Described by its founding king 260 years ago as a “yam between two boulders” pressed on both sides by the Chinese Empire and British India, the metaphor has metamorphosed in the new geopolitical reality that Nepal faces. The gradual withdrawal of a distracted West, the rise of India and China, and emerging power of the Gulf states is also changing Nepal’s foreign policy outlook, and forcing it to reimagine its place in a multilateral world. After Donald Trump became president for the second time this year, geopolitics is going through a tectonic shift. Washington’s relations with New Delhi have recently become strained after Trump took credit for the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May, and Trump dining with Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir at the White House. Then, Trump threatened to impose an extra tariff on 10 members of the BRICS bloc, which includes India. “Recent developments between India and the US are a result of President Trump’s reactive approach that did not meet Indian prime minister Modi’s expectations,” explains international relations expert Prakash Bhandari. If this pushes India closer to China, it may tip Kathmandu’s precarious balancing act between Beijing and New Delhi. Although Nepal has not suffered punitive US trade tariffs like other Asian countries, the closure of USAID projects and imminent mass deportation of Nepali TPS migrants will have far-reaching consequences. “There are multiple global crises happening at the same time. Any attempt to change Nepal’s non-aligned principle during this complicated phase of world politics will push us into a deep quagmire,” warns foreign policy expert Nishchal Nath Pandey. Shifting geopolitics could force Nepal to review its policy of neutrality and equidistance between its two giant neighbours to pursue a more pragmatic economic diplomacy that focuses on foreign investment, trade, tourism, and labour export. Experts have often joked that Nepal is not “landlocked but India-locked” since trans-Himalayan connectivity is much more difficult than the open border to the south. This has historically made Nepal more economically and politically dependent on India. “Whether like it or not, we are likely to lean more towards India,” says Santosh Sharma Poudel from Nepal Institute for Policy Research. “Even Chinese leaders have told Nepal’s rulers to maintain friendly relations with India.” This may therefore be the time for Nepal to look beyond the ‘two boulders’ to promote foreign direct investment from countries like Japan, Korea, the Gulf states and Europe. Besides serving as a destination for Nepali migrants, countries like Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman have untapped investment and tourism opportunities. “Sectors such as hydropower and trade have immense investment potential from countries beyond our neighbours,” says Poudel. Even so, the geopolitical reality is that India and China will always loom large. India has barely tolerated increased Chinese presence in Nepal’s hydropower and infrastructure, refusing to buy electricity and allow flights from projects with Chinese involvement. Nepal has felt squeezed by the two neighbours both when their relations are strained after border skirmishes, or when their relations are good.  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025072809074_febdc8038cb5d4bca3d6fe5abafd2d0aa79ab6b9cafec54b8b58037514908220.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2025072809074_febdc8038cb5d4bca3d6fe5abafd2d0aa79ab6b9cafec54b8b58037514908220" data-rendition-name="original" width="2048" height="1365" loading="lazy" alt="Looking beyond two boulders"><figcaption>Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal, the first by a Chinese head of state in 23 years. Photo: NEPALI TIMES ARCHIVE</figcaption></figure>  India’s post-earthquake blockade in 2015 still rankles. Nepalis remember that China did not support their claim to the Limpiyadhura region, and that Beijing retroactively announced that Pokhara airport was under its Belt Road Initiative (BRI) even though Nepal took a hefty loan for it. The Sino-US Cold War has also affected Nepal with the orchestrated opposition in 2021 to the $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) project to upgrade transmission lines and highways. After Trump, the MCC faced uncertainty but it has been continued possibly because it is seen in Washington as a counter to China’s BRI in Nepal. The lesson is that Nepal cannot expect magnanimity or charity from its big neighbours, or the United States. Every country is looking out for its own national interest, and so should Nepal by asserting its independence and improving its governance to develop the economy. “India has its own place and China has its own place in terms of their relations with Nepal,” says Indra Adhikari from Policy Research Institute. “But it is true that Nepal has not been able to leverage its relations with both neighbours.” This does not mean playing New Delhi off against Beijing, but to get both powers to be twin locomotives pulling Nepal’s economy in the same direction. What Nepal definitely cannot afford is to have the two engines tugging the country in opposite directions. Adhikari adds, “It is natural that each country sees its own interest while investing in Nepal. We should be able to establish an environment of trust for countries which want to invest.” With Nepal on the pathway to transitioning from a Least Developed Country to a developing country by November 2026, it will have to plan for loss of foreign aid and higher interest rates on loans from international agencies. This means greater emphasis on improving the foreign investment climate to create domestic jobs and boost the economy. This requires a change in the mindset of Nepal’s politicians to understand the transformed geopolitical reality, and strategise accordingly. But, says Nischal Nath Pandey: “We have changed our political system often, but our geography has not changed.”

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Looking beyond two boulders

They say you can choose your enemies, but not your neighbours. This rings true especially for small nation states bordering much larger ones.
And that is also what Mao Zedong told King Mahendra in Beijing in 1967, and it is the message successive Chinese leaders have given to Nepal’s rulers ever since: be clever, don’t rock the boat, learn to live with India.&nbsp;
In Beijing in 1988, Deng Xiaoping and Rajiv Gandhi demarcated each other's &nbsp;spheres of influence: south of the Himalaya India calls the shots, and north of it (including Tibet) China does.&nbsp;
Lila Nyaichyai, who did her PhD on Chinese Public Diplomacy in Nepal from Yunnan University, says China’s main concern in Nepal is stability.
“As a country grows to become a global power, its aspirations do too,” she says. “But China hasn’t cared much about whether Nepal is a monarchy, a democracy, or a federal republic as long as it is politically stable for development.”
Nepal’s royal rulers navigated the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States successfully, getting both to contribute to the country’s development. But the dramatic rise of India and China as global powers, and the fact that they are rivals in Nepal’s immediate neighbourhood has made the need for balance much more critical now.&nbsp;
A template could be the way Finland survived the Cold War between next door Soviet Union and the West. It did not join the Warsaw Pact, but its reference group was the other Nordics. The country decided to keep Moscow at arms length by appeasing it — a strategy that came to be called ‘Finlandisation’.
“Finlandisation was this attitude of yielding to pressure from a big brother,” Finnish journalist and author Katri Merikallio explained to me during a recent visit to Helsinki. “Finland remained independent, but its sovereignty was narrowed. There was a price to pay. We must acknowledge the risks that such a balancing involves, both for the sovereignty of a nation but also for internal politics.”
It was a survival tactic that saved Finland from being arm-twisted by the Soviet Union, like Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But today with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, ‘Finlandisation’ is not in vogue anymore and Finland has joined NATO.
Nepal’s strategy of ‘equidistance’ between New Delhi and Beijing is somewhat similar to how Finland survived the Cold War. But it is a little more complicated than that. Indian strategists do not like the term ‘neutrality’ to characterise Nepal’s dealings with its regional rivals China and Pakistan.&nbsp;
South Asia is now in America’s blindspot with Trump’s turbulent second term, and without Washington’s countervailing presence geopolitics has become much more slippery than Prithvi Narayan Shah’s yam analogy.&nbsp;
Back in Kathmandu, former Foreign Minister Bimala Rai Paudyal of the UML contends that despite their differences, bigger countries do come to an understanding, often at the expense of smaller neighbours. An example of this is China’s refusal to get involved in Nepal's Limiyadhura dispute with India.
“It will not be easy, but we must maintain our policy of equidistance in dealing with India and China,” Rai Paudyal told us. “We must assure both that we are not a security threat, and that Nepal’s prosperity and stability is in their national interest as well.”
Nepal is the oldest nation state in South Asia, and has survived invasions, expansionist empires, and neighbours who do not see eye to eye with each other thanks to master strategists like Jang Bahadur Rana, Chandra Shumsher and King Mahendra.
Today, Nepal is one of the few remaining open societies in Asia with a free press, and a fragile yet rambunctious democracy. Yet feckless governments with leaders unskilled to steer a safe course in a volatile region means Nepal has never been as vulnerable to outside interference as it is today (page 1).
Here in Helsinki, NATO membership has finally finished off Finlandisation. It is a lesson for Nepal about how quickly the geopolitical terrain can shift and upend a nation’s established foreign policy doctrine. &nbsp;
Nepal needs to be supple and agile, pragmatic and self-confident. This will require monumental political reform marked by greater accountability, transparency, and good governance at home.&nbsp;
In other words, secure relations with our two giant neighbours needs sturdier domestic politics.
Sonia Awale in Helsinki

