani power deal has ended up in litigation in the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. The new Sri Lankan government needs to carefully and comprehensively revisit the power deal.
Malpractices evident in the local awarding process needs to be considered as well as the role of local power brokers who made it happen and evident corruption that enveloped the entire project needs to be investigated. 
The project also needs to be evaluated in light of the global evidence against the Adani Group. In October, the Kenyan High Court suspended a $736 million agreement between the state-owned Kenya Electrical Transmission Company and Adani Energy Solutions to build and operate power facilities, including transmission lines.
In a lawsuit, the Law Society of Kenya argued that the deal was ‘a constitutional sham and tainted with secrecy’. It also argued that the Kenyan state entity and Adani Energy Solutions did not carry out mandatory public participation focused on the project properly, which is a requirement under Kenya’s Public Private Partnerships Act. These conditions sound alarmingly similar to the Sri Lankan case.
In 2023, accusations were made in India’s Gujarat State against Adani Power Mundra Limited that it had charged an excess of INR 39,000,000,000 over a period of five years under two power purchase agreements. An opposition politician in the state noted the case was a “textbook case of corruption, money laundering, loot of public money and above all, the classic case of cronyism that the Prime Minister and his government represent.” 
The issue here was that the rate at which coal for power production that was purchased by Adani Power Mundra was significantly higher than market rates at which coal was being traded in Indonesia, the source of the purchase. This meant that the state-owned Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, a Gujarati state entity in the energy sector had to pay much more for the overall electricity supply. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited has now written to Adani Power Mundra Limited asking that the excess amount charged be repaid. 
As a presidential candidate, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake assured that if he won, the National People’s Power would cancel the Adani energy project because it posed a threat to Sri Lanka’s energy sector sovereignty. 
The controls placed by Adani Power on its power supply to Bangladesh is a classic example of Bangladesh’s energy sovereignty being utterly compromised at a very crucial time in the country’s history. In real terms, Adani Power has slashed its supplies to Bangladesh by about 60% due to unpaid bills exceeding $800 million. Sri Lanka could also find itself in a similar situation if it compromises its power supply and energy sovereignty by going ahead with the Adani project.
In October President Dissanayake informed the Supreme Court that it would reconsider the approval given by the previous regime to the Adani Group projects. The government must now expect considerable pressure from vested parties, in this case both the Adani Group and the Indian government, more generally. But it is essential to be mindful that we are not dealing with a project in an Indian state.
We cannot be endlessly languishing in the depths of poverty simply because of the corruption of our own leaders of the recent and not-too-recent past, and business magnates of the region. The Adani case is a good starting point to roll back mega corruption and illegality in the country.
Sasanka Perera is the founding professor of the South Asia University's Department of Sociology. This commentary was first published <a href="https://island.lk/adanis-power-in-sri-lanka/">The Island Online</a>.

Adani in Sri Lanka

In June 2020, <a href="https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-row-dont-read-too-much-into-chinas-statements/articleshow/76056332.cms">incursions</a> by Chinese Army into the fraught borderlands of India’s Ladakh region triggered <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/what-was-india-china-military-clash-2020-about-2024-10-25/">bloody clashes</a> that killed 20 Indian soldiers, plunged bilateral relations to their lowest point in decades, and led to a prolonged military standoff. 
In November, China and India have reached a <a href="https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3284373/how-china-and-india-can-build-border-truce-normalise-ties">truce</a>, though many in India would prefer to hold their applause. Since the 2020 violence, bilateral relations have remained frozen, and India wants China to take steps to restore the status quo ante at the border. China’s unprovoked encroachments across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh are to blame for disturbing the peace in the first place.
To show it meant business, India <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2024-10-23/china-and-india-bury-the-hatchet-for-now">slowed down</a> approvals of Chinese investments; tightened visa approvals for Chinese nationals, and canceled direct flights between the two countries. India toughened its stance on Chinese territorial claims in the Pacific, and made pointed political gestures that were bound to displease China, like <a href="https://m.economictimes.com/news/india/china-lodges-protest-with-india-over-pm-modis-response-to-taiwan-president-lais-greetings-on-his-poll-victory/articleshow/110765182.cms">responding</a> warmly to the Taiwanese president’s congratulatory message after Modi’s re-election. (There was also talk of Taiwan allowing Indian workers.)
While the recent truce suggests that China has finally gotten the message, it is difficult to shake the impression that India was the more anxious of the two parties to reach an agreement. In fact, India’s economic establishment appears largely convinced that, far from pursuing a strategy of decoupling, or at least ‘de-risking’, vis-à-vis China, India should be using Chinese capital to fill its own investment gaps.
Given that bilateral trade has <a href="https://www.ptinews.com/story/business/China-largest-trading-partner-of-India-in-FY24-with-USD-118-4-bn%3B-US-second-with-USD-118-3-bn/1497275">reached</a> its highest-ever levels despite the political tensions, it comes as no surprise that India’s business community has reportedly been <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-10-24/how-india-ceos-convinced-modi-to-push-for-better-china-ties-at-brics">pressing</a> the government to conclude an agreement that would facilitate economic engagement. In July, the government’s chief economic adviser <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-not-rethinking-issue-allowing-chinese-investment-trade-minister-says-2024-07-30/">openly advocated</a> a strategy that would increase Chinese investments in India and deepen Indian integration into Chinese supply chains.
There were indications over the last few months that an agreement to end the Ladakh standoff was forthcoming. And a deal did soon emerge, allowing both China and India to resume patrols along the frontier.
But significant areas of concern remain. As the political commentator Brahma Chellaney observed, when Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met at the BRICS Summit in Kazan after the truce was announced, their respective ministries produced very different statements. Whereas India described the accord as a step toward a ‘multipolar Asia and a multipolar world’, China referred only to a ‘multipolar world’. The implication was subtle but clear: Asia belongs to China.
More broadly, China’s actions along the LAC have signaled a clear desire to keep India off balance by taking steps to shift the border in ways more favourable to its own interests. This mirrors China’s assertive approach to advancing its territorial ambitions elsewhere along its shared border with India, and in the South China Sea.
It is worth remembering how the last standoff between India and China, focused on the Doklam plateau in Bhutan, ended. India does not claim Doklam, but it does support Bhutan’s claim, which China disputes. Moreover, a major Indian highway runs below the plateau, connecting India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country. So, when China deployed troops to build a Chinese highway in Doklam, India sent troops to stop the project.
In that case, the two sides took just a few months to reach an agreement, which looked much like the recent Ladakh deal. Since then, however, the Chinese outflanked India by building a road elsewhere on the Doklam plateau to achieve the same result. The PLA now overlooks a vital Indian highway.
China’s conduct follows a clear pattern: create new facts on the ground, deploy forces to positions from which they can intimidate (and, potentially, attack) India, and wear India down with protracted diplomacy. In the meantime, encourage India to increase its dependence on Chinese imports and dangle the investment carrot before Indian business leaders.
Yet the promised economic benefits of the two sides’ recent rapprochement are unlikely to materialise. The Chinese have not lifted a finger to address India’s huge bilateral trade deficit which soared to $101 billion in 2022, from $70 billion in 2021 – or to lower the barriers Indian companies face when trying to access the Chinese market.
Moreover, all indications point to Chinese investment in low-value-added industries, rather than sectors involving technology transfer, even as Chinese companies pursue acquisitions in sensitive sectors in India. There are also massive opportunity costs: greater economic integration with China would surely make India less attractive to global companies seeking to reduce their exposure to the People’s Republic.
Add to that China’s long track record of exporting its way out of economic trouble and weaponising other countries’ economic vulnerabilities, and it seems clear that India should proceed with caution. Until China credibly demonstrates its good intentions, the truce in Ladakh warrants little celebration. © <a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org">Project Syndicate</a>

