In a swift and decisive move, US forces abducted Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States. The current government in Caracas has little choice but to largely submit to Washington’s dictates.&nbsp;
Trump’s motives for the war against Iran remain unclear, partly because the US president has cited various reasons: to finally destroy the Iranian nuclear program, to end the Iranian threat to the Middle East, to support the Iranian people, and to overthrow the terrible regime in Tehran. He remains vague about his reasoning and seems to make off the cuff suggestions for regime change.&nbsp;
Trump had a lofty idea at how he envisions the end of this war. He has suggested “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/2026/03/why-iran-regime-wont-surrender/686422/" target="_blank">unconditional surrender</a>,” followed by his personal involvement in the <a href="https://www.axios.com/2026/03/05/iran-leader-trump-khamenei" target="_blank">selection of a successor</a>: I must be involved in picking Iran’s next leader.
The swift victory against Iran failed to materialise, an end to the war is not in sight, and a new leader has been chosen without Trump’s involvement. The structures of the mullah regime appear so entrenched that the anticipated regime change following the rapid decapitation of the leadership did not occur. Yet Donald Trump had <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/13/magazine/iran-trump-regime-change-history-eisenhower.html" target="_blank">proclaimed</a>: “What we did in Venezuela is, in my opinion, the perfect, the perfect scenario.”&nbsp;
<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/2026/03/trump-venezuela-hostile-takeover/686469/" target="_blank">The Atlantic</a> calls this attitude a “hostile corporate takeover of an entire country”. Now the <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2026/03/17/politics/video/trump-cuba-honor-ldn-digvid" target="_blank">US government</a> expects Cuba to surrender. “I think I could do anything I want” with Cuba, Trump declared, now that the island is virtually cut off from energy supplies and its economy is in ruins. He is demanding the removal of Cuban President Diaz-Canel.
In the business world hostile corporate takeovers sometimes work, sometimes they fail. Similarly with Trump’s idea of swift government surrenders. In the case of Iran, he was misguided by the Wall Street playbook. Irresponsibly, he called on Iranians to overthrow the government before the bombing campaign started. Regime change in Iran has now been forgotten and Trump is agnostic about democracy. He is interested to get the oil price down and the stock market up.
Lessons from the past
The concept of regime change—replacing the top of the government to install one more agreeable to the US—is not new to US foreign policy. Proponents of regime change usually point to Japan and Germany as positive examples of successful democratisation. Often, however, the goal is not, or at least not primarily, democratisation, but rather the installation of a government that is ideologically close to the US or amenable to them.&nbsp;
But the “Trump Corollary”, as explicitly stated in the National Security Strategy to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, is not new either. In reality, it was already the Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, and Bush doctrine.
Both Trump’s idea of ​​regime change and his rigorously pursued territorial ambitions (Canada, Greenland, the Panama Canal) are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, particularly the version of this doctrine expanded by President Roosevelt in 1904.&nbsp;
This doctrine legitimised American interventions in Latin America. At the beginning of the 20th century, the US intervened in numerous Latin American countries in ‘its backyard’, using military and intelligence means: in Colombia, to support Panamanian separatists in controlling the Panama Canal; repeatedly in the Dominican Republic; they occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909 and intervened there repeatedly afterward; in Nicaragua during the so-called ‘Banana War’, to protect the interests of the US company United Fruit; in Mexico, as well as in Haiti and Honduras.
<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/13/magazine/iran-trump-regime-change-history-eisenhower.html" target="_blank">The New York Times</a> recently suggested that Trump’s current enthusiasm for regime change is most comparable to that of Dwight D. Eisenhower. During his two terms in office from 1953 to 1961, the once coldly calculating general allowed himself to be seduced into a downward spiral from one coup to the next.&nbsp;
In 1953, the US succeeded in overthrowing the elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh with Operation Ajax. Mossadegh wanted to nationalise the British-owned oil industry. The coup succeeded with CIA support. The US installed the Shah as its puppet. He ruled with absolute power until the so-called Iranian Revolution and the dictatorship of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.&nbsp;
After the successful overthrow of the government in Iran, Eisenhower decided to intervene in Guatemala. The elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who initiated far-reaching land reform laws, was overthrown in a coup d’état in 1954 and replaced by the pro-American colonel, Castillo Armas.
During this period, the US government also formulated the so-called domino theory, which aimed to prevent governments, particularly in Asia, from aligning themselves with the Soviet Union. The assumption was that if one domino fell, others would follow. It was during this time that the costly war in Korea ended in an armistice. Therefore, countries like Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, and others were on Eisenhower’s domino list.&nbsp;
However, the destabilisation campaigns carried out by the CIA sometimes had the opposite effect. Governments in Indonesia and Syria emerged strengthened from the interventions. Eisenhower left Kennedy with the loss of American influence in Cuba. The failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961, intended to overthrow Fidel Castro, was the starting point for the decades-long blockade of Cuba, which Trump is determined to end now through regime change.
The most dramatic example of failed regime change in recent history is undoubtedly the Iraq War, which began in 2003 under President George W. Bush. The stated goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy his weapons of mass destruction. The war led to the overthrow of the regime.&nbsp;
The United Nations and US teams found no weapons of mass destruction despite intensive on-site investigations. Attempts to establish an orderly state in Iraq failed. These experiences, and especially the disastrous outcome of two decades of military intervention in Afghanistan, discredited the concept of regime change.
What are the implications?
The most important lesson taught by efforts to affect externally forced regime change is that interventions often lead to crises that were ostensibly meant to be prevented or solved. The temptation was too great for Trump to miss the opportunity to depose the despised Maduro government.
Scholarly studies of the numerous attempted regime changes and democratisation efforts reveal three key findings. First, simply removing the government from power (whether through assassination, as in the case of Saddam Hussein in Iraq or now in Iran, or through kidnapping as in Venezuela) is insufficient, as such actions often lead to chaos, state collapse, or even civil war. Thus, it will be interesting to watch further developments in Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran.
A second lesson from empirical studies of regime change is that democratisation is more likely to succeed if democratic experience already existed in the country. However, this is often not the case.
Finally, if the real goal is democratisation (and not just to secure spheres of influence or oil supplies etc.), it is far more promising not only to hold elections (as in Afghanistan, for example), but to renounce violence and initiate a long-term program with development aid and support for civil society.
Whether the US government will be impressed by these findings, or even acknowledge them, is doubtful. Currently, the American president is euphoric, despite the strong reaction from the Iranian government which he, surprisingly, did not expect. His promises to end the senseless wars and not start any new ones, however, seem to have been forgotten.
Herbert Wulf is a Professor of International Relations and former Director of the Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC).
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and has been republished from <a href="http://toda.org/global-outlooks/regime-change-sometimes-it-works-often-it-doesnt/">the original</a> with permission.