Love thy neighbours

Throughout its 260-year history, Nepal has tried to keep an equilibrium between its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/latest/political-geography-of-india-nepal-china-ties">two giant neighbours</a>. Past rulers have tried to ensure friendly relations with India and China even if the two are not exactly friendly <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/chindia?%2F">with each other</a>.&nbsp;
But just how delicate this balancing act can be was thrown into sharp relief last week in two events.&nbsp;
A Nepali was among 25 killed in an attack in Kashmir <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/nukes-in-the-neighbourhood">last month</a>, and at a seminar on regional terrorism this week in Kathmandu foreign policy wonks felt Nepal needlessly irritated India by not being more forthcoming in its condemnation of Pakistan.
Then, at the annual Kathmandu International Mountain Film Festival (<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/festival-of-mountain-films">Kimff</a>) Chinese documentaries on Tibet were screened under a China-funded ‘Xizang Panorama’ showcase.
There was an immediate backlash against Kimff for accepting Chinese sponsorship and the use of ‘Xizang’, the Chinese name for Tibet. The films were said to be 'colonial propaganda', and Beijing’s attempt to erase Tibetan identity, independence, and self-determination.&nbsp;
'The term "Xizang" is not merely a geographic designation—it represents China's calculated campaign to replace "Tibet" in international discourse, seeking to erase a distinct and vibrant artistic, literary and spiritual identity,' a collective &nbsp;of Tibetan filmmakers and writers wrote to Nepali Times last week as Kimff was ongoing.&nbsp;
The Nepal government in its diplomatic language has started using ‘Xizang’ to refer to Tibet, and there was speculation that the Chinese lobbied with the government to pressure Kimff to show the films on Tibet. Kimff did not respond to our request for comment.&nbsp;
“While we can advocate for the rights and identity of the Tibetan community in activism and media, the reference to Tibet in our diplomacy will remain in line with our foreign policy with regards to China,” says international relations specialist Indra Adhikari.
The terrorism seminar and the film festival controversy were just the latest examples of how Nepal’s government and civil society are being increasingly squeezed by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/no-man-s-land">rival neighbours</a>.&nbsp;
The rollback of Pax Americana <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">under Trump </a>means that emerging powers China and India are filling the gap. The result: a politically-weakened Nepali state is now more subservient than ever before.&nbsp;
Nepal’s strategy of equidistance is fraying at the edges as Kathmandu is buffeted by countervailing pressure from north and south.
“<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">Nepal’s political leadership</a> in recent times has changed the definition of ‘national interest’ to suit its own circumstance,” explains former SAARC General-Secretary Arjun Bahadur Thapa. “This means our <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/at-home-and-abroad">foreign policy</a> tilts towards one neighbour or the other depending on which party is in power.”&nbsp;
To be sure, Nepal has asserted itself from time to time, eliciting Indian ire over the Limpiyadhura dispute, and Kathmandu’s refusal to directly condemn Pakistan on the Pahalgam attack even when one of its nationals was killed.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/balochistan-to-kashmir">Balochistan to Kashmir</a>, Shyam Tekwani
New Delhi has never liked the term ‘equidistance’, and there are also some in Nepal who want it redefined, taking into account proximity, &nbsp;cultural affinity, trade and economic <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/how-to-reboot-nepal-india-relations">relations with India</a>.&nbsp;
“Perhaps it is time that we move beyond equidistance to a more pragmatic approach,” says Adhikari. “<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-s-love-triangle-with-china-and-india-impacts-investment">Nepal’s relations with India and China</a> are different in nature, and our policy could reflect that difference.”
Meanwhile, Thapa is not so sure that growing American and Western disinterest in the region is making India and China more assertive towards smaller nations. &nbsp;
He says: “It is true there is declining Western interest in this region, but the US and Europe never really had more influence in Nepal than India and China.”
Speculation is also rife about how Nepal’s two neighbours regard the clamour on the streets and cyberspace for a restoration of a Hindu monarchy. The pro-monarchy RPP and RPP-N joined forces, but amidst shrinking turnout at their rallies decided to ‘decentralise’ protests to other parts of the country.
The Indian media has given wall-to-wall coverage to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/republicans-and-royalists-on-nepal-s-streets">the royal rallies in Kathmandu</a>, almost at the level of its reporting on the cricket IPL. China has not said much, and seems more interested in trying to unite Nepal’s disparate Communist parties.
India’s ruling BJP and China’s CCP have their preferences for how and who governs Nepal, but that may not mean they are working at cross purposes. Both New Delhi and Beijing would prefer the buffer state between them to be politically stable.
Indra Adhikari says that sections of the BJP could want Nepal to become a Hindu state.&nbsp;
She adds: “Some in the BJP even want the reestablishment of a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/nepal-party-reincarnating-hindu-monarchy">Hindu monarchy</a>. But China wants a stable and amenable government, preferably led by a leftist alliance.”

Shristi Karki

National insecurity

India and Pakistan are twins separated at birth. Tensions between them have been at a hair trigger ever since independence and has erupted into full scale conflict at least four times in the past 80 years.
The 22 April terrorist attack in Kashmir that killed 25 Indian tourists and a Nepali citizen, threatens to escalate tension between the two nuclear-armed nations. India has squarely blamed Pakistan for the attacks, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given his military “operational freedom” to respond. Pakistan has said it has credible intelligence of an Indian military strike and its officials have promised a “full spectrum” response — a code for a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/thinking-the-thinkable">nuclear retaliation</a>.
For Nepal, the killing of its national in the Pahalgam attack comes as another stark reminder that in conflicts from Afghanistan to Iraq, from <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine">Ukraine</a> to Israel, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/10-nepalis-from-one-town-fighting-in-ukraine">Nepalis are getting caught in the crossfire</a>. The last time full-scale fighting broke out between <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/peacemongers-at-india-pakistan-border">India and Pakistan</a> on Kargil in 1999, at least 22<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-trial-by-fire-for-soldiers-from-nepal?%27%5C%22="> Nepalis fighting for the Indian Army</a> were killed in action.
Three of Nepal’s immediate neighbours (China, India, Pakistan) have nuclear weapons, and they do not have good relations. With China supplying weapons, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/war-and-warming">missile technology</a> and other support to Pakistan, this triangular friction could set off a regional conflagration.&nbsp;
<a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0" target="_blank">Research at Rutgers University</a> has calculated that even a week-long tactical nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would throw up so much smoke and debris into the atmosphere that it would block out the sun for years, and lead to a collapse of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/grow-nourish-sustain-together-world-food-day">global food system</a>. This does not take into account the radioactive fallout that prevailing winds would blow up to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lives-on-the-line-in-the-himalaya">the Himalaya</a>, contaminating glaciers that are the sources of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/saving-what-is-left-of-himalayan-rivers">Asia’s main rivers</a>.
The impact of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/climate-breakdown-linked-to-thame-flood">climate breakdown </a>on High Asia was already ringing alarm bells about its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/himalayan-icecap-melting-faster-than-thought">shrinking ice cap</a> reducing the dry season flow of water downstream. Water was going to be the next strategic commodity, geopolitical experts warned, and the next wars in Asia would be over water.
That water war is already happening. India retaliated to the Kashmir attack by suspending the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/24/world/asia/india-pakistan-indus-waters-treaty.html" target="_blank">Indus Waters Treaty</a> of 1960 mediated by the World Bank that has withstood at least three wars between India and Pakistan. The treaty gives India control over the three eastern tributaries of the Indus (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beas_River" target="_blank">Beas</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ravi_River" target="_blank">Ravi</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sutlej" target="_blank">Sutlej</a>), while Pakistan got water from the Indus and two of its western tributaries (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indus_River" target="_blank">Indus</a>, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chenab_River" target="_blank">Chenab</a> and <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jhelum_River" target="_blank">Jhelum</a>.
Pakistan was assured of 70% of the annual flow, and India could use a reasonable amount of water for<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15231"> irrigation and hydropower</a>. &nbsp;Within days of its threat, India stopped water flowing down to Pakistan from the Chenab river and is reportedly preparing to do the same on the Jhelum.
The sabre-rattling has reached a crescendo. Besides threats and counter-threats there are also symbolic drills, with the Indian Air Force practicing landing on an expressway in Uttar Pradesh by its Rafale, Su-30 and Jaguar fighter jets to demonstrate ‘operational readiness’. In response Pakistan test-fired its Abdali ballistic missile that can carry a nuclear warhead and has a range of 450km.&nbsp;
The danger is that with ultra-nationalist rhetoric and the beating the war drums by both sides, India’s government and Pakistan’s military may have to ‘do something’ to appease domestic public opinion. But any tactical strike, an artillery exchange, or territorial incursion could quickly escalate out of control.
Expecting an Indian retaliation for the Pahalgam killings, Pakistan is using<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/interfaith-collaboration-for-nuclear-disarmament"> nuclear deterrence </a>and warning of “catastrophic consequences”. The two neighbours came close to a nuclear exchange in 2019 after an attack on the Indian military in Kashmir, and prompt international intervention led by the United States cooled tensions.&nbsp;
This time, the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">Trump administration</a> is too distracted and not as engaged. Pakistan has denied it was responsible for the terrorist attack and called on Washington to stop a possible Indian retaliation. India and Pakistan have stopped overflights by each other’s airlines, and some international carriers have even stopped flying over Pakistan fearing an air war.
Washington, Beijing, the UN and the EU have all urged restraint. Iran, which has good relations with both India and Pakistan has sent its foreign minister to urge both countries not to go into a tit-for-tat war. Iran has its own nuclear flashpoint to worry about with tensions in Israel, &nbsp;Yemen and Syria.
India and Pakistan both share similar problems of joblessness, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/why-nepal-s-poverty-rate-is-stuck">poverty </a>and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/climate-change-new-threat-to-nepal-s-rhinos">environmental threats</a>. Neither side needs the threat of a senseless war, and we in the neighbourhood do not need it either.&nbsp;
Kunda Dixit
This Editorial is brought to you by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/" target="_blank">Nepali Times</a>, in collaboration with <a href="https://inpsjapan.com/en/" target="_blank">INPS Japan</a> and <a href="https://sgi-peace.org/" target="_blank">Soka Gakkai International</a>, in consultative status with UN ECOSOC.