CHINDIA

Project Syndicate: Being especially vulnerable to climate change, the Global South is open to receiving financial, technical, and other forms of support from wherever they can get it. Are America and its allies squandering an opportunity here?
Ian Bremmer: At this point, developing economies are open to climate finance support from any quarter. With simultaneous major geopolitical conflicts, inflationary pressures, and pivotal elections happening this year, America and its allies view climate partnerships with emerging markets as a lower priority. The EU’s top priority is Ukraine, and the US has been consumed with the Gaza conflict.
The Global South will therefore strengthen ties with China and Middle Eastern countries, as we’ve seen happening since the last United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai (COP28). Diversifying partnerships makes sense for these governments, since wealthy countries have made it clear they won’t significantly ramp up support anytime soon. Although <a href="https://cop29.az/en/news/letter-to-parties-and-constituencies#:~:text=The%20COP29%20Presidency's%20top%20negotiating,priorities%20of%20developing%20country%20Parties." target="_blank">climate finance</a> will be a major topic at COP29 in Azerbaijan, the $1 trillion target will go unmet, leading to frustration and even more collaboration with non-traditional partners.
The donor pool is becoming a contentious topic in UN climate negotiations, because countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, and China are not currently classified as ‘<a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2014wesp_country_classification.pdf" target="_blank">developed economies</a>’. The United States and some EU governments are pushing to expand this list to achieve more ambitious goals, but it won’t happen. Many emerging markets support the current list because they don’t want to antagonise China, which firmly opposes being a donor and criticises developed markets for not delivering on climate finance.
Do strategic and ‘national-security’ considerations surrounding climate policy and green technologies ensure a zero-sum dynamic?
This collaboration has historically set global policy expectations, laying the groundwork for milestones like the Paris climate agreement, COP26 in Glasgow and COP28 in Dubai. The outcome of the US election will be crucial, but under a Democratic administration, robust climate cooperation could continue, particularly with the right climate envoys.
During the first three years of <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/joseph-biden-jr">Joe Biden</a>’s presidency, US Climate Envoy <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/john-kerry">John Kerry</a> and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, demonstrated that meaningful <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-00692-7" target="_blank">progress</a> can still be made despite broader tensions. After the <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/08/05/1115878668/china-taiwan-pelosi-climate-military#:~:text=BEIJING%20%E2%80%94%20China%20declared%20Friday%20it,Nancy%20Pelosi's%20visit%20to%20Taiwan." target="_blank">suspension</a> of climate talks following US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, Kerry and Xie’s teams were among the first to resume discussions in 2023.
Even then, separating climate issues from US-China tensions will pose a challenge. Chinese officials have stressed that climate collaboration requires “overall stable relations”.
What about under a second Trump presidency? How much damage could he do to the net-zero transition, both in the US and globally?
Donald Trump is obviously no fan of climate policies, but he supports US industry. His administration would cut Inflation Reducation Act spending, and could do so significantly with full Republican support. These cuts would then ripple through the economy. But the US would still pursue aggressive industrial policies, challenging economic trade partners. A Trump administration would favour oil and gas, but its impact would be limited.&nbsp;
On the international front, you could expect a US withdrawal from UN climate talks altogether, which could derail progress at COP30 and significantly reduce funding for developing economies. This could weaken new climate commitments from all governments by 2025, eventually pushing global temperatures higher than currently projected.
And following the strong performance by far-right parties in the European Parliament elections, should we expect Europe’s ambitions under the 2020 EU Green Deal to be scaled back?&nbsp;
The EU has temporarily peaked in its adoption of environmental policies. Looking ahead, the bloc will largely focus on implementing existing regulations. Key among these is the <a href="https://finance.ec.europa.eu/capital-markets-union-and-financial-markets/company-reporting-and-auditing/company-reporting/corporate-sustainability-reporting_en" target="_blank">Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive</a>, which will require companies to ramp up disclosures starting next year, with France already <a href="https://www.novata.com/resources/blog/csrd-unpacked-enforcement-compliance-and-penalties/#:~:text=France%20is%20the%20only%20country,not%20publishing%20the%20sustainability%20report." target="_blank">imposing</a> strict penalties for noncompliance. 
&nbsp;
Similarly, the <a href="https://green-business.ec.europa.eu/deforestation-regulation-implementation_en#:~:text=It%20will%20start%20to%20apply,Deforestation%20Free%20Products%20(EUDR)." target="_blank">EU Deforestation Regulation</a> will take effect this December, and countries around the world are already preparing for it. Seven key commodities will be barred from the EU market if their sourcing involves any kind of deforestation, legal or illegal.
Meanwhile, the recently adopted <a href="https://www.esginvestor.net/eu-approves-nature-restoration-law/#:~:text=EU%20member%20states%20have%20approved,targets%20in%20the%20bloc's%20history." target="_blank">Nature Restoration Law</a> – the EU’s flagship biodiversity legislation – requires that member states create action plans and set targets to increase their conservation and restoration efforts. The enforcement of these policies will lead to “<a href="https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Nature_Positive_Guidelines_for_the_Transition_in_Cities_2024.pdf" target="_blank">transition risks</a>.” Multinational corporations and governments that fail to comply with sustainability-related regulations will face legal action.
Another elephant in the room is India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has set highly ambitious decarbonisation targets reaching <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-59125143" target="_blank">net-zero by 2070</a>, but India has also been hoovering up Russian hydrocarbons at a discount and <a href="https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Indias-Coal-Consumption-and-Emissions-Hit-Record-Highs-in-Q1.html" target="_blank">increasing</a> its consumption of coal.&nbsp;
Actually, India’s net-zero target by 2070 is perceived by many as <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-net-zero-emissions-target-by-2070-little-too-long-term-hardeep-singh-puri/article67398684.ece" target="_blank">insufficiently ambitious</a>. But India faces a tough balancing act between long-term decarbonisation and immediate economic priorities. It still relies on coal for domestic security and is being cautious about phasing it out until renewable-energy capacity and alternative revenue sources for coal-producing regions are well established.
Energy-storage limitations, fluctuating LNG prices, and other challenges have prompted a shift toward a combination of LNG and green hydrogen for industry, and a mix of solar and nuclear power for residential areas.
Owing to capital shortages, grid instability, minimal storage solutions, and reliance on emerging technologies, India <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/renewables/india-may-miss-2030-renewable-energy-targets-as-up-punjab-haryana-lag-say-experts/articleshow/90964081.cms?from=mdr" target="_blank">will not meet</a> its 2030 targets of 500 gigawatts of non-fossil fuel power capacity and a 45% reduction in carbon intensity from 2005 levels. It is, however, expected to build its clean-energy supply chains by 2030 (leveraging a second-mover advantage), and this should help to accelerate its energy transition.
EVs are one bright spot. India has implemented <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/india-says-high-tariffs-evs-protect-chinese-imports-2024-06-14/" target="_blank">tariffs</a> to protect its budding domestic EV sector, and earlier this year it introduced a new <a href="https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2014858#:~:text=The%20Union%20Government%20has%20approved,by%20reputed%20global%20EV%20manufacturers." target="_blank">policy</a> to encourage EV manufacturing. This could attract investments worth billions of dollars from companies like Tesla or various Japanese firms.
In the past, you’ve proposed new bodies such as a World Carbon Organisation. Where does your thinking stand today in a world increasingly dominated by zero-sum strategic considerations?
Multilateral institutions will continue to face challenges, but they remain essential in an increasingly fragmented world. Their value lies in reaching global consensus and driving coordinated action, as seen with the Paris agreement’s impact on countries, companies, and communities. In that case, there was a clear ‘before and after’.
Yes, progress has been too slow, but to be fair, expectations for these negotiations are often too high, setting them up for failure. International fora should be seen as what they are: annual stocktaking exercises that help the world assess its current position and decide on necessary course corrections.
Unilateral initiatives, such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Deforestation Regulation, face just as much, if not more, pushback. This highlights the need to improve multilateral systems – by creating new structures or overhauling existing ones – rather than abandoning them. Doing so is ultimately in everyone’s interest. <a href="https://www.project-syndicate.org/">© Project Syndicate</a>
Ian Bremmer is a political scientist and founder of Eurasia Group, a geopolitical risk advisory firm, and GZERO Media.

