Neither side lost, both sides won

It is widely known that a significant trade and currency dispute between Nepal and Tibet that began in 1788 led to a military conflict between China and the Gorkha Kingdom.

The outcome of this Sino-Gorkha War in 1791-92, particularly the question of who emerged victorious, however, remained uncertain and subject to debate. The emergence of a hitherto unknown war report of 1793 sheds not only new light on this question, but may also offer insights into contemporary global peace challenges.

Scholars relying on Chinese and Tibetan sources assert that China emerged victorious, and that Nepal was required to dispatch a quinquennial mission bearing valuable goods to the imperial palace in Beijing. 

Chinese scholar Wei Yuan, in his Military History of the Qing Dynasty (Shèngwu Ji) wrote: ‘The request of the rebels (the Gorkhalis) for surrender was granted.’ 

Similarly, an inscription from 1792, found on a stone slab beneath the Potala in Lhasa, attributed to the Chinese emperor, reads: ‘Now that the Gorkhas have submitted to me, the imperial army has been withdrawn.’ Qing paintings also depict an ostentatious victory banquet.

However, this claim of Chinese victory has been occasionally contradicted by Nepali and Western scholars who both rely on scarce Nepali sources. For example, the Nepalikabhupa-Vamsavali (misleadingly known as the ‘Wright Chronicle’) states: ‘(King Rana Bahadur Shah) killed the Chinese army. He thus caused the Chinese Emperor to praise him.’ 

Additionally, a letter attributed to Rana Bahadur Shah, addressed to officials sent for the conquest of Kumaon Garhwal and published in 1957 by Dhana Bajra Bajracharya and Jnana Mani Nepala in Aitihasik Patrasamgraha (Vol 1.56-61), supports the notion of Nepali victory.

Recently, a comprehensive Nepali war report has come to light, previously only indirectly or partially known. This report (sandhi) from 1793AD has been published by the project Documents on the History of Religion and Law of Pre-modern Nepal, a collaboration between the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the National Archives in Kathmandu, established in 2016. 

The sandhi and its translation by Manik Bajracharya, Rajan Khatiwoda and Axel Michaels is publicly accessible. According to this 28-folio text, which details the course of the war from the initial clashes in Tibet in 1788 to the so-called Treaty of Betrawati in late 1792, Nepal emerged victorious in the final and decisive battle at Betrawati near Nuwakot.

The sandhi recounts: ‘After realising that his troops had been defeated and had fled, the Minister (General Fuk’anggan) observed them through his binoculars and issued the following order: “Establish a strong checkpoint at the Betrawati bridge and do not allow any fleeing soldier who crosses the Betrawati river to pass. Chop off the nose of anyone who tries to cross, and also send additional troops.” The Minister himself came to this side of the bridge with 13 cannons. At that time, the Gorkha Maharaja’s troops at the checkpoint pushed back the Chinese troops to Betrawati. Since the Chinese troops were in a hurry, they were unable to complete building a new bridge. 

In their rush to cross the bridge, many Chinese soldiers drowned in the Betrawati. The remaining soldiers threw two cannons into the river out of fear of the Gorkha Maharaja’s troops, and many of them jumped into the river and died. When the Minister witnessed the defeat of his troops, he opened the way over the old bridge

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The sandhi continues with a peace offer in a quoted letter from the Chinese General to Rana Bahadur Shah: “In the midst of battle, victories and defeats are common occurrences. In such circumstances, no one should lose heart. Previously, I had communicated to the Gorkha Maharaja that we would resolve matters upon reaching Nuwakot. I had also instructed my troops to remain on this side of the bridge. Despite these precautions, we suffered losses (literally, ‘my troops died’). Let us consider this a tragic play, witnessed by myself. The populace, especially the underprivileged, must now feel extremely fearful. 'The Gorkha Maharaja and the British Resident need not fret about vacating Nuwakot, as I have decided to abandon my intention of advancing there. […] I will now draft a letter to the venerable Maharaja to appease him. I request you to also correspond with him, agreeing to the terms I will propose. If we can come to an agreement, I will withdraw my troops from your realm, report to the Chinese Emperor, persuade him, and arrange for numerous gifts (khillat) to be sent to the venerable Gorkha Maharaja and the venerable saheba [Kirkpatrick].'

It appears that both sides claimed victory. How was this possible? The key lies in the differing interpretations of the gifts exchanged. The Chinese referred to them as tribute (Chinese: gòng), while the Nepalis understood them primarily as ‘gifts’ (saugat, koseli). The sandhi details the agreed-upon terms:

After five years, a representative of the Gorkha Maharaja will journey with a petition and offerings (saugat) to the Chinese Emperor, pay homage, and return with news.