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Opinion

Regime change – sometimes it works, often it doesn’t

In the first six days of the United States military campaign against Iran, Washington spent $11.3 billion, according to a Pentagon briefing to Senate appropriations staff. The entire annual operating budget of the United Nations stands at $3.45 billion for 2026, covering diplomacy, political missions, human rights monitoring, and the institutional machinery designed to prevent conflict. In less than a week, one country spent more than three times what the world invests in preventing conflict over an entire year.&nbsp;
Since then, the Pentagon has asked the US Congress for more than $200 billion in supplemental funding to sustain the campaign and replenish depleted munitions stocks.
This is not an anomaly. It reflects a structural feature of the international system: the consistent overfunding of war and the chronic underinvestment in prevention.
The imbalance is not primarily about scarcity. Global military expenditure exceeded $2.2 trillion in 2024 and continues to rise across regions. Over the same period, funding for multilateral institutions has stagnated or declined in real terms. The United Nations, whose core mandate is the maintenance of international peace and security, operates on a budget modest by the standards of national governments, with many member states in arrears on their assessed contributions. This pattern reflects a political economy that consistently privileges the financing of conflict over the financing of prevention.
Part of the explanation lies in political incentives. Military spending is visible, immediate, and readily justified to domestic audiences. It signals resolve and responsiveness to threat, and political leaders can mobilise support for such expenditure quickly, often with limited scrutiny once a crisis is framed in security terms.
Prevention operates differently. When diplomacy succeeds, when tensions de-escalate, when mediation holds, there is no spectacle and no clear political dividend. Success registers as absence. This asymmetry between the visibility of war and the invisibility of peace systematically distorts how resources are allocated.
Institutional dynamics reinforce this bias. Defence establishments are typically well-resourced and embedded in decision-making systems. Diplomatic and development institutions are more fragmented, more vulnerable to cuts, and often politically marginal.
In several major donor countries, development agencies have been weakened or absorbed into broader foreign policy structures, reducing their ability to act early and independently. At the multilateral level, the United Nations depends on assessed contributions that are frequently delayed or withheld, alongside voluntary funding that is unpredictable and often earmarked. Peacebuilding remains one of the least funded areas of the system, despite repeated recognition that prevention is more cost-effective than response.
The consequences are cumulative and mutually reinforcing. When preventive diplomacy capacities are under-resourced, opportunities for de-escalation narrow and conflicts are more likely to reach the point where military intervention appears unavoidable. When the United Nations is tasked with managing complex crises without adequate or predictable funding, its performance is constrained, reinforcing perceptions of ineffectiveness and further eroding political support for multilateral solutions.&nbsp;
The costs of conflict are then externalised globally: military escalation in strategically sensitive regions disrupts energy markets, trade routes, and supply chains, with the resulting increases in fuel and food prices falling disproportionately on low- and middle-income countries. A
t the same time, decisions to mobilise large-scale resources for military operations are typically taken within executive branches, with limited sustained public debate, while the underfunding of diplomacy and development is normalised as a technical constraint rather than recognised as a strategic choice.
It would be misleading to argue that the use of force is never justified. States face real security threats, and there are circumstances in which military action is deemed necessary. In the case of Iran, however, a functioning diplomatic framework had already demonstrated that constraints on its nuclear programme were achievable. The diplomatic option was dismantled, not exhausted. Senior American intelligence officials stated publicly that Iran was years away from the threat cited to justify the campaign.&nbsp;
But the current structure of incentives ensures that diplomacy is too often set up to fail: under-resourced before it begins, and then judged ineffective when crises escalate.
Rebalancing this political economy requires more than incremental budget adjustments. At the national level, it means integrating preventive approaches into foreign and security policy with corresponding investments in diplomatic capacity, development partnerships, and early warning systems, alongside greater transparency in how resources are allocated between military and non-military instruments.&nbsp;
At the multilateral level, member states need to provide more predictable and adequate financing for the United Nations, particularly in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Addressing arrears in assessed contributions and strengthening flexible funding mechanisms would be immediate steps. Coalitions of middle powers, countries with a strong interest in a stable international order but less directly engaged in great power competition, have a particular role in advancing practical initiatives on prevention financing and institutional reform.
The issue is not whether resources exist. The scale of global military expenditure makes clear that they do. The question is whether states are willing to treat prevention not as an aspiration, but as a strategic priority.
As long as the current imbalance persists, the system will continue to produce the same outcome: rapid mobilisation of resources for war, and chronic underinvestment in the institutions that might make war less likely. This is not a failure of capacity. It is a failure of political choice.
Jordan Ryan is a member of the Toda International Research Advisory Council (TIRAC) at the Toda Peace Institute, and former UN Assistant Secretary-General with extensive experience in international peacebuilding, human rights, and development policy.
This article was issued by the Toda Peace Institute and has been republished from <a href="https://toda.org/global-outlooks/why-the-world-funds-war-but-starves-peace/">the original</a> with permission.

World funds war but starves peace

<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/homecoming-at-election-time" target="_blank">Pappu Mahara</a>'s campaign for RSP began in Malaysia as he came to Nepal with a suitcase plastered with PM Balendra Shah’s photo. 
Last week, after what he considers a “job well done” he was flying back to Malaysia with a suitcase without the election poster but with high hopes for his, and Nepal’s, future.
On Thursday, the day of his flight, the first session of Parliament was underway. Addressing the House, RSP Chair Rabi Lamichhane made an apology to Nepal’s Dalit community. 
Pappu was traveling to Malaysia with Lalit and Abhinash and all three are members of the Dalit community working in a factory to provide for families back home. Migration is an equaliser: it connects talent which is universal with opportunities that are not. It allows people a fresh start no matter their circumstances.
What we do not talk about as much, however, is that this <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/valuing-moral-migration" target="_blank">equaliser</a> itself is not equally accessible. Access to migration requires money, networks and information – all of which are unevenly distributed.
Among the three, Abhinash was part of an initiative by Migration Lab and the group International Manpower Recruitment targeted at the Musahar community to make meaningful migration accessible to all. He did not pay a single penny. He got exactly the job he had been promised. 
Abhinash and other Dalit youth may still have migrated despite not having money, but they would have had to borrow to pay hefty recruitment fees to fraudulent agents. The Musahar cohort <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/fee-free-migration-is-possible" target="_blank">included</a> workers who were victims to passport confiscation by middlemen without any job placement. 
As they prepared to fly back to Malaysia after a 45 day break, the three workers were examples of how targeted labour mobility can be designed to ensure migration benefits the poorest.
One answer is scale: reaching more marginalised communities with ethical recruitment pathways so more people can benefit.
The other is to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/social-remittance" target="_blank">link</a> them to countries offering even higher salaries and better protections for migrant workers.
Abhinash and others would have typically gone to India, a low-cost, low-risk and low-return destination, but they went to Malaysia where returns are significantly higher. But returns are relative: a Nepali in a Malaysian factory earns a basic salary of $422. The same factory job in Korea would pay $1,500 per month. In both cases, overtime hours add to the income.
But there is a catch. Barriers to entry are higher for countries like Korea. Workers have to learn the language and pass a test, unlike Malaysia when an employer interview is sufficient. We helped youth prepare for the job interview so they could show up in the best way possible and pass. But helping workers with language preparation is a wholly different proposition.
In interactions with youth from the Musahar community, I have often asked them informally why they do not opt for Korea. Abhinash, Lalit or others could easily pass the Korean language test if they put their minds to it.
There is lack of information (even misinformation) about migrating to places like Korea. Village-based agents will not share information about the Korean labour market in the villages because it is a government-to-government initiative where brokers have no role at all. 
While not a representative sample, many youth I spoke with do not know such details: how to apply, what the benefits are and how much it can cost. Abhinash thought that it costs upto Rs800,000 to migrate to Korea, which is not true. Actually a Korea placement costs just Rs70,000 which can easily be recuperated in less than a month.
There is also a network barrier. Musahar youth I spoke with did not know a single person who had migrated to Korea or Japan. Not knowing anyone who has attempted to go to Korea or Japan makes it daunting and out of reach. 
We have witnessed this first hand in the case of ethical migration in Malaysia. Word of mouth is one of the most important sources of job information for workers. Friends of Abhinash and Lalit ask us if there are similar ethical opportunities. It takes just one cohort to change perceptions of the unknown, we have learnt.
Lalit is setting up a WhatsApp group with peers from his village who also wanted to get jobs without recruitment fees. He already has a friend that he put in a good word about, 
“My friend is very smart and educated, but has never worked in his life,” he says. It was an honest referral, but not a blind one. 
When we create labour mobility initiatives, a part of the wider goal is also to enable such knock-on effects like building networks, role models, mentors, and reliable sources of information. Only then can we eliminate fraudulent actors.
The government’s apology to the Dalit community for historic discrimination has to be followed through with concrete action. This means creating job opportunities, including for foreign employment that are transformational.
This is in line with RSP’s own manifesto. Goal number 80 states: ‘Families from Dalit and marginalised communities who wish to go abroad for employment will be provided with concessional loans through banks based on recommendations or guarantees from local authorities.’
This commitment can be realised in many innovative ways so people from marginalized communities have access to not just any migration but the most rewarding, safe and transformational ones. 
Unlike India, Malaysia and the Gulf, access to high-return markets like Korea and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/nepal-japan-jobs-deal-still-stuck" target="_blank">Japan</a> has a more rigorous preparatory and selection stage. What barriers, for example, do youth from underserved communities like the Musahar face in accessing language preparation classes? Are there gaps in finances, social networks or reliable information that can be addressed? Can they access high-quality instruction? Sometimes, the barriers may be invisible like our own limiting beliefs stemming from unfamiliarity and lack of guidance and role models.
Publicly available administrative data on outmigration is not disaggregated for caste and other factors to help who is migrating, and by extension, who is not.
Not all migration is the same, and <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/labour-mobility/our-great-stories" target="_blank">Nepalis</a> understand this all too well. Some return worse off than when they left, others are engaged in “survival migration”. Some come back having built assets or to build thriving businesses. A successful <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/labour-mobility/helping-migrant-returnees-to-pivot-2urk8oo9" target="_blank">returnee</a> contributing to Nepal is inevitably a function of their migration experience: how much they earned, saved, learned, and were protected.
The earlier we become intentional through better program design, training partnerships, recruitment practices, and employer selection, the more likely it is to create positive and lasting change for migrants and their families. That we have an action oriented, proactive government gives us hope. 
We met Abhinash when he had doubts about whether he could actually migrate without paying fees. Now, back home for a break, he encouraged others to migrate ethically directly through recruiters and avoid middlemen. He has bought land, and now plans to build a house on it within the next two years.
A youth from the Musahar community or someone from Bajura should have the information and resources to migrate for rewarding overseas jobs if they wish to do so and to break out of the broker-trap that puts them in vulnerable positions. The new government should undertake measures to ensure that this great equaliser is also equally accessible to all.
Upasana Khadka heads Migration Lab, a social enterprise aimed at making migration outcomes better for workers and their families. Labour Mobility is a regular column in Nepali Times.