Nukes in the neighbourhood

The armistice agreement that ended the Korean War in 1953 has been mentioned as a possible model for how to end the fighting in Ukraine. This makes sense. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/trump-s-first-month">Trump administration</a>, however, seems to opt for a quick deal like the 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam or the Minsk agreements of 2014–15, combining “ceasefires in place” with vain prospects of subsequently reaching a genuine <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/restorative-justice-for-peace-building">peace agreement</a>.
One lesson from the negotiations that led to the Korean armistice is that patient diplomacy is needed to end a stalemated war. When talks began in July 1951, the impatient Mao Zedong estimated that two weeks would be enough to conclude. The negotiations instead took two years.
The result was a long text, detailing the exact border line and establish a demilitarised zone across the peninsula under UN supervision. The stated intention was to follow up with a peace agreement. This came to nothing. The conference established for the purpose in Geneva decided instead to reach an agreement on Indochina, dividing Vietnam for the next 21 years and replacing the French with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-world-9-11-made">American military forces</a>.
The biggest difference between the Korea and Ukraine wars is that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/ukraines-lessons-for-sandwiched-nations-like-nepal">Ukrainians are fighting alone</a>, with only external military support, while the Korean War was primarily fought by American and Chinese forces on Korean soil.
Back then, the armistice agreement was concluded by the commanders of the US-dominated UN forces, the Chinese “volunteers”, and the North Korean army, against the wish of Syngman Rhee’s government in Seoul. He wanted to continue the fight for national reunification. Only after being offered a defence pact with the US did he accept the negotiated outcome, yet did not sign the agreement. South Korea has never signed the armistice that has prevented new <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2664">outbreaks of war</a>.
The key similarity between the Korean and Ukrainian wars is the prominent role of the USA as a supporter of the governments in Seoul and Kyiv. In both cases a condition for ensuring that an armistice can hold is that the US take responsibility for any agreement and joins up with others in providing security guarantees.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/is-the-time-ripe-for-an-end-to-the-ukraine-war">Is the time ripe for an end to the Ukraine war?</a> &nbsp;Herbert Wulf
A key reason why war has not resumed in Korea for the last 72 years is the continued US presence in the south. American troops act as a "tripwire," ensuring that any North Korean invasion would lead to a war it would surely lose. For the same reason, the US needs to have boots on the ground in Ukraine.
Another similarity is that any attempt to conclude a genuine peace agreement is futile. A genuine peace in Korea would require that North and South agree either on national reunification or on recognising each other as independent states, just as East and West Germany did in 1973.
A peace agreement was even more unthinkable for Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung in 1953–54 than it is for Seoul and Pyongyang today. It is just as inconceivable that President Vladimir Putin will withdraw voluntarily from Donbas and Krym as it is for President Volodymyr Zelensky to conclude a definitive peace agreement that does not recognise Ukrainian sovereignty to its entire territory.
To maintain the principle of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is also crucial for Europe and the UN that Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty is not internationally recognised. Therefore, just as the two Koreas, Russia and Ukraine must settle for something less than a peace treaty, namely an armistice. This may end the fighting and could save hundreds of thousands of lives but will not establish peace.
An armistice is not a simple ceasefire, where military forces are supposed to remain where they happen to be situated when the agreement is made. For a Ukrainian armistice to be respected, the Russian and Ukrainian forces must withdraw to either side of a clearly delineated demilitarised zone. This is complicated by the fact that the front lines are so long.
The easiest compromise would be for Ukraine to let Russia retain control over Krym, while Russia withdraws from Donbas. Third parties should put pressure on Moscow and Kyiv to accept that neat solution. To soften the pill, Ukraine could guarantee a high degree of local autonomy for Donetsk and Luhansk.
International monitoring with the use of satellite surveillance along the entire border would be needed. If one or both parties were to mobilise combat forces, launch drone attacks, or place rocket launchers on alert, warning signals should be triggered and international security guarantees enforced by robust multi-national forces.
A final similarity between Korea 1953 and Ukraine 2025 armistice is that both sides must abstain from any political interference at the other side of the agreed boundary. Russia and Ukraine must remain fully sovereign and independent states.
Any rapprochement between the two Korean states continues to depend on Seoul’s ability to convince Pyongyang that it does not seek regime change in the north and on the willingness of Kim Jong Un to abstain from provocative <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/thinking-the-thinkable">missile tests</a> and vocal threats.&nbsp;
Putin apparently wants an agreement to include a provision for new elections in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/ukraine-crisis-hits-nepal-economy-hard">Ukraine</a>, so he can interfere in Ukraine’s internal affairs and remove Zelensky from power. This is a destructive demand that should be consistently rejected by any mediating or facilitating party to talks. The Ukrainians must decide for themselves when to lift their state of emergency and hold<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/is-democracy-too-expensive-for-nepal"> democratic elections</a>.
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/trump-shock-wave-hits-nepal">President Trump</a> has put pressure on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire and has conceded on Ukraine’s behalf that it cannot get back all its lost territory or obtain NATO membership. He should now concentrate his efforts on convincing both sides to engage in negotiations for a strongly guaranteed and highly monitored armistice rather than a quick and fragile ceasefire or a dodgy settlement allowing one side to interfere in the other.
Stein Tønnesson is Senior Research Fellow (Peace and Security in Northeast Asia) at the Toda Peace Institute and Research Professor Emeritus, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and is being republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlook/2025/how-to-agree-an-armistice-in-ukraine-lessons-from-korea.html">the original</a> with their permission.

How to agree an armistice in Ukraine

Last month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the first official <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/reaction-to-wang-yi-s-nepal-visit-in-chinese-media">foreign visit </a>of the commission in her second term would be to India. On the same day, Marco Rubio held his first bilateral meeting as US Secretary of State with India’s minister of external affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Washington last month confirmed his country’s rising international profile. The visit ended with the promise of what Modi called a US-India “mega partnership.” He has committed to double trade with the US by 2030, increase <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/half-full/A-carbon-neutral-Nepal-is-possible-clean-Nepal,1064">oil and gas imports</a>, and expand US military sales to India.
India is now the fastest-growing major <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/comment/how-nepal-can-avert-an-economic-crunch">economy</a>, with the IMF forecasting a 6.5% increase in GDP this year. India is expected to overtake Japan and Germany to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2030.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/india-s-election-and-its-economic-future">India’s election and its economic future</a>, Raghuram G Rajan
Despite its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/missing-out-on-nepal-s-tourism-potential">vast potential</a>, India has long been overlooked by the West, both <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/ukraine-crisis-hits-nepal-economy-hard">economically</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitically</a>. But a fundamental global realignment is now underway. America’s ‘unipolar moment’ has given way to an era of great-power competition that, unlike during the Cold War, features demands by emerging and developing economies for a more <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/making-nepal-accessible-to-all">inclusive </a>and representative multilateral system.&nbsp;
In this multipolar age, both the US and Europe see India, a neutral <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/no-binary-foreign-policy?fb_comment_id=3583384368393672_3586424038089705">foreign-policy </a>actor and dynamic<a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=18861"> emerging economy</a>, as vital to the future of their strategic priorities.&nbsp;
A founder of the Non-Aligned Movement, India has plenty of experience navigating precarious moments in <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=4896">world affairs</a>. During the Cold War, it skillfully balanced its policies toward <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/america-nepal-and-the-royal-coup-qedzifz9">the US and the Soviet Union</a>.&nbsp;
When it engaged with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/so-far-so-good/the-vagaries-of-fate">the Soviet Union</a>, from which it received considerable <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/civil-military-synergy-in-disaster-management">military assistance</a>, it calibrated its approach to offset US support of Pakistan, without taking sides in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-rich-get-richer-and-more-powerful">great-power competition</a>.&nbsp;
India has since maintained this pragmatic balancing act, adapting its foreign policy to a shifting geopolitical landscape. Today, that means recognising its potential to shape global affairs, including by playing a leading role in building an efficient, realistic, and inclusive multilateralism.&nbsp;
This is reflected in Modi’s pursuit of a more assertive, internationalist foreign policy. Beyond building new partnerships and strengthening old ones, Modi has sought to increase <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-s-hindutva-politics-influencing-nepal">India’s influence </a>in traditional and emerging multilateral fora. In 2023 alone, India held the presidency of both the G20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (a Chinese creation, comprising nine Middle Eastern and Asian countries).&nbsp;
India plays a leading role in the BRICS, and is characteristically nuanced: whereas Russia and, to a significant extent, China see themselves as disruptors of the existing order, India views itself as a reformer. This enables it to maintain strategic flexibility as it advances its interests.&nbsp;
<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-china-rail-race">India’s relationship with China</a> is complicated by other factors. While the countries work together in some fora, they are also locked in protracted<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-bangladesh-border-talks-have-lessons-for-nepal"> territorial disputes</a> and a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-race-for-shital-nibas">competition for leadership</a> in the so-called Global South.&nbsp;
India’s growing global clout, including its appeal to Western powers, stems in large part from its ability to act as a counterweight to China. It is indispensable to the Quad alliance with Australia, Japan, and the US, a grouping that is officially focused on <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-quad-maritime-security-and-climate-change">maritime security</a> and economic cooperation, though its members clearly seek to provide a buffer against China in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/between-two-oceans">Indo-Pacific region</a>. It is thanks to India that the Quad is not viewed as just another Western vehicle.&nbsp;
Modi has sought to bolster India’s Southern credentials, including by highlighting its status as the “mother of democracy”. By framing <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/is-democracy-too-expensive-for-nepal">democracy</a> as intrinsic to Indian civilisation, rather than a colonial legacy, he aligned India with ‘middle powers’ seeking to redefine global governance on their own terms.&nbsp;
To be sure, Modi has moved India away from the secular and pluralistic values that had flourished after <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-goal-is-empowerment-and-independence-of-women">independence</a>, in favour of assertive <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/unconventional-convention">Hindu nationalism</a>. So many international indices have downgraded India’s democratic status that he is now seeking to create his own.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/borderlines/demodification-of-india">Demodification of India</a>, Chandrakishore&nbsp;
Modi is the second leader of independent India (after Jawaharlal Nehru) to be elected to three consecutive terms, and remains a dominant force in <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/india-s-faith-in-politics">Indian politics</a>.&nbsp;
And at a time of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-water-and-electricity">rapid geopolitical change</a>, he is committed to leveraging his position, and India’s profound strengths, to turn it into a global player. India has long had the potential to be an active shaper of international affairs. It has now arrived. &nbsp;&nbsp;© Project Syndicate
Ana Palacio, a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group, is a visiting lecturer at Georgetown University.