Climate security and geopolitics

The five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom) reign supreme, each wielding a veto over whatever the other 192 members might want. That is why Israel, owing to US support, can <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/mid-east/israel-ignores-un-cease-fire-resolution-to-keep-pummeling-gaza">blithely ignore countless UN resolutions</a>, and why Syria, owing to Russian and Chinese support,<a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/04/555292"> handily escaped sanctions</a> for its use of chemical weapons. Owing to the disproportionate power they wield, the Permanent Five share an old, decidedly British sense of empire. The authors of two recent books on empire, Lawrence James and Nandini Das, offer no thoughts on how the UN might, or indeed should, be reformed, would agree. In The Lion and the Dragon, James, a prolific historian of the UK’s role in world affairs, follows Britain’s relations with China from the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/20/hk.history.01/">nineteenth-century Opium War </a>until the return of Hong Kong and today’s tensions over Taiwan. And in Courting India, Das, a professor at the University of Oxford, concentrates on the very beginnings of the British Empire and its covetous reach into what was then the Mughal Empire in India. What this history shows is that empire is still very much with us. Though Americans, proud of throwing off the rule of King George III, tend to bristle at the idea, their own military, technological, and commercial power is as imperial and pervasive as Britain’s territorial dominance ever was. As James notes, we can thank the post-World War II Pax Americana for the mostly stable international relations that prevailed during the aptly named Cold War with the Soviets and their own empire. Read more: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/two-new-books-on-conflict-and-conservation">Two new books on conflict and conservation</a>, Kunda Dixit A perennial question, especially during periods of geopolitical upheaval, is not just how empires emerge, but how they fade. Though Britain and France still indulge their memories of empire, they have long since accepted being ‘middle powers’ at best. Ever since the Suez crisis of 1956, when the threat of US sanctions forced Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw from Egypt’s Suez Canal, Britain has supinely followed America’s lead in international relations. (UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s refusal to send troops to Vietnam in the 1960s is the exception that proves the rule.) At the same time, France has sought comfort in the collective embrace of what became the European Union. Vladimir Putin’s Russia is on a hopeless <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/what-does-defending-europe-mean">quest to reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union</a> and recreate the empire of Peter the Great. And China already sees itself, with some justification, as wielding global influence to rival that of the American empire. China’s pursuit of superpower status is born of not just current economic and political realities, but also its deep-seated resentment over the ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1949) that it suffered at the hands of European (and Japanese) imperial powers. Of course, similar sentiments also animate Putin’s revanchism, as well as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s dismissiveness of diplomatic overtures from post-Brexit Britain. In William Faulkner’s oft-quoted words, ‘The past is never dead. It isn’t even past.’ <h2>Passage To India</h2> The trite answer to the question of why empires fall is that they become victims of their own success, growing too large, too corrupt, too exhausted to fend off energetic newcomers. As the Arab philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun argued in the 14th century, empires are like living organisms: they grow, mature, and die. As Das’s wonderfully researched book shows, the Mughal Empire was almost mature when the British arrived in the 1600s. Its Muslim rulers, with their roots in Central Asia, are fascinating figures. Emperor Jahangir, a generous patron of the arts, was addicted to opium and wine, whereas his wife, Nur Jahan, wielded significant political influence. The emperor’s son, Shah Jahan, was a ‘king of the world’, whose love for his wife, Mumtaz Mahal, is permanently commemorated in the Taj Mahal. Mughal India was both a place of immense wealth and a bastion of religious tolerance (unlike Europe, with its centuries-long Inquisition against Muslims, Jews, and heretics). Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-smallpox-virus-in-british-india">The smallpox virus in British India</a>, Tom Robertson By contrast, the British Empire was barely in its infancy when its clash with Mughal India began. In Courting India, Das paints a vivid picture of the experiences – mostly endured, rather than enjoyed – of King James’s ambassador, Thomas Roe, at the Mughal court. But more than that, she also offers a rich description of Jacobean England as it was emerging from the first Elizabethan age and jostling for power with Portugal, Spain, France, and Holland. Roe’s own journals are a major primary source, but so, too, are the cultural interpreters of the period, from William Shakespeare to the poet John Donne (a friend of Roe). Theirs was an England full of energy, seeking its fortune in the Americas and the Indies. However, it was nowhere close to as sophisticated as courtiers like Roe seemed to believe. Indeed, Roe was almost a caricature of the Englishman abroad. He refused to learn any language that might have helped his mission (be it Farsi or Turkish), and he insisted that he and his staff wear English wool and silk, even through the Indian summer. While he eventually came to admire the pragmatic tolerance of Mughal society, he remained convinced of England and Protestant Christianity’s superiority. Never would he have allowed himself to ‘go native’. Roe was answerable not only to King James but also to his financial backer, the East India Company, which had been granted its charter by Elizabeth I in 1600. This meant he was constantly tussling with the miserly company for money (its traders were always jealous), as well as struggling to quell, or at least make excuses for, the riotous behavior of English sailors. Read also:<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/buried-in-history"> Buried in history</a>, Lisa Choegyal <h2>Century of Humiliation </h2> Two centuries later, the East India Company, as it appears in James’s book, would still be clinging to the same assumptions that Roe had held. The superiority and integrity of Christian Britain went unquestioned, and still stood in stark contrast to “Asian greed and despotism.” The biggest change, in the meantime, had been the collapse of the Mughal Empire. Mughal India, the wealthiest place in the world at the end of the 17th century, was steadily enfeebled by internal dissent and Persian and Afghan invasions. In 1857, the East India Company formally dissolved the empire, setting the stage for <a href="https://www.royal.uk/encyclopedia/victoria-r-1837-1901">Queen Victoria</a> to establish the “British Raj” and direct rule over the Indian subcontinent the following year.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20240815120836_d96f9f442c51b3abd7717e340c856b87423a5f6d5a9e97422ffa7deec482aac2" data-rendition-name="original" width="842" height="596" loading="lazy" alt="The Mughal Empire's Treaty of Allahabad by Benjamin West NT"><figcaption>A painting by Benjamin West of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II conveying the Treaty of Allahabad to Robert Clive in August 1765 after the Battle of Buxar that gave the Company the right to collect taxes -- marking the beginning of British India rule.</figcaption></figure>  To paraphrase Ibn Khaldun, 19th Britain was no longer an infant with imperial ambitions; it was now an adult with all the energy and ruthlessness needed to extend its reach around the world. As such, the British lion had no misgivings about disgracing the Chinese dragon. Looking back on this period, it is easy to see why Chinese President Xi Jinping is so determined to expunge the century of humiliation from the national memory. That century began in 1839 with the First Opium War. When China tried to block imports of East India Company opium from Bengal, Britain responded with all its (industrialised) military might. By 1842, British warships and soldiers had crushed all opposition and compelled China’s Qing emperor to sign the Nanjing Treaty. That opened China to international trade and ensured that British citizens in ‘treaty ports’ would be subject to British, not Chinese, law. Another consequence of the war was that Britain took possession of Hong Kong, which it would hold until 1997. Whereas Das describes India principally through Roe’s eyes, James is keen to present a balance between British actions and Chinese reactions. In doing so, he stresses that China was not reacting only to British imperialism. After all, this was a time when ‘a spirit of predatory imperialism … pervaded the foreign ministries of Russia, France, Germany and China’s near-neighbour, the newly industrialized Japan’. Seized by their own commercial ambitions, all four ‘regarded China as a land mass to be partitioned and shared out in the same way as contemporary Africa’. But these other imperial projects hardly give Britain a pass. In arguing that ‘Britain was reluctantly sucked into the complex geopolitics of great-power empire building in the Far East’, James simply is not convincing. Britain, the world’s leading naval power and the home of the Industrial Revolution, was already adept at the game of geopolitics and quite prepared to protect its interests in China, not least because that would also protect its interests in India. By the 18th century, the Qing Dynasty had expanded from its Manchu roots and established an empire extending from Mongolia and Tibet to the Pacific. But by the 19th century, it was too exhausted to withstand the pressure not only from the other imperial powers but also from its own people. The century of humiliation always refers to foreign interventions, but equally important were domestic embarrassments such as the 1850-64 Taiping Rebellion – in which some 30 million people died – and the 1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion. The dynasty’s ‘Mandate of Heaven’ was clearly slipping from its grasp. It finally came to an end in 1912, when the Western-educated Sun Yat-sen, following a brief revolution, established the ‘Republic of China’. <h2>Remember Thucydides</h2> Today, that title applies only to the island of Taiwan, whereas Xi presides over the ‘People’s Republic of China’, which was established in 1949 with the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist Party over Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces. Since the 1970s, most countries – including both rival Chinas – have embraced the fiction that the ROC and the PRC refer to a single country. But there is a constant fear that Taiwan could formally declare its independence and destroy the fiction, thus provoking an invasion from the mainland. If President Joe Biden is to be believed, the US would then come to Taiwan’s rescue and the South China Sea would witness a Sino-American war with far-reaching regional and global consequences. Given his focus on Britain and China, James understandably devotes only a handful of his final paragraphs to US analysts’ ‘bleak’ prognosis of a future war over Taiwan. Moreover, throughout the preceding chapters, he deals deftly with other instances when conflict erupted between rival regional powers. These include the Sino-Japanese war of 1894, which led to Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the Russo-Japanese war of 1904, Japan’s bloody expansionism in the 1930s, and Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought America into World War II. The big risk today is that China and America could end up at war as much by accident as by design. Graham Allison of Harvard University has famously warned of the ‘Thucydides trap’, an allusion to the Peloponnesian War, in which Sparta, the incumbent hegemon, was ‘destined for war’ with the rising power, Athens. It is tempting to dismiss Allison’s argument as alarmism. But over the past 500 years, there have been 16 instances of an incumbent power facing off with a rising power, and war was avoided in only four of them, the most famous being America’s rise to replace Britain as the leading world power in the early twentieth century. Notably, James recalls that China was ‘stunned’ by <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887">Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union</a>. The message pushed by Chinese state-controlled media was that the UK had surrendered to ‘a losing mindset’. Clearly, the current Chinese leadership has no intention of showing weakness. The good news is that political and military leaders on both sides of the Pacific are aware of the risks. As Xi said in 2015, on his first state visit to America, “There is no such thing as the so-called Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” The bad news, however, is that all countries are prone to ‘miscalculation’. <h2>Tick-Tock</h2> Almost a half-century ago, John Bagot Glubb, a British general who commanded the Jordanian army from 1939 until 1956, published a book entitled The Fate of Empires and Search for Survival. His thesis was essentially the same as Ibn Khaldun’s, only with the added claim that almost all empires rise and fall over a period of roughly 250 years. Putting aside the obvious flaws in Glubb’s arithmetic (the Ottoman Empire certainly did not ‘end’ in 1570), the core idea should not be dismissed. After all, historians now give the Qing Dynasty a lifespan of 267 years, and the Mughal Empire of Das’s book began to lose territory after only two centuries. A pessimist might say today’s China began with Communist victory in 1949, and that America’s quasi-imperial power began 201 years ago with the Monroe Doctrine. Time may not be on the side of those who place their trust in America to protect democracy and ‘liberal Western values’. John Andrews, a former editor and foreign correspondent for The Economist, is the author of The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Troublespots. © Project Syndicate  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920.jpg" data-media-id="editor_10" data-image-id="20240817040832_cfc464995c06ecb51810752401d179a4b4da0c9be7a21219b8b2f0845e1f1920" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>   <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36.jpg" data-media-id="editor_11" data-image-id="20240817040832_f993521a48e8f6baa1ccc7fd4428cb0f19ae2b39a5ae76a9fb062a9af0675c36" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="The evolution of empire book cover page NT"></figure>

The Evolution of Empire

Earlier in August, after Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India following her violent suppression of a people’s movement, in Nepal pundits asked: ‘Is Nepal Next?”&nbsp;
The national narrative here focused on similar public discontent with leaders who have overstayed, disregarding public welfare while being neck-deep in corruption. They pointed out that the present NC-UML coalition government was ‘India-aligned’, just as Sheikh Hasina was.
Nepal’s cybersphere also shared Indian mainstream media’s magnified reports of attacks on Hindu targets in Dhaka, leaving out the fact that most were attacked for being close to the Hasina and her Awami League.&nbsp;
Some Nepali media also unquestioningly reported that Nepal’s border security was on ‘heightened alert’ for a ‘mass influx’ of Hindu refugees, forgetting that Nepal and Bangladesh do not even have a contiguous border.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">Peacemongers at India-Pakistan border</a>, Beena Sarwar
Regional upheavals have a long history of impacting Nepali politics. After Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was executed by the military in 1979, student protests erupted in Kathmandu and quickly turned into mass rallies against the partyless Panchayat system. King Birendra finally agreed to hold a referendum on the absolute monarchy.
When street protests in Sri Lanka forced out the Rajapaksa government and the economy went into freefall in 2022, Nepali commentators again asked: ‘Is Nepal Next?’ Nepal’s macroeconomic position was in a much sounder footing, but editors needed catchy headlines.
Bangladesh’s unrest was initially triggered by students protesting the quota for government jobs, and commentators here immediately drew parallels with constitutionally-guaranteed reservations for women as well as ethnic and caste minorities – even though in Bangladesh the anger was over the increased job quota for Awami League cadre.&nbsp;
If all this was not convoluted enough, add geopolitics to the mix. India and China are now in overt competition for influence in the Subcontinent, a region New Delhi regards as being in its sphere of influence. While Sri Lanka and the Maldives are strategic because of their location astride Indian Ocean maritime routes, Nepal, Bangladesh and to a certain extent Bhutan, are important buffers.&nbsp;
India was fully backing the secular Awami League despite Sheikh Hasina’s &nbsp;growing authoritarianism and her close trade and economic ties with China.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/selfies-on-the-prime-minister-s-bed">Selfies on the prime minister’s bed</a>, Guna Raj Luitel
In July, Hasina returned to Dhaka earlier than scheduled during a state visit to Beijing after being unable to secure a $5 billion loan from China. New Delhi had also leaned on Hasina to cancel China’s involvement in the Teesta contract, and award it to India.&nbsp;
In Sri Lanka, Chinese ‘debt trap diplomacy’ is said to have contributed to its economic collapse, pushing President Ranil Wickremesinghe closer to India and the West to cultivate support for its IMF bailout in June. Defence and maritime cooperation has followed hot on the heels of these deals.&nbsp;
The China’s Exim Bank did sign a $4.2 billion debt restructuring agreement with Sri Lanka in June, showing that Wickremesinghe is deftly trying to balance geopolitical ties.
In the Maldives, relations with New Delhi soured and broke into full-scale war on cybersphere after Mohamed Muizzu won elections earlier this year. But Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar’s was in Malé this week to ‘rectify’ Muizzu’s pro-Beijing tilt.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/retrofitting-saarc">Retrofitting SAARC</a>, Shristi Karki
In Nepal, China has made no secret of its wish to seek unity among myriad Communist factions, while India and the West have worked behind the scenes to wreck that plan. The latest coalition switch in July was a manifestation of this geopolitical jostling.&nbsp;
India’s new Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri made a courtesy visit to Kathmandu this week where officials were careful not to raise contentious issues like Kalapani, the Eminent Person’s Group report, new air routes, or to lift restrictions on buying surplus hydroelectricity from plants with Chinese involvement. Misri was formerly India’s ambassador in Beijing.
Interestingly, the Chinese who never openly commented publicly on Nepal’s internal affairs are now much more vocal, while the Indians who used to be very outspoken have taken a hands-off approach ever since the 2015 Blockade.&nbsp;
The latest example of this new Chinese mood is Ambassador Chen Song’s X posts with crude criticism last month of a Nepali journalist’s report on the Pokhara airport loan, or using undiplomatic language about the unsuccessful search for the twin buses that fell into the Trisuli, killing 59.&nbsp;
Still, the recent regime change in Dhaka is a warning to Nepal’s leaders not to take electoral mandate for granted, and to demonstrate results from better governance in the run-up to the next elections in 2027, or risk losing out to populist parties.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-love-triangle-with-china-and-india-impacts-investment">Nepal’s China-India love-triangle impacts investment</a>, Ramesh Kumar