Upasana Khadka

Labour Mobility

The great equaliser

In a classic arc of political sociology, a revolutionary figure takes several decades to complete their cycle: mobilisation, institutionalisation, and finally governance. 
However, the timeline of this trajectory has been telescoped in the case of Home Minister Sudan Gurung, who in 2025 described himself as a social activist and volunteer, has gone from the barricades of the GenZ protests to the mahogany desk of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Gurung is a personal pick of Prime Minister Balendra Shah, and played a pivotal role in getting him to join the RSP by mediating with Rabi Lamichhane. His journey serves as a real test bed for the ‘Outsider-to-Insider Transition’, raising a fundamental question about someone who now leads the very apparatus that he once fought against: the police, intelligence service, and the bureaucracy.
Social capital can indeed be built during a crisis exacerbated by state failure, and that is where we first see Sudan Gurung — expediting relief delayed by systemic corruption and red tape. Gurung’s delivery aid through a social-media-driven volunteer network bypassed the government. 
Whether or not he really rushed a dying child to hospital after the 2015 earthquake does not matter, it has become an urban legend. 
His work evolved into the non-profit Hami Nepal in 2020, serving as a ‘parallel state’ mechanism that would later become central to his public identity. Later, his group sprang into action during the Covid crisis, organising oxygen cylinders and beds . He was there after flood disasters in Manang and Sidhupalchok, and even organised Rs15m worth of aid to Turkey after the 2023 earthquake. 
Moral Legitimacy became his primary source of power, and he strategically positioned himself as an alternative emergency response system. But the real rupture happened on 8 September 2025 when years of frustration, corruption scandals, lack of transparency and state accountability culminated in a rally that the next day descended into anarchy. 
There was no single leader. The movement was fully decentralised, but as elsewhere such upheavals produces a recognisable face. Among them was Sudan Gurung. Who despite being a millennial himself, became the most visible interlocutor of the GenZ movement. 
He negotiated with the state’s key actors, including the president and the Chief of Army staff, during the period of uncertainty When the country was on the brink. This led to the dissolution of parliament and the formation of the interim government under Sushila Karki, paving the way for the election on 5 March.
Since then, Sudan Gurung’s role has become contradictory. Within days of touching Prime Minister Karki’s feet after her swearing in, he was at the gates of Baluwatar spearheading midnight demonstrations calling for her resignation. He accused her and Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal of not consulting the youth over Cabinet appointments and not arresting the previous government officials.
This oscillation became a hallmark of Gurung’s own version of the ‘Radical Flank Effect’ — erratic behaviour to force the establishment to make concessions. 
On 18 January Gurung formally joined the RSP, and started campaigning from his home constituency of Gorkha-1. He won decisively and was appointed home minister by Balendra Shah. The transition was complete. 
As minister his role spans core security areas: overseeing internal security through the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and the intelligence bureau. The man who took part in anti-government rallies is now in charge of the riot police that aresupposed control anti-government protests.
His portfolio also handles state administration matters such as citizenship, immigration, and border security, coordinates with the judicial system on prisons, detention, and policies related to punishment and clemency. For example will be overseeing the fraud case against his own party’s chair, Lamichhane.
In his book Power in Movement, political scientist Sidney Tarrow observes that social movement leaders encounter ‘institutional capture’ upon entering government. In a sociological paradox, the man who previously denounced the police for killing youth protesters is now the person who issues directives to those same forces.
Preventive detention, surveillance, and the control of public festivals are the same instruments that the former old guard employed to stifle his movement. The activist who demanded transparency at the B P Koirala Institute now manages the state’s most secretive security apparatus.
In this arc, Gurung is not alone, there are parallels around the world for leaders emerging from the ashes of revolt. It is not so much a prediction, but for Gurung the challenge is even more acute because youth expectations are so high.
The bar for performance has been raised by citizens demanding change and quicker, more efficient service delivery. He is under constant public scrutiny, which is why he has to take YouTubers every time he goes on inspections of the airport, the BP Highway, police stations, picking trash on the sidewalks or meeting the Swiss ambassador to ask about repatriating the ill-gotten wealth of politicians.
Sudan Gurung is facing intense public glare. There have been calls to reveal the truth behind Hami Nepal’s finances, the alleged links to Free Tibet, and lately not paying five years of rent for an illegal lakefront property in Pokhara. 
As minister, he will find that moral legitimacy alone is no longer sufficient, it must be reinforced by transparent and consistent institutional accountability. Sudan Gurung’s ascent is evidence that the public mostly trusts ‘outsiders’ during times of crisis. However, history also cautions us that the state only permits ‘insiders’ to operate. 
Gurung will have to organise systemic reform to inject the transparency of his volunteer days to the Home Ministry’s traditionally secretive disbursements. If he fails, he runs the risk of validating Michels’ Iron Law of Oligarchy, which would serve as a warning about how revolutionary energy is dissipated by the very structures it was intended to overthrow.
Nepal is watching the man who said he once held a dying child in his arms after an earthquake. The volunteer has become the Warden.
Nischal Raj Gautam is a student of Media Studies and Mass Communication at St. Xavier's College, Maitighar. He is a member of the EU Delegation's Youth Sounding Board (YSB), and a journalist for TheirWorld's The Education Issue 2026.

He said no to politics. Now he runs it.

The Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) that swept Nepal’s post-GenZ election last month has taken office at a fraught period in global geopolitics. The <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-myth-of-red-lines">war in West Asia </a>could potentially reshape the world order with far-reaching<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/fuel-price-shock-hits-nepal-aviation"> strategic and economic consequences for Nepal</a> and the region.&nbsp;
The foreign policy of any state is largely dependent on the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/the-spheres-of-influence-illusion">extant structural features of the international system</a>, and Nepal and its remittance-driven economy faces a challenging geo-strategic environment.&nbsp;
The position of the United States in international affairs is still largely unrivalled, and provides a rather large window into the country. But the impact of greater Chinese power in Nepal is not yet properly understood, while India has always been and will continue to exert regional hegemonic influence.&nbsp;
With 5% of the global population contributing to 20% of the world economy, and flexing 50% of military might, the United States looms large just about everywhere in the world, including Nepal. Its rivalry with an emergent China puts Nepal in strategic proximity.&nbsp;
Whether it is the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/mcc-gets-green-light-in-nepal">Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) project </a>or the State Partnership Program (SPP), if President Donald Trump and the State and Defense Departments want it done in Nepal, they will get it done. The more germane question is whether this is beneficial to long term regional peace and stability. That is a consideration Washington will surely have to take into account moving forward.
How all this corresponds, or not, to <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/nepal-india-power-play">Indian policy towards Kathmandu </a>is the real question that will affect Nepal, given the strained relations between Washington and New Delhi lately.&nbsp;
There should be no confusion that as far as New Delhi is concerned, Nepal is part and parcel of India’s grand security structure. It has always been so, going all the way back to the British period under Viceroy George Curzon, and perhaps even earlier.&nbsp;
The Chinese assessment of Nepal is defined by Beijing’s interest to ensure the stability and security of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Any great power wishes to expand its influence beyond its borders and China, after all, now considers itself a global power. It has the engineering and financial capability to project its interest on a neighbouring country like Nepal whose economy is 400 times smaller.&nbsp;
However, expansion of Chinese influence in Nepal becomes a <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/a-past-foretold">matter of historical significance</a> only because it comes up against what India regards as its sphere of influence. New Delhi’s power especially vis-a-vis neighbouring South Asian states is grossly underestimated. India is emerging as the next great power in Asia, and at the current juncture of history, China is unlikely to become an alternative to India in Nepal.&nbsp;
COUNTERWEIGHT
This is also improbable and impractical because of the current power distribution in the international system. The United States is an off-shore power balancer, and is unlikely to countenance projection of Chinese influence into Nepal beyond certain limits.
India is not just a fellow democracy, but also serves as a counterweight to US fears of Chinese dominance of Eurasia. Washington can be expected to exert ever possible influence to ensure that China is not a decisive power in Nepal.
It may be the case that Beijing does not wish to enlist itself in such a position either such a manoeuvre in the Himalayan frontiers of the Subcontinent could draw the United States still more deeply into the Nepal’s political tapestry.
The result would be a more combustible Nepal with too many friction points to manage, and lead to a veritable headache deleterious to regional peace and stability.
How the new government in Nepal maintains <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rsp-dos-and-don-ts">domestic peace and stability</a> will be closely watched in the region. It is a question contingent on a wait-and-see approach, as there are too many variables at play which cannot at present be set into watertight prognostications.
Nepal’s domestic politics therefore is governed by<a href="https://nepalitimes.com/review/some-chicken-some-neck"> international developments</a>. The first quarter of the 21st century is already characterised by the interplay of interdependent variables.
As the geopolitical thinker Robert Kaplan describes it, conditions are taut like in a musical instrument where too much pressure at one point on the string can disrupt the entire system in ways that are unpredictable.
How that will play out in Nepal will be a function of the intersection of civilian and military leadership within Nepal, and the tripolar contestation of China, India and the United States in the region.
Bhaskar Koirala is an independent analyst associated with Peking University.&nbsp;

Guest Editorial

Tripolar contestation over Nepal

The war in West Asia has exposed the fragility of the economic architecture Nepal has built on over two generations. If the conflict continues, growth across developing Asia will slow and prices will rise. For Nepal, this will be felt through higher living costs, weaker economic activity, and growing uncertainty for the millions of families who depend on remittances.&nbsp; Nepal now needs to structurally transform from exporting labour to investing in domestic job creation. &nbsp; The country's current path toward a knowledge economy has a blind spot. A <a href="https://iids.org.np/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/unleashing.pdf" target="_blank">report</a> by the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS) in Kathmandu shows that IT export companies alone generated 7,228 jobs and income for 66,509 freelancers.&nbsp; We are building digital labour export, not an economy that accumulates institutional knowledge. The Nepali Upwork developer and a migrant construction worker in the Gulf are engaged in the same economic activity, but with different tools. Nepal’s reliance on a <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?locations=NP" target="_blank">remittance-driven economy,</a> means the country has failed to create enough <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nepal/publication/unlocking-nepal-s-growth-potential" target="_blank">quality jobs</a> at home. For millions of young people, leaving the country is not a choice but a necessity to survive and support families back home. <a href="https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nepal/publication/unlocking-nepal-s-growth-potential" target="_blank">Remittances</a> have no doubt helped reduce poverty. Thirty years ago, 55% of Nepal’s population lived on less than $2.15 a day, now it is 20% after the absolute poverty line was revised upwards. This progress has come at a cost — &nbsp;an economy that depends more on exporting workers than creating opportunities at home. This development reflects a deeper political failure to create meaningful jobs within the country. Since the democratic transition in 1991, Nepal’s leadership has largely recycled the same faces, with limited progress on job creation or industrial growth.&nbsp; Nepal cannot build a <a href="https://nipore.org/accelerating-nepals-startups/" target="_blank">knowledge economy</a> while its most ambitious people are outbound to Doha and Tokyo. We are also not just losing ‘labour’. We are losing the entrepreneurial risk tolerance of our youth.&nbsp; If the most ambitious 25-year-olds are abroad, who is left to support innovation and entrepreneurship? The same people who are working tirelessly abroad, are our biggest asset for development. Their work ethic and the know-how inurban renewal could well fit into the new RSP government’s mandate of 7% annual growth.&nbsp; The <a href="https://english.biznessnews.com/posts/-nepal%E2%80%99s-it-exports-cross-1-billion-" target="_blank">$1B milestone</a> of IT exports is a celebratory moment for Nepal. However, that cannot lead to a pathway to a $100 billion economy without innovation ecosystems that go beyond individual labour export. Companies like SecurityPal and industry associations such as NASIT have made significant efforts in building such an environment, recently championed by private sector leaders as a &nbsp;<a href="https://www.securitypalhq.com/blog/silicon-peaks" target="_blank">Silicon Peaks</a> model that emphasises a home growth tech cluster. The need to accelerate this transition is even more urgent with the escalating conflict in West Asia. &nbsp;The recent International Labour Organisation (ILO) <a href="https://www.ilo.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/Nepal%20LDC%20Graduation%20Employment%20Impacts%20Report.pdf" target="_blank">report</a> shows that LDC graduation is expected to adversely impact manufacturing with losses of $1 billion by 2030.&nbsp; If manufacturing takes such a large hit from losing trade preferences, then Nepal’s services and IT sectors need to structurally transform and shift from exporting individual talent to building firms. &nbsp; A generation’s frustration has finally forced a shift in Nepal’s political structure, handing the new government a clear mandate to fix failures. But the question still persists: what prevents Nepal from achieving sustained, productivity-driven growth? &nbsp;&nbsp; RSP is in the right place at the right time to put Nepal's economy on a firm footing. At the heart of Nepal’s economic underperformance lies a major development binding constraint: low returns to investment on projects.&nbsp; The government invests like a high-growth economy, with gross capital formation at around <a href="https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.GDI.FTOT.ZS?locations=NP" target="_blank">25–30 percent of GDP</a>. Yet economic growth remains modest. The problem is not how much the country invests, but how little it gets in return. One way to see this is by looking at how much investment is required to generate growth.&nbsp; Nepal needs large amounts of capital to produce relatively small gains in output (graph, below). For instance, in 2024, the ICOR was 8.29, this suggests that Nepal had to invest more than 8 units of capital to produce a one unit of additional economic output.&nbsp;  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260406040412_605dc527641d2ff2dc5723ed8bbec946898331d5538a55b9941e32a0725bf811.jpg" data-media-id="editor_9" data-image-id="20260406040412_605dc527641d2ff2dc5723ed8bbec946898331d5538a55b9941e32a0725bf811" data-rendition-name="original" width="1827" height="925" loading="lazy" alt="Economy graph"> <figcaption>Source: Author's calculation based on a Growth Diagnostic simulation</figcaption> </figure>  This reflects a deeper issue in how investment is allocated and executed. Capital is often locked in low-productivity sectors or diluted by delays, inefficiencies, and policy uncertainty.&nbsp; As a result, even high levels of investment fail to translate into sustained growth. Until investment shifts toward productive, firm-building activities, higher spending alone will not deliver results. &nbsp; To reverse this, the government must focus on raising the returns to investment by enabling firms to grow and compete. This requires a shift from managing scarcity to creating an environment where capital can generate consistent and predictable returns. A central priority should be given to attracting and retaining both domestic and foreign private investment. Investors do not just respond to direct incentives, but also to policy stability in the country. Nepal’s economy cannot sustain high growth if its human capital continues to leave the country.&nbsp; The goal should not simply be to create jobs, but to build companies that scale, innovate, and compete beyond Nepal. This requires supporting sectors with strong productivity potential and ensuring that firms can expand without being constrained by infrastructure gaps or regulatory friction. Finally, the state must improve the quality of its own investment. Public spending should focus on lowering the cost of doing business through reliable electricity, efficient logistics, and digital infrastructure.&nbsp; The GenZ movement took two days to bring change. The economic transformation of Nepal might take a generation. The RSP can accelerate this transition, but only if it focuses on building a better investment climate for business and not just feeding the global labour pool. Kailash Raj Pandey is an MPA/ID and MBA candidate at Harvard Kennedy School and MIT Sloan School of Management and a fellow at MIT Kuo Sharper Center for Innovation and Prosperity.&nbsp; Siddhartha Raymajhí is a policy researcher based in Kathmandu.