India has arrived

Till about 200 years ago <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/india-china-rail-race">China and India</a> were the world’s largest economies, and that helped Kathmandu prosper as an entrepôt between the two. We have now come full circle. China and India are ascendant once more, and the two giant neighbours can be the locomotives to pull Nepal along if we play our cards right. That is the message in former Kantipur editor <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/two-takes-on-the-nepal-india-nexus">Sudheer Sharma</a>’s omnibus edition of two books that explore the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/so-far-so-good/nepals-history-through-art">historical</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-geopolitics-of-nepal-s-politics">geopolitical dimensions of Nepal</a>’s relations with China.&nbsp; The two Nepali language books, भिक्षु, व्यापार र बिद्रोह (Monks, Trade and Rebellion) and हिमालपारिको हुरी (Trans-Himalayan Hurricane) follow Sharma’s previous work प्रयोगशाला (Laboratory) which looked mainly at Nepal-India relations and was translated into English as The Nepal Nexus. The first book is predominantly about Kathmandu’s historical links with Lhasa, and by extension <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/beijing-30-zak6iu1w">Beijing</a>. Vajrayana Buddhism played a significant role in bringing the two sides of <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/lives-on-the-line-in-the-himalaya">the Himalaya</a> together, allowing social and trade relations to thrive.&nbsp; Princess Bhrikuti, King Narendra Dev and Arniko were prominent historical figures, but thousands of lesser known <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/nation/monks-and-nuns-help-in-rescue-and-relief,2320">monks</a>, traders, and travellers also played their part in cementing Kathmandu-Lhasa ties. These connections were so strong that they endured three wars that the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/beginning-of-the-end-of-the-gorkha-empire">Gorkha Kingdom</a> and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/gift-a-goat-to-tibet-nomads-in-nepal">Tibet</a> fought against each other in which <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/neither-side-lost-both-sides-won">Chinese emperors</a> sent military help to fight off the Nepalis. Although<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-assam-connection-revived"> Nepal’s historic connections</a> with Tibet waned after the Chinese annexation of the plateau in the 1950s, it is on that foundation that present day <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-china-agreements-are-stuck">Nepal-China relations</a> are built.&nbsp; Till today, Nepal is the only country with a consulate in Lhasa, and the only <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/kathmandu-airport-to-cut-flight-hours">international flights</a> from Lhasa are to Kathmandu. But as Sharma notes, even back then, Nepal’s proximity with northern India figured importantly in its<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/home-is-where-the-heart-is-yqkvf5vx"> socio-economic </a>and cultural connections with <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/there-are-muslims-in-tibet-too">Tibet</a>. Nepal was the corridor for the exchange of trade and faith between the Ganga plains and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/it-is-getting-hotter-on-the-roof-of-the-world">the Tibetan plateau</a>. The road between Patna and Potala, Banaras and Beijing passed through <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/bringing-silicon-valley-to-kathmandu-valley">Kathmandu Valley</a>. Sharma traces this socio-political landscape to explain how it went on to shape the country’s modern day relations with the neighbours.&nbsp; There were 2,000 Buddhist monks in Nepal during the reign of Lichhavi king Amshuverma, and Arniko established himself in the court of Kubulai Khan and took eight years to build the massive White Dagoba in Beijing. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/the-life-and-times-of-arniko">The life and times of Arniko</a>, Sewa Bhattarai While Mahayana Buddhism spread from India, through Nepal to China and beyond, it was <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/crony-communism">Communism</a> that later came from China to Nepal. King Mahendra had great geopolitical savvy and navigated the complicated geopolitics of the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/land-reform-in-cold-war-nepal">Cold War</a> to cultivate relations with both Nehru and Mao, while keeping both at arms length. Mahendra wrested aid to build infrastructure like the Kodari and Prithvi Highways from China, but also from India, the Soviet Union and the United States. In fact Nepal was only the eighth non-Communist country to receive foreign aid during Mao’s China.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/the-new-equaliser">The new equaliser</a> But when <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/14-years-after-conflict-no-closure-in-nepal">Nepal’s Maoists</a> launched an armed struggle against <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/if-birendra-was-alive-nepal-could-still-be-a-monarchy">the monarchy</a>, China’s official media never called them ‘Maoists’. As far as Beijing was concerned, Mao was dead in his mausoleum. It was only later under <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-is-xi-jinping-s-big-surprise">Xi Jinping </a>that China warmed up to Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s ‘Maoist’ label.&nbsp; The first book takes us to the point when the Constituent Assembly <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/from-nepali-press/Ftnp-abolishing,624">abolished Nepal’s monarchy</a> in 2008, and the second book, as the name suggests, looks at how the whirlwind rise of China has buffeted Nepal.&nbsp; Sharma encourages readers to abandon <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/regular-columns/guest-editorial/Prithvi-Narayan-Shah-a-visionary-leader,1102">Prithvi Narayan Shah</a>’s famous metaphor of Nepal being ‘yam between two boulders’ to it being more like a ‘narrow canyon’ between two big <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/why-we-climb-mountains">mountains</a>, emphasising the challenges of maintaining sovereignty amid geopolitical pressures not just between India and China, but increasingly, with the United States. We have to see how the new Sino-US Cold War will evolve under <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/trump-s-second-coming">the second Donald Trump presidency</a>. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/the-great-game-2nd-half">suspension of the MCC</a> this week will be an opening for <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/crony-communism">China to push its own BRI infrastructure projects</a> in Nepal. It is not very helpful to see Nepal as being ‘squeezed’ between its giant neighbours, but leverage the country’s geostrategic location by being a connector between India and China. Both neighbours, naturally, have their own interests in Nepal as a buffer state, but both want stability. Kathmandu’s strategy should be to take advantage of the economic growth of its neighbours. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/poor-cash-rich-nepal">Poor cash-rich Nepal</a>, Sonia Awale &nbsp; Both books look at the arrival of Tibetan refugees into Nepal from the late 1950s, and how this resulted in geopolitical push and pull. Although American support for Khampa guerrillas was cut off after Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing in 1971, US and western support for Tibetans in exile resumed after that.&nbsp; Nepal allowed the<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/mindfulness-about-bhutan-s-refugees"> refugees</a> to stay and work here, but under Chinese pressure Kathmandu adopted stricter measures — including <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=2754">deporting Tibetans entering Nepal</a>. The Tibetan exile community remains one of Beijing’s biggest concerns in Nepal. Successive Kathmandu governments have been pressured to curb ‘anti-Chinese activities’ like celebrating the Dalai Lama’s birthday and other anniversaries.&nbsp; Sharma notes that so far Nepal has deftly balanced its support for refugees while keeping relations with Beijing on an even keel. It is significant that China has been surprisingly understanding of the presence of<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/the-start-of-the-anglo-gorkha-war"> Gorkha soldiers from Nepal</a> in the Indian Army along the disputed border where India and China fought a war in 1962, and after which there have been frequent skirmishes.&nbsp; The two books should be read chronologically so as to track the trajectory of historical Nepal-Tibet ties right up to present-day Nepal-China relations. The most relevant concern for bilateral relations today, as Sharma points out, is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/how-nepal-can-avert-an-economic-crunch">Nepal’s economic independence</a>, <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=15973">sovereignty</a>, and role in a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-column/nepal-in-the-new-world-order">transformed world order</a>. &nbsp;&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250224140256_38f09c2f6dc3b7c79892cf556976fa9f7b3a2f43fb53bd7a248a6c6af3ba4715.jpg" data-media-id="editor_37" data-image-id="20250224140256_38f09c2f6dc3b7c79892cf556976fa9f7b3a2f43fb53bd7a248a6c6af3ba4715" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sudheer Sharma 1"> </figure>  &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250224140256_c6eb78b8f59cfda4b3dae582212306fd3ea25b1973d554fdb7579b9d8f345969.jpg" data-media-id="editor_38" data-image-id="20250224140256_c6eb78b8f59cfda4b3dae582212306fd3ea25b1973d554fdb7579b9d8f345969" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Sudheer Sharma 2"> </figure>  &nbsp;

A past foretold

Thirty years after it abruptly pulled out of the Arun III project, the World Bank appears to have developed cold feet about an even larger project on the river in eastern Nepal. After opposition by civil society in Nepal, Japan and Europe, the Bank’s new president James Wolfensohn <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/20-years-ago-this-week/arun-iii">exited from Arun III</a>. The project’s generation capacity has been doubled to 900MW and it is being development by India’s state-owned SJVN Limited.&nbsp; Whereas in 1995, the opposition to Arun III was mainly from activists, this time it is said to be India’s displeasure with the Bank’s involvement in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/world-bank-flip-flop-on-upper-arun">1,061MW Upper Arun</a>. Delhi is so sensitive to the issue that sources said it even leaned on Indian-born American President of the World Bank, Ajaya Banga to cancel his trip to Kathmandu for the IDA21 Replenishment Meeting in June. When it gets the green light, Upper Arun will be the most expensive hydroelectric project in Nepal so far with a price tag of $1.6 billion. The semi-storage scheme is located on the transboundary Arun River 15km from the Chinese border after it cuts through the Himalaya between Mt Everest and Kangchenjunga. Beijing is said to have no objections to the project, but India’s silence is said to stem <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/geopolitics-of-nepal-s-rivers">from its strategic interest</a> in not allowing anyone else to build large storage projects on the tributaries of the Ganga in Nepal. India’s SJVN is also currently constructing three large projects downstream, including Arun III and Lower Arun with a total generation capacity of nearly 2,000MW.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20241220111240_f6e0fda98407360d7a4456e861481ad811f7a75ce5ab7605158e980615f3fb16" data-rendition-name="original" width="850" height="771" loading="lazy" alt="Upper Arun Map NT"> </figure>  Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) set up Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited (UAHEL) as a subsidiary and in May signed up the French firm Tractebel for detailed design of the scheme. Experts say the design will have to take into account future climate-induced glacial lake outbursts like the one that swept away the 1,600MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">Chungthang Teesta</a> III in Sikkim last year built at a cost of $1.7 billion.&nbsp; Upper Arun’s financing will be 70% loans and 30% equity. The World Bank had already earmarked $750 million with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with Japan’s JICA also joining. But UAHEL Managing Director Fanendra Raj Joshi said there was no word either way from the World Bank, which meant there was no financial closure yet. Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/right-climate-for-nepal-s-energy-transition">Right climate for Nepal’s energy transition</a>, Ramesh Kumar All this is in stark contrast to the optimism last year after Finance Minister Prakash Mahat returned from an IMF meeting in Morrocco and announced that the World Bank would be the main lender in Upper Arun.&nbsp; In November 2024, Mahat even took a helicopter with World Bank Managing Director Anna Bjerde and ADB Director Ramesh Subramaniam to the Upper Arun site and it looked like the loans were in the bag. It would also be the first large project in Nepal in which both big multilateral lenders would be involved.&nbsp; In April this year, an ‘agreement in principle’ was even reached between Mahat’s successor Barsaman Pun and World Bank Vice President for South Asia Martin Raiser to develop Upper Arun. But the loan meeting planned for June was cancelled. &nbsp; A Finance Ministry official told Nepali Times: “The World Bank told us categorically in November in Washington DC that India was opposed to its involvement in Upper Arun.” &nbsp; When Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal visited Delhi in June, Indian officials reportedly said they were interested in developing Upper Arun and evacuate its power through an extension of the 400kV transmission line it is building. Although Beijing had given the go ahead to the World Bank and ADB involvement in Upper Arun, it may not be as happy about an Indian company so close to its border. As a semi-reservoir project, Upper Arun can generate electricity at full capacity for up to six hours a day even in winter, unlike the schemes downstream which are run-of-the river in which generation depends on water flow.&nbsp; Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/rivers-be-dammed">Rivers be dammed</a>, Pinki Siris Rana&nbsp; India is involved in projects in Nepal’s rivers that will generate a total of 8,000MW when complete. SJVN Limited is also taking over from the Chinese the 769MW Tamor project in the Arun Basin. &nbsp; Says Fanendra Raj Joshi of Upper Arun Hydro-electric Limited: “Nepal can find alternative sources of funding and we will go ahead with this project even if the World Bank decides not to provide the loan.”&nbsp; Joshi and the NEA’s Kulman Ghising (pictured, below) attended a hearing with indigenous communities at the project site in Sankhuwasabha this week. Ghising told the gathering that if the World Bank pulled out Nepal would carry on with Upper Arun through “domestic and diaspora investment with the same financial package as Upper Tama Kosi”. The 546MW <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/when-it-rains-it-pours-ksqprbu3">Upper Tama Kosi was knocked</a> by a massive landslide in September and will not be fully operation at least for a year. &nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5.jpg" data-media-id="editor_8" data-image-id="20241218091240_bfaaadc83881c7551d1dd501447b7a22c10b89104aeea3cab58a100444b016d5" data-rendition-name="original" width="800" height="600" loading="lazy" alt="Kulman Ghising"> </figure>  “This is a project that can transform the local economy and Nepal’s economy as well,” Ghising added. “We will go ahead with blended financing from all levels of government.” Despite the lack of financial closure, construction of the project is expected to get underway in 2026 for completion in six years. Construction of a 21km access road from the power house to the dam site along the Kosi Corridor highway is in full swing through difficult terrain.