Shristi Karki

The geopolitics of Nepal’s politics…

When two nearby cyclones rotate around each other, merging into a larger and more dangerous storm, meteorologists call it the Fujiwhara effect.
Is something like this developing in Northeast Asia?
Recent decades have seen an increase in what analysts call ‘transnational conflicts’ – that is, conflicts with local, regional and international dimensions. Ukraine is one example, Taiwan is another. It is difficult to address these multi-level conflicts, since responses are needed at all three levels.
Read more: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/ukraines-lessons-for-sandwiched-nations-like-nepal">Ukraine's lesson for sandwiched nations like Nepal</a>, Bhaskar Koirala
Recently, transnational conflicts in different parts of the world have started to merge together. Responding to these emergent global conflict complexes will be a still more daunting challenge.
East Asia has a raft of unresolved conflicts, left over from the postwar settlement of 1945. &nbsp;The legacy of the Korean war fuels continuing tensions and fears of war. The unresolved dispute over the <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-taiwan-war-us-no-allies-2024-7">status of Taiwan </a>leads to dangerous military activity around the island. The territorial and maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas involve clashing nationalisms but also broader strategic concerns over supply lines and resources.
Events in these hotspots were always calibrated against the state of relations between the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/40-years-after-the-sino-us-thaw">US and China</a>, China and Japan, Japan and North Korea. But it is only recently that they have become connected with conflicts in Europe.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 rang warning bells in policy circles in East Asia. Policy-makers feared that President Xi might be emboldened to act against Taiwan following Putin’s lead.&nbsp;
The Ukraine conflict came closer with North Korea’s decision to supply the Russian Federation with weapons, and closer still when President Putin concluded a defence pact with Kim Jong-Un in June 2024. The Russian Federation and North Korea pledged to provide mutual assistance should either be attacked. Kim Jong Un offered “full support and solidarity to the Russian government, army and people in carrying out the special military operation in Ukraine” (CBS News, 19 June 2024).&nbsp;
Meanwhile, on the Korean peninsula, Kim Jong Un warned his people to prepare for war, and ordered the army to undertake <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/China-s-drills-appear-to-be-rehearsal-for-Taiwan-invasion-U.S.-admiral">‘actual war drills’</a>, while proposing to change the constitution to refer to ‘completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the R.O.K. and annexing it as a part of the territory of our ​republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.’
At the same time, the West has not yet learned the lesson that NATO expansion is dangerous, and NATO is preparing to expand its activities into the Indo-Pacific region and north east Asia. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nato-japan-south-korea-australia-new-zealand-6c3d9aa6fccc1253ca99ee140073f95c">NATO is developing links with South Korea and Japan</a> and invited them to attend its last two summits.
Staff talks between NATO and the Japanese Self Defence Force have identified areas of cooperation in responding to security challenges, cybersecurity and military planning. A NATO office was to have been opened in Tokyo, though France objected to this plan. &nbsp;
NATO sees its involvement in the area as a necessary response to the challenges to the ‘rules-based order’ coming from China, North Korea and Russia. The NATO summit of July 2023 declared that “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.’ The NATO Secretary General followed this up by saying that security is now globalised and security crises in one part of the world reverberate in another.
In April, before attending the NATO Summit for the first time as a South Korean leader, President Yoon condemned any ‘attempt to change the status quo by force’ in the Taiwan Strait, and promised that South Korea would cooperate with the international community to prevent such an outcome. The Japanese strategic community also believes that Japan would be drawn in, under this contingency. The Korean and Taiwan and Japan-China conflicts are thus potentially interlinked.
China and North Korea see the collaboration between NATO and Japan and Korea as a US-led effort to bring NATO into the region. In North Korea’s case, it is seen as part of a US strategy to overthrow Kim’s regime. In China’s case, NATO expansion is seen as a "grave challenge" to global peace and stability. "Despite all the chaos and conflict already inflicted, NATO is spreading its tentacles to the Asia-Pacific region with an express aim of containing China."
The US is deliberately emphasising the interconnections between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres as part of its strategy of building alliances with democratic partners. "We are also growing the connective tissue between US alliances in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe…allies in the Indo- Pacific are staunch supporters of Ukraine, while allies in Europe are helping the United States support peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait," notes National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.
NATO has addressed the possibility that it might become involved in conflict in the Taiwan Strait, specifically in the situation where US territory and forces came under attack, which would trigger Article 5.
China also objects to the participation of NATO members’ naval units in Freedom of Navigation operations in the Taiwan Straits.
How can the risks of transnational conflicts coming together into global conflict complexes be defused? Second-track dialogue meetings can convene interlocutors from different arenas and bring them together to discuss all aspects of a situation.&nbsp;
But though dialogue efforts are vital, they cannot bear the weight of conflict prevention alone. Restraint, trust-building and moderation on the part of political leaders is also needed. So is a climate of domestic political discussion that replaces security fears and nationalism with mutual understanding and an appreciation of our common humanity.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2024/turbulent-currents-merging-storms-northeast-asia-outlook-june-july-2024.html">the original</a> with their permission.
Hugh Miall is Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the University of Kent, and Chair of the Conflict Research Society, the main professional association for peace and conflict researchers in the UK. He is a Senior Research Fellow at the Toda Peace Institute.

Turbulent Currents, Merging Storms

Two days before Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal flew to New Delhi for Narendra Modi’s hat trick oath-taking this month, his coalition government abruptly recalled Shankar P Sharma, Nepal’s ambassador to India.
Dahal’s government on 6 June also called back ambassadors to the US and UK, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Malaysia, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, and Israel.&nbsp;
The fact that Nepal’s ambassadors are made to play musical chairs every time there is regime change in Kathmandu is proof enough that international diplomacy is just an extension of 'bhagbanda' power sharing. The recalled ambassadors were nominees of the Nepali Congress (NC) when it was in a coalition with the Maoist Centre.
The Maoists switched partners and are now in government with the UML, so five of the eight new ambassadors are UML appointees. None of the eight are career diplomats. Since there are not enough ministerial portfolios, heads of agencies and plum posts in the bureaucracy to reward party loyalists, ambassadorships are coveted gigs. Some are even ‘pre-paid ambassador’ appointments auctioned to the highest bidders.&nbsp;
But all is not lost. One of the eight was Sushil Pyakurel, former head of the National Human Rights Commission and recipient of the 2010 Gwangju Prize for Human Rights. He &nbsp;refused to accept ambassadorship to South Korea from the UML quota.
In a scathing press note turning down the appointment, Pyakurel exposed the corrosive politicisation of Nepal’s diplomatic service, and how it has undermined our national interest and reputation in the global arena.
Pyakurel heard of his appointment through the media, and questioned the whole selection process and criteria.&nbsp;
He wrote: ‘I am astounded by the government's practice of not discussing the background, capability, interest and diplomatic skills of a person as well as the political, economic, and social status of the respective country before assigning them the responsibility of representing the nation.’
Pyakurel’s decision set off a tsunami of criticism in Nepal’s cybersphere of past and present government practice of political parties scrambling for plum embassies.
Compared to accomplished past envoys like Bhim Bahadur Pande, Bhekh Bahadur Thapa or Kedar Bhakta Mathema who had access to the highest echelons of governments of their host countries, Nepal’s foreign service has been blighted by embarrassing ambassadors over the years.
Swarnim Wagle took to social media to pledge that his Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) would stop bad practices of the past. But even he seemed unsure his own party would do things differently.&nbsp;
Wagle wrote: ‘Let’s hope the ambassadors, permanent representatives or special envoys recommended by the RSP possess excellent qualifications, character and moral values reflecting the party’s criteria,’ Let's hope.&nbsp;
Ambassadors should be suitable for the countries they are appointed to, preferably speaking the language and being familiar with their governance culture. It should be reserved for those with high integrity and who can literally be Nepal’s ‘brand ambassadors’. Alas, ours have not been the sharpest tools in the shed.
The last time we counted, Nepal has had 28 prime ministers in 26 years. With a few notable exceptions, ambassadors appointed by a previous regime tend to be replaced with sidekicks, cronies, relatives, or business partners, usually in a foreign labour recruitment company.&nbsp;
In previous years, Nepal was reliant on development assistance and our ambassadors needed to be good fundraisers. Now, as the country graduates to lower-middle income status, the purpose of economic diplomacy is shifting to labour, trade, tourism, and liaising with international lending agencies.
Since remittances are the backbone of Nepal’s economy and make up an equivalent of 25% of the GDP, the role of ambassadors is to explore destinations where there are higher-paying jobs, to ensure labour rights safeguards, and to help Nepalis in trouble.&nbsp;
Nepal’s embassies abroad have promoted the country as a destination, but tourism income makes up less than 5% of Nepal’s foreign currency income every year.
As our investigation shows, Nepalis are increasingly headed to Europe where there is a labour shortage. Because Schengen is difficult to get into, Nepalis are being taken by recruiters to peripheral countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Malta and Cyprus where working conditions and pay are less than they are promised.
Portugal, Romania and Croatia alone now have nearly 100,000 Nepali workers, yet Nepal does not have an embassy in any of these countries to protect workers in case of abuse, exploitation or fraud.
With the rise of India and China, the choice of ambassadors to these two countries are even more critical than before. Yet, we see ad hoc appointees to New Delhi and Beijing who lack stature, contacts and diplomatic skills to navigate the geopolitics of the two darbars.
Why are we not surprised by the choice of new ambassadors by this government? What can we expect when a businessman with ties to a manpower company is the Labour Minister, and a person investigated for allegedly scamming cooperatives is the Home Minister?
Sonia Awale