Creating a firm future for Nepal

There is a term from psychology that has been quietly making its way into conversations among academics, policy thinkers, and ordinary citizens trying to make sense of what they are watching unfold: moral injury.&nbsp;
It is not the fear of being harmed. It is the damage done when human beings are forced to witness, or feel implicated in, events that violate their deepest convictions about right and wrong, about the rules by which civilisation is supposed to operate. It is what happens when everything you were taught to believe the world was built upon begins to dissolve in front of you in real time.
That dissolution is now a daily experience for millions of people. It arrives through screens, through speakers, directly into homes and offices and classrooms. The language of this moment is not the language of diplomacy or statecraft. It is the language of annihilation: eviscerate, decimate, stone age, eliminate, go fetch. These are not negotiating positions; they are performances.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/fuel-price-shock-hits-nepal-aviation">Fuel price shock hits Nepal aviation</a>, Nepali Times
Red lines, we were told, meant something. They were the architecture of deterrence, the invisible grammar of international order. For decades, this language organised how states behaved toward one another, how the public understood the limits of acceptable conduct, how generations of students were taught to think about power and its constraints.&nbsp;
Those students are now watching, in stunned disbelief, as line after line is crossed with impunity, and the consequences amount to more performance, more language, more noise. The red lines were always partly mythological — now they are undeniable.
DEMONSTRATION OF DOMINANCE
Power as performance changes everything about how conflicts unfold and how they end. When a war becomes primarily about the demonstration of dominance rather than the achievement of defined strategic objectives, there is no natural off-ramp.&nbsp;
Those who did not start this conflict and are most damaged by it may have to bear the unbearable reality that it must, to some degree, play itself out before any durable arrangement becomes possible. A forced resolution with no structural legitimacy would merely constitute an intermission.
Meanwhile, the real costs accumulate on a ledger that bravado consistently obscures: loss of life and livelihood, destroyed infrastructure and ecosystems, the hollowing out of a human rights architecture built over a century, and massive flows of displaced people.&nbsp;
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/when-geopolitics-becomes-lived-reality">When geopolitics becomes lived reality</a>, Sophia Kalantzakos
Beneath all of this is the quiet structural transformation of the global economy, where thousands of layoffs already demonstrate not a cyclical correction but a permanent reorganisation of how work, capital, and technology relate to one another.&nbsp;
Markets gyrate, offering opportunities for speculation that a small number of people can exploit while a much larger number absorb the losses. This is not volatility. It is displacement dressed up as opportunity.
Much is sacrificed in the process. Humanity is living through the greatest technological revolution of the 21st century: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/ai-takeover-of-all-media">artificial intelligence</a>, the energy transition, the restructuring of entire industrial systems, the preparation of workforces for a world that will look transformed sooner than we think. These challenges demand serious investment, serious governance, and serious political imagination.&nbsp;
The funds to prepare are instead being diverted to defence industries for conflicts driven by the logic of 19th- and 20th-century warfare. Bad things are happening, but importantly, our capacity to respond is being actively depleted while no one is looking.
This week, as these wars grind on and these words of annihilation fill the air, the largest initial public offering in history was confidentially filed, according to media reports. SpaceX, valued at potentially $1.75 trillion, prepares to raise more capital than any company has ever raised in a single public offering, with stated ambitions that include data centres in orbit and a base on the Moon.&nbsp;
The previous record belonged to Saudi Aramco, a company built on the fossil fuel economy whose contradictions we are still living inside.&nbsp;
The new record belongs to a company whose founding logic is that Earth is a problem to be escaped from rather than a home to be cherished. We cannot afford to be distracted from what is important by the deafening noise of performance power.
What does it actually mean to be powerful in the 21st century, not rhetorically, but structurally and durably. The states and leaders that will matter in the coming decades are those that invest in their populations, that govern the technological transition with foresight, that understand energy and resources and climate not as inconveniences but as the central organising facts of this era.&nbsp;
It is not a coincidence that so many global leaders are currently showing restraint, and in some cases quiet dignity, refusing to be drawn into the theatre of escalation.&nbsp;
They are calculating differently, working through back channels and careful diplomacy because they understand that any durable solution will have to be built on solid foundations. Coercion, arm-twisting, the transactional humiliation of allies and adversaries alike are not the tools of durable power. These are the tools used to dismantle rather than reform, to torch rather than adapt.
No doubt there were deep flaws in the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/might-might-be-right-after-all">unraveling international order</a>. It was uneven in its benefits, slow to reflect the rise of new powers, and ill-equipped for the challenges of this century. But it offered something that is now being actively upended: a degree of predictability, a framework of rules that created the conditions for negotiation and coexistence.&nbsp;
The better answer was never demolition. It was transformation, a harder and slower work that required exactly the kind of serious political imagination that performance power cannot supply.&nbsp;
The people absorbing moral injury today are not naive. They are paying attention. And the question that will define the coming decades is not whether the old order survives; it’s already too late for that. The question is what those who understand the stakes are willing to build in its place.
Sophia Kalantzakos is a Professor of Environmental Studies and Public Policy at New York University Abu Dhabi. She is the author of China and Geopolitics of Rare Earths and The EU, US, and China Tackling Climate Change: Policies and Alliances for the Anthropocene. This piece originally appeared in <a href="http://ekathimerini.com/" target="_blank">ekathimerini.com</a>. Reprinted with permission.