Upper Arun question mark

The bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh must be based on a win-win policy, rooted in mutual respect, non-hegemony, and the pursuit of shared prosperity and deeper understanding. 
For India, there have always been only two neighbours: China and Pakistan. The rest of us smaller South Asian countries are geographic entities to be praised, cajoled, reprimanded and even punished as the situation calls for.
Sheikh Hasina's last tenure in power (2009-2024) appears to have been a ‘praise’ period. However, after the student-led people's uprising toppled her regime in August, a powerful section of the Indian media has shifted into the ‘reprimand’ mode, with some even suggesting ‘punishment’. Much of the social media discourse seems to support this.
Oppression of minorities anywhere in the world, including in my own country, must be condemned and speedily resolved. It should never recur. Communal conflict has been an age-old phenomenon in South Asia following the British colonial policy of divide and rule. 
It is a regrettable fact that, after 77 years of the departure of the British, we have still not been able to solve it.
After the regime change in Bangladesh, the Indian media's coverage of events can, in my view, be categorised as follows: 
<ol><li>The events that toppled Sheikh Hasina was the work of Pakistan's ISI, the Islamists in Bangladesh, or pro-Chinese elements all aimed to replace the ‘India-friendly’ government with an ‘unfriendly’ one. There is no mention of the role of common people or of the students, of the killing of ordinary people. What is the source of all these assertions? </li><li>The new government in Dhaka is bent on persecuting Hindus and even committing ‘genocide’. Many of these stories were debunked by fact-checkers, including the BBC. But that did not stop or even slow down the tirade of stories demonising Bangladesh.</li><li>The US involvement was also referred to and linked with the events in Pakistan in toppling Imran Khan. So, the US toppled Sheikh Hasina.</li></ol>
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Sheikh Hasina government even resorted to firing on demonstrators using helicopters.
In a prompt action, the interim government fast-tracked the issuance of visas for journalists. However, Indian journalists who visited Bangladesh focused solely on the attacks on Hindus, ignoring the broader human rights abuses by the Hasina government. 
The Indian media’s coverage of the July-August uprising in Bangladesh was also striking in its one-sidedness.
The Indian media largely ignored the massive student-led people's movement, which saw millions take to the streets of cities across the country. Their focus remained almost exclusively on the sporadic violence against Hindus during the power vacuum in the first week of the transition.
The firing on unarmed demonstrators, resulting in at least 700 deaths by 5 August, was barely covered. This was one of the most barbaric crackdowns in the recent history of South Asia, yet the Indian media gave it little attention. 
In the <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gEoyTkOZ8xE&amp;t=588s">six interviews I gave</a> to <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bDJgVVBDLg">mainstream Indian outlets</a>, there was almost <a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/world/sheikh-hasina-had-turned-very-dictatorial-mahfuz-anam-on-bangladesh-regime-change/cid/2038904">no mention</a> of the scale of <a href="http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/2024/08/07/the-daily-star-journalist-mahfuz-anam-interview-bangladesh-protests-political-crisis.html">the uprising</a> or the civilian deaths, only the vandalism of symbols like Bangabandhu's statue or the burning of government properties.
Even three months later, there has been no substantial coverage of the atrocities inflicted on students and civilians. The Indian media's coverage appears to be driven by the isolated attacks against Hindus of Bangladesh, rather than the people of Bangladesh. India should not see the recent events through the lens of Sheikh Hasina but through the lens of democracy.
In a recent video broadcast by the Indian news portal ThePrint, Meenakshi Lekhi, a BJP leader and lawyer, said, ‘The chief adviser… is seeking to rename the nation [Bangladesh] to be [the] Islamic republic of East Pakistan.’ 
Where did she get that from? Her column was filled with distortions and misinformation. When recounting Sheikh Hasina's rule, she omitted critical facts like the rigging of the 2014, 2018 and 2024 general elections, which were at the core of voters' outrage with her regime.
At The Daily Star, we studied 56 news items appearing in the Indian media between 9 July-20 November. Except for a handful, most could be categorised as ‘views reports’ and not ‘news reports’. They had headlines like: ‘To avoid election Yunus is using the excuse of reforms’, ‘Politics of revenge – 13 including ministers on trial’, ‘Will democracy at all return to Bangladesh?’, ‘China, ISI behind escalation of student-led protests in Bangladesh’, ‘ISI conspiracy to topple Sk. Hasina and established anti-India govt’, among others. 
Some TV news even called it an ‘Islamist takeover’. There were hardly any attempts to take a serious look at the events in Bangladesh.
If we analyse the sourcing of the news, the presentation, the headlines, and the language used in reporting, it becomes clear that it was directed at creating an impression that Hindus were not safe in Bangladesh to generate deep hatred in the Indian population.
The mindset of the Indian media and also that of a section of political leadership is dominated by a fundamental disrespect for our intellectual ability, and Islamophobia.
Indian media coverage clearly implies that we, as a people, are incapable of determining our future. It is the Pakistanis, Chinese or the Americans (not to name the Indians, which they do not of course mention) that must tell us what to do. 
This mindset is insulting to a nation that has fought against Pakistani cultural, economic and military oppression, and that has defeated them in an armed struggle with Indian help. 
It is insulting to a people who have dismantled dictatorships and who have now toppled what appeared to be an invincible regime of Sheikh Hasina. This mindset shows the disdain of the Indian media towards Bangladeshis. One political leader even compared us with termites.
The Indian media has a total misunderstanding of the deep roots of Islam in Muslim Bangladeshi psyche. People going to mosques, wearing Islamic headgear, keeping beards, using Islamic salutations, or referring to the Quran as a part of daily life are portrayed as extremists and terrorists.
If the revival and strengthening of Hindu religious practices, building more temples, enshrining Hindu cultural traits, and becoming more practising Hindus are part of the present-day Indian ethos, then why should we, the Bangladeshis, becoming more Muslim make us extremists? 
If mass-based groups like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, the Bajrang Dal, and the RSS can propagate the Hindu religion, and if a political party like the BJP, whose aim is to establish Hindutva in India, can get elected three times, then why does the reappearance of Islamic groups make us a ‘fundamentalist’ country?
The Indian media and leadership must dig deep into the cultural and religious heritage of Muslim Bengal, and try to embrace us as we are, rather than define us as they would like us to be. 
We must accept what the Indian people decide is the India they want. Just as India must accept what the people of Bangladesh decide we are. 
That is the only way a durable Bangladesh-India relationship can be built. The lesson for India is that regime-based relationships must be replaced by people-based relationships. 
For that to happen, we must understand each other better, with sincerity and respect.
Mahfuz Anam is the editor and publisher of The Daily Star. Reprinted with permission.