Pre-paid Excellencies

There is cautious optimism after the Indian election results that the semi-comatose <a href="https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/media-centre/press-releases" target="_blank">South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC)</a> can be revived. The Kathmandu-headquartered bloc has been in limbo since November 2016, when Pakistan was set to host its 19th Summit, but India pulled out after <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Militants-attack-Army-headquarters-in-Uri-near-LoC/article55941862.ece">an attack on its military in Kashmir</a> which it blamed on Pakistan. "Bilateral grievances should not stand in the way of advancing the cause of a regional organisation,” says Arjun Bahadur Thapa, who was Secretary General in 2014 when the last SAARC summit was held in Kathmandu. ”India’s foreign policy is not dictated by politicians, but by its powerful bureaucracy. Modi's decreased political clout may dent his confidence on the global stage, but will most likely not impact India’s stance towards Pakistan, or SAARC." In the past 10 years, New Delhi has bypassed SAARC to pivot eastwards through overlapping sub-regional fora like BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative) and <a href="https://www.bimstec.org">BIMSTEC</a> (the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) that includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.&nbsp; The new SAARC Secretary General Golam Sarwar from Bangladesh has been touring South Asian capitals to try to resuscitate the regional organisation. This week he was in <a href="https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/press-release/354-the-foreign-minister-of-sri-lanka-reaffirms-sri-lanka-s-unwavering-commitment-to-saarc">Colombo</a>, after visiting <a href="https://www.saarc-sec.org/index.php/press-release/348-secretary-general-s-engagements-in-new-delhi-and-islamabad">Islamabad and New Delhi</a>. “To interpret the recent elections in India as a defeat of the BJP and the weakening of PM Modi will be a faulty approach to suggest a revival of the SAARC process,” says Nishchal Pandey at the Centre for South Asian Studies in Kathmandu. “India pays the biggest chunk of the annual SAARC budget and it is therefore also in the interest of Indian taxpayers to see that a Summit is held." Indeed, as long as SAARC is held <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/indo-pak-tension-hits-saarc-climate-action">hostage by geopolitics, not much may change</a>. New Delhi prefers bilateral dealings rather than multilateral ones, and India-Pakistan tension as well as turmoil in Afghanistan have kept SAARC in limbo.&nbsp; “Modi 3.0 has great power ambitions for India including redefining India’s identity on the world stage,” Pandey adds. “But this will not be achieved unless long-standing disputes are resolved.”&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20240621050636_4679d14e0718498e63bd52bf32dd13f940c83e1aa7dfd42f502259e3ae18e550.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20240621050636_4679d14e0718498e63bd52bf32dd13f940c83e1aa7dfd42f502259e3ae18e550" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="SAARC Secretariat NT"> <figcaption>SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu. Photo: SUMAN NEPALI</figcaption> </figure>  India’s preference for BIMSTEC serves to strengthen ties with ASEAN, and also offset <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-india-us-nepal-china-quadrangle">China’s growing influence</a> in the region. Other countries like Nepal which are members of both SAARC and BIMSTEC <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/sorry-state">have also been pulled along</a> by New Delhi.&nbsp; “For Nepal, SAARC seems to have taken a back seat to partnerships like BBIN and BIMSTEC as we look towards sub-regional alliances rather than regional ones,” said Nepali Congress leader Minendra Rijal at a geopolitical conference in Kathmandu last week. “But we do not get to hear a lot from the Pakistanis, who have a very different perspective on SAARC.” After being elected for the first time in 2014, Modi invited all SAARC leaders to his inauguration, announcing India's ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy. For his second swearing-in in 2019, he invited only <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/bimstec-facelift#">BIMSTEC members</a>, extending India’s regional policy to ‘Neighbourhood First and Act East’. This month, Modi invited neighbouring country leaders, but added Mauritius and Seychelles to the list, indicating another geopolitical priority: the Indian Ocean. “Global challenges demand collective action,” Secretary General Sarwar told a recent Indian Ocean Conference in Perth. “Investing in international partnership, diplomacy, and development initiatives foster peace, stability and shared prosperity.” Pessimists say SAARC is <a href="http://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/GUEST-COLUMN/forget-SAARC-go-for-bilateralism-or-sub-regionalism,402">as good as defunct</a>, but optimists still see a role for the group since many of the region’s problems can only be resolved through cross border collaboration in improving connectivity, trade, poverty, and coping with the climate crisis. Other foreign policy experts see <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/hindutva-juggernaut-hits-a-speed-bump">a weaker BJP</a> forcing Modi to mitigate attacks on minorities and the media at home, but may compensate by being more hawkish on Pakistan and in the neighbourhood. As current chair and the site of its headquarters, Nepal should be playing a catalytic role, says Pandey: “It is the obligation of the chair to ensure that the organisation is not dismantled through inaction and indecision. We must be able to impress upon the Indian leadership that it has been a decade since Nepal has been chair and we need to earnestly pass on the baton to the next country.”&nbsp; Bangladesh was a prime mover of SAARC when it was founded in 1985 in Dhaka. Zafar Sobhan, founding editor of the <a href="https://www.dhakatribune.com">Dhaka Tribune </a>brought his family for a holiday to Nepal this week and told us: “The disintegration of SAARC has been a tragedy for all South Asian countries. It would be in everyone's interests to revive it, but with the prevailing political winds in India, I don't see it happening. We are all the poorer for this loss, both literally and figuratively.”&nbsp;