The myth of red lines

A year ago, the most pro-crypto president in US history had just returned to power after pandering to clueless retail crypto investors and receiving massive financial backing from semi-corrupt crypto insiders.&nbsp;
Donald Trump’s second coming was supposed to be a new dawn for crypto, leading various self-dealing evangelists to predict that bitcoin would become ‘digital gold’, reaching at least $200,000 by the end of 2025.
As promised, Trump did gut most crypto regulations. He also signed the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stable Coins (GENIUS) Act, pushed for the Digital Asset Market Clarity (CLARITY) Act, profited personally from shady domestic and foreign crypto deals, promoted his own useless meme coin, pardoned crypto crooks who had allegedly aided terrorist organisations, and hosted private dinners for crypto insiders at the White House.
Moreover, crypto was supposed to benefit from various macro and geopolitical risks, such as the ballooning of US and other advanced economies’ debt and deficits, the debasement of the dollar and other fiat currencies; new trade wars, and growing tensions between the US and Iran, China and many others. Indeed, the heightened risk environment helps to explain why gold rose by over 60% in 2025.
Read also: <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/time-for-nepal-to-enter-web3">Time for Nepal to enter Web3</a>, Vishad Raj Onta
But ‘digital gold’ fell by 6% in 2025. Bitcoin is down 35% from its October peak last month, and the $TRUMP and $MELANIA meme coins are down 95%.&nbsp;
Every time gold has spiked in response to trade or geopolitical ructions over the past year, bitcoin has fallen sharply. Far from being a hedge, it is a way to leverage risk, showing a strong correlation with other risky assets like speculative stocks.
Calling bitcoin or any other crypto vehicle a ‘currency’ has always been bogus. It is neither a unit of account, a scalable means of payment, nor a stable store of value. Even though El Salvador made bitcoin legal tender, it accounts for less than 5% of transactions for goods and services. Crypto is not even an asset, as it has no income stream, function, industrial or real-world use (unlike gold and silver).
Some 17 years after bitcoin’s launch, the one and only ‘killer app’ in crypto is the stablecoin: a digital version of old-fashioned fiat money, which the financial and banking industry already digitalised decades ago.&nbsp;
Yes, whether digital money and financial services should be on a blockchain or a traditional double-ledger platform remains a question. But 95% of blockchain monies and digital services are ‘blockchain’ in name only.&nbsp;
They are private rather than public, centralised rather than decentralised, permissioned rather than permissionless and validated by a small group of trusted authenticators (as in traditional digital finance and banking) rather than by decentralised agents in jurisdictions with no rule of law.
NO ANONYMITY
True decentralised finance will never reach scale. No serious government — not even the Trump administration — will ever allow full anonymity of monetary and financial transactions, because that would be a boon for criminals, terrorists, rogue states, non-state actors, human traffickers, assorted crooks and tax dodgers.
Moreover, because digital wallets and regulated exchanges must be subjected to standard anti-money laundering and know-your-customer (AML/KYC) rules, it is not even clear that transaction costs through permissioned and private ‘blockchains’ are any lower — especially now that traditional financial ledgers have improved with real-time settlement and faster clearing tools.&nbsp;
The future of money and payments will feature gradual evolution, not the revolution that crypto-grifters promised. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies’ latest plunge further underscores the highly volatile nature of this pseudo-asset class.
As for the GENIUS Act, having set the stage for another destructive experiment in free banking, like the one that ended in tears during the 19th century, it may well be remembered as the Reckless Idiot Act.&nbsp;
Under the law, stablecoins are not regulated as narrow banks (meaning deposits and payments are separated from riskier lending and investing), nor do they have access to the lender-of-last-resort or deposit-insurance benefits provided by central banks.
Thus, all it would take to incite a panic and trigger a bank run is for a few bad apples in pseudo-libertarian US states to mis-invest their holdings or place their deposits in weak institutions like Silicon Valley Bank.&nbsp;
As in the 19th century, the current US approach — thanks to Trump’s venality, cluelessness and to the crypto industry’s corrupt influence peddling — is a recipe for financial and economic instability.
The recent fight between real banks and the crypto industry over the CLARITY Act is another example of Trump not understanding monetary and financial basics. The issue is not about banks wanting to keep their near-monopoly on monetary transactions. In a fractional reserve banking system, banks are involved in both payments and credit creation via the maturity transformation of short-term deposits into longer-term loans and credit. That means they provide a very valuable semipublic good.
Obviously, short-term deposits do not pay interest because they are nearly equivalent to currency. Yet the crypto industry is pushing to allow interest payments for stablecoins — directly or indirectly via exchanges — which would undermine the foundations of the banking system that we all take for granted.&nbsp;
We must either radically change our financial system to separate payments from credit creation (via narrow banks for payments and new loanable funds from financial institutions for credit) or prohibit stablecoins from paying interest and disintermediating banks.
This is a political and financial stability issue and few are as serious or as sensitive. Jamie Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, is rightly raising the alarm about the changes the crypto industry wants, and Brian Armstrong of Coinbase could not be more wrong in nonchalantly dismissing such concerns.&nbsp;
If Trump has any advisers one hopes they can teach him how the banking system works before he allows his own personal interests to destroy its foundations. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent should be listening. &nbsp;© Project Syndicate
Nouriel Roubini is professor emeritus at the Stern School of Business, New York University. Also known as ‘Dr Doom’, he predicted the global financial crisis that began with the 2008 U.S. subprime mortgage meltdown&nbsp;

The coming crypto apocalypse

Rivers have been the lifelines of civilisations with their dynamic ecosystems providing vital services for human survival and ecological balance through the ages.&nbsp; But accelerating anthropocentric footprints are causing severe, and often irreversible, damage to river systems across the world, including those across High Asia, a region that sustains nearly a fourth of the global population downstream. An example is the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/here-now/how-the-bagmati-civilisation-is-becoming-uncivilised" target="_blank">Bagmati River</a> that courses through Kathmandu, crosses the Himalayan foothills to join the Ganga in India. A river that once shaped the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/when-it-comes-to-water-pollution,3196" target="_blank">Kathmandu Valley Civilisation </a>is now a polluted and biologically dead water body constricted by urban sprawl, choked by construction debris, chemical waste and untreated sewage.&nbsp; The loss of a sacred river is tragic enough, but its hazards related to health, life and livelihoods are not limited to the Valley, nor is its enormity fully gauged by the metrics of fatality, income loss, flood return periods, runoffs, embankment failure.&nbsp; It is a systemic collapse of ecological integrity, socio-economic stability and cultural heritage, affecting its downstream users as well. The death of Bagmati is a peril for a population size way bigger than circa 5 million residents of Kathmandu Valley. The degradation started in the 1980s and has accelerated. Why has not enough been done to save this iconic river that runs through Nepal’s capital?&nbsp; The Bagmati River Basin Improvement Project (BRBIP) was designed to make headway in restoring the river with a sewage treatment plant, dams for storing water to support dry-season runoff, recharge groundwater, creation of <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/page/resurrecting-bagmati-the-river" target="_blank">green biodiversity corridors</a> along the river bank to also serve as recreation areas, reduce the urban heat island effect, and also provide cultural continuity. The project also envisages collection of hydrological data for managing Bagmati multipurposewater systems and providing flood forecasts and early warnings aimed at protecting lives and property, among other things. Most importantly, the project takes the integrated water resource management approach, which, in principle, is a holistic and collaborative way of managing all elements of the water cycle to ensure water security, public and environmental health and amenity.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260329040336_9605240fa8c7d649ce49fbe43565130e3187e979338ccf959c4e9b8c581b7a4c.jpg" data-media-id="editor_3" data-image-id="20260329040336_9605240fa8c7d649ce49fbe43565130e3187e979338ccf959c4e9b8c581b7a4c" data-rendition-name="original" width="2126" height="1577" loading="lazy" alt="Bagmati NT"> </figure>  This should pave the way for managing a river as a connected ecological, social, and economic system by enabling coordination across agencies and disciplines, stimulating technological innovation and financial investment. The success of this approach depends on long-term political will and commitment that transcend political cycles, but also needs strong community and civil society in defining issues and proposing solutions, creating and sharing knowledge, taking independent action to inform practice, monitoring and evaluating policies, and participating in public decision-making. Civil society, especially, in making the <a href="https://archive.nepalitimes.com/page/encounter-with-bagmati-river" target="_blank">revival of the Bagmati River</a> a pressing governance issue. The Bagmati Action Plan 2009, a precursor to the BRBIP, was designed in response to lawsuits filed in 2000 and 2004 by an independent legal practitioner of Kathmandu against waste dumping in the river.&nbsp; It took him almost two decades of legal battle for Nepal’s Supreme Court to pass orders for mandatory septic tanks in all homes in Kathmandu Valley, relocation of squatters from Bagmati river banks to government-built houses, and embargo on dumping and burying garbage on the banks of the river and its tributaries. Despite court orders, however, actual results have been unsatisfactory. Restoration of Bagmati barely made it to any political debate or electoral manifesto this time. Treatment plants have not been operational for years, yet no one is held accountable. The population ignores waste segregation or single-use plastic rules to check littering.&nbsp; The current condition of the river therefore seems to have more to do with the lack of public awareness and behaviour change than the failure of various master plans. Why does the deep danger of a dead river fail to arouse widespread civil society concern, let alone action? The apathy is perhaps underlined by an innately anthropocentric understanding of the river as a mere resource to be exploited, rather than the backbone of existence.&nbsp; Such a paradigm shift is possible when river or river systems are understood to be necessary for &nbsp;a harmonious coexistence with human populations. The more pertinent question is not whether a dead river can be restored because there are many examples from around the world where that has been successfully achieved. It is whether we choose to restore our rivers for intergenerational equity. This would require a holistic perspective and political will to revive reverence for a river system so that its symbiotic relationship with human settlements can be restored. Roshni Gurung is Research Assistant, River Basins at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD).