How the media shapes Bangladesh-India ties

This year, Sri Lanka entered a power purchase deal with Adani Green Energy Ltd. In terms of the agreement, the country will purchase electricity from the company over 20 years. The Adani Green Energy project received cabinet clearance from the previous government to produce 484MW of wind power in two facilities the company would build in Mannar and Pooneryn and invest more than US$442 million in its projected life span of 20 years.
Adani Green Energy would be paid $0.0826 per kWh of power produced. The deal was relentlessly pushed, defended and ultimately signed by the previous Sri Lankan government. The mandatory tender process was not followed indicating inbuilt and rampant corruption and vested interests at the time.
The project is now under litigation in the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka over the violation of fundamental rights. The main issues raised by the petitioners deal with environmental concerns surrounding the project and the woeful lack of transparency in the awarding process that led to the granting of the deal to Adani.
The petitioners also argue that the agreed upon per unit cost is a significant loss to the country and ideally this rate should be set at $0.005 kWh. The deal, its approval and the final granting process were mired in controversy even before litigation. 
In 2022, the then Chairman of the Ceylon Electricity Board, M M C Ferdinando told the parliamentary panel, the Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE), that the deal was offered based on a request from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to then Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. 
Ferdinando later retracted his statement and resigned from his post under pressure from the then government. In May 2023, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Sabry observed flippantly in an interview with The Hindu that Adani projects in Sri Lanka were a ‘government-to-government kind of a project’. He noted that it was the Indian government that selected the Adani group for infrastructure development projects including the Sri Lankan wind power project. 
Reading between the lines, Sabry’s public observations indicated a clear backdoor and informal Indian state involvement in the project. Despite the notoriety that Adani companies had already acquired across the world, Sabry had the nerve to say that his government was “very very confident” that the Adani Group’s companies had considerable capital.
Adani actually saw a the $140 billion drop in share values after the publication of a negative report by US research company Hindenburg accusing the company’s top leader Gautam Adani of getting away with the ‘largest con in corporate history’. 
Another investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project also documented serious malpractices by Adani companies. All this is in addition to The Guardian and Financial Times also reporting on Adani family’s surreptitious investments in the company’s shares.
It is against this background that the flamboyant and utterly inexperienced former Sri Lankan Minister of Energy attempted to convert the agreement with Adani Green Energy Limited in August 2023 into a formal government-to-government deal. 
In reality no such formal state to state level agreement existed between India and Sri Lanka. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Adani power deal has ended up in litigation in the Sri Lankan Supreme Court. The new Sri Lankan government needs to carefully and comprehensively revisit the power deal.
Malpractices evident in the local awarding process needs to be considered as well as the role of local power brokers who made it happen and evident corruption that enveloped the entire project needs to be investigated. 
The project also needs to be evaluated in light of the global evidence against the Adani Group. In October, the Kenyan High Court suspended a $736 million agreement between the state-owned Kenya Electrical Transmission Company and Adani Energy Solutions to build and operate power facilities, including transmission lines.
In a lawsuit, the Law Society of Kenya argued that the deal was ‘a constitutional sham and tainted with secrecy’. It also argued that the Kenyan state entity and Adani Energy Solutions did not carry out mandatory public participation focused on the project properly, which is a requirement under Kenya’s Public Private Partnerships Act. These conditions sound alarmingly similar to the Sri Lankan case.
In 2023, accusations were made in India’s Gujarat State against Adani Power Mundra Limited that it had charged an excess of INR 39,000,000,000 over a period of five years under two power purchase agreements. An opposition politician in the state noted the case was a “textbook case of corruption, money laundering, loot of public money and above all, the classic case of cronyism that the Prime Minister and his government represent.” 
The issue here was that the rate at which coal for power production that was purchased by Adani Power Mundra was significantly higher than market rates at which coal was being traded in Indonesia, the source of the purchase. This meant that the state-owned Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, a Gujarati state entity in the energy sector had to pay much more for the overall electricity supply. Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited has now written to Adani Power Mundra Limited asking that the excess amount charged be repaid. 
As a presidential candidate, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake assured that if he won, the National People’s Power would cancel the Adani energy project because it posed a threat to Sri Lanka’s energy sector sovereignty. 
The controls placed by Adani Power on its power supply to Bangladesh is a classic example of Bangladesh’s energy sovereignty being utterly compromised at a very crucial time in the country’s history. In real terms, Adani Power has slashed its supplies to Bangladesh by about 60% due to unpaid bills exceeding $800 million. Sri Lanka could also find itself in a similar situation if it compromises its power supply and energy sovereignty by going ahead with the Adani project.
In October President Dissanayake informed the Supreme Court that it would reconsider the approval given by the previous regime to the Adani Group projects. The government must now expect considerable pressure from vested parties, in this case both the Adani Group and the Indian government, more generally. But it is essential to be mindful that we are not dealing with a project in an Indian state.
We cannot be endlessly languishing in the depths of poverty simply because of the corruption of our own leaders of the recent and not-too-recent past, and business magnates of the region. The Adani case is a good starting point to roll back mega corruption and illegality in the country.
Sasanka Perera is the founding professor of the South Asia University's Department of Sociology. This commentary was first published <a href="https://island.lk/adanis-power-in-sri-lanka/">The Island Online</a>.

Adani in Sri Lanka

Where will Nepal be in 2050? It is only 25 years away. The country’s population will be peaking at 36 million, the poverty rate will drop to near zero. Maternal and child mortality rates will fall further. Nepal will be generating up to 40,000MW of hydro and solar power, more than half of that for export. Upgraded highways will improve connectivity, railways will make transport cheaper. Pokhara and Birganj will only be two hours away from Kathmandu. Nijgad airport could be Nepal’s new aviation hub, reducing Kathmandu’s congestion. Nepal will hitch its wagon to the engines of economic growth in India and China. Investment and job creation will reduce outmigration, Nepal's data centres will be powered with surplus electricity. Remote areas will prosper with high-value tourists. That is if all goes well. But if Nepal’s politics remains dysfunctional with incompetent leadership, then the country will muddle along as it is doing now. Society will be more unequal, public discontent may boil over as politicians resort to faith to hide failures, the exodus abroad of youth will continue. Climate breakdown will exacerbate these crises. Global average temperature will have risen to 2.7°C above pre-industrial levels (it is 1.1°C now). The remaining Himalayan icecap will shrink by half, glacial lakes will threaten valleys. The hydrology of rivers will change, reducing dry season flow. Severe and prolonged heat waves in the Tarai will force people to migrate back to the mountains. In the final analysis, it all boils down to a political system that is more accountable, and displays more integrity and efficiency. <h2>Mission 2050</h2> · Melamchi Water Supply Project · Pokhrara International Airport · Bhairawa International Airport · Upper Tama Kosi Hydroelectric Project . Kathmandu-Tarai Expressway What do these biggest infrastructure projects in Nepal have in common? All ended up being more expensive than they should, all have been delayed and are not fully operational, two were badly damaged in climate-related disasters that should have been foreseen. The $800 million Melamchi is Nepal’s most expensive infrastructure project to date. It took 30 years to build, but was nearly destroyed by a glacial debris flow in June 2021. The headworks need major repairs. The 456MW Upper Tama Kosi was severely damaged by a rockfall and floods in last September’s floods. It is still not operating at full capacity, and other hydropower plants were damaged in recent glacial floods. Pokhara and Bhairawa airports were supposed to be the new aviation gateways to Nepal to take the pressure off Kathmandu, and become game changers for tourism and pilgrimage. Nearly three years later, both handle domestic flights. Poor and inadequate design, kickbacks on contracts, cost overruns, failure of diplomacy to get India’s nod on air routes, and lack of planning and marketing have made the airports a pair of white elephants. Some of these setbacks can be blamed on natural calamities, but mostly it is political incompetence and greed, lack of accountability and poor implementation. That is no surprise, since these are the hallmarks of doing business in Nepal, often delaying projects, adding to the cost, and even when completed they are already outdated. That is the story of the last 25 years, are the next 25 going to be any different? Not if governance does not improve. “What we really need for the future is vision, idea, and understanding, and then the domestic capacity to implement them,” says infrastructure expert Surya Raj Acharya, who laments the total absence of technical and planning expertise. “None of our national highways meet technical standards, our cities are unplanned. The priority was never on quality. Politicians sold us short-term infrastructure that have now become a barrier to prosperity,” he adds. One silver lining has been private sector involvement in hydropower, and the energy strategy aims to generate 11,769MW by 2030. But hydropower is high-investment, high-risk due to climate breakdown, and ecologically damaging. “Hydropower is a good example of how government incentives and public-private partnership can work wonders, although we now have to take climate change into account,” explains economist Kalpana Khanal of the Policy Research Institute. She adds, “We now have to identify other key infrastructure areas that also enhance the growth of other sectors.” The National Planning Commission’s periodic plans guide overall social and economic strategy for the country into the coming decade. Nepal’s current five-year plan (2024-2029) has set a target of 7.3% annual economic growth against the current 3.9%, $2,351 per capita income up from $1,456 at present, and poverty reduction to 12%. The plan aims to export nearly half the hydropower generated by 2030, earning the country Rs41 billion annually. But there is no real coordination between line agencies, and bureaucratic lethargy leads to constant delays, says former member of the National Planning Commission (NPC) Min Bahadur Shahi. “Development in Nepal is still very much synonymous with building roads and bridges, and infrastructure is rudimentary,” he says. “Elsewhere in the world, digital infrastructure and governance go hand in hand, we are far behind.” The frustration of a man who served in the National Planning Commission is an indication where the problem lies: in actually executing plans and implementing strategies. “We need to prioritise projects based on our geography, climate, societal needs,” Shahi continues. “We want to push Nijgad airport when we can’t even operate Pokhara and Bhairawa. Have we even studied potential air routes and needs of international carriers?”  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250726070744_0547e5a7fd4424b5de8c279cab637ee7ebd9e65f2673b15e6dbd4eb2aa2524f2.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="20250726070744_0547e5a7fd4424b5de8c279cab637ee7ebd9e65f2673b15e6dbd4eb2aa2524f2" data-rendition-name="original" width="3600" height="2400" loading="lazy" alt="Pokhara airport"><figcaption>NO FLY ZONE: Pokhara airport was supposed to be the new aviation gateway to Nepal but nearly three years after its inaguration, it mostly handles domestic flights. Photo: RADHIKA KANDEL </figcaption></figure>  TARGET PRACTICE Export of hydropower, manpower and lately information technology are the mainstays of Nepal’s economy, and will carry the country to its graduation from Least Developed Country status to a developing country in November 2026, and hopefully to middle-income by 2030. Nepal has an installed capacity of about 3,800MW, most of it from hydropower, and increased adoption of electric cars has reduced the import of petroleum products, decreasing the trade deficit with India. Meanwhile, Nepalis abroad sent home $11 billion in remittances last year, and at least $900 million in backend IT exports. But demographer Yogendra B Gurung is not impressed: “Despite the reduction in the poverty rate, and our improving income status, life expectancy, income, even maternal and infant mortality are not on par with countries with similar economic status.” He says relying on remittances is an unsustainable economic model, vulnerable to external factors and remittances are mostly spent on day-to-day needs, and not invested in productive sectors. Remittance is credited with reducing poverty in Nepal which is down to 20.27% from 42% in 1990. Money sent home by workers abroad has allowed families to afford basic healthcare and education, in turn helping to reduce childhood malnutrition and maternal mortality while improving female literacy. But the progress has stalled in recent years, and many doubt Nepal will meet its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) targets. The National Planning Commission has said Nepal is likely to achieve just 60% of the targets by 2030. Sex ratio at birth, which is 112 boys to 100 girls in Nepal in particular, is worrying, as it is much higher than the biological ratio of 105 to 100. This is much more pronounced in Karnali, Sudurpaschim and Madhes Provinces which suffer from historical neglect. Despite a rise in female literacy, patriarchy is still deeply entrenched and the provinces are behind the rest of the country for gender equality, education, healthcare, nutrition and economic opportunities. “Karnali is resource-rich, especially hydropower and the recent discovery of the methane gas, but inequality is much greater,” says Shahi, who is with the Karnali Integrated Rural Development and Research Centre (KIRDARC). “Federalism in Nepal is only on paper, we need a total structural reform to devolve political power to really bring about change.”  <figure><img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250726070744_fd4a218656e1fbf6f13f5f87a47bfe624516c6a0232481b6be77875ae866deb9.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250726070744_fd4a218656e1fbf6f13f5f87a47bfe624516c6a0232481b6be77875ae866deb9" data-rendition-name="original" width="3600" height="2400" loading="lazy" alt="Butwal-Narayangadh "><figcaption>The Daunne section of the Butwal-Narayangadh road notorious for traffic jams and accidents, it has been in never-ending construction for three years. Photo: BISHNU PRASAD GAUDEL / RSS </figcaption></figure>  Despite limited resources, Nepal also suffers from wasteful investment as a result of politically (mis)guided decision-making, instead of people-centric plans and policies, says demographer Gurung. “People are overwhelmingly moving to the cities but our leaders are hell bent on building roads to every village and now there are empty schools in the mountains,” he adds. Nepal needs data-driven planning but its long-term economic vision 2020-44 seems more of a wish-list than realistic goals, including average annual GDP growth of 10.5%, $12,000 per capita income and population under the absolute poverty line at 0. Other goals include raising electricity generation capacity to 40,000MW, access to motor transport to 99%, life expectancy at birth to 80, maternal mortality down to 20% and literacy to 99% and 100% access to the internet, among others. Meanwhile, Nepal is committed to net-zero by 2045 and 100% renewable energy by 2050. “Our planners have no idea what kind of infrastructure we need 20, 30 years down the line to sustain and accelerate growth. We need a big structural change in the political leadership, in technocratic planning, and for policy implementation,” says infrastructure expert Surya Raj Acharya. Meeting such targets would require large investment, and it would be unwise to rely on remittances for the longer run, especially as Nepal’s demographic dividend will diminish as it turns into an aged society by 2065. Reversing out migration requires a favourable investment climate so jobs are created. Good governance marked by accountability and transparency are the basic prerequisite for ease of doing business. But lack of rule of law and illicit funds put Nepal in the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money-laundering watchdog. “Everything comes down to a political will. The established parties must realise that if they don’t perform, they will be replaced by alternatives,” says Kalpana Khanal. “In the meantime, we must engage the youth and find ways to retain them as well as attract the diaspora to invest in Nepal.”