Retrofitting SAARC

One smoggy winter morning in February 2019, Ekta regretted coming to her sculpture class. It was the first day of her period, and the 19-year-old wished she was home, curled up in bed with a hot water bag to soothe her cramps.
Her class was at Kalapremi Ceramic Studio, a dark room on the ground floor of a house in Maharajganj, and Ekta’s teacher was the artist Gopal Das Shrestha ‘Kalapremi’, a noted sculptor.
Two other students were already there, using all their muscle strength to knead the sculpting clay. Ekta, now 24, recalls how Kalapremi asked her if she was feeling all right. She avoided him, as she did not want everyone to know she was menstruating.
Kalapremi repeatedly asked Ekta what was wrong. She finally muttered that she was having her period, after which he grabbed her hand and led her to a partitioned corner of the studio and sat her on a chair. Before she could stop him, he slid his hand under her dress, and started massaging her abdomen.
“I was horrified,” Ekta recalls. “I told him to stop, but he didn’t listen, asking me not to be shy, saying he knew how to relieve my pain. He stopped only after I protested furiously.”&nbsp;
The art tutor then said, “You’re like my daughter. I’m doing it out of love to make you feel better, but you’re so stubborn.”&nbsp;
“Instead of saying sorry he acted like I was the one having crazy thoughts,” remembers Ekta, adding that from April 2016 to August 2020 beginning the time she was 16, the artist sexually abused and harassed her on several occasions. &nbsp;
Now, Ekta and the artist’s other former students are finally sharing their experiences and some are pressing legal charges against him, hoping that others do not have to endure what they did.&nbsp;
Award-winning artist and teacher Gopal Das Shrestha ‘Kalapremi’ (the name means ‘Art Lover’) is known for his ceramic art, sculpture, and contemporary pottery. He was <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/the-house-of-kalapremi">profiled in Nepali Times after a collaborative exhibition</a>, ‘Where the Wild Things Are’ at the Siddhartha Art Gallery three years ago.&nbsp;
His pieces, titled Gaalis, featured sculpted female figures with the heads of dogs, sheep, and donkeys (pictured) to depict derogatory terms for women. Some critics said the collection was a satire on feminists.
Kalapremi started his artistic and teaching career in 1983 and over the years taught at Bhanubhakta School, Kathmandu University School of Arts, Lalitkala Campus and at his private Kalapremi Ceramic Studio. He has also lectured at Jeonju University in South Korea and recently at Tabor Academy in the United States.
Seven of Kalapremi’s former students were interviewed for this story. Five female students said he touched them inappropriately in his studio or at Kathmandu University. Two male students said they witnessed him abuse and harass the women. In all cases, the students struggled to recognise the abuse when it occurred, and the lack of reporting systems left them to cope on their own for years.&nbsp;
Earlier this year, students shared a social media post hinting at Kalapremi’s history of abusive behaviour following which more students of the artist reached out sharing similar experiences. Some students spoke of abuse that happened as long as 20 years ago.
Kalapremi, 60, has denied the allegations. He told Nepali Times: “Some years ago, there was a movement encouraging people to hug and kiss. I used to do it purely out of friendship and love. But after seeing posts on social media last year calling out my behaviour, I realised my actions may have hurt some people. I understand now that I should have been more mindful.”
He added: “I am also an auxiliary health worker, so I know the exact points to massage to relieve menstrual pain. It’s not just menstruation, I take anyone who is ill to the hospital.”
Sexual abuse is much more rampant than reported given how difficult it is to prove it in court. The law defines sexual abuse as occuring when someone touches another’s private parts, coerces them into touching theirs, uses vulgar language, shows degrading images, or behaves indecently towards them without consent.&nbsp;
Ekta and her fellow students are consulting lawyer Suneeta Regmi Pokhrel, who says they know that even if the court decides in their favour, it is difficult to survive after speaking up, and influential men defend themselves saying they are being framed.&nbsp;
“They are in a lot of pain and weep when recalling how he abused them,” Regmi Pokhrel told us. “They are angry and have filed a case against him, but they are also terrified. They know he is a powerful man and they have seen how our society treats women who speak up against abusers. Unless people speak up, perpetrators will be emboldened.”
Art and academia in Nepal simply reflect the power imbalances in society where people with intersecting identities experience worse forms of abuse. Theatre actors Raj Kumar Pudasaini, Rajan Khatiwada, and Sunil Pokhrel were called out during the #MeToo movement in the Nepali theatre scene in 2019. Even after the allegations Pokhrel went on to receive national awards, while others continued to work without repercussions.
“If you speak up against abusers, you gradually get sidelined from projects,” explained a theatre artist who wished anonymity fearing professional setbacks. “The theatre scene in Nepal is quite small, you just have to make peace with the perpetrators and work with them if you want to sustain yourself.”&nbsp;
In academia there is a history of faculty members sexually harassing students and getting away with it. After Tribhuvan University (TU) lecturer Krishna Bhattachan was accused of harassing women students, the university said it would follow Nepal’s sexual harassment law and set up a reporting mechanism. But nothing happened to the professor, who had already retired. Instead, he counter-accused the students of 'attacking the indigenous people’s movement with baseless allegations' as <a href="https://kathmandupost.com/letters/2019/01/29/bhattachan-responds">he told the Kathmandu Post in 2019</a>. He continues to be featured as a prominent speaker including at TU.
Other faculty members previously accused of sexual harassment include Jagadish Murti Koirala from TU, Bishnu Prasad Acharya from Ratna Rajya Campus, and Bodha Raj Tripathee from Lalitpur Madhyamik Vidhyalaya. A woman staff member from TU also filed a sexual abuse complaint against Dambar Chemjong from TU.
Prominent figures like <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-rise-and-fall-of-nims-purja">mountaineer Nims Purja</a> have been <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/31/sports/mountaineering-sexual-harassment-abuse-nims-purja.html">accused of sexual assault</a>, and cricketer Sandeep Lamichhane, actor <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/celebrity-rape-case-spotlights-nepal-laws">Paul Shah</a>, and former speaker of Parliament <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mahara-arrested">Krishna Bahadur Mahara</a> have been accused of rape, but society-at-large has let off the alleged perpetrators amdist a larger debate about justice for survivors and punishment of perpetrators.&nbsp;
‘Gaushala-26’ is the court name given to the 18-year-old who accused Sandeep Lamichhane, former captain of Nepal’s national cricket team and skipper of Biratnagar Kings in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/here-comes-the-nepal-premier-league">ongoing Nepal Premier League</a>, of rape. She left the country citing society questioning her character affecting her mental health while Lamichhane got an outpouring of support. In May, the Patan High Court overturned a prior verdict that found Lamichhane guilty of rape and had sentenced him to eight years in prison. During the 23-month legal battle to pursue justice, Gaushala-26 faced threats of gang rape and acid attacks.&nbsp;
Exhausted by the struggle, Gaushala-26 sought to “move to a new world” where she could live free without hiding her identity.
Actress Samragyee Rajya Laxmi Shah in an Instagram video now deleted detailed the harassment she faced from a filmmaker during a movie shoot. She did not name any name but veteran actor Bhuwan KC filed a defamation case against Rana, but the court ruled that the charge lacked sufficient evidence.&nbsp;
Former Kathmandu mayor <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/theytoo">Keshav Sthapit also mocked the #MeToo movement</a>, calling accusations against him by journalists Rashmila Prajapati and Ujjwala Maharjan “a rape of men’s rights”.
Serial Abuse
Back at the Kalapremi Ceramics studio, another former student, 24-year-old Rajiv, says he felt the need to speak out after seeing his female classmates being abused.&nbsp;
“He frequently kissed them on their cheeks,” he told Nepali Times. “Whenever they walked into the studio he flailed his arms like a child asking for a hug. They awkwardly hugged him from the side, but he pulled them closer, held their chin, and kissed their cheeks.”&nbsp;
Rajiv says he also saw Kalapremi pull the women’s bra straps, touch their breasts, and slap their buttocks. The young students would freeze, not knowing how to react, and if they protested, he would say it was “normal in art”. Rajiv, 19 at the time like his classmates, remembers thinking perhaps the well-respected artist was right after all.
Another student, Luna, who took lessons at Kalapremi’s studio from 2020 to 2022 did try to confront the tutor after he made an obscene proposal to her. She recalls: “One day when the other students had left the studio and it was just the two of us, he told me that God had given him special artistic talent and he could transfer those powers to me. But to do that both of us will have to be naked, inside a dark room, and have sex.”
Luna, who was 18 then, was livid and told him she did not want any of his powers, but she says he laughed at her as if he was joking. She did not tell her family about the incident because she thought no one would believe her.&nbsp;
“They were all in awe of this famous artist and felt I should be grateful that to be learning sculpting from him,” she says. “I was scared to be alone with him in case he talked about sex again. My coping mechanism was to be rude so he wouldn’t try to come close to me.”
Seeing how some classmates were standing up to Kalapremi, Ekta too tried to push back against his advances, but she said he found ways to coerce her. Since Ekta, Rajiv, and Luna could not afford Kalapremi’s Rs30,000 monthly fee for lessons, he had offered them all a stipend to assist him in the studio.
“He had spondylosis and took me to his therapy sessions to learn massage techniques, then he often made me and other students massage him,” says Ekta. Whenever she refused, he would feign pain to make her feel sorry for him. “He would insist that I put my hands under his shirt so that I could massage him better,” she adds.
The art tutor often tried to “seduce sympathy” from Ekta by sharing how he had never been loved as a child and was “sexually frustrated” as an adult.&nbsp;
“At 7PM, he would pour himself Signature whiskey and immediately go off again about how he was sex-starved. I didn’t know how to respond. It took me time to realise alcohol was just an excuse to talk about sex,” Ekta says.
If convicted, Kalapremi could face financial penalty and/or a prison sentence of up to three years according to Section 224 of National Penal (Code) Act 2017.&nbsp;
Data suggests that victims of child sexual abuse on average take nearly 24 years to tell someone about their trauma, and some may never disclose it at all.&nbsp;
“In our culture, children are rarely taught about boundaries. They often react, show anger when adults pinch their cheeks. But adults insist they did it out of love, and force the children to accept it,” says Sita Lama, a psychotherapist at Manka Kura. “And even when someone touches them inappropriately they struggle to identify and verbalise it.”
When perpetrators claim to be “acting out of love”, Lama says survivors are likely to perceive it as something safe, rather than recognising it as abuse.&nbsp;
“It may take years for them to realise they were abused,” she explains. "And even when they become aware, the power imbalance with the abuser and the associated shame often prevents survivors from speaking up."
Other former students from the School of Art at Kathmandu University have also come forward years later, saying Kalapremi sexually abused them. As young adults, they felt his behaviour was off but were uncertain if it was inappropriate, illegal, or they did not know how to respond. After having understood that it was indeed abuse, they say they are speaking out now to protect others.&nbsp;
Amina Singh, a visiting faculty member at Kathmandu University, says there is no clause against sexual abuse in contracts of teachers, and there is no formal grievance handling mechanism for the students.&nbsp;
“So the only way students can to deal with sexual abuse is approach someone they trust,” she says.
Eight other former art students of Lalit Kala Campus and Srijana College of Fine Arts of Tribhuvan University and other private art studios in Kathmandu say they were also sexually abused by their art teachers. Three faculty members interviewed from these institutions said they saw the abuse, but felt it was futile to report it given how powerful the teachers were.
In the absence of a formal system, some longtime women artists warned each other about “problematic” artists. They shared &nbsp;a “heads-up” to be more cautious when collaborating with them, and avoided responding to their calls and texts after work hours.
To ensure art institutions are safe for all, galleries, museums, artist studios, and smaller art spaces need to develop policies on sexual harassment. This would include a code of conduct or studio policies that hold the leadership accountable and outline the principles of professional ethics.&nbsp;
Students and employees should inquire about accountability mechanisms for raising concerns, both formally and informally, advocates say.
Three years after Ekta left the ceramics studio, she learnt that Kalapremi had harassed many other women. Still trying to get a footing in the art industry, she attended a workshop in Kathmandu where women artists discussed ways to stay safe in the art sector.&nbsp;
Since it was a close-knit group Ekta opened up about how she felt violated and realised she was not alone, he had been abusing underprivileged students for years, and this was common knowledge among artists in Nepal.
Ekta says that even after she quit, Kalapremi continued sending her text messages like ‘I am thinking of you’, ‘Why have you stopped speaking with me’, or ‘I am waiting for your call’.&nbsp;
But what really forced her to act was when Ekta found out that he was sending similar texts to her younger sister.&nbsp;
“I’ve had enough,” she told us. “He abused me all these years but I won’t let him abuse my sister.” &nbsp;
Ekta, Rajiv and Luna are not the real names of the students.&nbsp;