The Gorkha Maharaja and the King of Lhasa (the Dalai Lama) shall maintain their friendship and refrain from further hostilities, while both parties retain their respective territories.

It was further decided that in transactions in Tibet, the unalloyed mahindramallī of the Gorkha Maharaja would be accepted at face value, while adulterated coins would be valued accordingly.

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Any enemy threat to the Gorkha Maharaja’s troops should be reported to the Chinese Emperor for potential military assistance.

However, the existence of a formal peace treaty, the so-called Treaty of Betrawati, remains uncertain. The exact wording of this treaty has yet to be found in Nepali, Chinese or eventually Indian archives. In 1909, Padma Jang Bahadur Rana, the third son of Prime Minister Jang Bahadur, published an English text of the treaty without presenting an original document. 

Nepali scholar Yogi Naraharinath published a summary of this ‘contract’ in his Itihasa Prakashma Sandhi Patra Sangraha (BS 2012, vol. 1, p. 121), which closely aligns with the aforementioned points. He also notes that the treaty, written in English, is currently housed in the Jaisikothā office in Kathmandu.

Paragraph 6 of this ‘treaty’ discusses the exchange of ‘products of their own country (aphaphna desha-ma ujjeko vastu)’ (Nepal and Tibet) to be sent to China every five years.

This clause is pivotal, as it raises the question: are these products considered gifts, as most scholars understand them, or tribute payments? If interpreted as tribute, it would suggest that China emerged victorious and that Nepal acknowledged Chinese suzerainty. However, the sandhi mentions ceremonial and honorary gifts (najara) and presents (tohapha) sent to the Chinese emperor only in the preliminary peace agreement of 1789, negotiated in Kerung. All subsequent documents refer to saugat, meaning “gift” or “present”.

For me, the answer to this question simultaneously resolves the conflict: both sides interpreted the terms differently, allowing each to declare victory. Sometimes, wars conclude with arrangements that enable both sides to claim success. Despite China’s evident superiority, Nepal avoided comprehensive defeat, while China failed to advance to Kathmandu, settling for an envoy (Amban) instead.

Therefore, the Treaty of Betrawati offered certain advantages to both parties, albeit to varying degrees. The Rana prime ministers, grappling with issues of legitimacy, sought recognition as legitimate rulers through missions to China. Emphasising the importance of regular missions, the emperors placed Nepal on the outer periphery of their network of tributary states known as the Cefeng system, asserting their claim to universal power.

The Treaty of Betrawati also highlights the divergent views on China’s suzerainty over Nepal (and Tibet). The lack of a clear victor in the war and Nepal’s relatively low significance to China contributed to this discrepancy. In addition to border reorganisation and fortification through watchtower construction, Nepal fulfilled smaller obligations such as returning looted items from the Tashi Lhunpo monastery. 

However, the five-year missions remained Nepal’s primary commitment, despite the Gorkha government’s increasing reluctance to fulfil them, ultimately discontinuing them from 1906 onwards.

Conversely, China provided no military aid to Nepal, even during the Anglo-Nepal War of 1814-16, despite the agreements in the Treaty of Betrawati. Its impact was more pronounced in Tibet, where it led to the presence of influential Ambans like Song Yun (1752-1835) and diminished the authority of the Dalai Lama. 

The sandhi states: ‘While the Gorkha Maharaja’s Kaji and the (Dalai) Lama of Bhot (Tibet) once held political sway, they (the Tibetans) are now considered subjects/cultivators (raiyata) of China. In Bhot, Chinese directives govern all tasks.’

Thus, the Treaty of Betrawati underscores the parties’ contrasting views on China’s dominion over Nepal (and Tibet). The absence of a clear victor in the war, coupled with Nepal’s limited significance to China, contributed to this disparity. 

Despite border reorganisation and watchtower construction, Nepal’s fulfilment of smaller obligations, such as returning looted items from Tashi Lhunpo, and discontinuation of the five-year missions, China’s impact was more pronounced in Tibet, where it exerted authority through influential Ambans and curtailed the Dalai Lama’s power.

There are many ways to end a war – through victory and surrender, truce, scarce resources, fatigue or attrition. Even if there are only limited lessons to be learned from history, the solution to the Sino-Gorkha war, in which both parties could see themselves as winners, may make it seem advisable to rethink today’s military conflicts. 

Axel Michaels is with the Centre for Asian and Transcultural Studies (CATS) / Südasien-Institut der Universität Heidelberg and author of Nepal — A History from the Earliest Times to the Present Oxford University Press, 2024.