Nepal in 2050

MetLife Nepal has signed Rohit Paudel and Indu Barma, the captains of the national men’s and women’s cricket teams, to promote the importance of life insurance.

Metlife signs Nepal cricket captains

Many of us former Nepal Peace Corps volunteers (PCVs) would agree that our time in Nepal changed in significant but very different ways our perspectives on life if not the future paths we chose to follow. Of no one was this truer than Dorothy Mierow. Dorothy was born in 1920, in Colorado Springs. Her father Charles C Mierow was a classics scholar and Latin professor, who served for ten years as president of Colorado College.&nbsp; Dorothy developed an interest in animals as a child, graduated with a BA degree in natural history from Carlton College in 1942, a Master’s in biology from the University of Pittsburgh, and another Master’s in geography from the University of Minnesota.&nbsp; As a young woman, Dorothy traveled with her father throughout Europe, including a visit to ancient Greek ruins, and took a Magellan Tour by cruise ship around the world in 1958.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071901074_0bad133ab22aada319e74bbad95d563e191371db291c08f373839fbd15440262.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2025071901074_0bad133ab22aada319e74bbad95d563e191371db291c08f373839fbd15440262" data-rendition-name="original" width="903" height="1178" loading="lazy" alt="How the Peace Corps changed a volunteer's life"> <figcaption>HOME AWAY FROM HOME: Dorothy Mierow as a college student in her native Colorado.</figcaption> </figure>  She was a college teacher during much of the 1940s, also teaching at a girls’ school in Hawaii. Then back to her native Colorado in 1953, where she became a curator and later director of the Colorado College Natural History Museum. She taught geography classes, and in her free time, Dorothy climbed 22 of Colorado’s 14,000-foot peaks. Traveling in India in 1960, Dorothy decided to spend two weeks in Nepal. In late 1961, she filled out an application to join the Peace Corps and specified that she wanted to go to Nepal, ‘because I admired the people so much when my father and I were there on our trip’.&nbsp; Dorothy reached Kathmandu in September 1962 as the first group of American Peace Corps volunteers in Nepal. She stood out from the others: one of the few women in that group, surely the oldest at age 41, a world traveler, and a woman who already had established a professional career.&nbsp; One doubts if Dorothy had had a husband and children whether she would ever have gone to work and spend much of the rest of her life in Nepal.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071901078_68e84ade1ffb0f6c83c7f8fa5c1e7315b5f6c543217f96cde012e4d86f171515.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="2025071901078_68e84ade1ffb0f6c83c7f8fa5c1e7315b5f6c543217f96cde012e4d86f171515" data-rendition-name="original" width="1259" height="910" loading="lazy" alt="How th Peace Corps changed a volunteer's life NT"> <figcaption>Pokhara Bazar in 1962.</figcaption> </figure>  The Peace Corps assigned Dorothy to teach geography at Tri-Chandra College. After the school closed in the winter due to lack of heating, USAID and the College of Education asked Dorothy to help train general science teachers.&nbsp; She taught for two months and became involved in a textbook-writing project, commenting: ‘I would like the children to know something about public health, conservation (the trees are going fast and so is the soil), and learn the names of some of their common birds, trees, and flowers. They are more impressed with electricity, airplanes, and cell structure.’ When a new college opened in Pokhara in 1963, Dorothy was transferred there and lived with a Nepali family. The college boasted 30 students and no permanent buildings.&nbsp; In October 1963, Dorothy wrote: ‘Pokhara is a town of almost 5,000 people … We are in a fertile valley surrounded by foothills … There is a small Mission Hospital … a Leper Hospital and Tibetan Refugee Camp started by the Red Cross and now run by the Swiss. With winter approaching, more Tibetans are appearing in town, often with pack horses or donkeys. Some have been carrying large boxes of powdered milk,donated (by USAID) to the camp from the airport … There is no electricity, and the transportation problems make many items scarce and expensive. I am really a sort of a museum. The landlord brings all kinds of people in to see how I live and count my shoes and dresses. They express amazement at my books, pictures, tin oven, Nepali dolls from Kathmandu, screened food shelves and curtained closet.’ The standard term for Peace Corps volunteers was two years, but Dorothy extended her term and was still at Prithvi Narayan College at the end of 1965, when she wrote that she had 20 Geography students in the first-year class and 6 in the second year preparing for the IA Examination. The college enrollment was 125 students, and the foundation for a new science building was being excavated.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071901074_c6a80e5e0db0c705b2f8733c6d30dc0386fe3abbd2238ea9d947b7d746f94a29.jpg" data-media-id="editor_2" data-image-id="2025071901074_c6a80e5e0db0c705b2f8733c6d30dc0386fe3abbd2238ea9d947b7d746f94a29" data-rendition-name="original" width="902" height="605" loading="lazy" alt="How the Peace Corps changed a volunteer's life"> <figcaption>Mierow and friends at Phewa Lake.</figcaption> </figure>  Dorothy noted that she ate one meal a day at the (Shining Mission) Hospital but otherwise lived on dal-bhat, momo, and potato curry at local shops. However, she had developed a new passion: to build what she initially called the Pokhara Museum of the Himalaya. In commendable Peace Corps fashion, Dorothy always worked with Nepalis and respected the culture. ‘The greatest joy and satisfaction I have had has been from the building of a Museum-Library in memory of my parents … It has been possible to feel like a wealthy benefactor with the money saved by father for the family’s education and now available for the education of others… (Father) would have loved to be in on the founding of a new college and be able to plan a library. Several hundred of the books to be in the museum-library came from his collection and were carefully selected to be of use for students in Nepal…’&nbsp; ‘The museum part is to satisfy my own inclinations and was thought of when I found how little diversion there was for the people of Pokhara… It is part of the University requirements for the college that it should have a geography and biology museum. The museum building is small but adequate.&nbsp; I have tried to design it in harmony with Nepalese architecture and decorate it with some of the art of the best artists or woodcarvers… Posts holding up the porch roof are carved by Cottage Industries to represent different peoples of Nepal in typical costumes. The door was carved by a local wood carver and has typical birds of Nepal around it. Inside are 10 roof-support carvings designed by the retired Director of the National Museum in Kathmandu, Mr. C.M. Maskey.&nbsp; They were carved by the best wood carvers in Patan very skilfully. The building has three rooms: the library, the exhibition room, and a smaller workroom which can be used by our newly formed Woman’s Club as well as other groups or classes.’  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071901074_03d3359c65389d30a0134e9a4862778994121e7e833b7d28b18e06e36fc76ff8.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="2025071901074_03d3359c65389d30a0134e9a4862778994121e7e833b7d28b18e06e36fc76ff8" data-rendition-name="original" width="629" height="599" loading="lazy" alt="How the Peace Corps changed a volunteer's life"> <figcaption>Mierow with local women in Pokhara in 1969.</figcaption> </figure>  Dorothy promoted her project to influential Nepalis connected with organisations whose support she solicited: The Department of Archaeology, the Department of Agriculture, the Godavari Botanical Gardens; Tribhuvan University’s Science and Education Department, Nature Conservation Society.&nbsp; The museum was opened officially in early 1967. The Annapurna Natural History Museum, the building Dorothy designed and had constructed, is still open and features some exhibits which she created many years ago.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071901074_54326a8a0685e980e782378076de2f5cd02d2426e9b0d94eed972d3dbe83af26.jpg" data-media-id="editor_4" data-image-id="2025071901074_54326a8a0685e980e782378076de2f5cd02d2426e9b0d94eed972d3dbe83af26" data-rendition-name="original" width="1333" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="How the Peace Corps changed a volunteer's life"> <figcaption>The Annapurna Natural History Museum.</figcaption> </figure>  Dorothy returned to America in 1967, but she longed for Nepal. In the spring of 1969, she again tried to enroll as a Peace Corps volunteer but was told that as she had spent more than four years, she would not be eligible for another assignment. Undeterred, she persuaded the college in Pokhara to invite her to return as a teacher.&nbsp; UNICEF and the Forestry Department sponsored Dorothy to prepare charts on trees, birds, animals and flowers in colour for distribution to the schools of Nepal. Dorothy, back in the Peace Corps, returned to Pokhara and the Museum in 1972. She formed a friendship with her former geography student from Sikles, Chandra Prasad Gurung, and in 1974, she brought Chandra to America, where he enrolled in Colorado College and studied cultural anthropology.&nbsp; Chandra subsequently earned his PhD in geography from the University of Hawaii and returned to Pokhara to become director of the Annapurna Conservation Area Project. Gurung actively promoted ecotourism, landscape conservation, and biodiversity conservation in Nepal. His life was cut short along with those of 23 other Nepalis and foreigners who perished in a helicopter crash near Taplejung in September 2006.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2025071901074_322d3c3ac6f1b08ffa07c44a19998b937a7db9eb43527f7539cf6481e1546314.jpg" data-media-id="editor_5" data-image-id="2025071901074_322d3c3ac6f1b08ffa07c44a19998b937a7db9eb43527f7539cf6481e1546314" data-rendition-name="original" width="2500" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="How the Peace Corps changed a volunteer's life"> <figcaption>Mierow's four books on Nepal and its biodiversity. </figcaption> </figure>  Dorothy worked with several well-known Nepalis to publish her paintings and photos in beautifully illustrated books. She and Hemanta Mishra of the National Parks and Wildlife Service wrote Wild Animals of Nepal (Ratna Pustak Bhandar, 1976). More than 400 photos Dorothy took on treks to the Everest region, Gosaikunda, Muktinath, Jumla and Rara Lake, as well as travels in the Tarai, appeared in Himalayan Flowers and Trees (Sahayogi Prakashan, 1978).&nbsp; The botanist Tirtha Bahadur Shrestha identified the species. Dorothy and Kesar Lall published This Beautiful Nepal (Sahayogi Press, 1981). Birds of the Central Himalayas (1988) contained Dorothy’s paintings of 250 species of birds found along the areas of the Kali Gandaki River, Pokhara, Chitwan and the central Tarai. Dorothy summed up her life and work in Nepal in Thirty Years in Pokhara (Pilgrims Book House, 1997). Dorothy returned to Pokhara and her adopted Gurung family several times during the 1980s and 1990s to celebrate festivals and meet old friends. Her final years were spent at her mountain cottage in Green Mountain Falls north of Colorado Springs. She died at the age of 79 in August, 2000. Nepal gave new meaning and purpose to Dorothy Mierow’s life. Daniel W Edwards was a Peace Corps volunteer in 1966 and is the author of several books on Nepal. The author thanks Special Collections, Tutt Library, Colorado College.