‘Art Lover’ accused of sexual abuse

It was 8:15 in the evening of 25 March 1968 when everyone in the village of Batulechaur near Pokhara heard a deafening sound like thunder as a bright flashing object hurtled down to land in a field.&nbsp; That field belonged to Kul Timilsina, and the next morning he retrieved a sheet of metal about 2m by 1m and carried it home with the help of a few others, thinking it would be useful for his buffalo shed.&nbsp; Before he died at age 83 three years ago, Timilsina had told photo archivist Sunil Ulak that the black metal sheet was not rectangular and had rounded corners. There are a few witnesses still alive who have a clear recollection of the object that fell from the sky that night.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024120707128_75cc85aac56b9cc4a77366471f058d7b3eb6868776811b0923845c2d0a61f014.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2024120707128_75cc85aac56b9cc4a77366471f058d7b3eb6868776811b0923845c2d0a61f014" data-rendition-name="original" width="1170" height="601" loading="lazy" alt="UFO over Pokhara"> <figcaption>The field in Batulechaur belonging to Kul Timilsina where fragments of a flying object fell from the sky in 1968.</figcaption> </figure>  One of them is Timilsina’s wife Gyanu, who was 22 at the time. She had been at home, and remembers hearing the big bang and the sky becoming very bright. “We saw the thing in the field in the morning,” she told us. “It looked like a lid, a covering of some sort. The way it was stuck in the ground, it must have fallen from the sky. We thought we could use it to dry clothes on, and took it home.”&nbsp; Another witness is Kul Narayan Paudel. “I was only eight then. We ran to the field to see what had fallen. It was a four-sided metal sheet. The elders took it away, and I don't know what happened to it.” &nbsp; Ram Bahadur Baniya, a teacher at the local school, says he had heard the sheet had been brought to the school, and later handed over to the Zonal Commissioner at the time, Nanda Prasad Malla. “But that is all hearsay,” he says.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2024120707128_0bf207a12063fb8155b3c8d9a00a94887b126380c9e0627527c84cf5e1101f54.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2024120707128_0bf207a12063fb8155b3c8d9a00a94887b126380c9e0627527c84cf5e1101f54" data-rendition-name="original" width="1170" height="610" loading="lazy" alt="UFO over Pokhara"> <figcaption>Gyanu Timilsina, wife of Kul Timilsina.</figcaption> </figure>  There are two versions of what happened to Kul Timilsina’s metal sheet. One is that an American Peace Corp Volunteer teaching at the nearby Bindyabasini School took it, and another is that it was handed over to the government. Recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US State Department documents from the time say that the US Embassy in Kathmandu tracked down the object two years later and had it shipped back to the US. A telegram from the Department of State and Department of Defense tagged as ‘MOON DUST / Space Fragments’ dated 1 March 1972 stated: ‘1. Restored space fragment will be on board Embassy support flight 115 arriving Kathmandu on or about March 10. Fragment is packed in shipping crate (cargo no. 72-33365) marked in care of DAO.&nbsp; 2. State and Defense representatives examined fragments prior to shipment finding restoration acceptable.’  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241207071212_929d903ee06d41baa4f6040e981cd7c7d7bd75cc9c37c9b617d307fc8538d2df.png" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="20241207071212_929d903ee06d41baa4f6040e981cd7c7d7bd75cc9c37c9b617d307fc8538d2df" data-rendition-name="original" width="856" height="568" loading="lazy" alt="UFO over Pokhara"> <figcaption>Declassified CIA documents about the investigation into the object sighted in Pokhara. </figcaption> </figure>  The documents show that the US government, military and intelligence agencies investigated this incident thoroughly when it occurred, and have continued to revisit it ever since, as recently as five years ago. What is even more intriguing is that the object that fell in Pokhara was not the only unidentified space object that fell to earth that year. There were similar sightings of objects falling from the sky in Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan between 19 February and 25 March 1968.&nbsp; These mysteries were the subject of a CIA investigation in 1968 titled ‘<a href="https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81R00560R000100070007-8.pdf">Sighting of Unidentified Flying Objects in Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan</a>’, and the report is part of the recent online declassification of 800,000 top-secret documents from the period.&nbsp; &nbsp;Although unidentified flying objects (UFOs) have a connotation now of being alien craft, it could be pieces of satellite, missile, rocket or even aircraft. The CIA report documents six sightings in 1968 and quotes local sources as describing all of them having similar characteristics: bright blue or red streaks in the sky accompanied by loud sounds like lightning and thunder and objects falling to the ground. Aside from the metallic object that was found in Batlechaur, there were other items also found nearby in Tallakot, Tureypasal, Armalakot and Maidan. Whatever the object was, it seems to have disintegrated even before it hit the ground.&nbsp; The CIA report records the first sighting on 19 February 1968 in various parts of Sikkim and Olangchung Gola and Ghunsa in eastern Nepal. The light was said to be ‘long and thin’ and giving out ‘green and red light’. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241207071212_c3c825027d966a2aedc846970390eebe063957503c7eacc8e01e0517843f9bbb.png" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="20241207071212_c3c825027d966a2aedc846970390eebe063957503c7eacc8e01e0517843f9bbb" data-rendition-name="original" width="892" height="596" loading="lazy" alt="UFO over Pokhara "> </figure>  Two days later on 21 February, a soundless blue object was seen traveling fast across the sky above Thimphu in Bhutan. Then on 4 March there were multiple daytime sightings or white streaks in the sky at Chang La Pass, Fukche and Koyul in Ladakh. There were more sightings in Ladakh on the very day fragments fell near Pokhara on 25 March 1968.&nbsp; After the sightings in Pokhara, rumours started flying in Kathmandu that these were aliens trying to land on Earth, it could be Russian or Chinese spy planes or satellites, and some even say it as a sign from heaven that the end of the world was near. This was at the height of the Cold War. The Russians and Americans were testing their thermonuclear devices as well as intercontinental ballistic missile delivery systems. The Washington-Beijing rapprochement had not yet happened, and China was making quick progress testing atomic bombs. Within two years after its first atomic test, in 1966 China exploded its first hydrogen bomb at the Lop Nur site in Xinjiang, 3,000km to the north from Nepal. After neary six decades, what is still intriguing is that all the sightings within a few months of each other in 1968 were along the Himalayan arc bordering Tibet: from Bhutan, Sikkim Nepal, to Ladakh. The US military intelligence seems to have concluded that this was not a coincidence and there were frequent research trips to the site in Pokhara by American officials in the months after the incident. With the help of the Royal Nepal Army, the region north of Pokhara was thoroughly searched.&nbsp; A confidential memo dated 25 June 1968 by Jerry C Trippy to a ‘Mr Farley’ mentions that the US Air Force’s Foreign Technology Division had decided that the debris could be important because it may be related to a Chinese missile test or a Soviet ‘Vehicle Venik’ rocket.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241207071216_feb5425692dc36b20187de4e4fcc2ce9fd12b6d9e1b8724398e50bcdbf9032fe.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="20241207071216_feb5425692dc36b20187de4e4fcc2ce9fd12b6d9e1b8724398e50bcdbf9032fe" data-rendition-name="original" width="1500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="UFO over Pokhara"> </figure>  On 28 August 1968 the US Embassy in Kathmandu sent a letter to Washington DC saying that the object could be of Soviet origin, possibly from when the rocket carrying the ‘Kosmos 208’ satellite re-entered the atmosphere. But why were the fragments falling to earth several weeks apart, and in the same region? No one knows where the metal sheet that Kul Timilsina recovered is now. It was definitely packed in a crate and taken to the US, and although it is rumoured that it was returned that is not very likely. Archivist Sunil Ulak heard from the Timilsina family that CIA officials had returned to the site five years ago. &nbsp; Interest in UFOs peaked in the US in the 1950s, with the Cold War space race and tests of atomic weapons and delivery rockets. CIA and scientists were being sent to investigate sightings, both publicly and privately. Could the Pokhara fragments as well as the sightings in Ladakh and Bhutan actually be alien craft falling to earth? The renewal in interest in space travel in large part due to Elon Musk’s SpaceX, UFOs and sightings are again subjects of public interest.&nbsp; Even 57 years later, even if there was definitive proof about whether the Batlechaur fragment was from a Chinese missile or a soviet rocket, it has not been made public in documents declassified so far. We may never know.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241207071216_b6938795f40731e7657fd6dcbb3cf460a326186a15eb11d4f832f602201ff598.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20241207071216_b6938795f40731e7657fd6dcbb3cf460a326186a15eb11d4f832f602201ff598" data-rendition-name="original" width="642" height="320" loading="lazy" alt="UFO over Pokhara"> </figure>  Sunil Ulak speculates if the debris actually came from an American aircraft, perhaps on an intel mission upon China. “Which could explain why they were so thorough in collecting the fragments in Pokhara,” he says. But that still does not explain the multiple sightings weeks apart in 1968.&nbsp; Indeed, US military aircraft were at that time flying frequent night-time missions from air force bases in India to supply weapons to Khampa guerrilla camps in Nepal located north of Pokhara in Mustang. It could very well be that the Chinese shot down one such aircraft. The other sightings could have been contrails of US spy planes, or Chinese anti-aircraft missiles.&nbsp; There were quite a few developments regarding UFOs in 2024. In a US congressional hearing in July, former intelligence officer David Grusch claimed that the government had long been involved in a program to investigate and retrieve non-human craft crashes, and then try to reverse engineer them. However Grusch did not show any evidence.&nbsp; The UAP Disclosure Act of 2024 was signed into law by Joe Biden in December 2023. It plans to oversee the public disclosure of UFO information. However, there is a clause in it that prevents disclosure if it would cause threats to military defense, intelligence operations or foreign relations.&nbsp; It is unlikely that the declassified documents about sightings in the Himalayan will cause any real surprise about definite evidence of alien life even if it was found. It seems humanity will continue, at least for now, to wonder about curious lights in the sky and whether there is anybody out there.&nbsp;