A lifeline becomes liability

Next to my home in Bhainsepati stood a dead Uttis tree next to a public tap. A nearby water tank built a year earlier had killed its roots.
If the tree collapsed, people living nearby and those queuing up to fetch water at the tap would be hurt. With the storm season approaching, the risk was obvious. The tree could also fall on my own house, so I volunteered to find a way to remove this threat.
Little did I know how difficult it would be. A forest officer acquaintance told me there is a special procedure for cutting risky trees. I contacted the Lalitpur District Forest Office (DFO).&nbsp;
He said a technical report from a field officer was needed, and passed on her number. When I called, she asked for the location, photos, and a video. I send them all.
The ward office also suggested I use Lalitpur Metropolitan City’s mobile app, Lalitpur Alert, to report the problem. I uploaded photos, and submitted the complaint. This seemed to be very easy and efficient.
Indeed, the next day the municipality called me back and I explained the situation. They said they could not act without permission from the DFO. I asked why the app existed if the city could not act on such complaints. The officer said he did not know. My happiness was short-lived.
A couple of days later, the app notified me that my problem had been solved, and the complaint was removed. But the dead tree still stood there defiantly.&nbsp;
A week later, two forest technicians arrived on a scooter to inspect the tree. They looked up at the tree and asked if I had a measuring tape so they could measure its diameter.
“You are the technicians,” I told them. “You came to inspect the tree, and you came without a measuring tape?”
I rummaged at home and found a tape measure. They got the diameter and said they would prepare a technical report, but I would have to obtain a recommendation letter from the ward office and submit it to the DFO.
“This tree is dead,” I told them. “It is on public land. You have seen it with your own eyes. You know it's dangerous, so write a report and arrange for it to be cut. Why do I have to run from office to office to apply for recommendation letters?”
Their answer was simple, yet expected: “Those are the rules.”
They left, and I gave up. Two technicians spent half a day visiting the site. The metropolis runs a complaint system with a mobile app funded with public money. The ward office has staff to solve problems. Yet none of these institutions took the responsibility to remove a dangerous tree.
Everyone is busy citing rules and regulations and passing the buck. Weeks passed. Everyone reacted to the problem, but no one took any responsibility to resolving it.
Then, one bright December morning under a deep blue sky, a few neighbourhood boys were swinging their axes on the trunk. They had no proper equipment, no safety gear, and no professional experience.
I gave the boys some money and so did a neighbour. It took an hour or so for the tree to come crashing down safely. We had paid to have the tree cut illegally, and the matter ended there.
Multiple government offices, technicians, procedures, and mobile apps could not remove a dangerous tree, and we had to break the law to cut it. The tree is gone now, but the real problem remains: an inefficient bureaucracy.&nbsp;
It is perhaps symbolic that the tree is the election sign of the Nepali Congress, which was part of Nepal's governance and bureaucracy for decades and did not perform well in this month's election.&nbsp;
That is the bureaucracy that the new RSP government now has to get to work. But it will not be easy.
I posted on Facebook: ‘When people feel leaders have grown arrogant or corrupt with power, they change their minds and their votes. If those who replace them follow the same path, voters will again change their minds and votes.’
I continued: ‘The strength of democracy lies in this simple principle: the more citizens act as independent voters, the stronger democracy becomes. The more they behave as party loyalists, the weaker it grows. If we want a better system, we must demand deep reform of the state bureaucracy and hold institutions accountable.’&nbsp;
The first responses came from two senior government officials. They told me privately that they agreed by 200% but could not say so publicly.
It is quite normal for a Nepali to get the run around in government offices, it is almost a given to be asked for a bribe. As an environmental reporter and citizen, I have numerous such examples.
It is not just one sector that has been suffering. It is everywhere, and this is just an example of how complicated our bureaucracy is. As a 40 something person, I am old enough to remember the 1990 pro-democracy movement, &nbsp;the Maoist insurgency. Many promises made then by the politicians were broken.
We fought for rights, we fought for regime change. The country has changed political systems several times, from monarchy to multiparty democracy and finally a republic.
Yet one thing that remains largely untouched or reformed is our inefficient and corrupt bureaucracy. The new government, to be led by the youngest prime minister in our history must start this reform if it wants to deliver.&nbsp;
Otherwise, we may have to keep changing governments every few years, and still find ourselves unable to legally cut down even one dead tree.

A dead tree tests Nepal's bureaucracy

Samsung Nepal has opened pre-orders for the Galaxy A57 5G and A37 5G. Both phones run Samsung’s One UI 8.5, featuring AI capabilities like voice transcription, Circle to Search, and photo editing. They feature a 50MP triple-camera system, a Super AMOLED display, and six years of OS and security updates.