How the Peace Corps changed a volunteer’s life

· On the night of 15 May, two glacial lakes burst in Tharka in Humla and the debris flow washed away homes and bridges.&nbsp; · Last week, a slurry surge on the Kali Gandaki in Upper Mustang caused at least Rs15 million in damage, and was traced to a melting glacier. · Dozens are feared dead after <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rasuwa-flood-likely-a-glof">an expanding glacial lake in Tibet overflowed</a>, sweeping down into Nepal and damaging four hydropower plants generating 230MW, nearly 8% of the country’s total grid supply.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250718060748_45225dc707c1e9c2968ca8dbf6e564e01e4eb6e2ff254fb8eb940cf62cdd910b.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20250718060748_45225dc707c1e9c2968ca8dbf6e564e01e4eb6e2ff254fb8eb940cf62cdd910b" data-rendition-name="original" width="2667" height="1500" loading="lazy" alt="Rasuwa flood"> <figcaption>Miteri friendship bridge connecting Nepal and China was swept away in the Rasuwa flood. Photo: PRAKASH CHANDRA TIMILSENA / NPL</figcaption> </figure>  And those are just in the past month. Climate scientists say Himalayan glacial lake outbursts are becoming more frequent and destructive, and a warning for Nepal not to put all its eggs in the hydropower basket.&nbsp; <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/editorial/when-it-rains-it-pours-ksqprbu3">Record precipitation last September</a> unleashed floods that killed 200 people, and temporarily slashed Nepal’s total generation capacity of 3,000MW by nearly half. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/nepal-valley-suffers-quadruple-disaster">Melamchi flood of 2021</a> caused by <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/multimedia/the-not-so-permanent-frost">permafrost melting</a> on a glacier upstream nearly destroyed a $800 million water supply scheme, Nepal’s largest infrastructure project which four years later still has not resumed full operation. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/sikkim-flood-is-warning-to-nepal">glacial lake overflow in Sikkim</a> caused by record rainfall in September 2023 that destroyed the $1.2 billion Chungthung Dam and caused catastrophic damage to infrastructure on the Teesta River. This was a warning to the cascade of hydropower plants on the Arun and Marsyangdi river basins.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250718060736_6f61797a6be308321e3bae26e55d2f64cba4b9e5eb262adacb9e92fb5f3c6152.jpg" data-media-id="editor_6" data-image-id="20250718060736_6f61797a6be308321e3bae26e55d2f64cba4b9e5eb262adacb9e92fb5f3c6152" data-rendition-name="original" width="919" height="549" loading="lazy" alt="hydro disasters and hydropower plants"> </figure>  Nepal has set a target of generating an additional 28,500MW by 2035 -- out of the feasible 48,000MW -- but how viable is an energy strategy that is exposed to heightened risk due to climate breakdown? &nbsp; “As extreme weather events increase, we must design and build infrastructures respecting river flow and topography,” says former Energy Secretary Dwarika Nath Dhungel. “We must make the best use of our water resources, but not by letting excavators loose everywhere mining riverbeds and building haphazardly where we shouldn’t.”&nbsp; Although no project can be disaster-proof, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/banner/climate-smarter-himalayan-infrastructure">climate smart design</a> can minimise damage from flash floods and landslides. Recent disasters have driven up insurance premiums for energy projects in Nepal, and smaller ones cannot even afford them. The 456MW Upper Tamakosi hydroelectric project which is still not fully functional after the September floods has claimed insurance worth Rs1.8 billion. The alternative to high risk high investment hydropower projects is <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/what-s-cooking-in-nepal-besides-politics">energy diversification</a> to other renewables such as solar, wind or biogas. Nepal gets annual sunlight of 300 days with 6-7 hours on average to total 50,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) per year.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250718060744_4acd452b4117180ca9bb5d3be839ff46dfd5464e4d507f5ad3704cef6253bc48.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20250718060744_4acd452b4117180ca9bb5d3be839ff46dfd5464e4d507f5ad3704cef6253bc48" data-rendition-name="original" width="1080" height="720" loading="lazy" alt="solar power"> <figcaption>Farmers in Tarai using solar powered water pump. Photo: GHAMPOWER</figcaption> </figure>  The Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment (SWERA) calculates that Nepal could source 3,000MW from wind energy alone, considering 10% of the area with more than 300W/m2 wind power density. <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/people-power/decentralising-power-in-nepal">Solar energy</a> stations are cheaper and quicker to build, and would be an ideal alternative to reliance on hydropower.&nbsp; “There has been some investment in solar power, especially from the state sector,” says water expert Madhukar Upadhyay. “But there is an issue of land acquisition since the arrays need a lot of space. It is comparatively easier to get a permit to put up a hydropower plant on a river.” As for biogas, there is simply no incentive to build on past success with household level plants to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/more-bullshit">promote industrial-scale production</a>. Scaling up biogas by integrating it with urban biodegradable waste would still be a viable alternative to LPG.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20250718060744_715d44afd5eb4ba8dafa209b0ad0f19400665797b5f078f5636821e600f96684.jpg" data-media-id="editor_12" data-image-id="20250718060744_715d44afd5eb4ba8dafa209b0ad0f19400665797b5f078f5636821e600f96684" data-rendition-name="original" width="1419" height="954" loading="lazy" alt="windmill"> <figcaption>A wind mill in Hapsikot in Nawalpur. Photo: WINPOWER NEPAL</figcaption> </figure>  Nepal’s public sphere is buzzing with excitement over the discovery of potentially 430 billion cubic metres of methane gas beneath Dailekh district that, if properly harnessed, would meet the country’s energy demand for the next 50 years. Even though a feasibility study is awaited, politicians from the prime minister down see this as a petro bonanza that will make Nepal rich. But drilling, storage and distribution of CNG in the country’s current kleptocratic state make that unlikely. If Nepal was to get rich solely on its hydro-energy potential, it could have done so in the past 50 years. Says Dhungel: “This is not exactly a new discovery, but it is premature to celebrate until its extraction is proven to be cost effective. And let us hope it does not get <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/balance-of-power">tangled in geopolitics</a>, since China is involved in the prospecting and drilling, which could make India uneasy.”&nbsp; The country suffers from the Dutch Disease curse even before its resource is fully exploited. And the same cronyism, corruption and rent-seeking structure cannot deliver the riches we expect from Dailekh’s methane discovery. Now, <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/right-climate-for-nepal-s-energy-transition">with hydropower in jeopardy</a>, Nepal’s planners will have to evolve a new strategy for energy security into the future. But first, governance needs to be cleaned up with long-term strategic planning that takes climate risk into account. For example, do we need to mine fossil gas when there are renewable options? Will Dailekh take Nepal away from its climate commitments? Says Madhukar Upadhyay: “Nepal has always been resource rich and management poor. And the larger the resource, the bigger our management incapacity. It is a societal malaise.”&nbsp;

geopolitics