UFO over Pokhara

When Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) president Rabi Lamichhane was arrested in October on charges of defrauding depositors of cooperatives, the party’s vice president Swarnim Wagle gifted him Fareed Zakaria’s book, Age of Revolutions.
Since then, Lamichhane has been shunted around from Kathmandu to Pokhara to Chitwan and back to Pokhara to attend police investigations and court proceedings. He was being flown to Birganj via Kathmandu on Buddha Air on Monday. There is another pending case in Janakpur.
Human rights groups and civil society have criticised the government for hounding Lamichhane with inhumane treatment that borders on physical torture. The two parties in the coalition, Nepali Congress (NC) and the UML, see Lamichhane’s RSP as a potentially formidable challenge to their power.
Even if the fraud charges against Lamichhane are true, the Nepali public is increasingly looking at the government’s actions through the police and courts as political vendetta.
Despite all the travelling, sometimes by plane and often by road at night, Lamichhane appears to be in high spirits, waving to supporters who often gather if they know he is going to be driven around. A social media video shows him giving high fives to fellow passengers on a recent flight to Pokhara.&nbsp;
In the past weeks, streets in Pokhara have erupted with parallel protests by Lamichhane’s supporters as well as depositors of cooperatives who lost their savings to the scam.&nbsp;
Although family visits are allowed, prison officials in Pokhara told Nepali Times that not many people visit Lamichhane these days. He added, “When he does get visitors, he asks them to bring him books.”
Lamichhane is currently Nepal’s most high-profile public figure in custody, and highlights the stark difference between how influential prisoners are treated compared to ordinary inmates.
There are six prison cells at Kaski District Police Office’s two-story detention centre, three on each floor. And while authorities pack prisoners into already overcrowded cells, Lamichhane has an entire room on the second floor to himself.&nbsp;
He has also been allowed to call his family every few days. Other prisoners are not permitted phone calls except for emergencies.
Meanwhile, Lamichhane’s former business partner Chhabilal Joshi, an ex-Deputy Inspector General of Police with whom he established his Gorkha Media Network, is in custody under the same charges in the prison cell next to him.
Lamichhane is accused of siphoning off depositors' money to the tv network in which he was part-owner and anchor. &nbsp;
Both Lamichhane and Joshi are able to buy food from the police canteen instead of being served the regular meal like other prisoners. Joshi has also given his statement to authorities in Rupandehi and Kathmandu for his alleged role in the scam. Lamichhane is yet to be presented in Kathmandu for questioning.
While he was in custody at the Kathmandu District Police Complex, Joshi expressed his desire to sleep in a police officer’s office, reportedly assuring authorities that he would not run away and he was entitled to certain facilities as a former officer of the law.
“He seemed to be under the impression that he is still a police officer,” says a source at the Kathmandu District Police. “We made it clear to him that as someone accused of a crime, he was not entitled to special treatment.”
Former ministers Balkrishna Khand and Top Bahadur Rayamajhi, and ex-home secretary Tek Narayan Pandey, who were arrested in connection with the fake refugee scam last year, were similarly housed in the offices of law enforcement officials instead of prison cells. Khand has since been released after six months in jail.
While there is no legal provision to keep high-ranking officials in separate detention centres when they are arrested, authorities granting them special facilities is not uncommon. Law enforcement officials say VIP detainees expect preferential treatment while in police custody.
Among those is former Kosi Province minister Lila Ballav Adhikari, who was arrested from Biratnagar on 10 November over his alleged involvement in human trafficking and brought to Kathmandu. Adhikari had flown to Japan without government approval with three individuals on 29 October to attend a cultural conference, but had been sent back to Nepal from Narita.&nbsp;
His three companions were arrested at Kathmandu airport upon their arrival, but Adhikari was able to exit unscathed from the VIP lounge. Adhikari had resigned as the Kosi Province Minister for Internal Affairs and Law when it became public that his companions had been taken into custody, and was himself arrested shortly after. He has since been cleared by the courts.
Throughout his detention, Adhikari was kept separately from other inmates. Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Basant Rajouri, head of the Bhadrakali complex, says that while there is no separate detention area for VIPs, some detainees are kept separately depending on the nature of their crime.
However, sources say that arrangements were made for retired judges and others to visit Adhikari frequently worked at the office of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) during his time in custody.&nbsp;
“He used to constantly pester the authorities to let him sit outside in the sun, and to be able to use the police officer’s shower area,” added an officer.
Adhikari was released on 25 November after the government prosecutor’s office decided not to charge him in a move that was seen to expose the government’s double standards.
Over at Kathmandu’s Dilli Bazar Prison, former Kist Bank CEO Kamal Gyawali emerges from his prison cell into the courtyard of the prison’s ‘Ka (क)’ block every morning with a thick book in his hands, ready to give his daily sermon.
With his long beard, Gyawali, who is serving a prison sentence for banking fraud, looks the part of a religious guru as he implores his rapt listeners to “walk the right path, abandon bad thoughts and turn to scripture and spirituality”.&nbsp;
Afterward, the attendees gather to discuss politics and current affairs. Inmates at his daily sermons at the prison include other high-profile detainees, including former MP Ichchha Raj Tamang, who is in jail for money laundering and cooperatives fraud, former joint secretary Chudamani Sharma, who was convicted of corruption, as well as NC leader Chandra Bahadur Lama and Krishna Bahadur Upreti of the UML both of whom are on trial for embezzling billions of rupees.
Victims of the cooperatives scam that former lawmaker Tamang was involved in have made trips to the prison and requested visits, but he has refused to meet with any of them.
“Tamang often complains that the state has prevented him from returning the money to the victims by locking him up,” says a police officer at the Dili Bazar jail.
“All you hear every day from the VIP prisoners is that they have been framed,” adds the officer. “No one admits that they were involved in misdeeds.”
But while most high-profile prisoners complain about prison conditions, one exception is former provincial lawmaker Deepak Manange, who is serving a sentence at Dilli Bazar Jail for attempted murder.
“He is the happiest prisoner here,” says a warden. “Unlike the others, he doesn’t claim to have been framed, in fact he doesn’t seem to care that he is in prison.”
Manange is detained in the ‘Kha (ख)’ block of the prison complex, which he renovated at his own expense. The block previously housed female prisoners, but Manange used his influence to transfer them elsewhere. He faces no shortage of visitors, who range from political leaders to people from the underworld.
Along with Manange, other well-known prisoners in this block include Nepal Telecom Managing Director Sunil Poudel, and former executive director of the Surakshan Printing Centre Bikal Poudel, who are serving time for corruption.
Former prisoners at Dilli Bazar prison include ex-ministers Khum Bahadur Khadka and Shyam Sundar Gupta, NC leader Ganesh Lama, Maoist MP Balkrishna Dhungel, Nagarik Unmukti Party leader Resham Chaudhary, as well as former IGs Ramesh Chand Thakuri, Om Bikram Rana, and Hem Bahadur Gurung.
Section 54 of Nepal’s Prison Act assigns each prison’s internal administration the
responsibility of governing its prisoners, which means the more favourable the jail management is, the more comfortable it is for prisoners.
Dilli Bazar prison has been the prison of choice for many high-ranking prisoners, especially those convicted of white collar crimes, due to its more accommodating administrators. The prison, which has the capacity to house 700 inmates, is also less crowded than other jails.
Anuj Bhattarai, spokesperson of the Department of Prison Management, says that there is no legal classification in Nepal for felons to be assigned prisons based on the nature of their crimes.
“That Dilli Bazar Jail has a higher number of prisoners convicted of crimes like corruption is most likely a coincidence,” says Bhattarai. “There is no provision for influential people to be able to choose where they will be incarcerated.”&nbsp;
Translated by Shristi Karki from the Nepali original published in himalkhabar.com

What Nepal’s VIP prisoners do in jail

If you were raised in Nepal, you must have picked up its unique set of vocabulary: आन्दोलन, चक्का जाम, बन्द, राँके जुलुस, आफ्नो मान्छे, हाम्रो दल, कर्फु and many more words connoting political protest.
We became familiar with the acrid smell of burning tyres, and eyes smarting from tear gas. And yet, everyone speaks of another revolution in the making. Not by desire, but by suffocation.
We heard speeches about नयाँ नेपाल, but the New Nepal never arrived. The governance system changed, but it did not reflect on people’s lives — except for those close to centres of power. The state is still unreachable and is not bothered about <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/matter-of-life-and-debt">victims of loan sharks</a>, cooperative scams and other injustices.
Politicians continue to speak in sound bites, but fail to deliver. They have mastered the game of pointing fingers towards an external enemy and convincing people that they are never at fault. The political narrative is so disconnected from the actual analysis of the problem that suffocation doesn’t go away after every revolution.
No genuine effort has been made to deliver at all, which is why there is a palpable sense of disillusionment in the air forcing us to seek another revolution, even if Nepal may not be able to afford it.
How has the current system successfully held power, even if the public is deeply frustrated? How is it that for three decades we continue to be led by the same faces, who have time and again, proved to us that they may be great politicians but not national leaders?
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/improving-internet-governance-in-nepal">My experience at the epicentre of politics</a> has led me to identify three cultures that have enabled political parties to keep a tight hold on power: acceptance, silence and dependency.
We accept things the way they are. We use fatalistic phrases like “नेपालमा यस्तै हो” or “नेपालको कानुन दैब जानुन”. While this resilience enables us to rise back up from devastating calamities, it is also a reason for our compliance with the status quo.
Despite so many ‘revolutions’ that have led to significant reforms, these phrases keep getting reinforced, to the point that the upcoming generations have made it their lingo.&nbsp;
This acceptance is not a symbol of law-abiding citizens, but citizens living in fear of those in power, unable to ask the whys and why-nots.
Innovation suffocates in this culture of acceptance of the status quo. This is manifested in remarks like “but we don’t have any laws for this,” or “we don’t have the capacity to implement this”. An innovator or entrepreneur therefore has to spend that energy to become a political lobbyist, often educating and convincing the bureaucracy.&nbsp;
Remember when locally assembled <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/designed-and-made-in-nepal">Yatri motorbikes</a>, despite having willing customers, had to suffer to secure license numbers because of a lack of regulations? Instead of creating new laws, the government kept chanting the “We will promote Nepal-made goods” mantra, leaving entrepreneurs in a labyrinth of bureaucracy. The weight of acceptance of the law lies heavily on innovators. Fatalism is a tactic used by those in power to generate mass fear in society.
When we accept, we become silent. This is a pervasive phenomenon. We are trained to keep quiet, lest we ruffle feathers, burn bridges, or not get the help we need in future. We know, yet we don’t speak.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/bureaucratic-hurdles-in-researching-nepals-bureaucracy">Bureaucratic hurdles in researching Nepal's bureaucracy</a>, Daniel W Edwards
Here is one example: the 2021 census shows that the number of baby boys born for every 100 baby girls is 112. This is a clear indication of female foeticide because of boy preference in society.
Despite such horrifying realities, there is finger-pointing within the government between the Ministry of Health and Population with the Ministry of Home Affairs. At the citizen level, we know those who are involved in killing girls. Yet, we don’t speak up. The Nepal Medical Council reports state that despite this gender imbalance at birth, there is no indication of any action.
But why would anyone speak against one's own fraternity, no matter how vile the act is?
When we accept and keep quiet, we become dependent on those who yield power. From getting our government procedure completed on time to getting transfers, to accessing any of our legally protected rights as well, we are forced to depend on our networks of चिनेको मान्छे people we know by blood, village, relations, political affiliation.
The culture of dependency has been the established way in Nepal. If you drive a two-wheeler or four-wheeler, and you get into a small accident, you will be asked to sort it yourself, dialing up the most powerful person you know. It becomes a competition of who knows who.
Recently I was told that there were calls from the Ministry of Health and Population and another from the Prime Minister's Office for just one medical position in a private hospital. Each was pushing its own candidate. Guess which candidate got the position.&nbsp;
The dependency of people is not on the laws or the state, it is with people in power, a reliance on the network of somebody who knows somebody, including those not officially in power.
These cultures are deeply ingrained in our heads, and in society. Collectively they form a vicious circle that helps those in power to retain power. This is not the society we want to live in.
Then, what do we do as a collective to break away from this? How do we break away from the cultures of acceptance and silence that have created this dependency? What can we do to ensure that our children do not have to learn the jargon of आन्दोलन before they learn about the state?
These are the cultures political parties need to shed rather than use them to perpetuate their power. This is what <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/an-alternative-to-alternative-politics-in-nepal">alternative politics</a> needs to be about.
Sumana Shrestha is a member of Parliament’s Education, Health and Information Technology parliamentary committee and represents the Rastriya Swatantara Party.

geopolitics