Galaxy A series

Know your Ministers

‘One early morning, we heard the ambassador’s wife cry out, “Ram, Ram, Ram!” A disaster has befallen Nepal!” She had heard on the radio that a fire had consumed Singha Durbar." This is not about the arson attack on 9 September 2025, but the one on 8 July, 1973. It started in the South Wing of the then single-largest building in all of Nepal. It took two days to bring the blaze under control, requiring the use of explosives to demolish one wing to protect the imposing western facade. As Bhekh Bahadur Thapa recalls in the English translation of his memoir A Life in Public Service: Nepal from Autocracy to Democracy, he was then on leave from the Nepal government serving with the IDRC in Ottawa.&nbsp; He had already served as Nepal’s Finance Secretary at age 25, went on to be Finance Minister and Governor of Nepal Rastra Bank. He was already younger than some of the GenZ ministers in Nepal’s present RSP government. Thapa, now 89, was at the launch of the book in February which was attended by former diplomats and bureaucrats. After speeches by panelists, there was a question from the audience about how Thapa had managed to be the diplomat he was, managing Nepal’s international relations on the world stage.&nbsp; Writer and journalist Akhilesh Upadhyay, who was moderating the panel, responded by going into the section of the book where we see Thapa as an ambassador to the US, playing tennis with White House officials, cultivating a network of contacts to project the identity and welfare of Nepal, and making it possible for a state visit by King Birendra to Ronald Reagan’s America. The book is full of anecdotes that suggest Thapa was a clever and strategic diplomat, always calm and unruffled, easily making friends in high places with his maturity and engaging sense of humour. Thapa’s memoir is heavy on details about Nepal’s administrative history during the years he was active in public service, serving as minister and ambassador under three kings: Mahendra, Birendra and Gyanendra, and alongside five prime ministers.&nbsp; Aside from an insider look on how certain treaties, development deals and research projects in Nepal came into fruition, Thapa goes into great detail about his personal and professional relationships with the kings, ministers, ambassadors, foreign leaders and politicians.&nbsp; As a reader, one is struck by the level of detail around the events that unfolded in Nepal over the years during Thapa’s tenure. Was Thapa recording a journal over the years of the events and the conversations that transpired, or were they committed to his phenomenal memory? Either way, the reader gets a glimpse of Nepal’s recent history from the early days of the Panchayat, through the People’s Movement and the democracy period, the Maoist insurgency, Royal Palace massacre of 2001, and Gyanendra’s coup of 2005.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/2026041204048_125dc8ae300a1e33124f394abe724d42727f83e067b0201d2008b58d60c459a4.jpg" data-media-id="editor_0" data-image-id="2026041204048_125dc8ae300a1e33124f394abe724d42727f83e067b0201d2008b58d60c459a4" data-rendition-name="original" width="1584" height="1000" loading="lazy" alt="How to win friends and influence nations NT"> </figure>  Not enough is said about the political parties of the time whose presence led to the way Nepal’s multiparty democracy came to be shaped. The book keeps its focus on the administration and the key figures around it, mostly those in the Panchayat era. Towards the second half of the book, we do start to hear about political parties, but not in great depth. Another figure whose presence in the book is conspicuously less prominent is that of his wife, Rita Thapa — the person who seems to have rescued him every time financial quandary or family care became a challenge. Yet, we do not see her as a full person. Perhaps because of the personal tragedies in his life, the children are also barely mentioned.&nbsp; The book is therefore less personal and more technical. Throughout, we learn about Thapa’s thinking as he navigated the world of diplomacy to win him the trust of those who mattered. There are tips here for a new generation of Nepali officials and diplomats about how much commitment and focus is needed to be good at one’s job and serve the national interest. This book adds to tomes that have been written on Nepal’s fragile relationship with India. ‘India has always wished for Nepal to remain dependent on it,’ writes Thapa, who served as Nepal’s ambassador to India and later in the Eminent Persons Group &nbsp;on Indo-Nepal relations that has been allowed to languish. The book has several insights into the Indo-Nepal trysts with diplomacy and agency.&nbsp; China’s role is also recorded, viewed through conversations during a visit to Beijing, but all that was before Nepal’s neighbour to the north emerged as a world economic and military power. The book also has such sudden instances of quirkiness and humour. For instance, we see a young Thapa in America explaining to a government official why he would like to return to Nepal instead of settling down in the US. “Because, Nepal is beautiful,” he said. The text is immaculate and does not read much like a translation, credit for which clearly goes to the team that put the edition together: translator Prawin Adhikari, &nbsp;Anagha Neelakanthan and Bhekh Thapa’s daughter, Manjushree. As Nepal enters a new era of governance and diplomacy, A Life in Public Service: Nepal from Autocracy to Democracy should be essential reading for students of political science, economics and foreign affairs who can gain a fresh perspective on the country’s trajectory.&nbsp; There are dozens of forgotten state secrets recorded in the book, but the reader must also remember this is a story told from one person’s perspective and there may be others.&nbsp; So, what really made Thapa the diplomat he was? I met him in 2004 at the Kantipur TV studio when he was serving as king Gyanendra’s foreign minister. He was there for a studio interview, and I was just done with my English newscast.&nbsp; He surprised me at the door: “Pratibha! I’ve been reading your articles in The Kathmandu Post. You must keep writing.” I thanked him, glad to have been noticed for my work by a stranger. That was perhaps one of the things that set Thapa apart — he excelled at staying close to those in power, while also noticing those who were not.  <figure> <img src="https://publisher-publish.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/pb-nepalitimes/swp/asv65r/media/20260412040412_213e706136a038ec9f5e2b8c6d7f7c1e9ceed9479e22fe2884872ad7bd20955f.jpg" data-media-id="editor_1" data-image-id="20260412040412_213e706136a038ec9f5e2b8c6d7f7c1e9ceed9479e22fe2884872ad7bd20955f" data-rendition-name="original" width="1136" height="702" loading="lazy" alt="Book details"> </figure>

How to win friends and influence nations

Prime Minister Balendra Shah on Wednesday broke tradition and met with 17 foreign envoys collectively, a move that was a notable departure from how his predecessors operated.&nbsp;
Shah had already set himself apart by talking less, listening more, and delegating to trusted friends. But by meeting all ambassadors at one go in the presence of the Foreign Ministry, he signalled a paradigm shift in how he wants Nepal to be seen: no longer just balancing India and China, but as a country confident about its <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/opinion/guest-editorial/tripolar-contestation-over-nepal">strategic importance and place in the world</a>.
In just two weeks, the <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/rsp-dos-and-don-ts">RSP has sprung into action </a>on multiple fronts to implement its ambitious 100-point, 100-days action plan. It has taken short-term measures to mitigate the impact of the Gulf war, as well as medium- and long- term measures to streamline the bureaucracy. A few high-profile figures have been made examples of to drive the message home.
Earlier this week, the government recalled six politically appointed ambassadors, the most notable being long-serving Shankar Sharma from New Delhi. The Kathmandu District Court issued arrest warrants against former prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and his former foreign minister wife Arzu Rana on charges of money laundering and corruption.
Each ministry has been trying to clean up the accumulated rot from the past three decades: regulatory overhaul of microfinance, education, health and service delivery.&nbsp;
These actions widely disseminated campaign-style on YouTube and TikTok have made most Nepalis hopeful that the party they installed in power means business.
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BACKLASH
But such attempts to overhaul a long-entrenched political culture were bound to face backlash. In their impatience and enthusiasm to get things done, some of Prime Minister Shah’s ministers have over-reached.
It was common knowledge that government-paid advertising in the mainstream press was kickback-driven, but the PMO’s directive that official notices be published or broadcast only on state-run media has been denounced — especially as the media industry struggles to stay afloat.
More serious are some recent appointments by ministers of relatives and figures closely associated with the RSP to key positions. This has rankled because this party built its political plank on ending nepotism and graft.&nbsp;
News that Home Minister Sudan Gurung allegedly had not paid rent on leased land, which illegally encroached on the lake in Pokhara did not help. &nbsp;
Prime Minister Shah himself has come under scrutiny for appointing a kitchen cabinet full of male buddies from his time as Kathmandu mayor. To douse criticism he brought in as adviser investigative journalist Deepa Dahal, who has exposed corruption in high places of the previous coalitions.&nbsp;
Shah’s appointment of another political adviser Asim Shah to the head Constitution Amendment Task Force, is also seen as problematic. He is a filmmaker and former lawmaker, but does not have a background in constitutional law.&nbsp;
Even more controversial is the Cabinet’s decision to appoint RSP Chair Rabi Lamichhane’s legal counsel, Narayan Kandel, as Attorney General. Kandel used to be a UK permanent resident, and does not have as much experience practicing law in Nepal.&nbsp;
Kandel’s appointment drew flak and raised eyebrows, and with the pending legal cases against Lamichhane this appointment represents a flagrant conflict of interest.
Health Minister Nisha Mehta was also accused of favouritism after reappointing Junu Shrestha, wife of Labour Minister Dipak Kumar Shah, as member of the Health Insurance Board which had earlier suspended her. The Labour Minister’s rambling rant at the Board’s meeting on Tuesday has not helped the RSP’s image.&nbsp;
(UPDATE: On Thursday, Prime Minister Shah sacked the Labour Minister after the RSP found him in breach of the party's code of conduct and discipline. He served 14 days in the Cabinet, one of the shortest tenures for a minister in Nepal )
It is hard to know what <a href="https://nepalitimes.com/news/ball-in-balen-s-court">Balendra Shah is thinking</a>, and how Rabi Lamichhane is going to justify some of these moves. After all, making politics, governance, and bureaucracy a meritocracy has been the core tenet of the RSP, and it risks alienating its mainly youth base if these missteps persist.
But at least for now, most RSP supporters seem to be giving the party the benefit of doubt.